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Abstract  
Traditionally, African states have played an active and relevant role in the 
formulation and development of international investment law. Generally, the 
contribution of African states is demonstrated through the active participation of 
African states in deliberations of the Non-Aligned Movement, the role of African 
states in the creation of specialised institutions such as UNCTAD and the 
strategic use of numerical strength by African states to sponsor numerous United 
Nations Resolutions. During the epitome of Africa’s active participation, African 
states aggressively resisted the internationalisation of foreign investment rules. 
However, the practice of African states appears to have changed through the 
conclusion of BITs containing far-reaching treaty provisions. 
On the basis of the foregoing, the thesis reviews the types of BITs concluded by 
African states with the objective of establishing the investment treaty practice 
of African states. In so doing, the thesis examines whether African treaty 
practice conforms or differs from general investment law. While reviewing the 
treaty practice of African states the thesis also explores the extent to which the 
emerging investment treaty practice interferes or restrains legitimate policy 
making of African states. This thus raises awareness to (i) African specific 
concerns with respect to the international law of foreign investment (ii) the 
controversy entrenched in substantive treaty standards (iii) the suitability of 
treaties concluded by African states and (iv) the possibility of drafting more 
acceptable rules that balance the interests of African states vis-à-vis interests of 
foreign investors. 
The thesis argues that there has been a paradigm shift in the investment treaty 
practice of African states. Specifically, the present treaty practice of African 
states suggests that African states have retreated from previously held positions 
augmenting for state sovereignty to a more peculiar position of acquiescence. 
Broadly, the current state of African investment treaty practice is all surprising 
when contrasted with the fierce resistance African states mounted against the 
internationalisation of foreign investment rules in the last century. The thesis 
demonstrated the extent to which African treaty provisions restrain legitimate 
policy making and suggests how African states can contribute to the further 
development of international investment law.      
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Part One Introductory Note: Background to the Study   
There are few areas in international law that generate as much controversy as 
the law regulating foreign investment.1 For this body of law controversy is not a 
new phenomenon, it can be traced to as far back as nineteenth century but most 
profoundly during the last century when formerly colonised states acquired 
independence.2 Specifically, during this period, decolonised states from Africa, 
Asia and Latin America combined efforts along similar ideological lines and 
started questioning the content of international rules regulating foreign 
investment. With the reassurance of numerical strength from decolonised 
African states, the third world movement successfully sponsored numerous 
resolutions and declarations asserting permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources and reinvigorated demands for the establishment of a new economic 
world order favourable to the economic interests of developing countries.3 
Principally, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter, developing countries 
under the third world solidarity advocated not only for changes to the existing 
economic order but also for the creation of new international rules favourable to 
the social, political and economic interests of third world countries. 
Undoubtedly, the combined efforts from third world countries received stiff 
resistance from developed countries and indeed the status of these declarations 
within international law remains controversial. Substantively, the ideological 
differences between colonisers and formerly colonised states centred on the 
composite of rules regulating foreign property which include inter alia, the 
minimum standard of treatment, settlement of disputes, the standard of 
compensation and national treatment.4 Throughout this period and over the 
                                                 
1 See for instance a recent public statement on the international investment regime 
supported by numerous academics with expertise relating to international law, investment 
law, arbitration and regulation <http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public_statement>accessed 
20 May 2012. See also M Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (3rd edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2010) 1.For a conceptual analysis of the successful integration of 
investment law within the general public international law discourse see Christian J Tams, 
‘Sources of International Investment Law’ in Tarcisio Gazzini and Eric De Brabandere (eds), 
International Investment law: Sources of Rights and Obligations (forthcoming, Brill 2012). 
2 M Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (3rd edn, Cambridge University 
Press 2010) 1. 
3 See generally M Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (2nd edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2004) 1-4. The numerous United Nations resolutions and 
declarations were sponsored by Third World Countries from Africa, Asia, and Latin America. 
4 For detailed discussions see Chapter 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
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years, there has been unequivocal consensus among third world countries to 
reject all multilateral investment treaties bearing imprints of developed 
countries. The scale of hostilities towards the internationalisation of foreign 
investment rules has over the years made consensus between developed and 
developing countries difficult at the global level.  
Indeed, the far-reaching antagonism against foreign investment rules culminated 
into the signing of the 1959 Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) between Germany 
and Pakistan. The successful conclusion of the Germany-Pakistan BIT inspired 
other developed countries interested in foreign investment undertakings to 
pursue similar treaties and over the years investment treaty protection has 
become a truly global phenomenon.5 Presently, over two thousand eight hundred 
BITs have been signed creating a new global system of foreign investment 
protection dedicated with international institutions, common procedural and 
substantive principles, specialized lawyers and arbitrators, dedicated activists 
and an emerging body of jurisprudence.6 The rapid escalation of BITs has been 
unprecedented and apart from a few countries such as Brazil, Botswana, 
Mozambique, Ireland and Myanmar virtually all countries have concluded BITs. 
Typically BITs are concluded mainly between developed and developing 
countries. 
For instance out of the existing BITs, African states have concluded close to 767 
BITs of which 622 have been concluded between an African state and a 
developed country while 145 have been concluded between African state 
parties.7 Remarkably of the 622 BITs concluded between an African state and a 
developed country 400 are in force while out of the 145 intra-African BITs 29 are 
in force.8 This suggests that BITs concluded between African states and 
developed countries rapidly come into force compared to intra-African treaties. 
                                                 
5
 Stephan W Schill, ‘International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law-An 
Introduction’ in Stephan W Schill (ed), International Investment Law and Comparative Public 
Law (OUP 2010) 5. 
6 Stephen D Krasner, ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables’ (1982) 36 Int’L Org 185, 186; R Doak Bishop, James Crawford and William Michael 
Reisman, Foreign Investment Disputes: Cases, Materials and Commentary (Kluwer Law 
International 2005) 9-17. 
7 Karel Daele, ‘Investment Disputes across Africa: Lessons to Be Learned From’ (2012) 2 
<http://www.africanlaw.org/images/papers/daelepaper.pdf>accessed 20 May 2012. 
8 Ibid. 
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There are number of important demographic differences throughout Africa; out 
of the 767 African BITs, the North African region has concluded 320 BITs, while 
the West African region has concluded 205 BITs, East African region has 
concluded 178 BITs and the Southern Africa region has concluded 124 BITs.9 
Comparatively within Africa, the majority of BITs have been concluded between 
developed states and Sub-Saharan African countries and cumulatively Sub-
Saharan African have entered into 507 BITs of all existing African BITs. On the 
basis of the rapid growth of BITs, it would not be exaggerating to state that 
bilateralism rather than multilateralism has become the norm through which 
international investment law progresses. Whether bilateralism remains the 
prevailing norm is unpredictable but with countries apprehensive about 
concluding a multilateral investment treaty the progressive development of the 
area will be shaped and influenced through the interpretation of treatment 
standards contained in BITs. 
In theory BITs aim at attracting foreign investments through offering foreign 
investors broad substantive treaty protection and the flexibility to directly 
resolve investment claims through international arbitration usually under the 
framework of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID).10 As the discussion in Chapter 5 elucidates, the flexibility offered to 
foreign investors to directly bring investment claims against sovereign states 
cannot be taken lightly considering the problems foreign investors encountered 
through espousing claims to home states during the pre-BIT era. Indeed, 
procedural rights contained in investment treaties offering foreign investors the 
possibility of direct investor-state arbitration have been appropriately described 
as the ‘‘ultimate investor protection’’.11 Arbitration under the ICSID framework 
is the most preferred forum for settling investment claims between foreign 
investors and sovereign states and presently 158 states are signatory to the ICSID 
Convention.12 On the African continent alone, with the exception of South 
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
10 Jarrod Wong, ‘Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties: Of Breaches of Contract, 
Treaty Violations, and the Divide between Developing and Developed Countries in Foreign 
Investment Disputes’ (2006)14 Geo Mason L. Rev 135, 135. 
11 See detailed discussion in Chapter 5. 
12 ICSID, List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention (as of April 18, 
2012)<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=Sh
owDocument&language=English>accessed 20 May 2012. 
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Africa, Libya, Eretria, Djibouti, Guinea and Angola, all African states are 
signatory to the ICSID Convention and Africa represents a cumulative number of 
48 African states. More broadly and this will be dealt with in Chapter 5, the 
rationale behind Africa’s rapid acceptable of the ICSID Convention offers insight 
into the continued popularity of BITs in African countries. 
At a theoretical level, states envision that by concluding BITs offering 
substantive treaty rights including the right to direct investor-state arbitration 
reluctant foreign investors will be persuaded to transfer foreign capital that 
would otherwise not have been transferred had the investor not been assured of 
favourable treaty protection. However, over the last decade, the modern 
investment regime as is loosely articulated in the corpus of BITs is witnessing 
increased scrutiny and growing level of discontent.13 Particularly, as subsequent 
parts of this thesis will demonstrate, discontent with the investment regime 
relates to concerns that include inter alia, ambiguity in treaty language, 
expansive interpretation by arbitral tribunals and the need for a more inclusive 
regime that balances the interests of foreign investors’ vis-à-vis interests of 
sovereign states. It is this growing level of frustration that rekindles ideological 
differences similar to the old rivalry between aggressive third world countries 
and developed states expressed through the united solidarity of third world 
countries advocating for the adoption of numerous contentious United Nations 
Declarations and Resolutions. 
Most recently, discontent with the investment regime has been expressed not 
just in the form of reactions and pronouncements but through the astonishing 
                                                 
13 For a thorough critique see generally Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and 
Public Law (OUP 2007). Specifically in Chapter seven Van Harten refers to ICSID tribunals as 
the ‘‘businessman’s court’’ and argues that although investment treaty arbitration is akin to 
the public law system of adjudication when constituted at the international level the system 
lacks four criteria of public law adjudication i.e. accountability, openness, coherence, and 
independence. With respect to accountability, Van Harten points out that the present system 
faces the problem of arbitrators basically interpreting public law issues without the possibility 
of judicial review for errors of law.  On openness Van Harten explains that the system does 
not satisfy the standard of openness because the arbitral system allows essential information 
about the process to be withheld from public scrutiny. In terms of coherence, Van Harten 
notes that the lack of an appellate body makes it virtually impossible to harmonise and unify 
the jurisprudence into a predictable system of state liability. Lastly, in terms of 
independence, arbitrators are financially dependent on governments and prospective 
claimants who appoint them on a case by case basis which simultaneously makes it difficult 
for them to function impartially. In essence, because arbitrators lack security of tenure this 
means that arbitrators who want to win future appointments have an interest in safeguarding 
their reputation with key constituencies. 
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withdraw of Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela from the ICSID arbitral system 
alleging that investment provisions are notoriously interpreted to favour 
multinational corporations at the detriment of sovereign states.14  Moreover, it 
should also be stressed that dissatisfaction with the investment regime is not 
peculiar to Latin American countries but is steadily extending to African 
countries and most recently South Africa initiated a detailed review of all its 
investment treaties.15 Specifically, in justifying the need for reviewing 
investment treaties, the South African government fervently argues that BITs are 
premised on old models focused on the interests of investors from developed 
countries and during treaty negotiations of existing BITs major issues of concern 
for developing countries are not addressed.16 Similarly, South Africa asserts that 
‘‘BITs extend far into developing countries policy space, imposing damaging 
binding investment rules with far-reaching consequences for sustainable 
development’’.17 
The attacks levelled against the content of BITs by the South African government 
are not without merit considering that recent commentary questions the efficacy 
of BITs as instruments of attracting foreign direct investment to developing 
countries.18 More insightful is the 2003 World Bank’s Report on Global Economic 
Prospects and Developing Countries which concluded that despite developing 
countries being signatory to BITs with strong protections such provisions have not 
resulted into increased investment flows to developing countries.19 Despite the 
marginal contribution of BITs, the 2011 data shows that 76% of cases registered 
under the ICSID framework have invoked BITs as the basis of consent to establish 
                                                 
14 Luck Eric Peterson, ‘Investment Treaty News’ May 27, 2007 
<www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/itn_may27_2007.pdf>accessed 20 May 2012. 
15 Official Gazette of the Republic of South Africa, General Notice 961 of 2009. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 For a thorough discussion on the spectrum of varying opinions see Karl P Sauvant and Lisa E 
Sachs (eds), The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties and Investment Flows (OUP 2009). Karl Sauvant and Lisa 
Sachs note that the analysis suggests difficulty in firmly establishing the contribution of BITs 
in attracting FDI. 
19 The World Bank, Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries (2003) xvii 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGEP/Resources/3353151257200391829/gep2003comp
lete.pdf> accessed 20 May 2012. 
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ICSID jurisdiction.20 The vast majority of developing countries have been 
subjected to ICSID proceedings for breach of BIT treaty standards-for example 
African states have been involved in 84 ICSID proceedings which represents close 
to 22% of all ICSID proceedings.21 
Broadly, the prevailing controversy suggests that the investment regime is at a 
tipping point and witnessing not only hostile response but also the rhetoric 
rekindles the previous rivalry that existed between industrialised and formerly 
colonised states during the last century. Whether the pace of hostilities towards 
international investment rules intensifies and spreads to other African countries 
remains unpredictable. However, as the discussion in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 of 
this thesis will demonstrate after reviewing the interpretation accorded to 
treaty standards, the possibility of African states revolting against the status quo 
is undoubtedly a question of time. In the interim, what remains remarkably clear 
is that without thorough reorientation of BITs towards more inclusiveness of 
legitimate public policy concerns of African states, it is inevitable that rules 
regulating foreign investors will pivot to a repetition of sovereign centred 
arguments. Moreover, given that for decades African states contributed to 
shaping rules of international investment law as witnessed during debates of the 
New International Economic Order (NIEO), the furtherance of rules regulating 
foreign investors will without doubt be underpinned and influenced by the 
investment treaty practice of African states.  
Against this backdrop, the thesis undertakes a detailed analysis of BITs 
concluded by African states with the objective of establishing the investment 
treaty practice of African states. In so doing, the thesis examines whether 
African treaty practice conforms or differs from general investment law. While 
reviewing the treaty practice of African states the thesis also explores the 
extent to which the emerging investment treaty practice interferes or restrains 
legitimate policy making of African states. This thus raises awareness to (i) 
African specific concerns with respect to the international law of foreign 
                                                 
20 Presently ICSID has registered 369 cases under the ICSID Convention and Additional Facility 
Rules. For detailed statistics see ICSID, The ICSID Case Load-Statistics Issue 2012-1 (ICSID 
Secretariat 2012). 
21 Karel Daele, ‘Investment Disputes across Africa: Lessons to Be Learned From’ (2012) 6 
<http://www.africanlaw.org/images/papers/daelepaper.pdf>accessed 20 May 2012. 
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investment (ii) the controversy entrenched in substantive treaty standards, (iii) 
the suitability of treaties concluded by African states and (iv) the possibility of 
drafting more acceptable rules that balance the interests of African states vis-à-
vis interests of foreign investors. 
Rationale for the Study  
While there is considerable literature on the alleged systemic bias of 
international investment treaties, this thesis goes beyond the universal narrative 
and captures concerns relevant to African countries that are broadly missing 
from the general discourse of international investment law. Specifically, 
examining international investment law from a regional African perspective 
offers insight into how investment law is evolving. In addition, while treaty 
practices from other regions/countries have been studied, there is no 
comprehensive study exploring Africa investment treaty practice despite the 
traditional contribution of African states towards shaping rules governing foreign 
investment. Evidently, over the last few years, scholarly commentary has mainly 
focused on capital exporting states, China, OECD countries, NAFTA member 
countries, Latin American countries and some studies examine developing 
countries more generically.22 The focus on more advanced economies is for 
obvious reasons, international investment law is still evolving and it takes time 
for exhaustive regional perspectives to be studied. 
Even more, although BITs are country specific the existing literature generally 
treats them as one regime. It is thus important to review BITs from an African 
perspective and explore whether BITs concluded by African states contain any 
nuances different from other existing BITs. Particularly, the over generalisation 
of BITs as one regime misses important differences such as whether a country 
enters into BITs and with whom, how it approaches the key substantive 
standards, what influences a country or region to conclude BITs, the extent to 
which BITs restrain a country’s legitimate policy making, and how the country 
approaches dispute settlement. It is the overall importance of critically 
reviewing the peculiar difference from different countries and regions that 
                                                 
22 For example see Norah Gallagher and Wenhua Shan, Chinese Investment Treaties Policies 
and Practice (OUP 2009). The authors explore Chinese perspectives on foreign investment 
regulation and provide a blueprint for future Chinese investment treaties. 
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necessitate a regional perspective centred on the investment treaty practice of 
African states. In essence, through examining African treaty practice the thesis 
offers insight into the formulation of investment law at a regional level.  
Similarly considering that there is detailed literature on other regions and 
countries, it is only after examining Africa treaty practice that we can fully 
claim to have a holistic view of international investment law. In addition, given 
that the restrictive nature of BITs towards policy space of sovereign states varies 
depending on country or region, there is need to review the treatment standards 
contained in African BITs to fully be informed of the extent to which the 
evolving jurisprudence restrains the legitimate policy making of African states. 
Also, although there is growing perception that international investment law as 
articulated in BITs and the evolving jurisprudence restrains legitimate policy 
making the literature does not capture Africa specific concerns and does not 
show the extent to which African states are affected by the prevailing practice.  
It would thus not be surprising that considering the geopolitical and economic 
differences between countries the overall policy restrictions imposed by BITs 
apply differently depending on the country or region. For instance, with respect 
to African BITs, subsequent chapters after analysing the evolving jurisprudence 
and the wording of African treaty standards argue that it is doubtful African 
states during the negotiations of many of the existing BITs anticipated the 
consequences of offering generous treaty standards. Indeed, a number of African 
states on the basis of expansive treaty standards have been sued by foreign 
investors and forced to defend regulatory measures even when such policies are 
within the public interest and pursued in accordance with national Constitutions 
and within the states regulatory competence. 
For instance in the case of Piero Foresti v Republic of South Africa the claimants 
alleged that the South Africa Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 
(MPRDA) and the Mining Charter was in breach of the prohibition of 
expropriation and the obligation of fair and equitable treatment as articulated in 
the South Africa-Italy BIT and South Africa-Luxemburg BIT. The claimant 
postulated that the Mining Charter through requiring mining companies to 
transfer 26% ownership of mining assets to historically disadvantaged South 
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Africans was tantamount to indirect expropriation and also breached the 
obligation of fair and equitable treatment that prohibits discrimination.23 
Furthermore, the claimants argued that operation of the Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) equity divestiture requirement that required foreign 
investors to sell 26% of their shares to historically disadvantaged South African 
companies amounted to expropriation.24 In response, the Respondent pointed 
out that the MRPDA and the Mining Charter were promulgated for the purpose of 
ensuring inter alia (i) simplifying and modernizing an overly complex legal 
system; (ii) ameliorating the disenfranchisement of HDSAs and other negative 
social effects caused by apartheid in general and the 1991 Mineral Rights Act in 
particular; (iii) reducing the economically harmful concentration of mineral 
rights and promoting the optimal exploitation of mineral resources; and (iv) 
protecting the environment and the communities living in the vicinity of mining 
operations.25 
According to the Respondent even if one was to admit that the Mining Charter 
treated foreign investors differently from South African investors the differences 
in treatment would be justifiable.26 In essence, the Respondent postulated that 
the differences in treatment fall squarely within the government’s margin of 
appreciation for determining which measures are reasonable and justifiable in 
advancing critical public interests.27 Similarly, the Respondent argued that there 
can be no indirect expropriation when the government action as the one taken in 
this case is rational and a proportional means of pursuing legitimate public 
regulatory purposes.28 Although the case was eventually discontinued at the 
request of the claimant the case does indeed demonstrate the extent to which 
treaty standards included in African BITs have serious consequences for 
legitimate public policy making even when such regulatory measures are 
implemented for a public interest. 
                                                 
23 Piero Foresti v Republic of South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/07/1, 4 August 2010, para 
56. 
24 Ibid para 64. 
25 Ibid para 69. 
26
 Ibid para 72. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid para 75. 
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More broadly, through reviewing the treaty practice of African states this study 
generally serves as an example of African practice in international law. 
Specifically as the next chapter will demonstrate, it is only when we deconstruct 
Africa’s traditional contribution to the development of international law as a 
whole that we can fully appreciate the need for African states to reassert 
themselves and the importance of a regional perspective. The African continent 
has traditionally played an active role in shaping third world perspectives on 
virtually all branches of international law and this is evidently demonstrated in 
the numerous declarations and resolutions decolonised African states supported.  
However, with respect to the evolving international investment regime, Africa’s 
traditional role of backing third world perspectives on international law appears 
to have disintegrated with the pursuit of BITs. Indeed, considering the treatment 
standards contained in African BITs the rhetoric as expressed in various demands 
such as the NIEO contradict most of the positions African states previously 
espoused. More broadly, considering the overarching ideological shift in African 
investment treaty practice, it would be insightful to explore whether African 
states have taken similar ideological shifts in other areas of international law. 
Unfortunately such a discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it is 
hoped that this study by more generally serving as an example of African 
practice in international will inspire further research into the extent to which 
African states are contributing to the development of other spheres of 
international law. For instance, it would be insightful given Africa’s active role 
in the formulation of the law of the sea to examine whether African states are 
still relevant players in the further development of this important area of 
international law.29 
This thesis aims at filling the existing gap in the literature by systematically 
examining the investment treaty practice of African states and also explores how 
African states fit within the broad investment treaty practice and the likely 
policy implications of the emerging arbitral jurisprudence on African states. 
Through undertaking a detailed study, the thesis underscores the contribution of 
                                                 
29 For detailed discussion of Africa’s traditional contribution to the development of the 
international law of the sea see NS Rembe, Africa and the International Law of the Sea 
(Sijthoff & Noordhoff Publishers 1980). 
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African states towards the development of international investment law and also 
highlights the silent features shaping the development of international 
investment law on the African continent. This is done through reviewing African 
practices prior to the colonial era, during the colonial period, the period 
immediately after colonialism and modern Africa investment treaty practice. It 
is appropriate to note that the evolution and trend of Africa investment treaty 
practice is of critical importance to the further development of international 
investment law in part because of the numerical strength of the African 
continent but also African states have traditionally played an active role in the 
development of international investment law.  
Specifically, as will be discussed in the next chapter and subsequent parts of the 
thesis, there are considerable changes taking place in the attitude of African 
states towards foreign investment rules from antagonism as witnessed during the 
post-colonial era-a period when decolonised African countries used numerical 
dominance to assert permanent sovereignty over natural resources and the 
modern investment phase represented through the conclusion of BITs. Manifestly 
therefore, reviewing international investment law from an African perspective is 
important because from a historical outlook African states have been at the 
forefront in shaping rules regulating foreign investors and any future 
development will undoubtedly be influenced or shaped by the contribution of 
African states. Lastly, the thesis is timely and comes at a time when foreign 
investment regulation is experiencing unparalleled attacks from different 
quarters and with a regional approach focused on Africa, the thesis underscores 
Africa’s nuances on the evolving investment treaty practice. 
Research Methodology and Scope of the Thesis  
The scope of this thesis focuses on the investment treaty practice of African 
states and particularly the treaty practice of Sub-Saharan African countries. 
However, it is practically difficult to thoroughly examine each and every treaty 
concluded by the forty eight Sub-Saharan African states. As a result, from the 
forty eight Sub-Saharan African countries, the thesis selected a sample of 
countries that are descriptive and illustrative of the general investment treaty 
practice of Sub-Saharan African countries. Accordingly, the thesis selected a 
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sample of Sub-Saharan African countries that can be considered indicative of the 
investment treaty practice of African states based on the following criteria, (a) 
the first criteria was twofold, (i) a reforming Sub-Saharan African economy 
according to the World Bank Doing Business Report30 and (ii) the reforming Sub-
Saharan state should have the most progressive investment treaty. On the basis 
of this criterion, Rwanda was selected because according to the World Bank 
Doing Business Report, it is ranked the fastest growing economy within Sub-
Saharan Africa31 and at the same time Rwanda recently concluded an investment 
treaty with the United States. (b) The second criteria involved selecting 
countries within the East African Community that have concluded not only BITs 
but have also experienced litigation under the ICSID arbitral rules. On the basis 
of this criterion, Burundi, Tanzania and Kenya were selected. (c) The last 
criteria involved selecting four countries from West and Central Africa that have 
not only entered into BITs but have also faced litigation under the ICSID arbitral 
rules. Under this criterion the following four countries qualified, Burundi, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana and Cameroon.  
The thesis deliberately excluded Southern African countries because apart from 
South Africa, the remaining countries within this region have social, political and 
economic conditions similar to the selected countries. However, it should be 
stressed that although the main thrust of the thesis focuses on seven African 
states as illustrative of African investment treaty practice where necessary the 
thesis makes reference to other African countries. However, where such 
reference is made, this only serves to reinforce the investment treaty practice 
of African states to provide an even broader perspective of African practice. 
                                                 
30 The Doing Business Report is an annual report of the World Bank Group that ‘provides 
objective measures of business regulations and their enforcement across 183 economies and 
selected cities at the sub-national and regional level. The Doing Business Project, launched in 
2002, looks at domestic small and medium-size companies and measures the regulations 
applying to them through their life cycle. By Gathering and analysing comprehensive 
quantitative data to compare business regulations environments across economies and over 
time, Doing Business encourages countries to compete towards more efficient regulations; 
and serves as a resource for academics, journalists, private sector researchers and other 
interested in the business climate of each country’. < http://www.doingbusiness.org/about-
us> accessed 20 May 2012. 
31 The 2010 World Bank Doing Business Report ranked Rwanda the world’s top reformer in 
improving the overall business environment. Even more, 2011 World Bank Doing Business 
Report stressed that Rwanda was a constant reformer in Sub-Saharan Africa. For full details 
see 2011 World Bank Doing Business Report, 
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/FPDKM/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual-
Reports/English/DB11-FullReport.pdf> accessed 20 May 2012. 
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Lastly, in terms of literature, the thesis relies heavily on BITs concluded by the 
selected African states, national legislation of the selected states, regional 
investment treaties, and investment cases concluded through international 
arbitration as well as international law theory and practices.  
Structural Outline  
The thesis is made up of six chapters divided into two broad but interrelated 
parts, the first part deals with the social and political realities shaping the 
development of foreign investment law in Africa and by extension explores the 
evolution of modern investment law. Briefly, the chapter examines how African 
states contributed to the formulation of investment rules as well as the silent 
features underpinning the development of these rules. The chapter proceeds by 
reviewing the contribution of African states to the period prior to the colonial 
era and shows that even prior to the colonial period the contribution of African 
states was evident. In essence, the chapter notes that the colonial period not 
only prohibited African states from contributing to the evolving customary law 
during this period but also more fundamentally colonialism interrupted with 
Africa’s overall contribution to international rule making.  
The chapter then discusses the contribution of African states during the colonial 
period and notes that African states lacked the sovereignty to make any 
meaningful contribution. After discussing the colonial period, the chapter 
reviews the practice of African states during the post-colonial period and shows 
that decolonised African states actively contributed to the development of 
international rule making. The chapter highlights Africa’s specific input and the 
growing influence Africa exerted on the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and within 
the United Nations General Assembly. Lastly the chapter examines modern 
treaty practice and demonstrates remarkable ideological differences between 
the practice of African states during the last century and the subsequent 
practice of African states in the BIT era. This chapter is of critical importance 
because the chapter not only demonstrates Africa’s traditional contribution to 
international investment law but also the treaty standards included in African 
BITs reinforces the discussion in chapters 2-6.   
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After providing detailed analysis showing Africa’s traditional contribution and 
the general evolution of investment law, the second part of the thesis focuses on 
key substantive standards included in African BITs. As will readily be apparent, 
the passive acceptance of BIT treaty standards by African states is surprising 
considering Africa’s resistance to foreign investment rules in the last century. 
Given the ideological change in African practice, the second part of the thesis 
thoroughly examines whether treaty standards included in African BITs conform 
or differ from general investment treaty standards. In so doing, the second part 
demonstrates how the inclusion of such provisions affects the legitimate policy 
making space of African states. The second part of the thesis is comprised of five 
different but interconnected chapters. 
The thesis selects and examines four of the most contentious treaty standards 
articulated in African BITs, i.e. expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, 
dispute settlement and the scope and definition clause. The rationale for 
selecting these standards is based on the fact that policy making space of 
African states will seriously be constrained depending on the interpretation 
arbitral tribunals’ accord to these four treaty standards. In addition, foreign 
investors are more accustomed to submit investment treaty claims based on 
these four treaty standards. On the basis of this justification, chapter 2 of the 
thesis starts by examining the scope and definition clauses articulated in African 
BITs and discusses the critical issues associated with the scope and definition 
clauses. In line with the themes of the thesis, the chapter also underscores the 
practical policy implications resulting from the scope and definition clauses of 
African BITs. 
Chapter 3 and 4 examine the standard of expropriation and the obligation of fair 
and equitable treatment. Chapters 3 and 4 form an integral part of the thesis 
not only because the two standards have the potential to disproportionately 
balance the relationship between states and foreign investors but also because 
African states are evidently the most hard-pressed with the evolving arbitral 
practice. Chapter 3 specifically focuses on issues such as the scope of 
expropriation, lawful expropriation, the standard of compensation and the likely 
policy implication of the emerging expropriation jurisprudence on legitimate 
policy making in African states. Chapter 4 examines the obligation of fair and 
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equitable treatment and argues that African countries should be more concerned 
with this standard because of the expansive nature of the standard coupled with 
the fact that the standard has the potential of being broadly construed to 
capture other treaty violations. In line with the theme of the thesis, chapter 4 
examines the scope, definition and meaning of fair and equitable treatment as 
spelled out in African BITs and the likely implication modern arbitral 
jurisprudence has to the understanding of fair and equitable treatment within 
African investment treaty practice. Chapter 5 examines African dispute 
settlement clauses and situates not only the current treaty practice of African 
states but also policy implications resulting from the jurisprudence of arbitral 
tribunals. Lastly but by no means least, chapter 6 concludes the thesis by 
underscoring the findings from African treaty practice and suggests policy 
options that African states should pursue.  
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Chapter 1 
The Protection of Foreign Investment: Historical Evolution 
of Africa Investment Law 
Introduction 
This chapter aims at exploring the formulation of investment rules on the African 
continent and the silent features underpinning the evolution of these rules. 
Through this, the chapter examines the geo-political factors shaping the 
development of Africa investment law and situates the contribution of African 
states towards the development of general international investment law. 
Undoubtedly, at the onset, it is worth mentioning that this chapter is not by any 
means exhaustive as such a task is beyond the scope of this chapter and also 
detailed assessment would best be achieved through a monograph. For the 
purpose of this thesis, the chapter underscores the formulation of investment 
rules on the African continent, the internal contradictions central to this 
evolution and the contribution of African states in shaping such rules. To this 
end, the chapter postulates that African states have traditionally played a 
relevant role in shaping foreign investment rules although such a role has 
gradually diminished. Also, from the historical evolution of Africa investment 
law, the chapter argues that the ideological differences between developed and 
developing countries are deeply entrenched such that achieving consensus 
towards a multilateral investment treaty remains more of an elusive aspiration. 
Before situating Africa’s contribution to modern investment law, some general 
preliminary remarks about African practice are important the thrust of which 
will become evidently clear in subsequent parts of this chapter. There is 
sufficient evidence alluding to the fact that although African states are at the 
moment passive participants in the development of international investment 
law, traditionally the African continent has been a relevant and active player. 
Moreover, Africa’s traditionally contribution spans generations and can be traced 
back even before colonialism. As numerous scholars demonstrate, prior to the 
colonial period African states participated in commercial activities within Africa, 
established diplomatic links and concluded both intra-Africa treaties and 
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international agreements.1 In essence, the African continent was not a dark 
continent and passive observe of international rules but rather the continent 
contained sovereign states that actively participated in the formulation of rules 
regulating interstate commercial relationships.2  
Specifically before the advent of colonialism, Africa had sophisticated kingdoms 
that enjoyed and conducted trade, diplomatic and other forms of contact within 
African states and the outside world-Asia, the Middle East and European states.3 
This period of considerable influence was interrupted during the colonial period 
which placed African states under the custodianship of colonial powers and in 
turn curtailed Africa’s contribution to the advancement of international affairs.4 
Professor Elias in a detailed book documenting Africa and the development of 
international law notes that prior to the colonial period traditional African chiefs 
and kings were highly respected during the execution of diplomatic, trade and 
international treaties implying that for all intent and purpose African states 
operated with full sovereignty.5 According to Elias the universality of commercial 
activities coupled with the fact that African states operated with full sovereignty 
and concluded numerous international treaties clearly disputes the theory that 
Africa was a dark continent before the colonial period and did not make any 
contribution to the development of international rules.6 In essence, the 
universality of international agreements and the established diplomatic ties 
between traditional African kingdoms, Asia, and the Mediterranean suggests that 
since indigenous African chiefs and kings operated with full sovereignty 
international commercial treaties would not have been concluded without their 
contribution.7  
                                                 
1
 TO Elias, Africa and the Development of International Law (Richard Akinjide ed, 2nd edn, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers 1988) 3-15. 
2 Ibid.  
3 NS Rembe, Africa and the International Law of the Sea (Sijthoff & Noordhoff Publishers 
1980) 5. 
4 Ibid. 
5 TO Elias, Africa and the Development of International Law (Richard Akinjide ed, 2nd edn, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers 1988) 19. 
6 Ibid 3-20. 
7
 Ibid.  
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However, during colonialism Africa’s contribution was interrupted by European 
powers who essentially substituted African sovereignty with sovereignties of 
European states leading to the collapse of historic modes of international 
intercourses between African indigenous states and the outside world.8 It was 
during the colonial period that African states completely ceased contributing to 
the development of international rules because as a matter of international law 
African states lacked international legal personality. The only contribution of 
African states if any was the fact that it was African territories and African 
resources that supplied raw materials for the ‘‘evolving rules and practices of 
international relations during the heyday of colonisation’’.9 Particularly during 
colonialism Africa’s social, economic and legal fabric was replaced with 
European rulers who controlled all external relations involving African states 
such as boundary, diplomatic engagements and commercial agreements.10 The 
control of Africa sovereignty had negative consequences which includes the fact 
that African states did not participate in the formation of rapidly evolving 
customary law because only sovereign states were subjects of international 
law.11  
More importantly, when the development of customary law was taking place 
regulating international relations covering important areas such as economic, 
technical and cultural, the contribution of African states could not be 
incorporated because African states depended on European states.12 For 
instance, in the Berlin Treaty of 1885 which was entered into between European 
powers to establish routes of the Niger and Congo River and international usage, 
there was no single African territory or African representative participating in 
the treaty.13 As will be discussed in more details, it is unsurprising that 
immediately after African states regained independence, African states 
supported and actively participated in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) that 
culminated into the formation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) and subsequently demands for the establishment of a 
                                                 
8 Ibid 19. 
9 Ibid 21. 
10 Ibid 19. 
11 Ibid 19-20. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid 20. 
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new international economic order. With this overview in mind, the following 
sections detail the progressive development of international investment law and 
demonstrate Africa’s specific input to the development of international 
investment law.  
For practical purposes the chapter starts the discussion by examining the nature 
of foreign investment rules during the colonial period-a period where African 
states did not participate in international relations because African states lacked 
the requisite sovereignty to participate in international rule making. The next 
section deals with the post-colonial period and shows how decolonised African 
states using numerical dominance actively participated in influencing and 
rejecting the status quo so as to shape international rules favourable to the 
African continent. Specifically, the post-colonial period is an important period 
because it shows how decolonised African states not only influenced the 
strategic thinking of the NAM but also captures Africa’s traditional thinking. 
After, demonstrating Africa’s specific contribution into demands for a new 
international economic order and the creation of global institutions such as 
UNCTAD, the last sections explores the birth of BITs and illustrates the 
paradoxical nature of African practice. More broadly, the last sections act as a 
precursor into the substantive analysis of modern African treaty practice that 
follows in chapters 2-6.  
1.1 Regulation of Foreign Investors during the Colonial Era 
During the colonial period, foreign direct investment was made mainly in the 
context of colonial expansion and as such foreign investors exporting capital 
required minimal protection.14 Accordingly, foreign investors did not have to 
worry about sufficient protection because the prevailing legal system in 
colonised states was similar to that of colonial masters. For instance, in British 
colonial Africa further to the introduction of a currency economy, the native 
population was also subjected to English Common law and by extension this 
accorded colonial powers total control over the prevailing trade and investment 
                                                 
14 M Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (2nd edn, Cambridge University 
Press 2004) 9. 
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regime.15 Manifestly therefore, investors transferring capital or engaged in 
foreign conquests received adequate protection both at the pre-establishment 
and the post-establishment stage.16 Generally, the colonial system was designed 
with ulterior motives of economic exploitation aimed at serving the interests of 
European powers and as such the system excluded the participation of African 
states from ownership, control and operation of foreign investment 
enterprises.17 During this period, foreign investors entering colonised African 
states acquired exclusive and plenary rights over natural resources which 
effectively accorded investors the right to absolute ownership and control.18 The 
right to exclusive ownership was safeguarded through expansive imperial laws 
applicable to foreign controlled assets. 
As noted in the foregoing paragraph, during the colonial period colonial 
exploitation was the order of the day and European colonial powers targeted 
African states rich in natural resources and untapped raw materials. This indeed 
explains the hostility preceding the scrabble and partition for Africa because 
majority of African states contained the much sought for raw materials and 
natural resources. Throughout colonised Africa, several companies from 
European countries acquired extensive concession rights to exploit and explore 
natural resources such as gold, ivory, silver and diamonds.19 The right over 
natural resources was granted unwittingly by African traditional chiefs under 
misguided consent from colonial masters and at times colonial governors issued 
the rights themselves.20 For purposes of facilitating deeper economic 
penetration into colonised states, colonial powers regulated pre-establishment 
                                                 
15 Victor Mosoti, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Possibility of a Multilateral Investment 
Framework on Investment at the WTO: Are Poor Economies Caught in Between?’ (2005) 26 
Nw.J.Int’l L.& Bus 95,106-107. 
16 M Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (2nd edn, Cambridge University 
Press 2004) 9. According to Sornarajah the legal system in colonised territories was changed 
to accommodate European notions of individual property rights and freedom of contract. 
17 See SKB Asante, Transnational Investment Law and National Development (JIC Taylor 
Memorial Lecture Series, Lagos University Press 1981) 22-24. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid 24.Asante highlights the classic concession rights that colonisers obtained from 
impoverished Africa. These include inter alia, Sierra Leone Selection Trust had a diamond 
concession in Sierra Leone for 99 years, Ashanti Goldfields Corporation in Ghana had a term of 
90 years, the Consolidated Africa Selection Trust had a cluster of diamond concessions in 
Ghana whose terms averaged 77 years, in Swaziland, Havilock asbestos had a concession for 
100 years. It should be stressed that these companies acquired plenary rights to extract not 
only one mineral but all minerals. 
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and post-establishment rights across colonised states.21 As noted above, 
traditionally colonised states lacked international personality leaving 
international relations entirely at the discretion of European colonial powers.22   
Practically, this meant that international treaties concluded between colonial 
powers such as foreign relations, trade and commerce directly applied to African 
states under colonial protectorate.23  For example in the British Protectorate of 
Tanzania, Britain concluded seventeen bilateral commercial treaties for and on 
behalf of the people of Tanzania without seeking approval from Tanzanian tribal 
chiefs.24 Unsurprisingly, the government of Tanzania after acquiring 
independence terminated virtually all commercial treaties concluded during the 
colonial period on the premise that such treaties had been concluded with 
British interests in mind rather than Tanzanian interests.25 Further the 
government of Tanzania issued declaratory statements to third party states 
notifying them that Tanzania considered such commercial treaties obsolete and 
was not bound by the undertakings.26 More broadly, based on the fact that 
European powers concluded international agreements without the participation 
of African states, it is unsurprising that decolonised African states not only 
terminated such treaties but also resisted traditional international law principles 
developed during the colonial period.  
During the colonial period, the settlement of investment disputes between 
investors and colonised states was regulated by imperial laws which offered 
foreign investors superior legal protection.27 However, it is important to stress 
that by the 19th century some developing countries such as Mexico and Argentina 
had attained independence and within these countries different rules applied. In 
these formerly colonised states, the pattern of solving disputes was either 
through diplomacy or the use of force and at times this included military 
                                                 
21 Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (OUP 2007) 14-15. 
22 Timothy Hillier, Sourcebook on Public International Law (Cavendish Publishing Ltd 1998) 28.  
23 Ibid. 
24 EE Seaton and ST Maliti, Tanzania Treaty Practice (OUP 1973) 66. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (OUP 2007) 14-15. 
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intervention.28 During this period, the protracted use of gun boat diplomacy 
aimed at protecting foreign nationals investing abroad was common.29 The use of 
diplomatic protection followed by force is well documented throughout state 
practice and in fact the approach is supported by many traditional writers of 
early international law but more profoundly are the views of De Vattel who 
argued that: 
Whoever offends the State, injures its rights, disturbs its tranquillity, 
or does it a prejudice in any measure whatsoever, declares himself its 
enemy, and exposes himself to be justly punished for it. Whoever, 
uses a citizen ill, indirectly offends the state which is bound to 
protect this citizen; and the sovereign of the latter should avenge his 
wrongs, punish the aggressor, and, if possible, oblige him to make full 
reparation; since otherwise the citizen would not obtain the great end 
of the civil association, which is, safety.30  
The views of Vattel are not without premise considering that traditional 
international law was developed by states with similar standards of economic 
development and shared imperialistic sentiments.31 In particular, early 
international law sanctioned the use of force as a corrective measure after the 
exhaustion of peaceful means in the form of diplomatic protection.32 During this 
period, it was not uncommon for coercive force to be applied to provoke states 
to comply with the demands of colonial powers. For instance in 1896, Mexico 
was the target of such force when three Western allies, Great Britain, Spain and 
France combined forces to compel Mexico to fulfil its contractual undertakings 
towards the citizens of France, Britain and Spain.33 Particularly, as a way of 
legitimizing excessive force against Mexico, western allies concluded the London 
Convention permitting direct military intervention to rectify injustices caused to 
                                                 
28 TC Wingfield and JE Meven, Lillich on the Forcible Protection of Nations Abroad: in 
Memory of Professor Richard B Lillich (Vol 77, International Law Studies, Naval War College 
Press 2002) 3 adopted from Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations (Joseph Chitty and 
Edward D Ingraham eds, T.& J.W Johnson & Co. 1883) 16. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 CF Amerasinghe, State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens (Clarendon Press 1964) 18-36. 
32 RB Lillich (ed), International Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens (University 
Press of Virginia1983) 3. 
33 This is just one example, almost all major Western powers exercised force in the interest of 
their nationals, Great Britain in Abyssinia, French Blockade of Argentina, Great Britain and 
France in Egypt etc...For a detailed analysis see TC Wingfield and JE Meven, Lillich on the 
Forcible Protection of Nations Abroad: in Memory of Professor Richard B Lillich (Vol 77, 
International Law Studies, Naval War College Press 2002) 26-36. 
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their respective nationals.34 Even more, the use of force was sanctioned not only 
by European powers but also leading intellectuals thus shaping the progressive 
evolution of international law in a manner that justified the permissibility of 
forceful protection.35  
Quite apart from the use of force, colonial powers also established investment 
agreements between themselves and the cohort of developing countries that 
survived colonialism. The framework of investment protection was in treaties 
commonly known as friendship, commerce and navigation treaties (FCN).36 The 
first of such treaties was signed in 1778 between France and the United States.37 
However, it is worth noting that principally early FCN treaties aimed at 
facilitating trade and commerce between advanced nations as opposed to 
articulating rules regulating foreign investment.38 In particular, developed states 
concluded FCN treaties with the intention of acquiring reliable market for 
finished goods as well as gaining greater access to expanding markets from 
developing countries.39 Substantively, FCN treaties contained extensive 
provisions regulating the treatment of property belonging to foreign investors.40 
                                                 
34 Ibid 26.  
35 Ibid 26-36.Wingfield and Meven note further that with the adoption of the United Nations 
Charter, the traditional view was challenged and this led to the emergence of a new set of 
international norms.  
36 It should be noted that not all treaties are referred to as FCN, for instance the 1951 
Ethiopia treaty was called Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations between the United States 
of America and Ethiopia, TIAS 284, U.S.T 2134, Sept 7, 1951[Hereafter FCN between United 
States and Ethiopia]. While the 1836 Morocco treaty was called Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship between the United States of America and Morocco, TS 244-22, 8 Stat. 484, Sept 
16, 1836 [Hereafter FCN between the United States and Morocco]. On the other hand, the 
1783 Netherlands treaty was called Treaty of Amity and Commence between Netherlands and 
United States cited in Charles I Bevans (ed), Treaties and Other International Agreements of 
the United States of America 1776-1949 (Vol 10, Dept. State Publication 1972) 6 [Hereafter 
FCN between the United States and Netherlands].  
37 Robert R Wilson, ‘Post-war Commercial treaties of the United States’ (1949) 43 Am.J. 
Int’I.L 262, 277. 
38 Rudolf Dolzer and Margrete Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties (Kluwer Law 
International 1995)10-11. 
39 Christopher F Dugan, Don Wallace and Noah Rubins, Investor-State Arbitration (OUP 2008) 
37. 
40 Kenneth J Vandevelde, ‘The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the United States’ 
(1988) 21 Cornell Int’l LJ 201,204.  
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The standard of treatment was absolute which guaranteed perfect protection to 
aliens investing abroad.41  
Also it should be stressed that majority of FCN treaties derived substantive rules 
regulating foreign direct investment from general international law principles of 
state responsibility for injuries caused to aliens abroad.42 As the principal 
initiator of FCN treaties, the United States contended that principles of state 
responsibility for injuries caused to aliens articulated in FCN treaties formed 
part of the international minimum standard.43 Accordingly, the United States 
argued for the treatment of foreign investors in accordance with the 
international minimum standard and amongst other rights the minimum standard 
entitled foreign investors to compensation based on an external standard 
requiring the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation.44 In 
support of this view Elihu Root noted that the standard is perfectly distinct and 
settled which means that; 
Each country is bound to give to the nationals of another country in its 
territory the benefit of the same laws, the same administration, the 
same protection, and the same redress for injuries which it gives to its 
own citizens, and neither more nor less: provided the protection 
which the country gives to its own citizens conforms to the 
established standard of civilisation. This standard of justice is very 
simple, very fundamental, and of such general acceptance by all 
civilised countries as to form a part of the international law of the 
world (emphasis added).45   
However, it remains contested whether the international minimum standard 
advanced by the United States and articulated by Root has crystallised into 
                                                 
41 See also Article IX of the1859 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the 
United States and Paraguay in Charles I Bevans (ed), Treaties and Other International 
Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949 (Vol 10, Dept. State Publication 1972) 
889 [Hereafter FCN between the United States and Paraguay]; Article VII of July 1853 Treaty 
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Argentina, TS 4, 10 
Stat. 1005 July 27, 1853 [Hereafter FCN between United States and Argentina]. 
42 CF Amerasinghe, State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens (Clarendon Press 1964)18-36; 
see also TC Wingfield and JE Meven, Lillich on the Forcible Protection of Nations Abroad: in 
Memory of Professor Richard B. Lillich (Vol 77, International Law Studies, Naval War College 
Press 2002) 2-35. 
43 M Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (2nd edn, Cambridge University 
Press 2004) 37-39.  
44 Ibid 37-38. 
45 Elihu Root, ‘The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad’ (1910) 4 Am. J. Int’I.L 
517,521-22.  
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customary international law. As will be shown below, over the years the content 
of this standard has been the subject of heated debate and particularly the 
divide in opinion was most visible during early development of international 
investment law through numerous contestations at the United Nations General 
Assembly. Over the years, attempts have been made to clarify and articulate the 
content of this standard. Perhaps more insightful are the views of Schwarzenber 
who opines that the international minimum standard basically entails three 
aspects: (a) the organisation of a State must correspond to reasonably defined 
minimum requirements of the rule of law in the Anglo-Saxon sense and most 
specifically a state must provide for an independent judiciary, (b) an alien has a 
right to expect his full, prompt and effective compensation established in 
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings whenever his property is expropriated even 
if such an expropriation was undertaken for public purposes, (c) An alien must 
first exhaust available local remedies even in cases of an illegal interference 
with his property rights.46   
The permissibility of the international minimum standard was intensely resisted 
by Latin American countries and leading Latin American jurists who opined that 
the minimum standard was legally implausible.47 Specifically, Latin American 
countries argued that interference with alien property rights falls within the 
domestic competence of host states and by extension this meant that foreign 
investors are entitled to treatment provided for under domestic laws.48 It should 
be stressed that invoking the minimum standard through diplomatic espousal is 
without doubt controversial and subject to abuse especially when the home 
state is pursuing political interests. More specifically, diplomatic protection 
makes the dispute settlement system heavily politicised which has the 
propensity to create endless interstate conflicts affecting the relationship 
                                                 
46 Georg Schwarzenberger, Foreign Investments and International Law (Stevens & Sons 1969) 
2-23. 
47 The international minimum standard was eventually given support in Mavrommatis 
Palestine Concessions (Jurisdiction) by the PCIJ when it ruled that by taking up the case of 
one of its subjects and resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on 
his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right, its right to ensure, in the person of its 
subjects, respect for the rules of international law. This precedent was followed by the 
Permanent Court of International Justice in the Panevezys Saldutiskis Railway case (Estonia v 
Lithuania) PCIJ (ser.A/B) No.76 (Feb. 28). 
48 M Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (3rd edn, Cambridge University 
Press 2010) 127. 
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between states. At a practical level, diplomatic protection does not effectively 
serve foreign investors because it is discretionary and usually based upon the 
state’s willingness to pursue the investment claim.49 In addition, it is important 
to stress that when a state is exercising diplomatic protection, the state is 
fulfilling a political function within the competence of its executive powers.50 
This in essence means that foreign investors cannot compel their home state to 
act despite experiencing violations to property rights. Commenting on the 
drawback of diplomatic protection, Borchard notes that;  
Protection by the nation of a citizen abroad reflects one of the most 
primitive institutions of man-the theory that an injury to a member is 
an injury to his entire clan. It seems questionable whether in the 
highly integrated organisation of the world today this practice is 
either necessary or desirable to secure for the citizen abroad the 
assurance of international due process of law.51   
The content of the international minimum standard of treatment remains 
divisive. Particularly, during this period the minimum standard was rejected by 
Latin American states on the ground that the standard is inscribed with Western 
dominance aimed at interfering with internal affairs of sovereign states.52 As a 
counter narrative against the international minimum standard, the famous 
Argentinean jurist Carlos Calvo formulated the Calvo doctrine. Unsurprisingly, 
the United States and leading European countries rejected the Calvo clause 
contending that, the clause does not only eliminate the possibility of using 
diplomatic protection but also relentlessly eliminates the principle without 
providing plausible alternatives.53 Briefly, the Calvo doctrine asserts the 
principle of sovereign equality and contends that foreign investors are entitled 
to similar or equal treatment as that accorded to nationals and should therefore 
seek recourse exclusively within domestic courts.54 The majority of Latin 
American countries passionately embraced the doctrine and included the clause 
                                                 
49 Diplomatic protection is regarded as an extraordinary legal remedy. The protection 
constitutes an appeal by a nation to nation performance of the obligations of one to the 
other, growing out of their mutual rights and duties. See, MM Whiteman, Digest of 
International Law (Vol 18, US Dept. of State 1967) 1216-17. 
50 Ibid. 
51 EM Borchard, ‘Limitations on Coercive Protection’ (1927) 21 Am. J. Int’I.L 303, 324.  
52 Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (5th edn, Cambridge University Press 2003) 734. 
53 Wenhua Shan, ‘Is Calvo Dead’ (2007) 55 Am.J.Comp.L 123, 127. 
54 Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (5th edn, Cambridge University Press 2003) 734. 
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in contracts and within national Constitutions.55 Writing in 1955, Donald Shea, 
one of the early writers on the Calvo doctrine noted that;  
It is certain that aliens who establish themselves in a country have the 
same right to protection as nationals, but they ought not to lay claim 
to a protection more extended. The rule that in more than one case it 
has been attempted to impose on American states is that foreigners 
merit more regard and privileges more marked and extended than 
those accorded even to nationals of the country where they reside. 
The principle is intrinsically contrary to the law of equality of 
nations.56  
Put differently, the Calvo doctrine postulates that foreign investors should not 
receive treatment better than that accorded to domestic investors and restrains 
home states from pursuing investment claims through the ambit of diplomatic 
protection. Practically, this means that aggrieved foreign investors must seek 
recourse through domestic courts notwithstanding any doubts about impartiality 
real or perceived that foreign investors may have against domestic courts. 
Commenting on the Calvo clause the Commission in North American Dredging 
was of the view that the clause is void to the extent that it limits states from 
exercising diplomatic protection.57 However, from the decision of the 
Commission, it is worth noting that the Commission did not rule out the 
possibility of states adopting the Calvo clause either in contracts, constitutions 
or national legislation.58 Principally, the approach of the Commission favoured 
circumscribed application of diplomatic protection and the Calvo doctrine. 
Specifically, according to the decision of the Commission provided aggrieved 
                                                 
55 Wenhua Shan, ‘Is Calvo Dead’ (2007) 55 Am. J.Comp.L 123, 127. For instance Article 31 of 
1933 Constitution of Peru stipulates that property, whoever maybe the owner is governed 
exclusively by the laws of the Republic of Peru and is subject to the taxes charged and 
limitation established in the laws themselves. The same provision regarding property applies 
to aliens as well as Peruvians except that no case may the said aliens make use of their 
exceptional position or resort to diplomatic protection (emphasis added). Similar trends are 
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Mexico.  
56 Donald R Shea, The Calvo Clause: A Problem of Inter-America and International Law and 
Diplomacy (University of Minnesota Press 1955) 17-19.  
57 North American Dredging Company of Texas (USA) v United Mexican States, 4 R.Int’l Arb. 
Awards 1926, para 22.The Commission held that the Calvo clause is neither completely valid 
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foreign investors exhaust local remedies nothing prohibits home states from 
exercising diplomatic protection on behalf of foreign investors.59  
From the foregoing, the following can be concluded as the main features of 
foreign investment regulation during the colonial period; firstly, African states 
did not participate in the formation of foreign investment rules because African 
sovereignty was substituted with that of European powers. On this basis 
European powers controlled international relations for and on behalf of African 
states. Substantively, during this critical evolution of customary international 
law principles regulating the treatment of foreign investors African states did 
not participate in the formation of these important principles because African 
states depended on European powers. As will be discussed shortly, it is for this 
reason that after acquiring independence African states rejected much of the 
evolving customary law developed during the colonial period.  
Predominantly, the investment system was imperialist in nature and designed for 
the purposes of economically exploiting weak states such as indigenous African 
states. Secondly, provisions articulated in early FCN treaties inadequately 
protected foreign investors because FCN treaties aimed essentially at promoting 
commercial relations as opposed to offering foreign investors favourable 
protection making diplomatic protection followed with coercive excessive force 
inevitable.60 Coupled with this, the prevailing investment regime was engrossed 
with controversy over the status of the applicable international law principles 
protecting property rights. Lastly but by no means least, compared with modern 
investment laws where trade and investment provisions are treated separately, 
during the colonial period treaties combined both trade and investment 
provisions in single treaties. 
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1.2 Post Colonial Era: The Battle for Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
At the outset, it is important to stress that there are remarkable differences 
between the conduct, attitude and practice of states after the First and Second 
World War. Shortly after the First World War, developed countries generally 
practiced protectionist measures aimed at improving economic conditions and 
preserving the social welfare of their citizens.61 Particularly, during this period, 
the United States economy witnessed unprecedented shocks which influenced 
the attitude and conduct of United States towards issues of trade and 
investment.62 The United States adopted restrictive measures in reaction to 
unpredictable stock markets and a weak economy which was progressing from 
recession to depression.63 Indeed, the economic turmoil culminated into the 
adoption of the infamous Smoot-Hawley tariff bill which hiked average tariffs on 
imports from 38 to 52 per cent.64 As a counter reaction towards measures 
pursued by the United States, other industrialised countries retaliated by 
imposing trade restrictions coupled with competitive devaluation of their 
currencies.65 By and large, the aftermath of the First World War was 
characterised with aggressiveness and protectionist measures and the prevailing 
economic circumstances made it virtually impossible for countries to even 
contemplate a multilateral investment agreement later alone agree on 
eliminating basic trade barriers. 
Lessons from the First World War did not go to waste. At the aftermath of World 
War II, countries realised that trade liberalisation, integration, and 
multilateralism are more viable policy options than protectionism.66 Previous 
negative policies such as beggar-thy-neighbour inspired the United States and 
leading European countries to pursue international cooperation and actively 
                                                 
61 Rondo Cameron, A Concise Economic History of the World: From Palaeolithic Times to the 
Present (3rd edn, OUP 1997) 371-80. 
62 Ibid.  
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Kenneth J Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment treaties: History, Policy and Interpretation 
(OUP 2010) 38-39.  
  
 30 
engage in establishing institutions that strengthen trade liberalisation.67 Indeed, 
during the Bretton Woods deliberations, discussions about the political, social 
and economic circumstances resulted in the creation of two institutions—the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)68 and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, commonly known as the World Bank. Each of 
these institutions was allocated a specific mandate; the IMF was tasked with 
providing oversight to the international monetary system with the view of 
regulating exchange rates while the World Bank was assigned the responsibility 
of post war reconstruction.69  
Furthermore, the Bretton Woods conferences envisaged the establishment of an 
International Trade Organisation that would formulate and adopt fair trade rules 
binding on member states.70 It should be stressed that deliberations at Bretton 
Woods though presumptuous and overly ambitious at the time were nevertheless 
helpful in setting the stage for subsequent negotiations. Indeed, the 1947 
Havana charter which aimed at establishing rules for international cooperation 
including trade, investment regulations and economic development can be 
attributed to the success of the Bretton Woods conferences. With respect to 
foreign investment protection, articles 11 and 12 of the Havana Charter are 
illustrative of such efforts and read as follows;  
Article 11 
Means of Promoting Economic Development and Reconstruction 
1. Progressive industrial and general economic development, as well 
as reconstruction, require among other things adequate supplies of 
capital funds, materials, modern equipment and technology and 
technical and managerial skills. Accordingly, in order to stimulate and 
assist in the provision and exchange of these facilities… (b) No 
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Member shall take unreasonable or unjustifiable action within its 
territory injurious to the rights or interests of nationals of other 
Members in the enterprise, skills, capital, arts or technology which 
they have supplied… 
Article 12 
 International Investment for Economic Development and 
Reconstruction  
1.The Members recognize that:  (a) International investment, both 
public and private, can be of great value in promoting economic 
development and reconstruction, and consequent social progress;  (b) 
The international flow of capital will be stimulated to the extent that 
Members afford nationals of other countries opportunities for 
investment and security for existing and future investments; (c) 
without prejudice to existing international agreements to which 
Members are parties, a Member has the right: (i) to take any 
appropriate safeguards necessary to ensure that foreign investment is 
not used as a basis for interference in its internal affairs or national 
policies; (ii) to determine whether and, to what extent and upon what 
terms it will allow future foreign investment;  (iii) to prescribe and 
give effect on just terms to requirements as to the ownership of 
existing and future investments; (iv) to prescribe and give effect to 
other reasonable requirements with respect to existing and future 
investments…(2) Members therefore undertake:…(i) To provide 
reasonable opportunities for investments acceptable to them and 
adequate security for existing and future investments and (ii) to give 
due regard to the desirability of avoiding discrimination as between 
foreign investments… 
It was envisaged that the Havana Charter would be enforced through the 
International Trade Organisation (ITO) which would inter alia make 
recommendations to promote bilateral or multilateral agreements.71 Accordingly 
such subsequent agreements would provide and regulate fair and equitable 
treatment, skills, capital, arts as well as technology brought from one member 
country to another.72 However, these efforts remained wishful thinking. The 
Havana Charter and the International Trade Organisation never materialised and 
instead contracting parties agreed to a more restricted General Agreement on 
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Tariffs and Trade (GATT).73 Specifically, contracting parties committed 
themselves to inter alia most-favoured nation treatment,74 national treatment 
on internal taxation and regulation, anti-dumping and countervailing measures, 
valuation for customs purposes, restrictions to safeguard and balance of 
payments.75 It should be stressed that the GATT did not contain any substantive 
principles regulating foreign investment and such omission is not without 
cause.76 Including investment regulation under the GATT framework would have 
been disastrous particularly because contracting parties such as United States 
would have rejected such provisions and made it further difficult for 
compromise on basic trade principles.77 Even more, the experience of ITO was 
still unprocessed especially the reasons that attributed to its demise in the 
United States senate. Specifically, three overlapping issues remained of essential 
concern; domestic politics within the United States notwithstanding the fact 
that United States was the initiator of the concept, the Korean War and 
dissatisfaction by members of the business community with provisions related to 
investment in the ITO Charter.78  
The GATT though marred with watered down provisions was nevertheless 
instrumental in giving birth to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Particularly, 
the GATT became the principal framework within which subsequent trade 
negotiations were successfully conducted.79 However, the failure of the Havana 
Charter was detrimental towards efforts of having clear rules regulating foreign 
investment because the Charter included within it the ITO which was negotiated 
with the intention to regulate key aspects of international economic policy that 
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included inter alia, investment, trade, restrictive business practices and primary 
products.80 On the basis of the failed Havana Charter, the United States 
reintroduced FCN treaties similar to those under the colonial era particularly 
because during this period United States industries had become highly 
competitive and export oriented.81 The United States launched its modern FCN 
treaty program from 1946 up to 1966 and under this framework the United 
States successfully concluded a total of 21 FCNs.82 
Equally important, provisions articulated in modern FCN treaties contained more 
nuanced provisions than those pursued during the colonial era. Essentially, 
modern FCN treaties combined previous FCN principles with elaborate 
investment provisions.83 By and large, the content and structure were closely 
related though adjusted to suite the United States post World War investment 
interests.84 Substantively, the structure of modern FCN treaties included a 
preamble, general purpose clause, entry, movement and residence of 
individuals, MFN provision, provision on fair and equitable treatment, liberty of 
conscience and communication, protection of persons from molestation and 
police malpractices, protection of acquired property, standing in the courts, 
right to establish and operate businesses, formation and management of 
corporations, non-profit activities, acquisition and tenure of property, tax 
treatment, administration and exchange controls, rules on international trade 
and customs administration, rules governing the state in business, treatment of 
ships and shipping, transit of goods and persons, reservations, definitions and 
general provisions and settlement of disputes.85 
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Comparatively, modern FCN treaties sought to protect not only investors but also 
companies and property belonging to investors and further accorded investors 
national and MFN treatment both in the pre-establishment and post-
establishment phases.86 For instance the FCN treaty between United States and 
Japan provided that; nationals and companies of either Party shall be accorded 
national treatment with respect to engaging in all types of commercial, 
industrial, financial and other business activities within the territories of the 
other Party, whether directly or by agent or through the medium of any form of 
lawful juridical entity.87  Accordingly, nationals and companies shall be 
permitted within United States and Japan territories to: (a) establish and 
maintain branches, agencies, offices, factories and other establishments 
appropriate to the conduct of their business; (b) to organize companies under 
the general company laws of such other Party, and to acquire majority interests 
in companies of such other Party; and (c) to control and manage enterprises 
which they have established or acquired.88 The treaty further  provided that 
enterprises controlled by investors of both states whether in the form of 
individual proprietorships, companies or otherwise, shall, in all that relates to 
the conduct of the activities thereof, be accorded treatment no less favourable 
than that accorded to like enterprises controlled by nationals and companies of 
either states.89  
By far the principal innovation of modern FCN treaties was the provision on 
peaceful settlement of state to state disputes.90 Quite apart from the colonial 
period, under modern FCN treaties jurisdiction over investment treaty claims 
involved the International Court of Justice (ICJ).91 For example the Japan and 
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United States FCN treaty provided that disputes regarding interpretation or 
application of the treaty which are not satisfactorily adjudicated by diplomacy 
shall be submitted to the ICJ unless both contracting states agree to settlement 
by some other peaceful means.92 Obviously, aggrieved foreign investors had to 
first exhaust local remedies before requesting home states to refer treaty claims 
to the ICJ. However, despite this innovation, problems associated with pursuing 
diplomatic protection on behalf of investors persisted because international law 
at the time accorded only states the right to international personality and as 
such only states could refer cases to international arbitration.93 Moreover, 
substantively FCN treaties did not contain the possibility of direct investor-state 
arbitration. Consequently, and as a result foreign investors’ espoused claims to 
home states which undoubtedly had major shortcomings because unfettered 
discretion of disputes to homes states is subject to abuse and political 
manipulation.94 
From the stand point of investors, this system was ineffective and inadequate 
based on the fact that pursuing investment claims was discretionary and 
dependent upon state bureaucrats who may not be as enthusiastic about the 
investment claim as the aggrieved foreign investor. Equally important during this 
period, the content of international law regulating foreign investment disputes 
was disputable as there was no multilateral investment treaty articulating 
acceptable foreign investment rules. More specifically, formerly colonised states 
universally disputed the premise and content of the international minimum 
standard and were not prepared to negotiate sensitive issues of national 
sovereignty.95 Similarly, modern FCN treaties experienced unprecedented 
rejection from developing countries and newly independent states which not 
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only questioned but also rejected substantive provisions articulated in these 
treaties.96  
Developing states were apprehensive about sensitive issues of national 
sovereignty and allowing unregulated foreign investors entry to domestic 
markets without adequate safeguards.97 The unified resistance towards modern 
FCN treaties was inspired by the allegiance of formerly colonised states to the 
Soviet Union and Communist China.98 From this new allegiance, formerly 
colonised states viewed any form of cooperation with the United States and 
other western powers as ideologically compromising.99 Moreover, the general 
perception among formerly colonised states was that the broad spectrum of 
political, social, economic and cultural cooperation contained in FCNs was more 
appropriate for developed countries at the same level of development.100 
Furthermore, because of the desire to achieve economic independence over 
natural resources, decolonised states started questioning principles of 
international law governing foreign investment.101 As will shortly be discussed 
formerly colonised states demanded for the establishment of a New 
International Economic Order included within it political and economic 
independence.102 Moreover, throughout formerly colonised states, it increasingly 
become acceptable that nationalisation aimed at economic reform or 
reorganisation is legitimate under international law.103 To this end, interaction 
between formerly colonised states and foreign investors became characterised 
by nationalisation and seizure of foreign owned property.104 At a doctrinal level 
especially in newly independent African states the common theme among 
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African nationalists was the notion that African states should first and foremost 
seek political freedoms as the impetus to economic realignment.105 Influential 
African nationalists like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana argued fervently for 
nationalisation of natural resources and postulated that it is possible for state 
revenue, profits from mines and marketing boards to be shared equally despite 
the size of the state.106 With a view of securing equitable distribution of wealth 
and economic freedom over natural resources, newly independent states 
launched series of expropriation without according the internationally required 
level of compensation.107  
Unsurprisingly, the practice of widespread expropriation without adequate 
compensation pieced controversy into the perceived standard of compensation. 
Developed countries insisted on the existence of an international minimum 
standard protecting duly acquired property rights while formerly colonised states 
argued against the existence of such a standard.108 It is imperative to note that 
insisting on an international minimum standard was inevitable because memory 
of the Mexican oil nationalisation of 1938 was still fresh.109 In addition, the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil company dispute was on going and widespread nationalisation 
was taking place or seriously being considered.110 To be sure, newly independent 
states used the acquired freedom to categorically reject the existence of binding 
customary international law.111 Principally, formerly colonised states argued that 
state practice did not conform to the Hule formulae and as such the standard 
lacked broad support required for rules to become customarily binding.112 It 
should be stressed that the theory of property rights and international law 
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standards postulated by developed countries received widespread condemnation 
from virtually all newly independent states whether from Africa, Asia and Latin 
America.113 By and large, the universal rejection of foreign investment rules was 
furthered by cold war struggles between the East and West.114 
Furthermore, struggles between the West and East reinvigorated the work of the 
NAM which was formed purposely to oppose western dominance.115 In particular, 
the NAM became the mouthpiece exerting pressure on Western countries to 
ensure that newly independent states acquired complete sovereignty over 
natural resources and attained economic independence.116 The resistance 
pursued by the non-aligned movement received widespread support from 
ideological allies of Soviet Union and Communist China who encouraged newly 
independent states to reject forces of capitalism and any form of western 
dominance.117 Furthermore, formerly colonised states believed that economic 
independence over natural resources and wealth was an integral component of 
acquiring other state rights such as the right to self-determination, sovereignty, 
exploration, exploitation, use and marketing of state natural resources.118 In 
addition, it was asserted that these rights and activities are subject to national 
laws within the exclusive competence of sovereign states.119  
The movement for permanent sovereignty over natural resources complicated 
matters for developed countries which heavily depended on raw material from 
formerly colonised countries.120 During much of this period, newly independent 
states pursued ideological sentiments of nationalisation over natural resources 
with the intention of alienating developed countries.121 Inevitably, the only 
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recourse available to developed countries was to rally support for the existence 
of an international minimum standard which culminated in the rhetoric that 
every state should take into account the interests of other states and of the 
world economy as a whole when claiming sovereignty over natural resources.122 
Particularly, this ambitious agenda for shared responsibility is reflected in 
agreements such as the GATT and the World Bank. For instance the GATT 
envisaged a world economy based on (a) reciprocity and mutual advantage (b) 
substantial reduction in customs tariffs and other impediments to trade, and (c) 
eliminating discriminatory practices in international trade.123 The pursuit of 
sovereignty coupled with a pro-nationalisation stance precipitated the birth of a 
declaration of permanent sovereignty over natural resources.  
This initiative was spearheaded by Latin American countries led by Chile and 
Uruguay. It later gained momentum with the support of Soviet Union, Asia and 
African countries resulting into the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 523 
(VI) of 1952.124 In adopting General Assembly Resolution 523(VI) the alliance of 
developing countries basically postulated that developed and developing 
countries are allowed to enter into commercial contracts provided the contracts 
do not contain economic or political conditions violating sovereign rights 
including the right to determine plans for economic development.125 The ideals 
of this resolution are further elaborated and captured in GA Resolution 626 (VII) 
which articulated the doctrine of economic self-determination. This resolution 
was the subject of heated debate and faced strong resistance by the United 
States and leading European countries; particularly the United States rejected 
this resolution because the resolution failed to mention obligation of states to 
recognize the rights of private investors under international law as well as 
obligations of states contained in treaties and other international agreements.126  
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The resilience of developing countries saw the adoption of GA Resolution 1314 
(XIII) of 1958. Specifically, this resolution was a victory for developing countries 
as it effectively recognised that the right to self-determination includes 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources. On the basis of this resolution, a 
Commission on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources was established 
made up of Afghanistan, Chile, Guatemala, the Netherlands, the Philippines, 
Sweden, Soviet Union, United Arab Republic and the United States. The 
commission was tasked with ascertaining the relationship between permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources with the right of self-determination. The 
work of the Commission resulted into the adoption of GA Resolution 1803 (XVII) 
which effectively declared permanent sovereignty over natural resources. 
Essentially, Resolution 1803 (XVII) enshrined permanent sovereignty over natural 
wealth and resources as an inherent component of the right to self-
determination.127 However, although the Resolution was adopted, this was not 
without heated debate in three sessions of the United Nations Commission on 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources followed by the thirty second 
session of the Economic and Social Council and the seventeenth session of the 
General Assembly.128  
During much of the deliberations, developed states unwaveringly opposed many 
draft provisions arguing that the spirit of the resolutions would enable 
developing countries to breach previously agreed contracts and concessions 
undertaken during the colonial era. Indeed, the wording of Resolution 1803 
(XVII) shows a delicate balancing of interests between developed and developing 
countries. Moreover, it should be noted that consensus of developed countries 
on sensitive issues such as expropriation, compensation, observance of 
investment agreements illustrates general understanding of earlier rules 
governing foreign investments.129 Further, the adoption of numerous resolutions 
and especially the adoption of the Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over 
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Natural Resources cannot be underestimated not only in the content the various 
resolutions articulated but also the successful convergence of developing 
countries along the same ideological reasoning demonstrates systemic rejection 
of previous rules regulating foreign investors. This thesis will not go into a 
detailed discussion of the resolution because a lot of ink has been dedicated to 
the substance of this resolution.130 Generally, it is critical to stress the 
importance of paragraph 4 and 8 of Resolution 1803 (XVII) which provide as 
follows:  
4. Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on 
grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest 
which are recognized as overriding purely individual or private 
interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases the owner shall be 
paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force 
in the State taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty 
and in accordance with international law. In any case where the 
question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, the national 
jurisdiction of the State taking such measures shall be exhausted. 
However, upon agreement by sovereign States and other parties 
concerned, settlement of the dispute should be made through 
arbitration or international adjudication (emphasis added). 
8. Foreign investment agreements freely entered into by or between 
sovereign States shall be observed in good faith; States and 
international organizations shall strictly and conscientiously respect 
the sovereignty of peoples and nations over their natural wealth and 
resources in accordance with the Charter and the principles set forth 
in the present resolution (emphasis added). 
It should be noted that although Resolution 1803 (XVII) attempted to balance 
competing interests between developed and developing countries, by and large, 
developed countries won the argument of the day. Specifically, the possibility of 
nationalisation of foreign property was accepted but with a caveat for 
appropriate compensation. Obviously, one can engage in semantics about 
whether compensation provided for under paragraph 4 above means prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation as articulated by Western scholars. 
Moreover, this can be followed with arguments whether foreign investors are 
entitled to no more than compensation stipulated under national laws-a position 
supported by Latin American countries, African states and Communist States. 
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However, what is evidently clear and based on the evolution of foreign 
investment rules during the colonial period such arguments would be flawed. At 
the heart of paragraph 4 is a silent reaffirmation of the international minimum 
standard advanced by developed states and rejected by developing states. 
Contextually, paragraph 4 should be read together with paragraph 8 which 
sought to reaffirm the credence of pacta sunt servanda as a binding principle of 
international law. Particularly, paragraph 8 imposes obligations on developing 
countries to respect commitments in good faith and ensures that developing 
countries although previously colonised are bound by contracts and concessions 
entered into with colonial powers. Inevitably, according to paragraph 8, this 
includes international agreements signed during colonialism despite the fact that 
colonised states did not have international personality. More broadly, the 
resolution remains aspirational in its efforts to clarify rules regulating foreign 
investment and the development of customary international law. 
1.3 From Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
to Demands for a New International Economic Order 
The African continent played a pivotal role in the demands for a new 
international economic order (NIEO) and in the creation of international 
institutions to articulate such demands. However, before situating Africa’s 
specific input, a few preliminary remarks are important highlighting the state of 
Africa in the period leading to decolonisation and the silent features influencing 
Africa’s participation in demanding for NIEO. As a starting point, it is worth 
mentioning that 1960’s are perhaps the most significant years in the history of 
contemporary Africa because this is the period when the African continent re-
asserted her role and place in international law.131 Even more, it was during this 
period that majority of African states acquired political independence and 
joined the league of sovereign states.132 During the early years of decolonisation, 
there was widespread faith that political independence and legal equality would 
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permit decolonised African states achieve autonomy and economic 
development.133 However, it was soon realised by African leaders that obstacles 
to self-determination were more formidable than had been previously 
anticipated.134 Particularly, despite acquiring independence the African 
continent remained impoverished and by far the most underdeveloped of Third 
World countries.135  
As correctly observed by numerous scholars, underdevelopment in the 1960’s 
throughout decolonised Africa can be partly attributed to the legacy of 
colonialism and the political institutions inherited after the colonial period.136 
For instance, in the aftermath of colonialism Britain ensured that even though 
African states under British protectorate achieved political independence African 
states would nevertheless be locked into a process of political dependency.137 
Specifically, formerly colonised African states under British control remained 
politically dependent on Britain because the institution of government under 
which the transition to legal independence was pursued depended on the British 
Westminster model of government.138 Obviously, given the structural 
dependence on former colonial powers and underdevelopment, newly 
decolonised African countries with the support of the NAM that represented 
Third World political and economic interests started demanding not only for 
political sovereignty but also complete economic liberation. 
More broadly, the gradual decolonization of African states coincided with and 
indeed catalysed the take-off stage of the Third World movement beyond the 
foundations laid at the 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung.139 At the first 
Asian-African Conference in Bandung, participants of the conference included 23 
Asian countries and 6 African countries i.e. Ethiopia, Egypt, Ghana, Liberia, 
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Libya and Sudan.140 Despite Africa’s low representation at the conference 
because at that time majority of African states were still under colonial 
administration, the contribution of participating African states was significant; 
Egypt’s Gamal Abd al-Nasser was influential during the drafting committees, 
leading one analyst to label him as ‘‘the hero of Bandung’ and indeed this paved 
the way for his ‘‘rapid emergence as one of the most prominent architects and 
leaders of the burgeoning Third-World movement’’.141  
Similarly, Africa’s contribution and influence at Bandung is demonstrated in the 
importance the conference assigned to human rights and self-determination of 
newly decolonized African states.142 It is on this basis that as more African 
countries acquired independence, the NAM grew in importance because African 
states provided the NAM the numerical strength to legitimately express third 
world concerns within the Third-World framework.143 Aside from the African 
continent playing host to summits of the NAM, from the 1960’s onwards, African 
countries represented the majority of the participants. Specifically, starting 
with the 1964 Cairo Non-Aligned Summit out of 47 participating countries 29 
were African. At the 1970 Lusaka Summit out of the 53 participating countries 32 
were African states. During the 1973 Algiers Summit out of the 75 participating 
countries 40 were African states. At the 1976 Colombo Summit out of 85 
participating countries 47 were African states. Finally in the 1979 Havana 
Summit out of the 92 participating countries 50 were African states.144  
Aside from strengthening the membership base of the Non-Aligned Movement in 
the most critical years, Africa provided some of the most instrumental leaders 
that shaped the direction the movement followed to articulate third world 
concerns. For example, Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah was one of the founding 
members of the NAM and significantly influenced newly independent African 
states to join the movement and unite under a common agenda.145 Similarly, 
other African leaders such as Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Julius Nyerere of 
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Tanzania through transforming the NAM ensured that African developments and 
concerns bore profoundly on the movement’s purpose and direction.146 Most 
importantly, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania provided the intellectual and ideological 
position through which third world countries could express demands for the 
establishment of a NIEO.147 Furthermore, Africa was instrumental to the birth of 
the NAM through hosting the preparatory meeting of Representatives of Non-
Aligned Countries for the Belgrade Summit.148 More importantly, it is also at this 
Cairo meeting of 1961 that the movement proposed the First United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development within which the Group of 77 was born of 
which majority of states were African countries.149 Subsequently after the 
Belgrade Summit, Cairo hosted the July 1962 Conference on the Problems of 
Developing Countries and among the eleven sponsors seven were African 
countries.150  
Among the resolutions of the Cairo conference included the Cairo Declaration of 
Developing Countries which called for an international conference within the 
United Nations framework on ‘‘all vital questions related to international trade, 
primary commodity trade and economic relations between developing and 
developed countries’’.151 It is after the Cairo solidarity that developing countries 
gained momentum to numerically influence the United Nations General Assembly 
to annex the Declaration of seventy five developing countries to the United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 1897(XVII) which called for the creation of 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).152 African 
states actively participated and rapidly signed the Declaration.153 The passage of 
the Declaration was not without stiff resistance from developed countries. The 
passage of the Declaration portrays how African states used numerical 
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dominance to influence international economic issues favourable to the African 
continent. Generally, considering the stiff resistance developed countries 
mounted against the UNCTAD Declaration, it is plausible to note that without 
Africa’s active participation the General Assembly would never have adopted the 
Declaration. More broadly, during much of the NAM and General Assembly 
deliberations, the attitude adopted by African states towards various 
international law issues was influenced by a number of factors that include inter 
alia, Africa’s historical background especially the colonial past, the negative 
impact of traditional international law on African states, Africa present 
preoccupation with national reconstruction, and the existing disparity in wealth, 
trade and power between developed and developing countries.154 Also, African 
countries identified traditional international law with the past order and viewed 
existing international rules as a detriment to the promotion of African national 
interests and international personality.155  
It is the deep-rooted resentment towards customary international law principles 
developed during Africa’s colonisation that influenced Africa’s decisive 
participation in shaping the agenda of the Non-Aligned Movement. Indeed, this 
subsequently influenced African states to use their numerical dominance within 
the United Nations General Assembly156 to demand for the establishment of a 
New International Economic Order (NIEO). Outside the corridors of the United 
Nations, African municipal investment laws also witnessed rapid transformation 
because majority of African states believed that investment laws created the 
desired framework necessary for the implementation of development plans.157 
Given this, it is unsurprising that in decolonised Africa of all the existing laws, 
investment laws were the first set of laws to undergo detailed revision.158  
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As African states implemented changes in national investment laws, the African 
continent at an international level with the alliance of other formerly colonised 
states used the newly acquired freedom to question the status quo and 
demanded for balanced international rules. Specifically, African states and other 
third world countries asserted that although the existing economic order worked 
well for developed countries this was to the detriment of developing states.159 
This argument was not without merit; for example in early 1950’s developing 
countries accounted for 32 per cent of world trade and by the end of 1972 
excluding oil exporting countries developing countries accounted for 10% of 
world trade.160 By contrast, from 1952 to 1972 the GDP of developed countries 
raised from $1,250 billion to $ 3,070 billion about three and a half times the 
aggregate GDP of developing countries.161  
Furthermore, exploration and regulation of oil products was dominated by 
multinationals which intensified sentiments of nationalism among oil producing 
countries.162 Particularly distressing for oil producing countries was the fact that 
multinationals controlled pricing policies, refinement, transport and marketing 
and earned exorbitant profits for themselves at the expense of oil producing 
countries.163 In addition, multinationals through the support of home states 
imposed high prices for oil products and provided quotas for national companies 
participating in the industry.164 As a result of the severe restrictions, oil 
producing countries started demanding effective control and formed the 
Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).165 After inception, 
OPEC set in motion an agenda of reappraising existing regulations, public 
awareness campaigns and started the first oil revolution defining new 
parameters for oil related policies.166 The Middle East war in October 1973 
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became the catalyst to unilaterally raise prices, impose embargoes and take 
total control of the oil industry and production line.167  
The Middle East power dynamics inspired developing countries interested in 
petroleum exploration as well as nationalisation to demand more national 
ownership which in turn refocused nationalisation from theoretical rhetoric to 
actual implementation.168 It was at the height of the oil crisis and the prevailing 
resistance over foreign dominance that the solidarity of formerly colonised 
states through the United Nations General Assembly passionately demanded for 
the establishment of a NIEO. This resulted into the adoption without a vote the 
Declaration on the establishment of NIEO and a programme of action for its 
implementation. The demands for nationalisation and the basis for a NIEO are 
elaborated in paragraph 4 of the declaration and stipulate as follows: 
4. The new international economic order should be founded on full 
respect for the following principles… (e) Full permanent sovereignty 
of every State over its natural resources and all economic activities. In 
order to safeguard these resources, each State is entitled to exercise 
effective control over them and their exploitation with means suitable 
to its own situation, including the right to nationalization or transfer 
of ownership to its nationals, this right being an expression of the full 
permanent sovereignty of the State. No State may be subjected to 
economic, political or any other type of coercion to prevent the free 
and full exercise of this inalienable right… 
Developing countries followed this strongly worded declaration with a 
programme of action for its implementation which included the following 
important provisions:  
1. Raw materials  
All efforts should be made: (a)To put an end to all forms of foreign 
occupation, racial discrimination, apartheid, colonial, neo-colonial 
and alien domination and exploitation through the exercise of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources; (b)To take measures 
for the recovery, exploitation, development, marketing and 
distribution of natural resources, particularly of developing countries, 
to serve their national interests, to promote collective self-reliance 
among them and to strengthen mutually beneficial international 
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economic co-operation with a view to bringing about the accelerated 
development of developing countries; … 
3. General Trade 
All efforts should be made… (b)To be guided by the principles of non-
reciprocity and preferential treatment of developing countries in 
multilateral trade negotiations between developed and developing 
countries, and to seek sustained and additional benefits for the 
international trade of developing countries so as to achieve a 
substantial increase in their foreign exchange earnings, diversification 
of their exports and acceleration of the rate of their economic 
growth. 
VIII. Assistance in the Exercise of Permanent Sovereignty of States 
over Natural Resources 
All efforts should be made: (a) To defeat attempts to prevent the free 
and effective exercise of the rights of every State to full and 
permanent sovereignty over its natural resources; (b)To ensure that 
competent agencies of the United Nations system meet requests for 
assistance from developing countries in connexion with the operation 
of nationalized means of production. 
The declaration establishing a NIEO and its programme of action are a reflection 
of the thinking and influence of the third world movement. Specifically, the 
passage of the Declaration demonstrates the robust efforts by African countries; 
Asia and Latin American countries to repeal laws on expropriation after realising 
that political independence does not necessarily translate into economic 
independence.169 Despite the legitimate demands of African states and the third 
world coalition, it is important to stress that the demands articulated in the 
NIEO are inherently contradictory and unbalanced because the advancement of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources, nationalisation and sovereignty 
was pushed to the extreme. Specifically, third world countries through adopting 
the declaration of a NIEO attempted imposing a new economic order that 
accords developing countries rights without obligations. In addition, the 
declaration of NIEO provided insufficient protection to foreign investors and 
unilaterally eliminated the possibility of applying the international minimum 
standard. Given the above, it is not surprising that developed countries rejected 
claims advanced under the NIEO framework. 
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Aside from pressing for the establishing of a NIEO third world countries using 
numerical superiority further pressed for the adoption of the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States.170 The Charter envisaged creating a new 
system of international economic relations based on equity, sovereign equality 
and interdependence of the interests of developed and developing countries. 
Unlike the Declaration for a NIEO, the Charter intended creating binding legal 
rules regulating economic relations between states. The Charter was 
overwhelmingly criticised and rejected by developed countries with a vote of 
120 in favour majority of whom are African states, 6 developed countries voted 
against (Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, United Kingdom and United States) and 
10 states abstained (Australia, Canada, France, Ireland, Israel Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway and Spain).171  
The Charter is a broad statement of principles covering inter alia the following; 
international trade, international economic co-operation, development of 
natural resources, industrialisation, sovereign equality of all states, transfer of 
technology, peaceful settlement of disputes, peaceful coexistence and non-
aggression.172 Whether the Charter constitutes customary international law rules 
regulating foreign investment is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, the 
voting pattern and circumstances surrounding the adoption renders such an 
argument doubtful. Article 2 regulating foreign investment serves as an 
illustration. It reads as follows; 
 2. Each State has the right: 
(a) To regulate and exercise authority over foreign investment within 
its national jurisdiction in accordance with its laws and regulations 
and in conformity with its national objectives and priorities. No State 
shall be compelled to grant preferential treatment to foreign 
investment… 
(c) To nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign 
property, in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by 
the State adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant 
                                                 
170 UN Documents, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3281(XXIX): Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States (A/RES/29/3281, 12 December 1974). 
171 UNCTAD, Proceedings of the United Nations Conference of Trade and Development Third 
Session (Vol.1, Report and Annexes 1A UN Pub., Sales NO: E.73.II.D4). 
172 Ibid. 
  
 51 
laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State considers 
pertinent. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise 
to a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of the 
nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and mutually 
agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful means be sought 
on the basis of the sovereign equality of States and in accordance with 
the principle of free choice of means. 
The purpose of article 2 is to replicate the famous Calvo doctrine that was 
contentious but popular among Latin American nations. Generally, it should be 
emphasised that the adoption of Article 2 demonstrates remarkable progress by 
Latin American nations in converging support among decolonised states of Africa 
and Asia for this controversial doctrine. Substantively, the unambiguous support 
for Article 2 by virtually all developing countries clearly illustrates that the 
Calvo doctrine was popular among African and Asian decolonised states. As 
mentioned above the adoption of article 2 shows that at a doctrinal level third 
world countries preferred national laws to supersede international law. 
However, doctrinally the standard of compensation adopted by the Charter was 
suspicious because the standard not only incorporated national laws but also 
overstated the interests of sovereign states above foreign investors. 
Furthermore, the Charter limited investor-state disputes to national jurisdiction 
without providing room for recourse to international arbitration. Similarly, 
although the Charter contributes to the evolution of foreign investment rules, 
the language of the Charter is one sided and does not balance the interests of 
developing countries vis-a-vis interests of developed states. More broadly, the 
Charter demonstrates the importance the United Nations played in serving as a 
platform for newly independent states as well as the unified position of formerly 
colonised states in demanding for investment rules favourable to national 
interests of third world countries.  
1.4 From New International Economic Order Demands to 
the Birth of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
The difficulty of concluding a binding multilateral investment framework and 
uncertainties about the scope and content of customary international law 
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protecting foreign investors resulted in the pursuit of BITs.173 More broadly, 
failed efforts towards multilateralism occurred alongside heated ideological 
differences between third world countries and Western states as espoused in the 
numerous United Nations declarations. This in turn stimulated developed 
countries seeking investment opportunities overseas to pursue such efforts at a 
bilateral level. More importantly, the successful adoption of numerous UN 
resolutions questioning the content of foreign investment rules illustrates 
difficulties of achieving consensus under a binding multilateral investment 
framework. Indeed, prior to BITs taking shape, there was attempt in the early 
1950’s to establish a magna charter for the protection of foreign investment 
containing binding standards and a permanent tribunal to enforce the Charter 
with authority to impose economic sanctions both for violating member states 
and non-signatory states.174  
Unsurprisingly, like other previous attempts in the United Nations, the Abs-
Shawcross Draft was not adopted because the Charter lacked sufficient backing 
from developing countries.175 However, this resulted in a second attempt under 
the auspices of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development-a 
forum of capital exporting countries.176 Unfortunately, the second attempt was 
also unsuccessful because of substantive differences between developed and 
developing countries about the content of international law regulating the 
protection of foreign investors.177 The underlying differences aside, elsewhere 
Germany was healing from losses suffered during World War II and was in need of 
overseas foreign revenue earnings.178 Against this backdrop, Germany initiated 
the first BIT in 1959 through the signing of the Pakistan-Germany BIT and 
thereafter ratified in 1962 its first BIT with Dominican Republic.179 Specifically, 
Germany opted for BITs as a mechanism of negotiating favourable investment 
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protection so as to regain foreign investment earnings lost in negotiated 
settlements for its role in violating rules of international law.180 Germany 
anticipated that by concluding BITs offering German investors adequate 
protection this would encourage German investors to undertake overseas foreign 
investment risks notwithstanding foreign investment losses suffered during the 
Second World War.181 
The successful conclusion of BITs between Germany and developing countries 
inspired enthusiasm among European countries searching for overseas 
investment opportunities to pursue similar initiatives.182 Even more, the success 
of Germany BITs was a relief to several European countries that had witnessed 
aggressive resistance to the international minimum standard, heated debates in 
the United Nations General Assembly and lukewarm support for United States 
FCN treaties. Accordingly, Switzerland concluded its first BIT with Tunisia in 
1961, France with Tunisia in 1972, Sweden with Ivory Coast in 1965, Denmark 
with Madagascar in 1965 and Italy with Guinea in 1964.183 As rhetoric for 
sovereignty and nationalisation deepened as well as continuous erosion of 
customary international law principles through adoption of numerous United 
Nations resolutions, the signing of BITs intensified.184 More industrialised 
countries such as the United Kingdom joined the BIT movement in 1975 followed 
by Japan in 1977 and finally the United States in 1977.185  
Generally, developed countries pursued the BIT option for purposes of obtaining 
superior legal protection for their home investors to circumvent protection 
accorded under domestic laws of capital importing states. As noted above, it 
was hoped that through offering foreign investors favourable legal protection 
this would incentivise foreign investors to invest in developing countries. On the 
other hand, developing countries concluded BITs as a means of attracting foreign 
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investors who are normally swayed by international protection and sceptical 
about national laws. In essence, developing countries pursue BITs for two 
intertwined objectives i.e. developing countries hope that BITs will offer 
sufficient legal protection to foreign investors who will subsequently be 
attracted to make long term financial investments. As previously noted, whether 
the reciprocal relationship envisaged by BITs is attainable remains doubtful. 
However, it should be noted that historically developed states found the BIT 
option attractive because BITs safeguarded against uncompensated expropriation 
which in turn minimised the possibility of foreign investors losing foreign 
investment undertakings but also consensus on a multilateral investment 
agreement was unattainable. Lastly, BITs as international agreements 
institutionalised the possibility for direct investor state arbitration through 
international arbitral tribunals.186   
Originally BITs were concluded between developed and developing countries 
although since the late 1980’s and especially in the 1990’s the pattern changed 
to also include BITs concluded between developing countries themselves.187 
However, despite the change in pattern significantly BITs remain largely 
between a developed and a developing country.188 Over the years the number of 
BITs has steadily increased, in the 1990s alone the number of BITs quintupled 
from 385 at the end of the 1980s and increased to 1,857 at the end of the 
1990s.189 The increase is attributed to the prevailing political, social and 
economic circumstances of the early 1990s and particularly during this period, 
the world witnessed collapse of the Soviet Union, unprecedented economic 
growth by the Asian tigers190 or newly industrialising countries and reduction in 
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foreign aid.191 More significantly, the collapse of the Soviet Union and success of 
the Asian tigers augmented in favour of liberalism as the best strategy for 
economic growth and prosperity.192 The economies of Asian tigers grew at a rate 
almost three times that of Latin American countries and about twenty five times 
that of African countries.193  
The remarkable growth experienced during this period persuaded advocates of 
liberalism that negative growth in developing countries resulted from excessive 
state intervention in the market place.194 Accordingly, free market theorists 
opined that developing countries needed to pursue policies that stimulated 
increased efficiency and economic growth which included inter alia policies 
promoting competitive free markets, privatising public enterprises, eliminating 
barriers to foreign investment, removing regulations and price distortions.195 The 
liberal school of thought was endorsed by the IMF and the World Bank and in 
turn this dominated economic policies designed for developing countries.196 
Furthermore, economists at the IMF and the World Bank conditioned financial 
support to developing countries based on economic policies that conformed to 
the ideals of the Washington Consensus.197 To this end, developing countries 
hard-pressed with economic uncertainties and without any better option 
subscribed to liberal economic policies.198 As a result, developing countries 
signed investment treaties as one mechanism of attracting foreign investment 
and show allegiance to free market advocates.199 In Africa, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union meant that Africa leaders no longer had to balance competing 
ideological differences between socialism and capitalism.200 Comparatively, 
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unlike Latin American countries, Africa leaders easily embraced the Washington 
consensus without major resistance. The World Bank’s intense support for 
liberalism is conservatively based on its earlier stance towards demands for PSNR 
by developing countries.201 
Indeed, despite relentless debates for permanent sovereignty, the World Bank 
enthusiastically supported Aron Broches initiative augmenting protection of 
foreign investors.202 This initiative materialised in 1965 when the Convention for 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other 
States (ICSID) was brought for ratification and signature.203 The ICSID Convention 
become operational on 14 October 1966 and contained within it the 
establishment of an International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes and as will be exhaustively discussed in chapter 5, the ICSID framework 
was deemed as a unique innovation for promoting international investment and 
cooperation among poorer nations.204  Specifically the Convention introduced the 
following innovations; (i) investors acquired the right to directly bring 
investment disputes against sovereign states,205 (ii) contracting states were 
prohibited from using diplomatic protection,206 (iii) international law was the 
applicable law for investment disputes, (iv) exhaustion of local remedies was 
removed, (v) awards by the tribunal were binding and not subject to any 
appeal.207 
During the early years, provisions dealing with settlement of disputes under 
ICSID appeared only as standard clauses in international investment contracts.208 
However, as momentum for BITs and investment agreements intensified, ICSID 
arbitration clauses become the standard blueprint. As will be discussed in 
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Chapter 5, direct investor-state arbitration is valuable from the point of view of 
investors because it minimises political complications involved in the use of 
diplomatic protection. In essence, through relying on BITs, investors have the 
right to directly bring investment claims against sovereign states.  For instance 
from 1987, the year of the first investor-state dispute based on a BIT up to April 
1998, investors brought 14 cases against host states before the ICSID arbitral 
framework.209 Over the years, foreign investors have maximised the dispute 
resolution mechanism and by the end of 2011, treaty based disputes totalled 369 
cases.210 Presently, over two thousand BITs have self-contained clauses 
submitting jurisdiction of investment disputes under the ICSID arbitral system.211 
The raise in investor state disputes can be attributed to exponential growth in 
BITs that elevated the jurisdiction of investment disputes from domestic courts 
to international arbitration. 
The acceptance of investment arbitration is exceptional especially from the 
perspective of Latin American nations that resisted previous attempts in support 
of the Calvo doctrine. However, lately there seems to be a breakdown in the 
Washington Consensus with continuous claims that arbitral tribunals have 
expansively interpreted provisions contained in investment treaties.212 The 
backlash is akin to the numerous UN deliberations and resolutions resenting the 
content of international law and the avowed support for the Calvo doctrine. If 
we are to go by the current denunciation of ICSID Convention by Ecuador, Bolivia 
and Venezuela,213 the present resentment towards international arbitration 
suggests history may be repeating itself within a short period. Although, it is 
premature to write the obituary of modern investment arbitral system, the 
denunciation sheds light about the feelings of countries towards international 
investment arbitration. As will be discussed in subsequent parts of this thesis 
                                                 
209 UNCTAD, Latest Development in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (Issue note No.1, 
UNCTAD April 2012) 3 <http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaeia2012d10_en.pdf> 
accessed 20 May 2012. 
210 ICSID, The ICSID Caseload-Statistics Issue 2012-1(ICSID Secretariat 2012) 7. 
211 UNCTAD, World Investment Report: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and 
Development (UN Pub. Sales No. E.11.II.D.2, 2011) 100. 
212 For a quick synopsis of varying opinions see Michael Waibel and others, The Backlash 
against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality (Kluwer Law International 2010). 
213 Article 71 of the ICSID Convention stipulates that contracting states may denounce the 
convention by written notice. On the basis of this article Ecuador denounced the convention 
on 7th July 2009, Bolivia on May 2007 and Venezuela on January 24, 2012. 
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through an in-depth analysis of substantive provisions of African BITs, it is only a 
matter of time before African countries join the chorus of resistance.  
Aside from BITs, a number of regional agreements have been concluded between 
developed and developing countries as well as between developing countries. 
However, it should be noted that there are remarkable differences between 
provisions included in regional agreements and those included in BITs. 
Specifically, regional agreements contain both trade and investment provisions 
presumably because of the need for market access and elimination of non-tariff 
barriers across the regional trading block. For instance, in 1994 the United 
States, Canada and Mexico concluded the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) which contains trade and under Chapter 11 investment provisions.214 
Other regional agreements include, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) Comprehensive Investment Agreement,215 the Treaty Establishing the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA),216 the Unified 
Agreement for the Investment of Arab Capital in the Arab States217 and the 
Energy Charter Treaty.218  
It should be stressed that the approach of African states in the 1960’s and 1970’s 
sharply differs from existing practice of African states. Specifically, in the 1960’s 
and 1970’s African states articulated views as one bloc and actively participated 
in deliberations of the Non-Aligned Movement. Indeed, African states provided 
both the intellectual leadership as well as the required numerical strength at the 
United Nations General Assembly which provided broad support for declarations 
demanding a New International Order and the establishment of institutions such 
as UNCTAD. As noted above, throughout this period, the prevailing view in 
African states was a deep resentment towards customary international law 
principles. This resentment lead majority of African states to implement 
                                                 
214 NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement <http://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/en/view.aspx?conID=590&mtpiID=142> accessed 20 May 2012. 
215 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, Cha-am Thailand, 26 February 2009, 
<http://www.aseansec.org/22244.htm> accessed 20 May 2012. 
216 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (1993) <http://www.comesa.int> 
accessed 20 May 2012. 
217 Unified Agreement for the Investment of Arab Capital in the Arab States (1980) 
<http://www.trans-lex.org>accessed 20 May 2012. 
218 The Energy Charter Treaty, (1994) < http://www.encharter.org> accessed 20 May 2012. 
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national investment laws contradicting customary law standards on 
expropriation. Considering, the fierce resistance mounted by African states 
rejecting international investment rules, subsequent practice of African states is 
surprising. The rhetoric pursued by African states has not only subdued through 
undertaking BITs as a mechanism of attracting foreign investors but also African 
states have remained generally passive and easily accepted treaty standards. In 
fact clauses of modern BITs as will shortly be seen in subsequent parts of this 
thesis offer investors substantive protection above that articulated by traditional 
international law. For instance, in addition to the international minimum 
standard of treatment, modern BITs provide investors with rights such as fair and 
equitable treatment, full security and protection, national treatment and MFN 
treatment.  
Whether arbitral tribunals have expansively interpreted BIT provisions will be 
examined in later parts of the thesis but in the interim, it is worth mentioning 
that BITs have been embraced by virtually all developing countries and 
surprisingly this includes African countries, Latin American countries with the 
exception of Brazil and Mexico. Through embracing detailed international 
arbitration, Latin American countries and formerly colonised states have but in 
one voice swallowed the pride of the Calvo doctrine requiring domestic 
jurisdiction over international arbitration. Indeed, the deep-rooted rhetoric in 
UN buildings about formation of a NIEO and related resolutions can optimistically 
be described as historical statements contributing to the advancement and 
understanding of international law. More broadly, at the core of the BIT 
consensus begs the question whether the patchwork of BIT provisions can be said 
to have crystallised into customary international law regulating foreign 
investment.219 
                                                 
219 Whether BITs have crystallised into customary international law is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. For varying opinions on this issue see FA Mann, ‘British Treaties for the Protection of 
Investments’ (1981) 52 BYIL 241; Stephen M Schwebel, ‘The Influence of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties in Customary International Law’ (2004) 98 Am.Soc’y Int’l L. Proc 217; Andrew T 
Guzman, ‘Why Countries Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties’ (1998) 38 Va. J. Int’l L 639. 
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1.5 The Paradox and Structure of African BITs   
Three preliminary remarks about the practice of African states deserve mention 
before a brief commentary on the structure of African BITs. Firstly, as seen from 
the historical rivalry discussed above and especially attempts to rewrite rules of 
international investment law through numerous United Nations resolutions and 
declarations, the practice of African states suggests that when African states are 
acting collectively at the international level, African states are usually 
apprehensive about rules regulating foreign investors and as a result profoundly 
contest international attempts aimed at building consensus towards multilateral 
investment framework. Secondly, the practice of African states is remarkably 
contradictory because the same rules regulating foreign investment African 
states resist in numerous international forums easily find passage without much 
resistance at the bilateral level. Lastly and most importantly, substantive 
investment rules African states consent to at the bilateral level through BITs 
offer foreign investors far superior protection compared to similar rules African 
states reject at the international level. Given this, the practice of African states 
suggests that at a bilateral level, African states are driven by political and 
economic realities peculiar to each state while at the international level African 
states are motivated by the collective desire to safeguard state sovereignty. In 
light of this consideration and especially because collective rejection of 
investment rules at the international level has minimum consequences to 
respective African constituencies there is more latitude for African states to 
assert sovereignty centred sentiments at the international level.  
However, at the bilateral level, since each African state acts individually raising 
sovereign centred arguments against powerful developed states is difficult 
especially when the intention and language of the treaty includes the reciprocal 
duty to encourage the transfer of capital into the African state. Briefly without 
an in-depth assessment of the substantive provisions as these provisions will 
thoroughly be discussed in chapters 2,3,4,5 and 6; African BITs generally follow 
the following structure; typically, African BITs proceed with a title section that 
usually indicates contracting states part to the treaty and the intended purpose 
of the treaty. Generally, the title sections of African BITs follow two formalities; 
the first formality, for example is captured in the United Kingdom-Kenya BIT 
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that reads as follows; ‘‘Agreement between the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the 
Republic of Kenya for the Promotion and Protection of Investments’’.220 Another 
variation is the Cameroon-United States BIT which reads as follows; ‘‘Treaty 
between the United States of America and the Republic of Cameroon Concerning 
the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment’’.221 The wording of 
the two titles though different have minor substantive differences because each 
of the formalities clearly encapsulate the principal purpose of the BIT as 
protecting and promoting foreign investment between the two contracting 
states.  
However, from the wording of the two formalities, since the two contracting 
states have an asymmetrical relationship where the title envisages reciprocal 
encouragement of investment, there is scope for African states with such 
                                                 
220 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Kenya for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments (Treaty Series No. 8, 2000). See also similar wording in the Agreement between 
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United 
Republic of Tanzania for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (Treaty Series No. 90, 
1996); Agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the Government of the 
Italian Republic for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (2001); Agreement between 
the Government of the Republic of Finland and the Government of the Republic of Kenya for 
the Promotion and Protection of Investments (19 June 2001); Agreement between the 
Kingdom of Denmark and the Government of the Republic of Ghana for the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments (13 January 1992);Agreement for the Protection and Promotion of 
Investments between the Republic of Ghana and the Arab Republic of Egypt (11 March 1998); 
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the Government of the 
Republic of Guinea for the Promotion and Protection of Investments ; Agreement between the 
Government of the Republic of Ghana and the Government of Malaysia for the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments ; Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Korea and 
the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments (March 17, 2005). For a complete database of African BITs see 
<http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch.aspx?id=779>accessed 20 May 2012. 
221 Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Cameroon Concerning 
the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (USTR, Nov 27, 1984). See also 
similar wording in the Federal Republic of Germany and Burundi Treaty Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (No. 26278, 10 Sept 1984); 
Agreement betwen the Government of the Peoples Republic of China and the Government of 
the Republic of Ghana Concerning the Encouragmenet and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments (12 October 1989); Treaty Between Federal Republic of Germany and the 
Republic of Kenya Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (3 
May 1996) [Hereafter Germany-Kenya BIT]; Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of 
Ghana; Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government 
of the Republic of Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investment ;Treaty between Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Tanzania 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (20 Jan 1965);Treaty 
between the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Zaire 
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment. 
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wording to argue for special and differential treatment in the interpretation of 
the BIT as a whole. Moreover, it should be stressed that encouragement in the 
title section suggests the capital exporting state (usually developed state) must 
and should facilitate investment flows to an African state part to the BIT. In 
essence considering that the BIT is concluded between two unequal parties i.e. 
African state (weak party/capital importing state) and capital exporting state 
(usually superior states) when the title clearly emphasizes reciprocity towards 
encouraging investment between the two states, arbitral tribunals should 
cumulatively give equal weight to both the protective aspect of the BIT and the 
reciprocal duty to encourage investments.222 
Put succinctly when the title section explicitly mentions ‘‘encouragement’’ this 
suggests that arbitral tribunals interpreting substantive treaty standards or the 
totality of the BIT must be mindful of both the protective and developmental 
aspects of the BIT.223 African BITs usually follow the title section with a 
preamble which essentially details the intended purpose of the BIT. Although the 
content and scope of African preambles will be discussed shortly, in the interim 
it is worth noting that the preamble language of African BITs are elaborate but 
conclusively vague.224 Generally, African preambles are followed with a 
definition section that defines key concepts and the overall scope of the treaty 
and this is further followed with treaty standards that include inter alia, MFN, 
national treatment, expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, arbitrary and 
discriminatory treatment, full protection and security.225 Last but by no means 
least, African treaty standards are often followed with detailed dispute 
settlement clauses and provisions for entry into force and termination of the 
treaty. Clearly from the structure of African BITs, it would be beyond the scope 
of this thesis to exhaustively scrutinise each of the treaty provisions. Given this, 
the second part of the thesis selectively examines the most contentious treaty 
provisions articulated in African BITs and discusses how inclusion of such 
provisions restrains legitimate policy making space of African states. 
Specifically, the second part of this thesis focuses on the scope and definition 
                                                 
222 For a detailed discussion of this issue and related issues see Chapter 2. 
223 For more details on the developmental aspect see Chapter 2. 
224 For a detailed discussion of African preambles see Chapter 2. 
225 For detailed discussion see Chapter 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
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clause, expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, and dispute settlement 
mechanisms. As previously stressed the selection of these provisions is premised 
on the fact that policy making space of African states will seriously be 
constrained depending on the interpretation arbitral tribunals’ accord to these 
four treaty provisions.  
1.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the evolution of modern investment law and 
demonstrated the contribution of African states at each of the evolutional 
stages. Specifically, through reviewing African treaty practice the chapter has 
shown that although the contribution of Africa was interrupted during the 
colonial period, after decolonisation Africa played an active role in shaping 
international investment rules favourable to the African continent. The 
contribution of African states is evident not only in African states comprising 
majority membership as well as hosting majority of the NAM conferences but 
also through the critical leadership African states provided. Indeed, it was 
through the solidarity of African states and the stewardship of African leaders 
that the NAM successfully institutionalised UNCTAD and pressed for the 
Declaration demanding a NIEO. 
Moreover, African leaders provided the ideological framework within which to 
articulate third world interests and also galvanised support for the NAM agenda. 
In essence therefore, Africa has traditionally played an active role in the 
development of international investment law though such a role seems to have 
receded after the inception of BITs. Presently, the African voice so to speak 
remains largely confirmatory to the status quo with each African state driven by 
political and economic realities peculiar to its own economic interests. This in 
essence has resulted into a situation where African states generally acquiesce to 
model BITs developed by capital exporting states without questioning the 
premise of these treaties. The general passiveness of African states in the 
development of international investment law has consequences which will be 
discussed in subsequent chapters. As the investment regime undergoes increased 
resistance based on Africa’s traditional participation, one would have expected 
African countries to be part of the cohort of countries advocating for changes to 
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existing rules. However, as Latin American countries express increased 
resistance to the prevailing system, African states with the exception of South 
Africa have remained silent. The thesis now proceeds to a detailed discussion of 
African BITs focusing on the most controversial provisions and the evolving 
jurisprudence that an awakened Africa should and must seriously reconsider in 
future treaty negotiations.  
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Part Two Introductory Note: Analysis of the Most 
Contentious Treaty Provisions in African Treaty Practice  
The first part of the thesis reviewed the evolution of foreign investment law and 
highlighted the contribution of African states at various stages of the 
evolutionary process. Specifically, the first part of the thesis demonstrated that 
traditionally African states have played a relevant role in the development of 
international investment law although this has significantly diminished after the 
inception of BITs on the African continent. Obviously, the reasons underlying 
Africa’s passive participation are many but the most important one seems the 
premise on which African states pursue BITs. Having reviewed Africa’s 
contribution to the development of international investment law and concluded 
that Africa states have regressed from the status of relevant participants to 
passive observes, the second part of the thesis builds on this foundation and 
examines whether African BITs conform or differ from general investment treaty 
practice. While exploring Africa’s investment treaty practice, chapters 2-6 also 
raises awareness to the policy effects of African treaty standards which are 
usually ignored by African states in BIT negotiations. 
The second part of the thesis focuses on actual treaty standards included in 
African BITs and how the treaty standards have been interpreted in arbitral 
practice. The reasons for focusing on actual treaty standards are fairly 
straightforward-African states have traditionally rejected the 
internationalisation of foreign investment rules based on sentiments of 
sovereignty but have in equal measure passively submitted to the conclusion of 
BITs containing far-reaching treaty provisions. It is such peculiar inconsistencies 
within the foundation of African investment law that makes a detailed review of 
African treaty provisions important. Given this, the second part of the thesis 
examines whether African treaty standards conform or differ from general 
investment treaty practice and the extent to which the articulated treaty 
provisions restrain legitimate policy making of African states. This in turn raises 
awareness to the controversy entrenched in substantive treaty standards, the 
suitability of treaties concluded by African states and the possibility of drafting 
more acceptable rules that balance the interests of African states vis-à-vis 
interests of foreign investors. 
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One preliminary remark is important, part two of the thesis only discuses four 
treaty standards which in the opinion of the present author are the most 
controversial and far-reaching. It should be stressed that although ideally the 
thesis should have examined all African BIT treaty standards but for purposes of 
a more focused study such pursuit would have been beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Nevertheless, the thesis discusses the most controversial standards that 
foreign investors usually invoke in investment arbitral practice. The discussion 
proceeds with Chapter 2 which examines the scope and definition clauses 
articulated in African BITs followed with the standard of expropriation (Chapter 
3), the obligation of fair and equitable treatment (Chapter 4), the dispute 
settlement provisions (Chapter 5) and finally the thesis concludes with a forward 
looking section (Chapter 6). 
 In terms of jurisprudence, the analysis in chapter 2-5 includes African cases and 
other arbitral cases where arbitral tribunals have interpreted provisions similar 
to those stipulated in African BITs. As noted above, African states have 
concluded close to 767 BITs of which 622 have been concluded between an 
African state and a developed country while 145 have been concluded between 
African state parties.226 Comparatively within Africa, the majority of BITs have 
been concluded between developed states and Sub-Saharan African countries 
and cumulatively Sub-Saharan African have entered into 507 BITs of all existing 
African BITs. In terms of regional distribution, the West African region has 
concluded 205 BITs, East African region has concluded 178 BITs and the Southern 
Africa region has concluded 124 BITs.227 However, it should be noted that 
although BITs remain popular on the African continent, not all of them have 
been applied in litigation. It is for this reason that Chapters 2-5, look to arbitral 
practice outside Africa especially where the wording of the treatment standard 
is similar to that articulated in African treaty practice. Similarly, as will be 
discussed shortly, the investment treaty practice of African states generally 
conforms to general treaty practice followed elsewhere. Given the similarities, 
the evolving arbitral jurisprudence though not binding serves a persuasive value 
to the interpretation of African BITs.  
                                                 
226 Karel Daele, ‘Investment Disputes across Africa: Lessons to Be Learned From’ (2012) 2 
<http://www.africanlaw.org/images/papers/daelepaper.pdf>accessed 20 May 2012. 
227 Ibid. 
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Chapter 2 
The Scope and Definition Clauses of African Bilateral 
Investment Treaties 
Introduction 
Over the last decade, the scope and definition clauses articulated in BITs have 
undergone unprecedented scrutiny as more claimants and respondents enforce 
them with the objective of either constraining or expanding the jurisdiction of 
arbitral tribunals. As expounded in recent cases such as Biwater v Tanzania, 
Hamester v Ghana, Patrick Mitchell v Congo, Fedax v Venezuela, Salini v 
Morocco, the wording of the scope and definition clauses can and do raise a 
range of interconnected procedural challenges which include issues such as, 
whether the transaction constitutes an investment, whether the investor or 
transaction complied with host state laws and whether the investor has locus 
standi. At the jurisdictional level therefore, scope and definition clauses are the 
basis upon which arbitral tribunals assess whether assets and investors qualify 
for treaty protection and thereby decide whether the tribunal has jurisdiction 
over the dispute. In essence, the wording of a treaty’s scope and definition 
clauses articulate the contracting state’s obligations towards investors and 
covered investments and is the basis upon which arbitral tribunals acquire 
jurisdiction over treaty claims.1   
However, as subsequent parts of this chapter will demonstrate, the scope and 
definition clauses contained in most BITs are vaguely worded and the intention 
of contracting states is unclear. In addition, vital concepts such as what 
constitutes an investment are not defined coupled with the fact that there is no 
universally accepted definition for the term investment. This indeed stresses the 
importance of making treaty language unambiguous. Given the lack of a precise 
definition for the concept ‘investment’, arbitral tribunals use their own 
discretion to determine whether transaction constitute an investment. On the 
basis of this discretion, arbitral tribunals have developed a set of characteristics 
used to establish whether transactions qualify for treaty protection. However, 
                                                 
1 Jeswald W Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (OUP 2010) 158. 
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the characteristics developed through arbitral practice have created conflicting 
opinions especially when the disputed transaction is not explicitly articulated as 
an investment in the relevant treaty.2 Moreover, since the concept of 
investment is broadly construed, a number of key challenges have arisen such 
as, what criteria should be used to determine the distinction between an 
ordinary commercial transaction and an investment and whether bank 
guarantees, loans and promissory notes qualify as investments.3 Apart from the 
definition of investment, the definition of investor remains contentious 
especially the need for investors to establish an effective link between 
corporate nationality and contracting states.4  
Taken as a whole therefore, whether a person or company is an investor or 
whether transactions constitute ‘investments’ are important jurisdictional 
challenges that cannot be taken lightly.5 More importantly, if transactions or 
investors fall outside the scope of the treaty this simultaneously means that the 
investor or transactions cannot claim treaty protection and by extension arbitral 
tribunals lack jurisdiction over the dispute.6 To this end, procedural 
requirements encapsulated in the scope and definition clauses are as important 
as the substantive standards stipulated in the treaty. Against this backdrop, this 
chapter examines the scope and definition clauses articulated in African BITs 
and situates the practice of African states within the broad investment treaty 
practice. For purposes of clarity and contextualising the scope of African BITs, 
the chapter commences the discussion by briefly exploring the intention and 
purpose of African BITs as expressed in the preamble. The chapter then 
undertakes a detailed discussion of the most pressing concerns associated with 
the scope and definition clauses of African BITs which include inter alia, what 
constitutes an investment, the meaning of in accordance with laws and 
regulations, the definition of investor as well as the territorial and temporal 
                                                 
2 See, Fedax N.V. v Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Jurisdiction, July 11, 1997 
[Hereafter Fedax v Venezuela]; Salini Costruttori S.P.A and Italstrade S.P.A v Morocco, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/00/4, Jurisdiction, July 23, 2001 [Hereafter Salini v Morocco]; Biwater Gauff 
Ltd v United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, July 18, 2008 
[Hereafter Biwater v Tanzania]. 
3 UNCTAD, Scope and Definition Clause: UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment 
Agreements II (UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/20120/2, UN Pub. Sales No. 11.II.D.9, 2011) 6-10.  
4 Ibid.  
5 Jeswald W Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (OUP 2010) 158. 
6 Ibid. 
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scope. Through this analysis, the chapter underscores the practical policy 
implications resulting from the scope and definition clauses of African BITs.   
2.1 The Preambles of African BITs  
Before examining the preamble language, some preliminary remarks about the 
titles of African BITs are worth emphasising. As noted earlier, African BITs have 
some slight variations in the titles used and such phrases include reciprocal and 
mutual protection,7 encouragement and reciprocal protection of investment,8 
economic cooperation.9 However, substantively, there appears to be no 
apparent difference between the various phrases used by African BITs. In 
essence, as stressed above whether the title of African BITs are worded using 
the expression promotion and protection of foreign investment or reciprocal and 
                                                 
7 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Mauritius and the Government of 
the Republic of Ghana for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments  [Hereafter 
Mauritius-Ghana BIT]; Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of 
Bulgaria and the Government of the Republic of Ghana Concerning the Mutual Promotion and 
Protection of Investments  [Hereafter Bulgaria-Ghana BIT]; Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union 
and the United Republic of Cameroon Convention Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments (No. 21155, 27 March 1980) [Hereafter Belgium-Cameroon BIT]; 
Agreement between the Government of the  Republic of India and the Government of the 
Republic of Ghana Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments (June 
23, 2000) [Hereafter India-Ghana BIT];  Agreement of United Republic of Tanzania and the 
Government of the Kingdom of Sweden on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments (1 Sept 1999) [Hereafter Tanzania-Sweden BIT]. 
8 Treaty Between Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Kenya Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (3 May 1996) [Hereafter Germany-
Kenya BIT]; Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Republic of Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investment  [Hereafter United States-Rwanda BIT]; Federal Republic of Germany 
and Burundi Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments 
(No. 26278, 10 Sept 1984) [Hereafter Germany-Burundi BIT]; Agreement on Encouragement 
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the 
Republic of Ghana [Hereafter Netherlands-Ghana BIT]; Treaty between the United Republic of 
Tanzania and Government of the  Kingdom of Denmark Concerning the Promotion and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investment (22 April 1996) [Hereafter Tanzania-Denmark BIT]; 
Agreement on Encouragement and  Reciprocal Protection of Investment between the United 
Republic of Tanzania and Government of the  Kingdom of the Netherlands (27 Sept 2002) 
[Hereafter Tanzania-Netherlands BIT]; Agreement between the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Ghana Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (12 October 1989) [Hereafter China-
Ghana BIT]; Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Cameroon 
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (USTR, Nov 27, 1984) 
[Hereafter United States-Cameroon BIT]; Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union and Rwanda 
Convention Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments (No. 23577, 2 
Nov 1988) [Hereafter Belgium-Rwanda BIT]; Treaty Between Federal Republic of Germany and 
the United Republic of  Tanzania Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments (30 Jan 1965) [Hereafter Germany-Tanzania BIT]. 
9 Agreement on Encouragement Economic Co-operation between the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and the Government of the Republic of Kenya [Hereafter Netherlands-Kenya BIT]. 
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mutual protection, the difference is one of choice of words rather than 
substance. After lengthy worded titles, African BITs follow the title section with 
elaborate but vague preambles. The preamble language as expressed in African 
BITs can be categorized into three broad categories, (i) preambles stressing the 
desire to create favourable conditions for greater economic cooperation,10 (ii) 
preambles incorporating favourable economic conditions with the obligation of 
fair and equitable treatment and MFN,11 (iii) preambles that seek to strengthen 
traditional ties of friendship so as to extend and intensify economic relations to 
encourage investments on an equal basis for mutual benefit.12  
From the three formulations, predominantly most African BIT preambles stress 
the desire to create favourable economic conditions for both contracting states 
as the principle purpose of the treaty. Furthermore, the preamble language 
suggests that African states envision protecting foreign investors as a necessary 
requirement to increased foreign investment flows. Clearly from the spirit and 
purpose of the preamble language, it is evident that African states undertake 
BITs under the perceived notion real or imagined that the BIT will contribute to 
increased transfer of foreign capital. For instance the preamble of the Tanzania-
Italy BIT reads as follows:  
                                                 
10 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the United Republic of Cameroon for the Promotion and Protection of Investments 
(Treaty Series No. 40, 1985) [Hereafter United Kingdom-Cameroon BIT]; Agreement between 
the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the Government of the Republic of Benin for 
the Promotion and Protection of Investments [Hereafter Ghana-Benin BIT]; Agreement for the 
Protection and Promotion of Investments between the Republic of Ghana and the Arab 
Republic of Egypt (11 March 1998) [Hereafter Ghana-Egypt]; Ghana-Mauritius BIT; Germany-
Kenya BIT; United States-Rwanda BIT; Agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania 
and the Government of the Italian Republic for the Promotion and Protection of Investments 
(2001)  [Hereafter Tanzania-Italy BIT] ;Burundi-Germany BIT; Agreement between the 
Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (March 17, 2005) [Hereafter Congo-
Korea]; Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the Government of 
the Republic of Guinea for the Promotion and Protection of Investments  [Hereafter Ghana-
Guinea BIT]; Belgium-Cameroon BIT; United Kingdom-Congo BIT; Agreement betwen the 
Government of the Peoples Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Ghana 
Concerning the Encouragmenet and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (12 October 1989) 
[Hereafter China-Ghana BIT]; India-Ghana BIT; Agreement between the Government of Ghana 
and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania on the Mutual Protection and 
Guarantee of Investments (14 Sep 1989) [Hereafter Ghana-Romania BIT]; United Kingdom-
Kenya BIT; Tanzania-Finland BIT; Malaysia-Ghana- BIT; United Kingdom-Ghana BIT; Germany-
Tanzania- BIT; United Kingdom-Tanzania BIT. 
11 See for instance Netherlands-Ghana BIT; Tanzania-Denmark BIT; Tanzania-Finland BIT; 
United States-Cameroon BIT; United States-Congo BIT; Ghana-Denmark BIT and Belgium-
Rwanda BIT. 
12 See for e.g. Netherlands-Kenya BIT and Netherlands-Tanzania BIT. 
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Desiring to expand and strengthen economic and industrial 
cooperation on a long term basis, and in particular, to create 
favourable conditions for investments by investors of one Contracting 
Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party; Recognizing the 
need to protect investments by investors of both Contracting parties 
and to stimulate the flow of investments and individual business 
initiative with a view to promoting the economic prosperity of both 
Contracting Parties; 
Aside from this formulation, some preambles of African BITs are negotiated with 
the intention of strengthening traditional ties of friendship and intensifying 
economic relations.13 Surprisingly the formulation of ‘strengthening traditional 
ties of friendship’ is included in BITs of capital exporting states that have had 
limited or no traditional ties with African states.14 Clearly, one would have 
expected this formulation to be more profound in BITs of capital exporting states 
with colonial ties to African states. At the core of the preamble formulation is 
the assumption that protecting foreign investors will stimulate capital and 
technology flows and lead to economic development mutually beneficial to both 
contracting states.15 Perhaps the most expansive preambles even though these 
are rarely used are preambles incorporating the obligation of fair and equitable 
treatment.16 There are a number of ways the obligation of fair and equitable 
treatment is incorporated into the preamble language and typically such clauses 
read as follows:   
Desiring to create favourable conditions for investments in both states 
and to intensify the cooperation between private enterprises in both 
states with a view to stimulating the productive use of resources, 
recognizing that a fair and equitable treatment of investments on a 
reciprocal basis will serve this aim…   
In the vast majority of preambles of African BITs, the last paragraph normally 
envisions that the encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments will 
be conducive to the stimulation of business initiatives and will increase 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
14 This provision is included in BITs between Netherlands and African states. For example see 
Netherlands-Kenya BIT and Netherlands-Tanzania BIT. 
15 See for instance United Kingdom-Tanzania BIT; Germany-Kenya; Italy-Tanzania BIT; 
Germany-Burundi BIT and United Kingdom-Congo BIT. 
16 See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion on Fair and Equitable Treatment. 
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prosperity in both contracting states.17 Whether this objective is achieved upon 
entering into the BIT or at any point during the course of the BIT’s existence 
remains questionable. However, the jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals stresses 
that although preambles are vaguely worded they form an important component 
in determining the intention of contracting states and as a result arbitral 
tribunals rely on them to interpret the totality of treaties. For instance, the 
tribunal in LG&E v Argentine Republic examined the preamble language of the 
US and Argentina BIT to ascertain the intention of United States and Argentina 
for including the obligation of fair and equitable treatment as part of the BIT.18 
The preamble stipulated that, fair and equitable treatment of investment was 
desirable in order to maintain a stable framework for investment and maximize 
effective use of resources. On the basis of the preamble language, the tribunal 
posited that:  
In entering the Bilateral Investment Treaty as a whole, the Parties 
desired to ‘promote greater economic cooperation’ and stimulate the 
flow of private capital and the economic development of the parties.’ 
In light of these stated objectives, this Tribunal must conclude that 
stability of the legal and business framework is an essential element 
of fair and equitable treatment in this case, provided that they do not 
pose any danger for the existence of the host state itself.19 
The body text of preambles presents nuanced challenges to arbitral tribunals 
especially when both investors and states tailor arguments on the basis of article 
31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) which requires 
treaties to be interpreted in accordance with their object and purpose.20 Article 
31(2) elaborates further that the context for the purpose of treaty interpretation 
shall comprise in addition to the text, the preamble, the annexes, any 
agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty, any instrument which was made by 
                                                 
17 See for example United Kingdom-Congo BIT; United Kingdom-Cameroon BIT; Ghana-Benin 
BIT; Germany-Kenya BIT; Italy-Tanzania BIT and Netherlands-Tanzania BIT. 
18 LG&E v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1 Jurisdiction 3 October 2007, para 85-88 
[Hereafter LG&E v Argentina]. 
19 Ibid para 99. 
20 See for example in Siemens v Argentina where both parties based their arguments on the 
interpretation of the Treaty in accordance with Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention. The 
tribunal noted that the treaty has to be interpreted neither liberally nor restrictively. For a 
detailed discussion of the tribunal’s approach see Siemens v Argentina, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/8 Decision on Jurisdiction, para 80-81 [Hereafter Siemens v Argentina]. 
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one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and 
accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.21 The 
wording of article 31 clearly underscores the importance of the preamble as a 
vital component in determining the object and purpose of the treaty as well as 
the intention of contracting states. However, under investment treaty 
arbitration, it remains unclear whether foreign investors’ accrual additional 
legal protection from preambles or whether capital exporting states have a legal 
duty to encourage foreign investors to invest in host states.  
For instance, in Biwater v Tanzania, the investor argued unsuccessfully that the 
preamble language of the Tanzania-UK BIT stressing that ‘‘more favourable 
conditions for investors, must be taken to be a promise to investors such as BGT 
of the more favourable treatment found in the BIT, including its dispute 
resolution settlement procedures.’’22 The tribunal rejected this argument on the 
basis that such a reading was an expansive interpretation of the preamble 
language and held that the investor sought to elevate generalized introductory 
language into specific obligations.23 Although the tribunal did not directly 
address the issue raised by the investor, this does however underscore the 
difficulties African states have placed themselves into through concluding 
generalized preambles. Even more, African states that have concluded BITs with 
preambles incorporating fair and equitable treatment and MFN obligation will 
encounter further difficulties because this sends a clear message to arbitral 
tribunals to interpret the BIT in a manner that accords full effect to the rights of 
the investor.24   
Although the Vienna Convention requires tribunals to look first to the ordinary 
meaning of treaty terms over generalized principles such as preambles,25 it is 
                                                 
21 Vienna Convention of the Law on Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S.331, 81. L.M. 679. Jan 27, 1980 
[Hereafter VCLT]. Specifically see Article 31(2) VCLT. 
22 Biwater v Tanzania, para 333. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Methanex Corp v United States, Partial Award, para 103-105 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Methanex-1stPartial.pdf> accessed 20 May 2012 
[Hereafter Methanex v United States]; See also Aguas del Tunari S.A v Republic of Bolivia, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3 Jurisdiction October 21 2005, para 91 [Hereafter Aguas del Tunari  v 
Republic of Bolivia]. 
25 See particularly in Aguas del Tunaris  v Republic of Bolivia , para 99, where the tribunal 
noted that ‘the Vienna Convention’s directive to look to the ordinary meaning of a word in its 
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worth stressing that provisions in most African BITs are as generalized as the 
preambles.26 Substantively, this means that African states have entered into 
demanding treaties that have the potential of benefiting foreign investors to the 
detrimental of African states. Furthermore, even though the intention of African 
treaties as spelled out in preambles clearly points towards a dual obligation of 
protecting and promoting foreign investment, there is an imbalance in the 
overall treaty framework. For example, foreign investors can hold African states 
accountable for breach of treaty obligations through investor-state arbitration 
but on the contrary the equivalent duty to promote foreign investors cannot 
easily be enforced or measured by African states.27  
In recent cases, although arbitral tribunals have sought to dissuade 
interpretations that exaggerate protection accorded to foreign investors28 the 
fact remains preambles as supplemented by treaty provisions are more 
favourable to foreign investors and lack sufficient safeguards to ensure foreign 
capital is actually transferred to African states. To my mind, although the 
wording of nearly all African preambles appears prima facie reasonable however 
when juxtaposed to the entire text of the treaty, it becomes remarkably clear 
that African treaties are negotiated between two unequal partners. Specifically, 
the wording places strenuous obligations on African states to protect foreign 
investors and does not equally elevate the obligation to encourage foreign 
investment flows into African states. By and large, the emphasis of the 
preambles as correctly opined by Luke Peterson reflects the interests and 
                                                                                                                                                    
context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty is intended to (1) to find the 
intent of the parties in the specific instrument, (2) to respect the possibility that the parties 
have used the instrument to address issues of mutual concern in innovative ways, and (3) to 
not forcibly conform the specific aims of a treaty to general assumptions about the intent of 
assessment of past practices’. More generally see UNCTAD, Scope and Definition Clause: 
UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II 
(UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/20120/2, UN Pub. Sales No. 11.II.D.9, 2011). 
26 See Chapter 3 for detailed discussion on Expropriation and subsequent Chapters. 
27 Despite preambles articulating dual obligations evidence suggests that investment flows 
accruing from concluding BITs remains scant. On the contrary evidence indicates that 
investors have successfully brought claims on the basis of BITs. See Mann Howard and K von 
Moltke, A Southern Agenda on Investment? Promoting Development with Bilateral Rights and 
Obligations for Investors, Host States and Home States (International Institute for Sustainable 
Development 2005) 4. 
28 Saluka Investments BV v Czech Republic, Partial Award of 17 March 2006,para 300 
[Hereafter Saluka Investments v Czech Republic]; see also Plama Consortium Limited v 
Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24 Award 27 August 2008, para 193 [Hereafter Plama 
Consortium v Bulgaria]. 
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concerns of investors expressed through their home governments without taking 
into account interests of host states.29 In other words, through signing BITs with 
expansive preambles containing unbalanced rights and duties, African states 
have by extension constrained their ability to regulate domestic policy with 
minimal investment flows in return.  
Having said that, it is worth pointing out that, there are few preambles in 
African treaty practice that do not follow the general trend though such BITs are 
rare and precaution should be exercised not to over emphasize them. For 
example, the Tanzania-Finland BIT explicitly states that the objective of the BIT 
should be achieved without relaxing healthy, safety, and environmental 
measures of general application.30 The preamble of the United States-Rwanda 
BIT also contains a provision stressing the desire to achieve the objectives of the 
BIT in ‘‘a manner consistent with the protection of health, safety, and the 
environment, and the promotion of internationally recognized labour rights’’.31 
The wording of the two preambles suggests that when interpreting the BIT as a 
whole, arbitral tribunals should seek to balance interests of foreign investors but 
with deference to interests of the capital importing African state. In conclusion, 
with minor exceptions, the preambles of African BITs are inherently biased to 
benefit foreign investors to the detriment of African states and while this would 
be justifiable if foreign investment flows actually accrued to African states, the 
reality from available evidence suggests that BITs contribute little in 
accelerating foreign direct investment.32   
2.2 The Definition of ‘Investments’ in African BITs 
African BITs follow the preamble with definition clauses articulating inter alia 
the concept ‘investment’ and ‘investors’. In virtually all African BITs, the first 
                                                 
29 Luke Eric Peterson, ‘South Africa’s Bilateral Investment Treaties, Implications for 
Development and Human Rights, Dialogue on Globalisation’ (Vol 26 November 2006) 10 
<http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/04137-20080708.pdf>accessed 20 May 2012. 
30 Paragraph 7of the preamble of the Finland-Tanzania BIT. 
31 Paragraph 6 of the preamble of the United States-Rwanda BIT. 
32 For thorough discussion on the spectrum of varying opinions see Karl P Sauvant and Lisa E 
Sachs, The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, 
Double Taxation Treaties and Investment Flows (OUP 2009). Karl Sauvant and Lisa Sachs note 
that the analysis suggests difficulty in firmly establishing the contribution of BITs in attracting 
FDI. 
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article in the definition clause focuses on transactions contracting states 
consider as protected investments under the treaty. Generally, African BITs 
formulate the definition of investment in two broad categories; (a) the first 
formulae followed by majority of African BITs defines investments broadly and 
sometimes includes the connotation ‘in accordance with host state legislation’33 
(b) the second formulae though rarely used defines investment broadly but 
includes substantive characteristics of the form an investment must take to 
qualify for treaty protection.34  
Irrespective of the formulae used, all African BITs define the concept 
‘investment’ broadly to include any kind of assets and usually this is followed 
with a non-exhaustive list of assets that are considered as examples of 
investments. The definition of covered investments includes both tangible and 
intangible assets.35 Evidently, this removes any doubts regarding the protection 
of intangible assets and also dispels early reservations that international law 
does not protect intangible property rights.36 Typically the definition of the 
concept ‘investment’ in African treaty practice follows wording similar to the 
United Kingdom-Burundi BIT which provides as follows:  
The term ‘investment’ shall comprise every kind of asset, in 
particular: (a) Movable and immovable property as well as any other 
rights in rem, such as mortgages, liens and pledges; (b) Shares of 
companies and other kinds of interest; (c) Claims to money which has 
been used to create an economic value or claims to any performance 
having an economic value; (d) Copyrights, industrial property rights, 
technical processes, trademarks, trade-names, know-how and 
goodwill; (e) Business concessions under public law, including 
                                                 
33The definition of investment in African BITs conforms to the predominate formulation of 
BITs elsewhere, for a detailed discussion see Noah Rubins, ‘The Notion of ‘Investment’ in 
International Investment Arbitration’ in Norbert Horn and Stefan M Kroll (eds), Arbitrating 
Foreign Investment Disputes, Procedural and Substantive Legal Aspects (Kluwer Law 
International 2004) 283-324; see also UNCTAD, Scope and Definition Clause: UNCTAD Series 
on Issues in International Investment Agreements II (UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/20120/2, UN Pub. Sales 
No. 11.II.D.9, 2011). 
34 For example see the United States-Rwanda BIT that not only provides specific 
characteristics of the form an investment must take but also includes a footnote emphasising 
that ‘some forms of debt, such as bonds, debentures, and long-term notes, are more likely to 
have the characteristics of an investment, while other forms of debt, such as claims to 
payment that are immediately due and result from the sale of goods or services, are less 
likely to have such characteristics.’  
35 Ibid. 
36 M Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (2nd edn, Cambridge University 
Press 2004) 220-221. 
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concessions to search for, extract and exploit natural resources; any 
alteration of the form in which assets are invested shall not affect 
their classification as investment. 
As stressed above, African BITs generally define the concept ‘investment’ using 
terms similar to those of the United Kingdom-Burundi BIT. However, some 
African BITs incorporate the same formulae but slightly expand the definition. 
For instance, article 1 of the Belgium-Rwanda BIT provides as follows; ‘‘The 
term ‘investment’ shall mean any direct or indirect medium or long term 
contribution of movable or immovable property intended for the development of 
an economic activity acknowledged to be in the national interest at the time the 
contribution is made under the laws of the State in whose territory such 
contributions are made’’.37 Obviously no difficulties will arise when envisaged 
assets neatly fit within the illustrated list38 but more often than not, assets 
usually fall outside the illustrated list but comply with the generalized definition 
of investment. The genesis of this expansive definition appears to have 
originated from institutions such as the World Bank and IMF that require 
countries in search of new forms of investments to demonstrate their 
commitment through defining investments broadly.39   
From the wording of the term investment, it would not be unsurprising for assets 
that African states did not envisage as investments during treaty negotiations to 
qualify as protected investments under the investor-state dispute settlement 
system. The investment clause therefore has the propensity to bring about policy 
and legal ramifications unforeseen by African states at the time of concluding 
the treaty. Indeed, as stressed in the Patrick Mitchell v Congo annulment 
proceedings, treaties containing an enumerative and non-exhaustive approach to 
investment make it possible to apply the protection provided by the treaty to a 
range of rights and assets of the foreign investor.40 The recent UNCTAD study 
points out that broad asset based definitions have significant implications for the 
                                                 
37 Article 1 of the Belgium-Rwanda BIT. 
38 Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (OUP 
2008) 62. 
39 For general discussion see Ibrahim F.I Shihata, Legal Treatment of Foreign Investment: The 
World Bank Guidelines (Martinus Nijhoff 1993). 
40 Patrick Mitchell v The Democratic Republic of Congo, Annulment Proceedings Case No. 
ARB/99/7 November 1 2006, para 26 [Hereafter Patrick Mitchell v Democratic Republic of 
Congo]. 
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range of possible disputes that could come before arbitral tribunals.41 According 
to UNCTAD, generalized definitions have led to a widening of the types of 
transactions that tribunals have felt able to include as ‘investments’ which has 
in turn given arbitral tribunals’ subject matter jurisdiction over a wider range of 
claims.42  
In other words, what the parties might have believed to be purely commercial 
transactions at the time the investment treaty was signed could now potentially 
be viewed as investments under the broad assets based definition contained in 
BITs.43 Schreuer aptly observes that in the vast majority of ICSID cases, arbitral 
tribunals have found nearly all disputes before them meet the threshold of 
investments as defined in respective BITs.44 On the contrary, arbitral tribunals 
have found only a few cases where activities of claimants fall outside the 
definition of investments as stipulated in the BIT.45 In light of these 
considerations, the definition of the term ‘investments’ as articulated in the 
relevant BIT cannot be taken lightly because it is the primary source of 
reference that demonstrates the intention of contracting states. Moreover, the 
existence of an investment is the premise on which arbitral tribunals acquire 
jurisdiction over treaty claims.  
Historically, the concept ‘investment’ has been the subject of heated debate 
and the differences between developed and developing countries are well 
illustrated during the drafting of the ICSID Convention.46 Particularly, the failure 
to agree on a universal definition during the deliberations demonstrates the 
difficulty of narrowing the meaning of the term investment.47 As a solution to 
the lengthy discussions, a compromise was reached to leave the concept 
                                                 
41 UNCTAD, Scope and Definition Clause: UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment 
Agreements II (UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/20120/2, UN Pub. Sales No. 11.II.D.9, 2011) 48-49.  
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Christoph H Schreuer and others, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2nd edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2009) 124. 
45 Ibid. 
46 A discussion of the historical disagreements is beyond the scope of this thesis for a detailed 
analysis see ibid 114-117;  see also Julian Davis Mortenson, ‘The Meaning of ‘Investment’: 
ICSID’s Travaux and the Domain of International Investment Law’ (2010) 55 Harvard 
International Law Journal 257, 258-317. 
47 Ibid. 
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‘investment’ open-ended with the view that an appropriate definition will be 
determined by countries through treaties or contracts.48 Indeed, the failure to 
agree on a mutually acceptable definition explains why the ICSID convention 
does not define the term investment.49 In this regard, when determining 
whether the requirements for an investment have been met arbitral tribunals 
first examine the treaty followed by whether the activity is an investment in the 
sense of the ICSID Convention.50 As will shortly be discussed, the failure of the 
ICSID Convention to define investment has often created conflicting 
methodological results in arbitral practice. Briefly, the contention has mainly 
been whether arbitral tribunals should play a screening role beyond what is 
articulated in the treaty especially because of the open ended nature of assets 
considered as protected investments under BITs.51 
Based on the fact that the ICSID Convention does not define the concept 
investment, arbitral tribunals have developed objective characteristics or 
criteria applied when examining whether assets are protected investments. The 
application and influence of these characteristics differs between tribunals with 
some tribunals using the criterion as yardsticks or benchmarks to help the 
tribunal assess the existence of an investment while other tribunals view the 
elements of an investment as requiring cumulative compliance.52 Proponents 
favouring the latter approach argue that the characteristics should be applied 
flexibly and on a case by case basis.53 Under this approach, the characteristics of 
an investment are indicative and the existence of any of the characteristics can 
suffice to classify a transaction as an investment.54 The alternative perspective 
views the characteristics as a sine qua non for the existence of an investment.55 
According to this viewpoint, transactions failing to cumulatively satisfy the 
                                                 
48 Christoph H Schreuer and others, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2nd edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2009) 116. 
49 Ibid 115. 
50 Ibid 117. 
51 Julian Davis Mortenson, ‘The Meaning of ‘Investment’: ICSID’s Travaux and the Domain of 
International Investment Law’ (2010) 55 Harvard International Law Journal 257,317. 
52 Saba Fakes v Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20 July 14 2010, para 99 
[Hereafter Saba Fakes v Republic of Turkey]. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid para 99-100. 
55 Ibid para 101. 
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characteristics of an investment do not qualify as investments under the ICSID 
Convention.56 However, it should be stressed that there is no unanimous 
approach emerging from the jurisprudence and the constitutive elements remain 
contentious.57 
For instance the tribunal in Fedax v Venezuela examined whether promissory 
notes constitute covered investments protected under article 25 of the ICSID 
Convention and the Venezuela-Netherlands BIT. The tribunal stressed that the 
ICSID Convention contemplates the definition of investment is controlled by 
contracting states through the relevant treaty.58 The tribunal then made 
reference to article 1(a) of the Venezuela-Netherlands BIT and found that the 
parties intended a very broad meaning to the term investments. On the basis of 
the BIT, the tribunal rejected the respondent’s argument that titles to money as 
defined in the BIT are restricted to foreign investment or portfolio 
investments.59 In the tribunal view titles to money are not necessary excluded 
from the concept of foreign direct investment.60 According to the tribunal, the 
basic features of an investment can be described as involving, certain duration, 
a certain regularity of profit and return, assumption of risk, a substantial 
commitment, and a significance of a host state’s development.61 Based on the 
facts of the case, the tribunal found promissory notes met the basic features of 
investments for the following reasons; 
The duration of the investment in this case meets the requirements of 
the law as to contracts needing to extend beyond the fiscal year in 
which they are made. The regularity of profit and return is also met 
by the scheduling of interest payment through a period of several 
years. The amount of capital committed is also relatively substantial. 
Risk is also involved as has been explained. And most importantly, 
there is clearly a significant relationship between the transaction and 
                                                 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid para 97-102. The tribunal posited that the proposed solutions are inconsistent, if not 
conflicting and do not provide any clear guidance to future tribunals. 
58 Fedax v Venezuela, para 31. 
59 Ibid para 32. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid para 43. 
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the development of the host state as specifically required under the 
law for issuing the pertinent financial instrument. 62 
Similarly in Salini v Morocco, the respondent alleged that the road construction 
contract did not constitute an investment protected both under the ICSID 
Convention and the Italy-Morocco BIT. The tribunal acknowledged that various 
objective criteria must be met before a transaction can qualify as a protected 
investment under the Italy-Morocco BIT and the ICSID Convention.63  According 
to the tribunal;  
Doctrine generally considers that investment infers: contribution, 
certain duration of performance of the contract and a participation in 
the risks of the transaction...In reading the Convention’s preamble. 
One may add the contribution of the economic development of the 
host State of the investment as additional condition.64  
The tribunal further emphasized that the constitutive elements may be 
interdependent, for example the risks of the transaction could depend on the 
contributions and the duration of performance of the contract.65 Based on the 
Italy-Morocco BIT as well as the ICSID Convention, the tribunal was of the view 
that:  
The Italian company made a contribution in money, in kind and in 
industry through inter alia providing the necessary equipment’s, 
qualified personnel and issuing of bank guarantees, the transaction 
was for 36 months complying with the minimum length of time upheld 
by doctrine, there were risks involved such as risks associated with 
prerogatives of owner permitting him to prematurely bring an end to 
the contract, unforeseen incidents that could be considered as force 
majeure, the contract contributed to economic development of 
Morocco because the highway in question serves a public interest and 
it is within the duty of states to construct infrastructure.66  
Taken as a whole the tribunal found the contract constituted an investment as 
articulated both under the Italy-Morocco BIT and article 25 of the ICSID 
Convention. The criteria used to determine whether disputed transactions 
                                                 
62 Ibid. 
63 Salini v Morocco, para 52. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
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constitute investments are now commonly known as the ‘Salini test’67 and have 
been followed with measurable degree in subsequent cases. For instance, in the 
Patrick Mitchell v Congo annulment proceedings, the ad hoc committee 
recognized four characteristics of investment identified by ICSID case law and 
noted that these characteristics are interdependent and need to be examined 
comprehensively.68 In casu, the ad hoc committee rejected the award on the 
grounds that services of the law firm did not sufficiently contribute to the 
development of Congo.69 According to the ad hoc committee, before services of 
the law firm could be regarded as investments, it was necessary that such 
services should contribute to economic development or at least the interests of 
the state should somehow be present in the operation.70 Furthermore, the ad 
hoc committee opined that the award should have indicated that, ‘‘through his 
know-how, the claimant had concretely assisted the DRC, for example by 
providing it with legal services in a regular manner or by specifically bringing 
investors’’.71 In sum, the ad hoc committee concluded that the award had to be 
rejected on the ground of manifest excess of power and inadequacy of reasons 
showing how the claimant’s services contributed to the development of the host 
state.72  
Opinion remains divided in arbitral practice about whether the Salini criteria are 
compulsory prerequisites required for a transaction to qualify as an investment. 
For example in Biwater v Tanzania, the respondent argued that a loss lender 
could not qualify as an investment because the elements of risk and substantial 
commitment were not satisfied. According to the respondent, even though the 
shareholder’s loan might qualify as an investment under the Tanzania-United 
Kingdom BIT, the tribunal’s jurisdiction is founded upon the objective 
requirements of Article 25 of the ICSID Convention and the scope of that 
                                                 
67 Christoph H Schreuer and others, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2nd edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2009) 116-129, Saipem S.p.A v The People’s Republic of 
Bangladesh, ICSID Case No.ARB/05/07 21 March 2007, para 99 [Hereafter Saipem v 
Bangladesh]; Joy Mining Machinery Limited v Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11 6 August 2004, 
para 51 [Hereafter Joy Mining Machinery v Egypt]. 
68 Patrick Mitchell v Democratic Republic of Congo, para 27. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid para 39. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid para 39-41. 
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jurisdiction cannot be expanded through the BIT.73 The tribunal rejected the 
respondent’s argument and asserted that the criterion of ‘investment’ adopted 
in Salini and subsequent cases are not fixed or mandatory as a matter of law.74 
According to the tribunal there was no basis for an overly restrictive application 
of the Salini test. In the tribunal’s view, ‘‘given that the Convention was not 
drafted with a strict, objective definition of investment, it is doubtful that 
arbitral tribunals sitting in individual cases should impose one such definition 
which would be applicable to all cases and for all purposes’’.75   
The tribunal also found the Salini test problematic and stated that if the 
elements of an investment are identified into a fixed and inflexible test, there is 
risk that certain transactions will be excluded from the scope of the 
convention.76 In the tribunal’s view this would lead to a definition that may 
contradict individual agreements which could be contrary to the intention of 
contracting states.77 In addition, the tribunal held that since BITs define 
investments more broadly than the Salini test, it is implausible for the ICSID 
Convention to be read narrowly.78 The tribunal further opined that the concept 
‘investment’ should be approached flexibly taking into account elements of the 
Salini test as well as all the circumstances of the case including provisions in the 
relevant BIT.79 Most importantly, the tribunal noted that even if the claimant 
were to fail meeting all the elements of an ‘investment’ spelled out in Salini, 
this would not necessarily mean that the transaction should not be deemed as an 
investment.80 
The ruling of the Biwater tribunal departures from the Salini test towards an 
approach that combines elements developed in Salini as well as the definition of 
investment spelled out in the respective treaty. This approach was subsequently 
found persuasive in Malaysian Historical Salvors v Malaysia. In casu, the ad hoc 
                                                 
73 Biwater v Tanzania, para 288. 
74 Ibid para 310. 
75 Ibid para 313. 
76 Ibid para 314. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid para 316. 
80 Ibid para 318. 
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committee rejected the notion that the ICSID Convention imposes outer limits on 
the definition of investment contained in BITs.81 The ad hoc committee was of 
the view that ignoring or devaluing the definition of investment as stipulated in 
BITs undermines the importance of jurisdiction BITs accord ICSID tribunals.82 
According to the ad hoc committee, the failure by the Sole Arbitrator to consider 
or apply the definition of investment as contained in the BIT was a gross error of 
law that gave rise to manifest failure to exercise jurisdiction.83 In addition, the 
ad hoc committee was not impressed with the Sole Arbitrator’s decision 
elevating contribution to the host state’s economic development to a 
jurisdictional condition.84 Lastly, the ad hoc committee asserted that the award 
was inconsistent with the ICSID travaux because according to the tribunal 
drafters of the ICSID Convention rejected a monetary threshold attached to the 
definition of an investment and instead entrusted the definition of investment to 
contracting states.85  
The Biwater and Malaysia Historical approaches are not without difficulty based 
on the fact that majority of BITs generally define the term investment broadly. 
The approaches espoused by the Biwater and Malaysia Historical tribunals are 
problematic because the approaches inevitably result in arbitral tribunals having 
jurisdiction virtually for all disputable transactions. Indeed, as aptly noted by 
Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen in his dissenting opinion in Malaysian Historical 
Salvors, the role of the ICSID Convention is to subject the will of the parties to 
some ‘outer limits’ beyond those outer limits their consent is ineffectual to 
create transactions considered as investment under the ICSID framework.86 
Persuasively, Judge Shahabuddeen argues that there is nothing that stops 
contracting states from consenting to broad investment definitions provided this 
is within acceptable limits and beyond those limits, the parties consent is 
                                                 
81 Malaysian Historical Salvors SDN BHD v Malaysai, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Decision on 
the Application of Annulment, April 16 2009, para 69 [Hereafter Malaysian Historical Salvors v 
Malaysia]. The 2007 decision by the Sole Arbitrator was annulled because the Sole Arbitrator 
exceeded his powers by failing to exercise jurisdiction with which it was endowed by the 
terms of the Agreement and the Convention.   
82 Ibid para 73. 
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84 Ibid para 80. 
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ineffective.87 Judge Shahabudden’s reasoning was reinforced in Global Trading 
Resources v Ukraine where the tribunal noted that the generous margin left 
under the ICSID Convention is not absolute.88 In the tribunal’s view the margin 
does not extend to allowing states to deem activities as an investment without 
regard to whether such transactions meet the requirement of an investment 
under the ICSID Convention.89 Jezewski notes that the asset based definition 
basically yields two possible results; either one accepts that all investor 
activities considered as assets under the relevant BIT are investments within the 
jurisdiction of an ICSID tribunal or the tribunal should be left with the discretion 
to make a determination on its own.90 According to Jezewski, an approach that 
overtly stresses the intention of contracting states under the relevant BIT 
renders article 25 of the ICSID Convention meaningless.91 
From the foregoing discussion, it is plausible to argue that the ICSID Convention 
requires an objective interpretation to the term investment independent of the 
intention of state parties under the relevant BIT. Put differently, if the claimant 
fails to demonstrate that the transaction at hand meets the characteristics of 
‘investments’ irrespective of whether the transaction complies with the BIT 
definition, arbitral tribunals should decline jurisdiction. Even more, when the 
definition of investment explicitly states that assets should be in the host state’s 
national interests, arbitral tribunal should evaluate whether such assets indeed 
contribute to the host state’s development.92 It should be noted that although 
majority of BITs concluded by African states contain an asset based definition 
with a non-exhaustive list of assets that qualify for treaty protection there are 
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some exception such as the United States Rwanda BIT and the Ghana-Denmark 
BIT.  
Particularly, the United States-Rwanda BIT goes beyond the typical asset based 
definitions and the non-exhaustive list by explicitly mentioning substantive 
characteristics that ‘investments’ must comply with to qualify for treaty 
protection.93 Specifically, the ‘investment’ clause in the United States-Rwanda 
BIT reads as follows, ‘‘investment means every asset that an investor owns or 
controls, directly or indirectly, that has the characteristics of an investment, 
including such characteristics as the commitment of capital or other resources, 
the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk’’.94  To be sure, the 
United States-Rwanda BIT inserts a footnote that provides as follows ‘‘for 
greater certainty, where an enterprise does not have the characteristics of an 
investment that enterprise is not an investment regardless of the form it may 
take’’.95 Although the United States-Rwanda BIT defines investments broadly, it 
is remarkably different from other African BITs because it offers a set of criteria 
that an investment must display to qualify for treaty protection. Manifestly 
therefore if disputable transactions do not demonstrate that the investor has 
committed capital, expects to gain and has incurred risk, then under the terms 
of the United States-Rwanda BIT the investor cannot claim treaty protection.  
Aside from the United States-Rwanda BIT, another notable departure from Africa 
treaty practice is the Denmark-Ghana BIT. According to the Denmark-Ghana BIT, 
transactions qualifying as investment must be acquired for purposes of 
establishing lasting economic relations.96 Salacuse suggests that the underlying 
motivation of BITs with this wording is the conviction that short term 
investments do not contribute to the host state’s economic development.97 By 
and large, countries with such treaty language believe that short term 
transactions bring about undesirable speculation and through the treaty process, 
                                                 
93 The United States-Rwanda BIT. The BIT also indicates that footnotes and annexes shall form 
an integral part of the treaty implying therefore that arbitral tribunals interpreting the 
meaning of investment must give credence to characteristics of the form of investment as 
stipulated in the footnotes and annexes.  
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid.  
96 Article 1 of the Ghana-Denmark BIT. 
97 Jeswald W Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (OUP 2010) 164. 
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the countries seek to accept only transactions that contribute to the state’s 
economic development.98  It should be stressed that although the United States-
Rwanda BIT and the Denmark-Ghana BIT are outliers, the two BITs illustrate 
nuanced approaches through which the term investments can be defined broadly 
but also considerably take into account the interests of the capital receiving 
African state.  
From the foregoing, the following observations can be made about the definition 
of ‘investments’ in African treaty practice; with the exception of the United 
States-Rwanda BIT and the Denmark-Ghana BIT, majority of African BITs define 
investments broadly using the phrase ‘every kind of assets’. In addition, African 
BITs contain a non-exhaustive list of assets that African states prima facie 
consider as investments. Comparatively, the definition of ‘investment’ across 
different African states is substantively similar notwithstanding the contracting 
states part to the BIT. In other words, whether the BIT is signed between African 
states and the traditional capital exporting countries or among African states 
themselves, the definition of investments remains nearly the same. The only 
substantive variation among African BITs is the additional requirement included 
in some African BITs that the investment must be made ‘in accordance with the 
laws or regulations of the host state’. As will shortly be discussed, this is an 
important qualification to the definition of investment and the meaning of this 
requirement has created conflicting opinions in arbitral jurisprudence. The 
investment clause articulated in African BITs has inherent flaws because the 
clause can essentially enable even worthless assets to qualify for treaty 
protection. From a sovereign and policy perspective, there is need for a 
redefinition of the investment clause and this is more apparent considering the 
array of inconsistent decisions coming from arbitral practice.  
As shown in the analysis above, the jurisprudence suggests that arbitral tribunals 
are gradually shifting towards the direction of giving more weight to the 
definition of investment articulated in the relevant treaty. Indeed, as correctly 
observed by one commentator, there is need for a paradigm shift in the 
definition of investment especially because the durability of Salini test is 
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uncertain.99 For instance, in a recent case, Saba Fakes v Turkey, the tribunal 
remained unconvinced that contribution to the host state’s economic 
development was a necessary requirement for determining an investment within 
the ICSID framework.100 According to the tribunal, even though economic 
development of the host state is one of the proclaimed objectives of the ICSID 
Convention, contribution to the economic development of the host state is an 
expected consequence and cannot be perceived as an independent criterion.101 
In light of the existing jurisprudence, it remains to be seen whether African 
states negotiating future BITs will qualify the definition of investment with a set 
of objective characteristics.   
2.3 The Qualification of Investment with ‘In Accordance 
with the Laws and Regulations of the Host State 
As mentioned above, the investment clause of nearly all African BITs broadly 
defines the term investment. However, there are a few African BITs which 
qualify the investment clause with an additional requirement that the 
investment must be made ‘‘in accordance with the laws and regulations of the 
host state’’. Typically, African BITs incorporating the definition of investment 
with an ‘in accordance with the host state law’ clause follow the formulation of 
the Tanzania-Finland BIT and read as follows:   
The term investments means every kind of asset established or 
acquired by an investor of one Contracting Party in the territory of the 
other Contracting Party in accordance with the laws and regulations 
of the latter Contracting Party…(emphasis added).102 
Alternatively, some African BITs insert the qualification ‘in accordance with the 
laws and regulations’ in the admission provision.103 When the clause is included 
as part of the admission provision, substantively this means that investments 
                                                 
99 Marek Jezewski, ‘Development Considerations in Defining Investment’ in Cordonier Segger 
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must comply with local laws and regulation at the time of initiating the 
investment and not necessarily throughout the life of the investment.104 The 
Netherlands-Ghana BIT is illustrative, it specifically provides under article 2 
that, ‘‘either Contracting Party shall within the framework of its laws and 
regulations, promote economic cooperation through the protection in its 
territory of investments of nationals of the other Contracting Party. Subject to 
its right to exercise powers conferred by its laws or regulations, each 
Contracting Party shall admit such investments’’ (emphasis added).105  
From this provision, the reference to laws and regulations ensures that only 
lawful investments are protected by the treaty.106 Even more, the clause limits 
the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals to only investments undertaken in 
accordance with domestic laws and regulations. However, African BITs like other 
existing treaties do not explain the exact meaning of the clause ‘in accordance 
with laws and regulations.’107 In addition, the qualification contributes little in 
explaining or delimiting the types of investments covered by the treaty.108 As a 
result of this uncertainty, arbitral tribunals grapple with giving content to the 
meaning of ‘in accordance with the laws and regulation of the host state.’ In 
particular, arbitral tribunals constantly struggle with determining the scope of 
the obligation as well as establishing whether investors complied with existing 
host state laws.  
For instance, in Inceysa v El Salvador, the respondent argued successfully that 
the tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the claimant obtained the bid without 
complying with El Salvador’s domestic law. The tribunal concurred with the 
respondent based on the wording of the BIT which explicitly accorded protection 
                                                 
104 Gustav F W Hamester v Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24 Award 18 June 2010, 
para 127 [Hereafter Hamester v Republic of Ghana]. 
105 Article 2 of the Netherlands-Ghana BIT; see also article 10 of the Germany-Ghana BIT. 
106 Anna Joubin-Bret, ‘Admission and Establishment in the Context of Investment Protect’ in 
August Reinisch (ed), Standards of Investment Protection (OUP 2008) 18. 
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the meaning of the qualification. See Norah Gallagher and Wenhua Shan, Chinese Investment 
Treaties: Policies and Practices (OUP 2009) 55. 
108 In Salini v Morocco, para 46 the tribunals noted that ‘in accordance with laws and 
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only to investments that comply with domestic laws and regulations.109 In the 
tribunal’s view, there was no doubt that contracting states obviously included 
this clause as an integral part of the BIT as reflected in the travaux 
preparatoires of the agreement. The tribunal observed that the only correct 
interpretation of the BIT must be that any investments made against the laws of 
El Salvador are outside the protection of the treaty and therefore beyond the 
scope of the tribunal.110   
Regarding the laws of the host state, the tribunal stated that the Constitution of 
El Salvador considers duly enacted international agreements as valid El Salvador 
law which therefore elevates the BIT as the primary and special legislation of 
the tribunal.111 The tribunal then observed that the BIT as valid El Salvador law 
does not contain substantive principles that would permit a determination about 
whether the investment was made in accordance with the laws of El Salvador.112 
As a result, the tribunal resorted to general principles of international law such 
as good faith, nemo auditor propiam turpitudinem allegans, violation of 
international public policy and violation of unlawful enrichment.113 In conclusion 
the tribunal found it lacked jurisdiction to hear the dispute because the 
‘‘investment was made in a manner that was clearly illegal, it was not included 
within the scope of consent expressed by Spain and El Salvador in the BIT and, 
consequently, the disputes arising from it are not subject to the jurisdiction of 
the Centre’’.114 
Similarly, the tribunal in Fraport v Philippines declined jurisdiction on the basis 
that the investment was not carried out in accordance with the laws and 
regulations of Philippines as articulated in the BIT. According to the tribunal, the 
fact that the claimant knowingly concealed violations of Anti Dummy Law (ADL) 
mitigates against any good faith endorsements accruing to the investor through 
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the actions of the Philippines government.115 The tribunal further observed that 
the BIT explicitly required that for an investment to qualify for treaty protection 
the investment had to be in accordance with host state law and therefore since 
the claimant knowingly and intentionally circumvented the ADL, the investor 
cannot claim protection from the BIT.116 In the tribunal’s view, since the 
investment was not made in accordance with the laws and regulations of the 
Philippines and also since the claimant cannot claim estoppel the tribunal 
therefore lacked jurisdiction ratione materiae.117 The tribunal further noted 
that ‘in accordance with the host state laws and regulation’ applies at the time 
the investment was initiated and not throughout the life of an investment. In 
conclusion, the tribunal was of the view that:  
If, at the time of the initiation of the investment, there has been 
compliance with the law of the host state, allegations by the host 
state of violations of its law in the course of the investment, as a 
justification for state action with respect to the investment, might be 
a defence to claimed substantive violations of the BIT, but could not 
deprive a tribunal acting under the authority of the BIT of its 
jurisdiction. 118 
Furthermore, in World Duty Free v The Republic of Kenya, the respondent 
successfully demonstrated that the investment contract was obtained through 
bribery and corrupting senior government officials including the former 
President of the Republic, Daniel Arap Moi which was contrary to Kenyan laws 
and regulations as well as English laws. The tribunal noted that contracts 
obtained through corruption are not only contrary to domestic laws but also 
against international conventions and international public policy.119 The tribunal 
rejected the claimant’s assertion that the bribe was an independent collateral 
transaction severable from the Parties agreement.120 In the tribunal’s view 
corruption and bribery of senior government officials was rationally connected to 
the Agreement and formed an intrinsic part of the overall transaction without 
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which no contract would have been agreed upon by the parties.121 With respect 
to the claimant argument that bribery extended to both the claimant and 
government of Kenya, the tribunal held that as a matter of public policy ‘the law 
protects not the litigating parties but the public and in this case, the mass of 
tax-payers and other citizens making up one of the poorest countries in the 
world.’122 In sum, the tribunal concurred with the ruling in Holman v Johnson 
where Lord Mansfield stressed that; 
‘‘…the objection, that a contract is immoral or illegal as between 
plaintiff and defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of 
the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is 
ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which 
the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as 
between him and the plaintiff, but accidentally, if I may say so. The 
principle of public policy is this: ex dolo malo non oritur actio. No 
court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an 
immoral or illegal act. If, from the plaintiff’s own stating or 
otherwise, the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa, or the 
transgression of a positive law of this country, there the court says he 
has no right to be assisted…’’(emphasis added).  
Equally, the tribunal in Anderson v Costa Rica, declined jurisdiction on the 
ground that the claimants did not comply with Costa Rica’s laws and regulations 
as specified under the Costa Rica-Canada BIT. Arriving at its decision, the 
tribunal stressed that by specifically including ‘in accordance with laws of host 
state’ the parties manifestly showed the importance they attached to legality of 
investments made by investors.123 The tribunal found the process through which 
the claimants obtained assets was not consistent with the Organic Law of the 
Central Bank because Villalobos brothers were engaged in financial 
intermediation without authorization of the Central Bank.124 According to the 
tribunal, Costa Rica, ‘like any other country has a fundamental interest in 
securing respect of its laws’ and this interest was clearly articulated in the BIT 
which required that investments under the BIT  be owned and controlled in 
accordance with Costa Rica laws.125 The tribunal further noted that, foreign 
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investors have a duty to assure themselves that their investments comply with 
host state laws and regulations. On the basis of the evidence, the tribunal found 
that the claimants did not exercise the kind of due diligence reasonable 
investors would have taken to assure themselves.126  
In Hamester v Ghana, the respondent argued unsuccessfully that the tribunal did 
not have jurisdiction because the claimant presented false and fraudulent 
documents at the time of acquiring the investment and also committed multiple 
fraudulent act during the life of the investment.127 The tribunal observed that 
the obligation ‘‘in accordance with host state laws’’ relates to legality at the 
initiation of the investment and not during performance of the investment.128 
According to the tribunal, the wording of the BIT stressed that legality of 
creating an investment is a jurisdictional issue while ‘‘the legality of the 
investor’s conduct during the life of the investment is a merits issue’’.129 The 
tribunal then examined whether the joint venture agreement (JVA) was illegal 
from its inception because of the foreign investor’s alleged fraudulent 
behaviour. The tribunal found that there was inadequate evidence to show the 
existence of fraudulent behaviour at the time of initiating the JVA.130 Moreover, 
the tribunal noted that even if there had been fraudulent behaviour, the 
respondent would still have entered into the joint venture irrespective of the 
overstated figures.131 Evidence from arbitral tribunals reaffirms that ‘in 
accordance with host state laws and regulations’ is an important qualification to 
the definition of investment.  
The tribunal in Hamester v Ghana emphasized further that the qualification is a 
general principle that exists independently of the specific language of the 
treaty. Specifically, the tribunal stressed that:  
An investment will not be protected if it has been created in violation 
of national or international principles of good faith; by way of 
corruption, fraud, or deceitful conduct; or if its creation itself 
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constitutes a misuse of the system of international investment 
protection under the ICSID Convention. It will also not be protected if 
it is made in violation of the host State’s law.132 
From the foregoing, the following are worth pointing out about the evolving 
jurisprudence; ‘‘in accordance with the laws and regulations of the host state’’ 
is a substantive legal obligation that investors should comply with irrespective of 
whether the obligation is articulated in the BIT or not. Even more, when 
contracting states explicitly include the qualification, arbitral tribunals must 
examine investor’s compliance with host state laws and regulations at the 
jurisdictional level.133 Conversely, when contracting states do not include the 
qualification, arbitral tribunals should evaluate compliance with host state laws 
and regulations at the merits level.134 In essence, this means that in investor-
state claims based on BITs that do not make reference to ‘‘in accordance with 
laws and regulation’’, compliance with host state laws is examined at the 
admissibility level rather than as part of the jurisdictional threshold analysis.   
It should be stressed that approaches taken by arbitral tribunal remain unsettled 
in as far as determining specific host state laws that should be applied to a 
particular dispute. For example, in Inceysa v El Salvador, the tribunal viewed 
the BIT as El Salvador law and interpreted ‘in accordance with host state laws’ 
using benchmarks of general international law while the tribunal in Anderson v 
Costa Rica, viewed the Costa Rica-Canada BIT constituting part of Costa Rica law 
and interpreted ‘‘in accordance with host state laws’’ following principles 
articulated under Costa Rica laws and regulations. However, it should be 
stressed that methodology used in Inceysa v El Salvador is unconvincing because 
the tribunal did not give sufficient credence to the domestic laws of El Salvador. 
Indeed, as seen from the cases above subsequent tribunals did not follow this 
approach and instead concentrated on examining actual host state laws that are 
being disputed. To my mind, this methodology is preferable because it would be 
presumptuous to assume that contacting states intended international law to be 
the applicable law rather than duly enacted domestic regulations and 
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legislation. Obviously, if domestic laws manifestly contradict international law 
then the requisite international law can be considered but logically the starting 
point requires an examination of local laws and regulations.  
From the jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals, it should be stressed that although 
majority of African BITs do not contain the clause ‘‘investment must be made in 
accordance with local laws and regulations’’ foreign investors still have a duty to 
comply with domestic laws and regulations because complying with domestic 
laws is a general principle that exists independently of the specific language of 
the treaty.135 Put differently, foreign investors investing in African States 
containing BITs that do not explicitly mention ‘‘in accordance with host state 
laws’ must still disengage from illegal transactions. However, the omission of 
‘‘in accordance with host state laws’’ in majority of African BITs means that 
arbitral tribunals will easily accept jurisdiction in investor-state disputes 
involving African states especially when the breach of host state laws is not 
manifest from investor’s conduct. In essence, by not explicitly stipulating that 
investors must comply with domestic laws, majority of African States have 
indirectly consented to the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals to determine 
investor-state disputes on the merits.136 Finally, majority of African BITs contain 
a generalized definition of investment and do not include any legal qualification, 
the problem underlying this wording is that any asset qualifies for treaty 
protection and implicitly this accords arbitral tribunals unrestrained discretion 
to decide nearly all disputes at the substantive level.   
2.4 The Definition of Investor in African Treaties  
Aside from the claimant having to demonstrate that the transaction is an 
investment, the claimant must as a threshold matter prove that he or she is an 
‘investor’ as specified in the relevant treaty.137  Generally, the definition of 
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investor through limiting the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals aims at ensuring 
that benefits of the treaty do not apply to domestic investors of the host state. 
The wording of the concept ‘investor’ varies among African BITs with some BITs 
explicitly indicating covered ‘investors’138 while others simply make reference to 
‘nationals and companies’ without necessarily mentioning the term investor.139 
For instance the Malaysia-Ghana BIT stipulates that an investor means ‘‘any 
natural person possessing the citizenship of, or permanently residing in the 
territory of a Contracting Party in accordance with its laws; and any corporation, 
partnership, trust, joint-venture, organization, association or enterprise 
incorporated or duly constituted in accordance with applicable laws of that 
Contracting Party’’.140  
African BITs making reference to nationals and companies usually have two 
separate paragraphs; one mentioning ‘nationals’ and the other mentioning 
‘companies’.141 In addition, African BITs following this formula do not use the 
term contracting states to encapsulate national and companies of both parties. 
The typical formula as illustrated in the Burundi-Germany BIT provides as follow; 
‘nationals’ means; (a) in respect of the Federal Republic of Germany, Germans 
within the meaning of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany; (b) In 
respect of the Republic of Burundi, Burundi citizens within the meaning of the 
law in force in the Republic of Burundi’’.142  Substantively, although there are 
variations in African BITs, it’s important to note that African states protect 
foreign investors who are able to establish a link to the contracting states either 
on the basis of nationality or through corporate nationality. Given the overall 
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importance of the concept ‘investor’ in determining jurisdiction, subsequent 
parts of this chapter assess the two main elements stipulated in African BITs 
under which an investor can qualify for treaty protection.  
2.4.1 The Nationality Requirement in African BITs  
In all African BITs, for a claimant to qualify as an investor, the claimant must 
establish that he or she is a national of the contracting state under which the 
claimant is seeking treaty protection.143 However, the wording of the nationality 
requirement differs among African BITs though predominately most African BITs 
explicitly stipulate that nationality should be based on national laws of 
contracting states. For instance in the Belgium-Rwanda BIT, a national is said to 
mean: ‘‘(a) with regard to the Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union, any 
individual who under Belgian or Luxembourg law is considered to be a citizen of 
Belgium or Luxembourg; (b) with regard to Rwanda, any individual who under 
Rwandese law is considered to be a citizen of the Rwandese Republic’’.144 In 
contrast, the Tanzania-Finland BIT simply defines an investor as ‘‘any natural 
person who is a national of either contracting party in accordance with its 
law’’.145 
Aside from this general requirement, exceptionally some African BITs recognize 
not only the citizenship or nationality of contracting states but also claimants 
who are permanently residing in contracting states.146 This wording though rarely 
used in Africa treaty practice can have unintended consequences especially 
when the claimant has permanent residence of a contracting state and at the 
same time the nationality of the host state. From the phrasing of this clause, it 
should be stressed that African states with BITs containing such wording risk the 
possibility of domestic investors bringing claims against them alleging that the 
                                                 
143 This is a universal requirements in all African BITs for instance see Belgium-Cameroon BIT; 
United Kingdom-Cameroon BIT;  United Kingdom-Congo BIT; Ghana-Benin BIT; India-Ghana 
BIT; Germany-Kenya BIT; Germany- Burundi BIT; United States- Cameroon BIT; Korea-Congo 
BIT; United States-Congo BIT; Ghana-Guinea BIT; Netherlands-Ghana BIT; United Kingdom-
Ghana BIT; Belgium-Rwanda BIT; United Kingdom-Tanzania BIT; China-Ghana BIT; Ghana-
Egypt BIT; Mauritius- Ghana BIT; Ghana-Romania BIT; United States- Rwanda BIT; Finland-
Tanzania BIT; Italy-Tanzania BIT; Tanzania-Sweden BIT; Ghana-Bulgaria BIT; Denmark-Ghana 
BIT; Ghana-Malaysia; Denmark-Tanzania BIT and Netherlands-Tanzania BIT.  
144 Article 1 of the Belgium-Rwanda BIT.  
145 Article 1(5) of the Finland-Tanzania BIT. 
146 Article 1(5) of the Tanzania-Denmark BIT.  
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domestic investor is a foreign investor as spelled out in the definition of covered 
investors. The possibility of such claims is without doubt not unlikely, for 
example in Feldman v Mexico, the tribunal had to decide whether a claimant 
possessing United States Citizenship as well as permanent residence in Mexico 
had standing to bring claims against Mexico under Chapter Eleven of NAFTA.  
The tribunal in the above case rejected the argument that article 201 of NAFTA 
makes permanent residence tantamount to nationality and is an instance of dual 
nationality which requires a determination of dominant or effective 
nationality.147 In the view of the tribunal such contextual interpretation of equal 
treatment of nationals and permanent residents leads to the result that 
permanent residents are treated like nationals in a given State Party only if that 
State is different from the State where the investment is made.148 The tribunal 
essentially made a distinction between permanent residence and dual 
citizenship and held that since the claimant was a citizen of only the United 
States there was no prohibition under both international law and NAFTA barring 
the claimant from protection of the treaty because of possessing permanent 
residence in Mexico.149  
However, the decision of the arbitral tribunal is implausible because it 
perpetuates abuse of arbitral procedure through treaty shopping. Essentially, 
contracting states include the notion of permanent residence in investment 
treaties as a manifestation that states consider permanent residence to be 
functionally equivalent to nationality. In essence therefore, although permanent 
residents should benefit from treaty protection, arbitral tribunals must decline 
jurisdiction in situations where claimants possessing permanent residence and 
citizenship of two different states bring disputes against one of the contracting 
states under the same treaty. Finally, unlike other existing BITs, African BITs 
hardly address the issue of dual or multiple nationalities. Among the treaties 
examined, only the United States-Rwanda BIT explicitly limits the possibility of 
dual citizens seeking protection from both contracting states. Specifically, the 
                                                 
147 Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF) 99/1, 
Jurisdiction Award, 6 December 2000, para 33-34 [Hereafter Feldman v Mexico]. 
148 Ibid para 34. 
149 Ibid para 36. 
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United States-Rwanda BIT stipulates that natural persons with dual nationalities 
are deemed to be exclusively nationals of the State of dominant and effective 
nationality.150 
2.4.2 The Requirement of Corporate Nationality  
The determination of corporate nationality is more complicated than natural 
persons because of the ever changing landscape within which modern corporate 
enterprises operate. This is especially more apparent in situations where 
companies are created and owned by investors who have no real or genuine 
connection to the state granting corporate nationality.151 All African BITs like 
many of the existing treaties incorporate economic entities into the definition of 
protected juristic persons.152 Specifically, under African treaty practice 
protection accorded to corporate nationality can take any of the following 
forms; some African BITs require that the corporation, enterprise, partnership, 
trust, joint venture or association should be established or incorporated in the 
territory of the contracting state in accordance with domestic laws,153 other 
African BITs require that the entity be located in the contracting state and 
controlled either directly or indirectly by nationals of the contracting party.154 
Other African BITs simply require the juristic person with or without legal 
personality should have the seat in the contracting state.155   
Generally, the acquisition of corporate nationality under African treaty practice 
usually follows two different formulas; some African BITs use the combined 
system whereby companies must undergo multiple tests to qualify for treaty 
protection156 while others simply provide for single criteria.157 For example, the 
                                                 
150 Section A of the United States-Rwanda BIT. 
151 Jeswald W Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (OUP 2010) 181. 
152 For a comprehensive review of region specific treaties, see Norah Gallagher and Wenhua 
Shan, Chinese Investment Treaties: Policies and Practices (OUP 2009) 53-104. 
153 See for example the Malaysia-Ghana BIT; Denmark-Ghana BIT; Ghana-Guinea BIT; United 
Kingdom-Cameroon BIT. 
154 See for instance the Netherlands-Ghana BIT; Italy-Tanzania BIT. 
155 See particularly the Germany-Burundi BIT and the Germany- Kenya BIT. 
156 Article 2 Belgium-Cameroon BIT; Article 1(b) Netherlands-Ghana BIT; Article 1(2) Belgium-
Rwanda BIT; Article 1(b) Tanzania-Denmark BIT and Article 1(b) Netherlands-Tanzania BIT. 
157 Article 1(d) United Kingdom-Congo BIT; Article 1 (d) of the Ghana-Benin BIT; Article 1(2) of 
the Ghana-Egypt BIT; Article 1(c) of the Ghana-Mauritius BIT; Article 1(4) of the Germany-
Kenya BIT, Article 1(5) of the Tanzania-Finland BIT; Article 1(2) of the Italy-Tanzania BIT; 
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Netherlands-Ghana BIT provides that an investor shall comprise of ‘any legal 
persons located either in Ghana or the Netherlands and controlled, directly or 
indirectly, by nationals of that Contracting party.’’158  According to the 
Netherlands-Ghana BIT therefore, corporate enterprises must not only be based 
in Ghana or the Netherlands but should also be controlled by nationals of the 
contracting states. The Netherlands-Ghana BIT can be contrasted with for 
example the Tanzania-UK BIT which simply requires that the corporate entity 
should be incorporated under the laws and regulations of the contracting 
states.159  
The combination of different criterion has the advantage of limiting the scope of 
the treaty to only those corporate companies with real or continuous links to the 
home country.160 In arbitral practice where BITs contain incorporation as the 
sole criteria, arbitral tribunals have generally not pierced the corporate veil and 
declined looking at the nationality of the owners of the company.161 For 
instance, in Saluka v Czech Republic the tribunal strictly followed the definition 
of corporate nationality in the Czech Republic-Netherlands BIT which required 
only that the claimant should be an investor incorporated under the laws of the 
contracting states.162 Although the tribunal was sympathetic to the argument 
that companies which have no real connection with the contracting states should 
not benefit from the treaty, the tribunal declined imposing any additional 
criteria other than those the parties articulated in the treaty.163 The tribunal 
was of the view that ‘‘the parties had complete freedom of choice in this 
matter, and they chose to limit entitled “investors” to those satisfying the 
                                                                                                                                                    
Article 1(4) of the Germany-Burundi BIT; Article 1(d) of the United Kingdom-Congo BIT; 
Article 1(2) of the Bulgaria-Ghana BIT; Article 1(3) of the Denmark-Ghana BIT; Article 1 (d) of 
the Ghana-Guinea BIT; Article 1(b) of the United Kingdom-Ghana BIT; Article 1(c) of the 
Malaysia-Ghana BIT and Article 1(c) of the United Kingdom-Tanzania BIT. 
158 Article 1(b) of the Netherlands-Ghana BIT. 
159 Article 1(c) of the United Kingdom-Tanzania BIT.  
160 Rachel Thorn and Jennifer Doucleff, ‘Disregarding the Corporate Veil and Denial of 
Benefits Clauses: Testing Treaty Language and the Concept of Investor’ in Michael Waibel and 
others (eds), The Backlash against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality (Kluwer 
Law International 2010) 9. 
161 Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (OUP 
2008) 50. 
162 Saluka Investments BV v Czech Republic, para 240. 
163 Ibid. 
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definition set out in Article 1 of the Treaty’’.164 Respectively, the tribunal held 
that the corporate entity met the sole incorporation criteria as articulated in the 
BIT and refused to ‘‘add any other requirement which the parties could 
themselves have added but which they omitted to add’’.165  
Similarly, a subsequent tribunal in Rompetrol Group v Romania followed the 
reasoning adopted in Saluka v Czech Republic and Tokios Tokeles v Ukraine.166 
The facts and decision of Rompetrol Group v Romania are revealing on the 
continued reliance on formalities even when there is sufficient evidence showing 
the investor suspiciously acquired corporate nationality. In this case the facts 
clearly suggest that the tribunal should have looked beyond formalities and 
pierced the corporate veil. The facts are briefly as follows; an investor group led 
by Mr. Patriciu, a Romanian national, purchased a controlling stake in 
Rompetrol, a Romanian petroleum company. Subsequently, Mr. Patriciu 
incorporated a private limited liability company in the Netherlands called 
Waverton which was a wholly owned subsidiary of a Luxembourg company called 
ROGI owned by Mr. Marin. Shortly thereafter, Waverton and ROGI become 
controlling shareholders of Rompetrol S.A and Waverton changed its name to The 
Rompetrol Group. Under this arrangement, Mr. Marin and Mr. Patriciu between 
them owned 74% of ROGI, which owned 100% of The Rompetrol Group. 
Subsequently, Mr. Marin was bought out by Mr. Patriciu and Mr. Stephenson; Mr. 
Patriciu then owned 80% and Mr. Stephenson 20% of the shares in Rompetrol 
Group. It was not disputed that the claimant in this arbitration was a company 
duly established in the Netherlands and in compliance with the formal 
requirements of the BIT but what was disputable was whether the claimant can 
bring a claim against Romania yet he is a Romanian citizen. According to the 
respondent based on the facts of the case, the dispute fell exclusively within the 
domestic jurisdiction of Romanian courts and is not within the purview of an 
ICSID tribunal.  
The respondent argued unsuccessfully that even though the claimant met the 
formal requirements of corporate nationality as articulated in the Romania-
                                                 
164 Ibid para 241. 
165 Ibid.  
166 Tokios Tokeles v Ukraine, para 53-71. 
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Netherlands BIT, there was a clear exception to this where it can be shown that 
the real and effective nationality of the legal entity in question is that of the 
respondent state.167 While rejecting this reasoning, the tribunal emphasized that 
the definition of corporate nationality as stipulated in the BIT is the decisive 
factor for establishing jurisdiction. According to the tribunal, there was ‘simply 
no room for an argument that a supposed rule of ‘real and effective nationality’ 
should override either the permissive terms of Article 25 of the ICSID Convention 
or the prescriptive definitions incorporated in the BIT.’ Based on the terms of 
the BIT the tribunal held that ‘‘neither corporate control, effective seat, nor 
origin of capital has any part to play in the ascertainment of nationality under 
The Netherlands-Romania BIT and that the Claimant qualifies as an investor 
entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Tribunal by virtue of Article 1(b)(ii) of 
the BIT’’.168 
The approach by arbitral tribunals to strictly rely on formalities without looking 
beyond corporate nationality could result in extending treaty protection to 
fictitious companies which would be against the intention of contracting states. 
As mentioned above, African states have either combined or separated the 
criteria of corporate nationality implying therefore that the jurisprudence as 
developed by arbitral tribunals also has consequences for African states. 
Particularly, it should be stressed that strict reliance on formalities 
disproportionately affects African states compared to other developing countries 
with similar BITs because the legal infrastructure of African states is generally 
perceived as inadequate and lacks the necessary ingredients required for a 
stable business environment. Given this deficiency, foreign investors are likely to 
acquire treaty protection from contracting states that have BITs with African 
states even though the corporate enterprise has no real or actual connection 
with the contracting state granting corporate nationality. Furthermore, domestic 
investors from African states with the intention of benefiting from both domestic 
courts and international arbitration could potentially bring claims against the 
host state provided the domestic investor has corporate nationality of any 
contracting state part to the BIT. In light of these considerations, the present 
jurisprudence has serious consequences for African states because not only will 
                                                 
167 The Rompetrol Group v Romania, para 54-78.  
168 Ibid. 
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African states be subjected to disputes by foreign investors with little or no 
connection to the contracting states but also African states face a real threat of 
domestic investors bringing claims against them.  
2.5 The Territorial and Temporal Scope of African BITs  
Generally, a discussion of the scope and definition clauses of African BITs would 
be incomplete without a brief assessment of the territorial and temporal 
provisions because of the centrality of these provisions in the scope and 
definition clauses. Taken as a whole, territorial and temporal provisions are 
important because their set the geographical boundaries within which the treaty 
applies as well as the duration of the treaty and in so doing complement the 
definition of assets and covered investor. With this in mind, the remaining parts 
of this chapter briefly review issues rising from territorial and temporal 
provisions which in turn conclusively complete the analysis of the scope and 
definition clauses of African BITs.  
It should be stressed that the definition section of nearly all African BITs 
contains a clause highlighting the territory within which an investment must be 
made for the investment to qualify for treaty protection.169 The wording of the 
territorial scope of most African BITs usually alternate between three different 
formulations; some African BITs have one clause incorporating territories of both 
contracting states170 while others have separate clauses which individually 
specify the territory covered by the African state and the contracting state171 
and lastly a number of African BITs do not explicitly define the territory covered 
by the BIT.172 However, based on the wording of these BITs, it can be presumed 
that if the BIT is silent about the territorial scope, the territory envisaged is that 
                                                 
169 See for example, Korea-Congo BIT; Ghana-Benin BIT; Denmark-Ghana BIT; Ghana-Guinea 
BIT; Malaysia-Ghana BIT; Netherlands-Ghana BIT; Denmark-Tanzania BIT; Netherlands-
Tanzania BIT; United Kingdom-Cameroon BIT; Ghana-Egypt BIT; Italy-Tanzania BIT. 
170 Finland-Tanzania BIT; United States-Cameroon BIT; Korea- Congo BIT; Netherlands-Ghana 
BIT; Tanzania-Denmark; Tanzania-Netherlands BIT; Ghana-Egypt; Finland-Tanzania BIT; Italy-
Tanzania BIT. 
171 Germany-Burundi BIT; Ghana-Benin BIT; Denmark-Ghana BIT; Ghana-Guinea BIT; Malaysia-
Ghana BIT; United Kingdom-Ghana BIT; United Kingdom-Tanzania BIT; United Kingdom-
Cameroon-UK BIT; United States-Congo BIT; India-Ghana BIT; Mauritius-Ghana BIT; United 
States-Rwanda BIT. 
172 For instance see Belgium-Rwanda BIT; Belgium-Cameroon BIT; China-Ghana BIT; Romania-
Ghana BIT; Germany-Kenya BIT and Sweden-Tanzania BIT. 
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provided for under the respective national constitutions of contracting states. It 
should be stressed that only investments made within the sovereign boundaries 
of the contracting states will qualify for treaty protection. The territorial scope 
aside, all African BITs also contain a clause articulating the entry into force and 
termination of the treaty. With regard to entry into force of the treaty, some 
African BITs indicate that the BIT shall enter into effect after 30 days upon 
notification,173 of the BIT’s approval while other African BITs only require 
notification and do not provide any specific time frames.174  
African BITs contain remarkable differences related to protected rights before 
entry into force of the BIT; specifically, some African BITs explicitly indicate 
that investments made by investors prior to entry into force of the BIT are 
protected,175 while other BITs remain silent on this issue.176 Generally, provisions 
protecting investors prior to entry into force of the BIT have negative 
consequences than sometimes anticipated by host states. Particularly, from the 
host state’s perspective, some previous investments might not have been 
approved had the host state known that the rights and privileges of investors 
could potentially be expanded beyond what was agreed to at the time the 
investment was made.177 Moreover, there is potential for the BIT to turn into an 
instrument protecting existing foreign investors while making insignificant 
contribution in stimulating new foreign investment flows. In such situations, the 
host state will not only have constrained its ability to make legitimate policy 
through entering the BIT but also granted existing foreign investors additional 
protection without acquiring substantial increase in foreign investments.  
                                                 
173 Germany-Burundi BIT; United States -Cameroon BIT; Korea-Congo BIT; Denmark-Ghana BIT; 
Ghana-Guinea; Malaysia-Ghana BIT; Netherlands-Ghana BIT; United Kingdom-Ghana BIT; 
Belgium-Rwanda BIT; Netherland-Tanzania BIT; Belgium-Cameroon  BIT; United States-Congo 
BIT; China-Ghana BIT; Germany-Kenya BIT; United States-Rwanda BIT; Sweden-Tanzania BIT. 
174 Ghana-Benin BIT; Netherlands-Kenya BIT; Denmark-Tanzania BIT; United Kingdom-Tanzania 
BIT; United Kingdom-Cameroon BIT; Ghana-Egypt BIT; India-Ghana BIT; Mauritius-Ghana BIT; 
Ghana-Romania BIT; United Kingdom-Kenya BIT; Finland-Tanzania BIT; Italy-Tanzania BIT. 
175 Ghana-Benin BIT; Ghana-Guinea BIT; Malaysia-Ghana BIT; Netherlands-Ghana BIT; United 
Kingdom-Ghana BIT; Denmark-Tanzania BIT; Netherlands -Tanzania BIT; United Kingdom-
Tanzania BIT. 
176 Denmark-Ghana BIT; Ghana-Egypt BIT; Belgium-Cameroon BIT; see also Article 12 of the 
Netherlands- Kenya BIT which reads as follows ‘The present Agreement shall apply to all 
approved investments made in the territory of the one Contracting Party by a national of the 
other Contracting Party’.  
177 Jeswald W Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (OUP 2010) 173. 
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Given this potential drawback, a number of African BITs explicitly exclude from 
the realm of the treaty any investment made prior to the entry into force of the 
BIT.178 The entry into force aside, the duration of African BITs is usually 
anticipated to last between ten to twenty years with a presumption that the 
treaty will remain in force unless terminated by one of the contracting party.179 
Furthermore, African BITs normally provide that the termination of the BIT takes 
effect after twelve months upon receipt of the intention to terminate it.180 Upon 
termination of the treaty, African BITs stipulate that approved investment made 
prior to termination of the treaty remain protected for a period of about 10 
years.181 The Malaysia-Ghana BIT is typical of African treaty practice and it reads 
as follows; ‘With respect to investments made or acquired prior to the date of 
termination of this Agreement, the provisions of all of the other Articles of this 
Agreement shall continue to be effective for a period of ten (10) years from such 
date of termination’’.182 
                                                 
178 For instance the Belgium-Rwanda BIT explicitly provides that ‘investments made before 
the entry into force of this Convention shall not be covered by it. A similar provision is 
articulated in the India-Ghana BIT and Mauritius-Ghana BIT. 
179 Mauritius-Ghana provides for 10 years, while the United States-Congo BIT provides for 20 
years. See also the following Ghana-Egypt BIT provides for 10 years; China-Ghana BIT provides 
for 10 years, United States-Congo BIT provides for 10 years; United Kingdom-Cameroon BIT 
provides for protection for 10 years; Germany-Burundi BIT provides for 10 years; United 
States-Cameroon BIT provides for 10 years while Ghana-Benin BIT; Denmark-Ghana BIT; 
Ghana-Guinea BIT; Ghana-Malaysia BIT; Netherlands-Ghana BIT provide for 15 years. On the 
other hand, United Kingdom-Ghana BIT; Netherlands-Kenya provide for 5 years and Belgium-
Rwanda BIT provide for 5 years while Denmark-Tanzania BIT provides for 10 years; 
Netherlands-Tanzania provides for 10 years; United Kingdom-Tanzania BIT provides for 10 
years; Belgium-Cameroon BIT provides for 10 years and lastly India-Ghana provides for 10 
years. 
180 Egypt-Ghana BIT; China-Ghana BIT; United States-Congo BIT; Mauritius-Ghana BIT; India-
Ghana BIT; United Kingdom-Cameroon BIT; United Kingdom-Tanzania BIT; Germany-Burundi 
BIT; United States- Cameroon BIT; Mauritius-Ghana BIT; United Kingdom-Congo BIT; Ghana 
Benin BIT; Denmark- Ghana BIT; Ghana-Guinea BIT; Malaysia-Ghana BIT. On the other hand, 
the following African treaties provide for 6 months Netherlands-Ghana; United Kingdom-
Ghana BIT; Netherlands-Kenya BIT; Belgium-Rwanda; Denmark-Tanzania BIT; Netherlands-
Tanzania and the Belgium-Cameroon-BIT. 
181China-Ghana BIT; United States-Congo BIT; Ghana-Egypt BIT; United States-Cameroon BIT; 
Denmark-Tanzania BIT; Germany- Burundi BIT; United States-Cameroon BIT; United Kingdom- 
Congo BIT provided for twenty years; Denmark-Ghana BIT; Ghana-Guinea BIT; Malaysia-Ghana  
BIT; Netherlands-Ghana BIT. However, the United Kingdom-Ghana BIT provides for 15 years, 
Netherlands -Kenya BIT provides for 5 years; Belgium-Rwanda BIT provides for 5 years; 
Netherlands-Tanzania provides for 15 years; United Kingdom-Tanzania BIT provides for 20 
years; United Kingdom-Cameroon BIT provides for 20 years and the India-Ghana provides for 
15 years. 
182 Article 12(4) of the Malaysia-Ghana BIT.  
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From the wording of this clause, potentially foreign investors can bring 
investment claims against Ghana ten years after termination of the treaty. This 
provision has developmental implications not only for Ghana but also African 
states with BITs that protect investment made prior to the entry into force of 
the treaty. Given the wording of this provision especially the fact that it extends 
protection even to investments concluded prior to the treaty, it is doubtful 
African states with such BITs anticipated the consequences of according 
additional years of protection to prior investments after expiry of the treaty. It 
should be stressed that although some African BITs have explicitly excluded 
investment disputes arising prior to the entry into force of the treaty other 
African BITs with the same provision are silent on the issue.183 The protection 
accorded to prior investments was possibly included without anticipating the 
likelihood of such disputes arising. However, given increasing claims against 
African states without an explicit restriction to such disputes, the threat of 
investors bringing claims for investments that existed prior to the entry into 
force of the treaty and after the expiry of the treaty is a really possibility.  
2.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has reviewed the scope and definition clauses contained in African 
BITs and the approaches through which arbitral tribunals have interpreted such 
clauses. From the wording of African preambles it is evident that African 
preambles and more broadly African BITs are negotiated between two 
asymmetrical parties. Particularly, the preamble language of African BITs 
requires African states to protect foreign investors and the protection is further 
reinforced in treaty standards but the dual obligation to encourage foreign 
investment flows into African states is not elevated to the level of enforceable 
treaty obligations. Similarly, the chapter has shown that the majority of African 
BITs define the concept ‘investment’ broadly to include every kind of asset. In 
the majority of African BITs this is usually followed with a broad based asset 
                                                 
183 See Article 13 of the Ghana-Benin BIT  that reads as follows ‘This Agreement shall apply to 
investments made prior to and after its entry into force by investors of one Contracting Party 
in the territory of the other Contracting Party. It shall not, however, apply to investment 
disputes arising before its entry into force. See also for example article 10 of the Malaysia-
Ghana BIT which reads as follows ‘‘This Agreement shall apply to investments made in the 
territory of either Contracting Party in accordance with its laws and regulations or national 
policies by investors of the other Contracting Party prior to, as well as after the entry into 
force of this Agreement’’. 
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definition containing a non-exhaustive list of examples of assets African states 
consider as investments. The wordings of African investment clauses have 
inherent flaws because basically treaty protection extends virtually to all assets 
including insignificant assets that may have little impact on the economic 
development of the respective African state. Given the array of inconsistent 
decisions from arbitral practice grappling with the definition of investment the 
chapter suggests that future African BITs should insist on redefining the 
definition of investment with unambiguous development characteristics.
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Chapter 3 
The Standard of Expropriation in African Bilateral 
Investment Treaties 
Introduction 
The expropriation of foreign investors is one of the most controversial issues in 
the relationship between foreign investors and sovereign states because it 
directly attacks duly acquired property rights.1 When left unconstrained, 
expropriation has the propensity to reshape and disproportionately balance the 
relationship between foreign investors and sovereign states. Most importantly, 
expropriation involves the complicated poise of balancing between two 
competing and disenchanted interests. Generally under international law, the 
entry of foreign investors into sovereign states is discretionary based upon a 
state’s overall social, political and economic realities.2 However, international 
law recognises that when foreign investors are permitted entry, there is an 
equally compelling responsibility to offer compensation for damages resulting 
from expropriation measures.3 While the duty to compensate foreign investors is 
                                                 
1 The interest expropriation has generated is testament to the controversy entrenched in the 
philosophy of expropriation. For a cursory view of divergent opinions on expropriation see 
Campbell McLachlan, Laurence Shore and Matthew Weiniger, International Investment 
Arbitration ( OUP 2007) 265-313; M Sornarajah , The International Law on Foreign Investment 
(2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2004) 344-401;Andreas F  Lowenfeld, International 
Economic Law (2nd edn, OUP 2008) 559-570; Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles 
of International Investment Law (OUP 2008) 89-118; Norah Gallagher and Wenhua Shan, 
Chinese Investment Treaties: Policies and Practices (OUP 2009) 253-298; Fath El Rahman and 
Abdalla El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment in Sudan and Saudi Arabia 
(2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2003)114-140, 263-304;Yvon Heckscher and Jan 
Schokkaert, International Investment Protection: Comparative Law Analysis of Bilateral and 
Multilateral Interstate Conventions, Doctrinal Texts and Arbitral Jurisprudence Concerning 
Foreign Investments (Bruylant 2009) 365-422; Burns H Weston, ‘Constructive Takings Under 
International Law: A Modest Foray into the Problem of Creeping Expropriation’ (1975) 16 Va. 
J.Int’l L 103;  Rudolf  Dolzer, ‘New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property’ 
(1981) 75 Am. J.Int’l. L 553, George C Christie, ‘What Constitutes a Taking of Property Under 
International Law’ (1962) 32 Brit. Y.B.Int’I L 307; Vicki L Been and Joel C Beauvais, ‘The 
Global Firth Amendment: NAFTA’s Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an 
International Regulatory Taking’s Doctrine’ (2003) 78 NYU Law Rev 30; Reisman W Michael 
and Sloane D Robert, ‘Indirect Expropriation and its Valuation in the BIT Generation’ (2003) 
74 BYIL 115. 
2 Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (OUP 
2008) 89. 
3 Ibid. 
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fairly straightforward, international law falls short on delimiting or 
deconstructing measures that constitute indirect expropriation.4  
As stated in the introductory chapter, the 20th century witnessed probably the 
most intensive period in the relationship between developed and developing 
countries.5 To recap, during this period, there was unprecedented consensus in 
developing countries expressed through numerous resolutions and declarations 
unanimously rejecting the standard of compensation. Particularly, the prevalent 
view among many developing countries was that the standard of compensation is 
an extension of foreign dominance and a form of neo-colonialism. However, as 
stressed earlier, the rhetoric espoused by many developing states appears to 
have subdued following the signing of BITs that essentially condition 
expropriation upon the payment of prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation.6 This pragmatic change in attitude towards foreign investors is 
premised on the perceived notion that foreign direct investment promotes social 
and economic development and investment treaties are the catalyst through 
which foreign capital is attracted.7 Moreover, protecting foreign investors 
against uncompensated expropriation through treaties is considered important 
because modern investment treaties offer foreign investors discretion to pursue 
direct arbitration conducted by ‘neutral tribunals’. It then becomes the 
responsibility of arbitral tribunals to determine whether government conduct 
                                                 
4 David A Gantz, ‘The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions: From NAFTA to the United 
States-Chile Free Trade Agreement’ (2004) 19 Am.U.Int’l L. Rev 679, 704; Jurgen Kurtz, ‘A 
General Investment Agreement in the WTO? Lessons from Chapter 11 of NAFTA and the OECD 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment’ (2002) 23 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L 713, 738. 
5 See Chapter 1 for in-depth discussion. 
6 UNCTAD notes that the general direction of global investment policies is towards openness 
for and facilitation of foreign investment. For instance between December 2009 and March 
2010, 73 countries concluded 37 International investment agreements. UNCTAD, Investment 
Policy Monitor (UNCTAD Secretariat 20 April 2010) 
<http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20102_en.pdf>accessed 20 May 2012. The 
number of bilateral investment treaties is skyrocketing; according to UNCTAD statistics over 
three thousand BITs have been concluded and the number continues to increase. For example 
in 2002 alone African countries had signed a total of 533 BITs. It should be stressed that all 
BITs concluded by African countries contain an expropriation clause requiring expropriation to 
serve a public purpose, follow due process, non-discriminatory and accompanied by the 
payment of compensation. 
7 Whether BITs indeed attract foreign capital is not entirely clear. Some authors take the view 
that BITs do indeed influence FDI flows while others conclude that BITs play a limited role in 
increasing FDI flows. For a thorough discussion on the spectrum of varying opinions see,  Karl 
P Sauvant  and Lisa E Sachs, The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties and Investment Flows (OUP 2009). Karl 
Sauvant and Lisa Sachs note that the analysis suggests difficulty in firmly establishing the 
effect of BITs on FDI. 
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amounts to expropriation as well as the amount of compensation awarded to 
damages suffered by foreign investors.  
The delicate balance between government interests vis-à-vis the interests of 
foreign investors appears to have revived the bitter rivalry between developed 
and developing countries. Put succinctly, arbitral tribunals are faced with the 
dilemma of deciding whether government regulatory measures have crossed the 
line into compensable expropriation and quite often the conclusion from such 
determinations have not necessarily satisfied sovereign states. Moreover, 
considering that BITs do not define what constitutes expropriation the discretion 
to determine measures’ amounting to expropriation entirely rests in the hands of 
arbitral tribunals. It is the outcome of that determination that has created 
unprecedented controversy between foreign investors and capital importing 
states. In light of these considerations, this chapter thoroughly examines the 
standard of expropriation as articulated in African BITs and by so doing 
underscores the practice of African states as well as situates African treaty 
practice within the context of general investment law treaty practice. Briefly, 
the chapter examines issues such as the scope and definition of expropriation, 
indirect expropriation, lawful expropriation and the standard of compensation. 
Lastly, in line with the overall themes of the thesis, this chapter also assess 
likely policy implications of the emerging expropriation jurisprudence towards 
legitimate policy making of African states.  
3.1 Mapping the Doctrine of Expropriation  
International law holds that states have the sovereign right to expropriate 
foreign property provided this is followed with the payment of prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation.8 In other words, the payment of compensation is a 
                                                 
8 This principle is a restatement of international law as reflected in the United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution of 1962 on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources cited 
in International Legal Material, United Nations: General Assembly Resolution on Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources (Vol 6, America Society of International Law 1967) 147-
149. The tribunal in Amoco v Iran noted that while the responsibility of states to respect 
contracts has been questioned since its inception this rule has been confirmed in numerous 
cases and is not disputed anymore.  See Amoco International Finance Corporation v Iran, 14 
July 1987, 15 Iran-U.S CTR 189, para 177; see also Garcia Amador  Special Rapporteur for  
State Responsibility ‘The right of expropriation even in its widest sense is recognised in 
international law, irrespective of the patrimonial rights involved or of the nationality of the 
person in whom they are vested. This international recognition has been confirmed on 
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sine qua non for the exercise of legitimate expropriation. Brownlie aptly notes 
that expropriation per se is lawful provided it is carried out for a public purpose, 
follows due process is non-discriminatory and the measures are accompanied 
with the payment of prompt adequate and effective compensation.9 
Contextually, it is important to draw a distinction between, confiscation, 
nationalisation and expropriation. In essence, although these concepts appear 
analogous and often are used interchangeably a distinction between the 
concepts is warranted to avoid ambiguity. Sornarajah defines confiscation as the 
capricious taking of property for personal enrichment and notes that usually such 
measures are implemented by dictators.10 Traditionally, international law 
prohibits confiscatory taking and pronounces such takings as unlawful and 
unjustifiable.11 On the other hand, nationalisation is defined as the systemic 
taking of foreign property to curtail economic dominance.12 Nationalisation 
usually leads to the creation of state monopolies, termination of all foreign 
investments and the total takeover of means of production by state machinery.13 
Generally, the nationalisation of foreign owned property as part of government 
sanctioned policy was once commonly practiced by formerly colonised states 
from Africa, Asia and Latin America. Particularly, from post-World War II until 
the early 1980s, nationalisation was pursued by formerly colonised states as a 
strategy to safeguard newly acquired liberty.14 Coupled with this nationalisation 
was pursued because formerly colonised states viewed economic prosperity as 
the impetus to sovereignty and independence. In contrast, expropriation is said 
to be actions that are taken, authorised, ratified or condoned by the 
                                                                                                                                                    
innumerable occasions in diplomatic and in the decisions of courts and arbitral commission, 
and, more recently, in the declarations of international organisations and conferences’ Garcia 
FV Amador , Special Rapporteur’s Report on  State Responsibility (Vol. II, Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission 1959) para 41. 
9 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (6th edn, OUP 2003) 508-12. Brownlie 
notes that since international law recognises exceptions to the requirement of compensation 
this should be articulated in treaties so as to allow legitimate regulation. 
10 M Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (2nd edn, Cambridge University 
Press 2004) 346. See also Schwarzenberger observing that confiscation is a form of 
interference that amounts to an international tort, Georg Schwarzenberger, Foreign 
Investments and International Law (Stevens & Sons 1969) 17. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 See Chapter 1 for in-depth discussion. 
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government which result in a divestment of investors’ property rights.15  At an 
elementary level, expropriation involves interfering with investors’ rights to 
freely enjoy the fruits from his duly acquired property rights.16 Comparatively 
and in legal terms, nationalisation is a form of expropriation although it differs 
in scope and breadth from other forms of expropriation.17 Distinctively, Martin 
Domke suggests that in reality the distinction between nationalisation and 
expropriation may have little practical effect on the relationship between states 
and foreign investors.18 In essence, this is because interfering with investors’ 
property rights includes not only an outright taking but also any interference 
with the use and enjoyment of property rights.19   
The definition of the term expropriation continues to be the subject of heated 
debate in scholarly literature and arbitral practice. Over 40 years ago, Professor 
Christie in his influential piece analysing precedent setting cases concluded 
without offering a clear definition and opined that each case must be considered 
on its own merits.20 Christie arrived at this conclusion after thoroughly reviewing 
landmark cases of German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia and the Norwegian 
Claims as well as the body of jurisprudence of the American Foreign Settlement 
Commission.21 A similar attempt was initiated by Friedmann who noted that 
expropriation is a legal procedure that involves government taking away private 
property.22 With this in mind Friedmann defined expropriation as a procedure 
through which states in time of peace and for reasons of public utility 
                                                 
15 The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) administers the American Foreign 
Investment Guarantee Program. It is a government of the United States agency established in 
1971 for financing political risk insurance so as to help United States businesses of all sizes to 
complete in emerging markets and meet the challenges of investing overseas when the 
private sector support is not available. 
16 Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (OUP 
2008) 89. 
17 BA Wortley, Expropriation in Public International Law (Cambridge University Press 1959) 
36. 
18 Martin Domke, ‘Foreign Nationalisations: Some Aspects of Contemporary International Law’ 
(1961) 55 Am.J. Int’l L 585,588. 
19 Article 10 (3) (a) Harvard Draft Convention of the International Responsibility of States for 
Injuries to Aliens, 15 April 1961 prepared by Louis B Sohn and Richard Baxter (1961) 55 Am. J. 
Int’l L 553. 
20 George C Christie, ‘What Constitutes a Taking of Property under International Law’ (1962) 
32 BYIL 307,388. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Fath El Rahman and Abdalla El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment in 
Sudan and Saudi Arabia (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2003) 118. 
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appropriate private property rights with or without compensation so as to place 
the property at the disposal of its public services.23 However, the definition 
espoused by Friedmann is simplistic and underestimates the sophistication 
through which governments can interfere with property rights without an overt 
taking. 
Generally, the philosophical underpinnings of expropriation are premised on 
traditional international law theory that seeks to enforce and protect duly 
acquired property rights. The theory is premised on basic assumptions of 
property that are prevalent in liberal regimes and uphold the inviolability of 
private property as well as the sanctuary of contract.24  The notion of property 
rights is not without controversy and opinions differ depending on the legal 
system and culture. For instance in Africa, traditionally land ownership was 
communal; land was allocated to people as a group and controlled by chiefs.25 
Distinctively, the African system of land ownership was shaped by the creation 
of communal land ownership as well as dependent land structures that are 
resistant to change.26  
The aftermath of western dominance and civilisation witnessed a shift in this 
paradigm as liberalism took centre stage. The values entrenched in African 
traditional understanding of property rights succumbed to western liberal ideals 
which uphold and protect individual property rights.27 Moreover, through signing 
extensive property provisions, African countries effectively undermined their 
own traditional understanding of property rights as well as limited the right to 
regulate even in the public interest. However, it should be submitted that 
although African countries lost the argument of the day such traditional 
sentiments over property rights are rekindled when African states find 
                                                 
23 Ibid 119. 
24 Samuel KB Asante, ‘International Law and Foreign Investment: A Reappraisal’ (1988) 37 
ICLQ 588, 595. 
25 Sandra F Joireman, ‘Applying Property Rights Theory to Africa: The Consequences of 
Formalising Informal Land Rights’ (2006) 5 
<http://www.isnie.org/ISNIE06/Papers06/11.2/joireman.pdf>accessed 20 May 2012. 
26 Ibid 6. 
27 Ibid. 
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themselves at the centre of expropriation claims.28 As seen from the practice of 
Latin American countries, such sentiments have the tendency to resurface 
sovereign centred arguments and can create unexpected hostilities in the overall 
investment regime.29 Be that as it may, through initiating BITs, capital exporting 
countries have succeeded in exporting extensive property provisions in the over 
two thousand eight hundred BITs.30 For instance, as this chapter will shortly 
demonstrate, the right to property under African BITs not only accentuates the 
international law position but also extensively protects foreign investors against 
any state interference.   
Moreover, expansive property provisions notwithstanding ambiguity in 
expropriation clauses offers foreign investors’ sufficient opportunity to claim 
compensation for any measure vaguely perceived as an expropriation.31 
Comparatively, it is for instance asserted that the definition of property in 
United States model BIT goes beyond the definition of property articulated under 
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution because the model BIT 
allows conceptual severance and consideration of money as property.32  
According to Vicki and Joel the broadly construed provisions clearly demonstrate 
that foreign investors from capital exporting countries such as the United States 
enjoy superior protection than that accorded under the Fifth Amendment 
despite the fact that the Fifth Amendment already provides extensive 
protection.33 Moreover, it should be stressed that expansively worded 
expropriation provisions have an impact on a country’s political, social and 
                                                 
28 See for example, Biwater v United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No ARB/05/22 Award 
18 July 2008 [Hereafter Biwater v Tanzania]; Bernardus Henricus Funnekotter and others v 
Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/6 Award 22 April 2009 [Hereafter Bernardus v Zimbabwe]. 
29 Most recently Ecuador and Bolivia denounced the ICSID arbitration process and withdrew 
from ICSID. 
30 Vicki L Been and Joel C Beauvais, ‘The Global Firth Amendment: NAFTA’s Investment 
Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International Regulatory Taking’s Doctrine’ (2003) 
78 NYU Law Rev 30, 38.  
31 Moreover, the expansive nature of the clause offers foreign investors the right to bring any 
investment claim broadly perceived as an expropriation. The pursuant of such claims can have 
far-reaching implication  on the social political and economic realities of poorer nations   
32 Vicki L Been and Joel C Beauvais, ‘The Global Firth Amendment: NAFTA’s Investment 
Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International Regulatory Taking’s Doctrine’ (2003) 
78 NYU Law Rev. 30, 63-8. 
33 Ibid 63. 
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economic circumstances.34 As a result any costs associated with implementing 
expropriation measures falls disproportionately on developing countries which 
inevitably benefits foreign investors at the detriment of sovereign states.35  
3.2 An Overview of the Expropriation Terminology used in 
African BITs 
There are different terms used by investors when pursuing expropriation claims 
and these include, indirect expropriation, disposition, de facto expropriation, 
confiscation, a taking, disguised expropriation, creeping expropriation, measures 
having equivalent effect to, or tantamount to expropriation.36 These concepts 
are used on a case by case basis although the use is usually dependent on the 
creativity of aggrieved foreign investors. The terminology is a hatchback for a 
fishing expedition because investors are offered expansively construed 
possibilities within which to bring expropriation claims. For instance aggrieved 
American nationals with investments in Cameroon can initiate expropriation 
claims under the Cameroon-United States BIT alleging that the measures 
Cameroon has taken amount to an indirect expropriation, a disposition, de facto 
expropriation, confiscation, disguised expropriation, creeping expropriation, 
measures having equivalent effect to, or tantamount to expropriation.37 This is 
not unique to Cameroon; virtually all BITs signed by African countries contain 
expropriation clauses with similar or equivalent guarantees.38  
                                                 
34 Jeswald W Salacuse and Nicholas P Sullivan, ‘Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain’ (2005) 46 Harv. Int’l L. J 67, 74. 
35 Ibid.  
36 Rudolf Dolzer and Margrete Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties (Kluwer Law 
International 1995) 98.  See also Errol P Mendes, ‘The Canadian National Energy Program: An 
Example of Assertion of Economic Sovereignty or Creeping Expropriation in International Law’ 
(1981) 14 Vand. J. Transnat’I L 475, 498-501. 
37 Article III of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of 
Cameroon Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (USTR, 
Nov 27, 1984) [Hereafter United States-Cameroon BIT]. 
38 See for instance article 5 of the Treaty between the United Republic of Tanzania and 
Government of the  Kingdom of Denmark Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection 
of Investment (22 April 1996) [Hereafter Denmark-Tanzania BIT]; Article 4 of the Federal 
Republic of Germany and Burundi Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments (No. 26278, 10 Sept 1984) [Hereafter Germany-Burundi BIT]; Article 
5 of the Agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the Government of the 
Italian Republic for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (2001)  [Hereafter Tanzania-
Italy BIT]; Article 3 of the Treaty Between Federal Republic of Germany and the United 
Republic of Tanzania Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
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Although all African BITs contain expropriation clauses, none of the clauses 
specifically defines what constitutes an expropriation. Typically, African BITs 
contain a generalised expropriation clause that does not explain the scope of 
expropriation and the extent of government interference required for 
compensable regulatory expropriation.39 Essentially African BITs contain vaguely 
worded expropriation clauses with the hope that arbitral tribunals will interpret 
the expropriation clause in accordance with Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention.40 For instance, Article 5 of the United Kingdom-Kenya BIT explains 
expropriation in the following terms: 
Investments of nationals or companies of either Contracting Party 
shall not be nationalised, expropriated or subjected to measures 
having effect equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation […] except 
for a public purpose related to the internal needs of that party on a 
non-discriminatory basis and against prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation…  
The language of Article 5 of United Kingdom-Kenya BIT is analogous to Article 
5(1) of the Tanzania-UK BIT which provides that nationals or companies of either 
contracting party shall not be: 
 “Nationalised, expropriated or subjected to measures having effect 
equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation...in the territory of the 
other Contracting Party except for a public purpose related to the 
                                                                                                                                                    
Investments (30 Jan 1965) [Hereafter Germany-Tanzania BIT] and Article 5 of the Agreement 
between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 
the Government of the Republic of Kenya for the Promotion and Protection of Investments 
(Treaty Series No. 8, 2000) [Hereafter United Kingdom-Kenya BIT]. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Article 31of the Vienna Convention of the Law on Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S.331, 81. L.M. 679. 
Jan 27, 1980 [Hereafter VCLT]. Particularly article 31(1) of the VCLT provides that a treaty 
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.  Even more article 
31(2) stipulates that the context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall 
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement 
relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection of the treaty; (b) 
any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of 
the treaty and accepted by other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. Similarly, 
article 31(3) stipulates that there shall be taken into account, together with the context (a) 
any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or 
the application of its interpretation; (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the 
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.  Lastly, 
article 31(4) stresses that there any special meaning shall be given to a term if it is 
established that the parties so intended. 
  
 117 
internal needs of that Party on a non-discriminatory basis and against 
prompt, adequate and effective compensation…” 
The expropriation clauses mentioned above are not limited to Kenya and 
Tanzania, BITs signed by other African countries contain similar clauses inter 
alia Rwanda, Burundi, Cameroon, Zambia, Ghana and Democratic Republic of 
Congo. Although the expropriation clause contained in the Tanzania-UK BIT does 
not explicitly state concepts such as indirect expropriation, creeping 
expropriation and de facto expropriation, these terms can be construed from the 
wording of the expropriation clause. Indeed, the tribunal in Biwater v United 
Republic of Tanzania found that Article 5 (1) of the Tanzania-United Kingdom 
BIT was broadly framed to encompass both formal taking (direct expropriation) 
but also de facto expropriation or indirect taking that does not involve actual 
taking of title but nonetheless results in effective loss of property.41 Broadly, 
despite the level of ambiguity in African expropriation clauses, it is worth 
stressing that all African treaties contain an expropriation clause and the 
expropriation clause complies with customary international law standards 
requiring that expropriation measures should be followed with compensation.  
Reflectively, the language of the expropriation clause reveals that at least 
theoretically the rhetoric of post-World War II when African countries demanded 
for the establishment of a New International Economic Order are over. As will be 
discussed in subsequent parts of this chapter, the expropriation clause contained 
in African BITs have generally settled for either parts of the Hull formula or the 
full Hull formula requiring expropriation to be accompanied with the payment of 
prompt, adequate and effective compensation. Also the expropriation clauses 
included under National Investment Codes of African states are similar to the 
expropriation clauses articulated in African BITs. For instance, article 30 of the 
Rwanda Investment Code provides that the government can only expropriate for 
a public purpose, on a non-discriminatory basis and in accordance with due 
process of the law and upon the payment of prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation.42 Equally, under the Kenya Foreign Investment Protection Act, it 
is stipulated that expropriation measures are permissible when such measures 
                                                 
41 Biwater v Tanzania, para 452. 
42 Article 30 of the Rwanda Law No. 26/2005 of 17/12/2005 Relating to Investment and Export 
Promotion and Facilitation [Hereafter Rwanda Investment Act]. 
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are for a public purpose, non-discriminatory, in accordance with due process and 
followed with the full and prompt payment of compensation.43 Similarly, section 
78 of the Ghana Investment Act guarantees against expropriation and stipulates 
that there shall not be any acquisition of an enterprise unless the acquisition is 
in the national interest, for a public purpose and followed by payment of fair 
and adequate compensation.44 At a regional level, the language of the 
expropriation clause is remarkably similar to National Investment Acts and 
African BITs. For example, Article 20 of the Investment Agreement for the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa provides as follows;  
Member States shall not nationalise or expropriate investment in their 
territory or adopt any other measures tantamount to expropriation of 
investments except: (a) in the public interest ;(b) on a non-
discriminatory basis; (c) in accordance with due process of law; and 
(d) on payment of prompt adequate compensation.45 
Expropriation clauses in African BITs contain variations in the use of the 
terminology direct and indirect expropriation. Generally, most expropriation 
clauses in African BITs do not explicitly mention the term indirect expropriation. 
For example, although the Democratic Republic of Congo has concluded 13 BITs 
only the United States and France BITs explicitly mention the term indirect 
expropriation.46 A similar trend is followed in Tanzania which has BITs 
mentioning both direct and indirect expropriation as well as BITs that do not 
explicitly mention indirect expropriation. For example Article 4 of the Tanzania-
Sweden BIT stipulates that ‘‘neither party shall take measures depriving directly 
or indirectly…’’while Article 5(1) of the Tanzania-UK BIT simply states that 
either contracting party shall not be “nationalised, expropriated or subjected to 
                                                 
43 Article 8 of the Kenya Foreign Investments Promotion Act Chapter 518 (1964, 15 December, 
Rev 2010) [Hereafter Kenya Investment Act]. 
44 The Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act, 1994 (Act 478) [Hereafter Ghana Investment 
Act]. 
45 COMESA is made up of the government of Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, 
Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Collectively, the countries are 
called Member States of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. 
46 Specifically article 3 of the United States-Congo BIT stipulates that investment shall not be 
expropriated or nationalised either directly or indirectly through measures tantamount to 
nationalisation except for public purpose, in a non-discriminatory manner upon payment of 
prompt and adequate compensation. Similarly, article 3 of the France-Congo BIT explicitly 
uses the term direct and indirect expropriation.   
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measures having effect equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation…’’47  This 
trend is also followed by Zambia which has concluded 6 BITs, with a number of 
BITs omitting the terminology indirect expropriation. For example, the Zambia-
Switzerland BIT explicitly mentions indirect expropriation while the Zambia-
Germany BIT only mentions direct expropriation.48  
From the foregoing, it can be stated that the lack of a clear expropriation clause 
is a common trend in African BITs. However, this is not peculiar to African states 
alone, within NAFTA arbitral jurisprudence the tribunal in Feldman v United 
Mexican States, attempted to interpret the expropriation clause contained in 
Article 1110(1) of NAFTA and arrived at the conclusion that the language of this 
article is of such generality and its applicability in practical cases is difficult.49 
Evidently, this observation would astutely apply to expropriation clauses 
contained in African BITs as well as the National Foreign Investment Codes. In 
summary, African investment treaties envisage three forms of expropriation, 
direct expropriation, indirect expropriation and measures tantamount to 
expropriation. 
3.2.1 The Principle of Direct Expropriation 
As highlighted above, BITs signed by African countries explicitly undertake not to 
pursue measures that directly expropriate foreign property without the payment 
of compensation. For example the Cameroon-US BIT makes reference to the 
principle that investments shall not be expropriated or nationalized either 
directly or indirectly except for a public purpose and in accordance with due 
process of law (emphasis added).50 The meaning of direct expropriation is fairly 
clear, the government takes over a mine or factory which deprives the investor 
                                                 
47 See further variations in Tanzanian BITs especially article 5 of the Italy-Tanzania BIT which 
provides for ‘measures having effect equivalent to…’; article 5 of the Finland-Tanzania BIT 
provides specifically for indirect expropriation. However, see also article 5 of the Tanzania-
Denmark BIT which does not mention indirect expropriation. 
48 Article 5 of the Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments 
between Switzerland-Zambia BIT (No. 0.975.282.3, August 3 1994); Article 3 of the Treaty 
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Zambia Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (10 Dec 1966). 
49 Martin Roy Feldman Karpa v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/99/1, Award, 
December 16, 2000, para 98-9 [Feldman v Mexico].  
50 Article 3 of the United States-Cameroon BIT. 
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of all meaningful benefits of ownership and control51 or as stated in Amoco v 
Iran direct expropriation is the compulsory transfer of property rights.52 In sum, 
direct expropriation is understood as ‘‘the forcible appropriation by the State of 
the tangible or intangible property of individuals by means of administrative or 
legislative action’’.53 
Although cases of direct expropriation have become increasingly rare54 such 
cases cannot completely be ruled out. For instance in South Africa, the 2008 
Expropriation Bill gives the Minister of Public Works the authority to expropriate 
any property for public purpose or in public interest subject to compensation.55 
Within the South African context the Bill underscores public interest to include 
South Africa’s commitment to land reform and other reforms that bring about 
equitable access to natural resources.56  Essentially, this means that the South 
African government has the discretion to carry out direct expropriation as part 
of legitimate government policy to address historic injustices provided such 
measures are followed with the payment of compensation. Similarly, Namibia 
has undertaken land reform measures giving the Namibian government the 
power to bring about equitable redistribution of natural resources.57 According 
to the Namibian land reform law, the Minister of Lands may acquire in the public 
interest agricultural land and make such land available for agricultural purposes 
to Namibian citizens who do not own land.58  Furthermore, the Minister has the 
authority to acquire agricultural land and make it available to those Namibian 
citizens who have been socially, economically or educationally disadvantaged by 
                                                 
51 Feldman v Mexico, para 100. 
52 Amoco International Finance Corporation v Iran, Iran-U.S. C.T.R, para 220 [Hereafter 
Amoco v Iran]. 
53 LG&E Capital Corp. and LG&E International Inc v Argentina Republic ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/1, October 2006, para 187 [Hereafter LG&E v Argentina]. 
54 Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (OUP 
2008) 92. 
55 Republic of South Africa, Expropriation Bill, Government Gazette No.30963 of April 2008. 
Particularly see Chapter 2 of the Bill titled Powers of the Minister to Expropriate Property.  
56 Ibid. 
57 International Institute for Sustainable Development, ‘Investment Treaty News’ 
<http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itn_may31_2006.pdf>accessed 20 May 2012.  See also Sidney 
L Harring and Willem Odendaal, ‘One day we will all be equal’: A Socio-Legal Perspective on 
the Namibian Land Reform and Resettlement Process (Legal Assistance Centre 2002). 
58 Ibid. 
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past discriminatory laws or practices.59 On the basis of this law, the government 
of Namibia has notoriously exercised this power and expropriated foreign owned 
farms against the principles of ‘willing buyer, willing seller.’60  This has resulted 
to legal proceedings in the Namibian High Court alleging breach of the Namibia 
Land Act as well as violation of the expropriation clause contained in the 
Namibia-Germany BIT.61 In essence, although direct expropriation seldom 
happen because of political, social and economic ramification associated with 
such measures, countries still nevertheless impose discreet forms of direct 
expropriation.  
3.2.2 The Principle of Indirect Expropriation 
Conceptually, indirect expropriation is a concept of deep controversy because it 
leaves investor’s legal title untouched but deprives the investor meaningful 
enjoyment of the investment.62 The concept has come of age because states 
that are serious about attracting foreign capital will not directly expropriate 
foreign property. Moreover, the prevailing investment system rewards 
governments that do not hinder the operation of foreign investors.  Through this 
governments are compelled to respect commitments so as to leverage the 
rewards from the system to prosper and develop. Governments are forced to 
respect rules and commitments through architects of the media, big corporation 
and institutional design that serve as watch dogs for government compliance. 
This oversight function ensures that countries are reluctant to design policies 
pursuing outright takings for fear of negative publicity which can result in 
decreased investment flows. Because of severe consequences associated with 
direct expropriation, this has resulted in countries devising other creative means 
to interfere with property rights without a formal taking.  
There are a number of creative ways governments can deploy to deprive 
investors effective control without actually taking the investor’s property. Such 
measures include but are not limited to the use of legislation, withdraw of a 
                                                 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid.  
61 Ibid.  
62 Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (OUP 
2008) 92. 
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licence, refusal to renew permits, higher taxes, and sometimes simply omitting 
to act. Obviously, countries that pursue measures tantamount to expropriation 
will deny the existence of such measures and will not contemplate paying 
compensation.63 Cases of indirect expropriation are complicated because 
compensation is not guaranteed and the investor has to sustain a claim that the 
state’s conduct has the effect of depriving meaningful use and enjoyment of the 
property.64 Using the cases Norwegian Claims and German interests in Polish 
Upper Silesia, Christie correctly summarises the dilemma in the following words:  
A State may expropriate property, where it interferences with it, even 
though the State expressly disclaims any such intention. More 
important, the two cases taken together illustrate that even though a 
State may not purport to interfere with rights to property, it may, by 
its actions, render those rights so useless that it will be deemed to 
have expropriated them. 65 
African BITs like many other BITs do not define the concept indirect 
expropriation leaving arbitral tribunals to grapple with unearthing conduct that 
amounts to indirect expropriation. As a result of this ambiguity, the term 
indirect expropriation is used interchangeably by tribunals and investors to 
include expressions such as de facto expropriation, disguised, constructive, 
regulatory, consequential, or creeping expropriation.66  The difficulty arbitral 
tribunals, scholars, investors and governments face is underscored by the not so 
clear line between on one hand government’s regulatory measures that do not 
require compensation and on the other hand illegal expropriation that requires 
compensation.67 Soloway aptly captures the dilemma in the following words: 
If the definition is too expansive the argument goes, it could impose 
potentially huge financial obligations on governments, create 
disincentives to enact health and safety regulations and introduce 
multiple distortions and social inefficiencies. On the other hand, a 
                                                 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 George C Christie, ‘What Constitutes a Taking of Property under International Law’ (1962) 
32 BYIL 307, 312.  
66 August Reinisch, ‘Expropriation’ in Peter Muchlinski and others (eds), The Oxford Handbook 
of International Investment Law (OUP 2008) 423. 
67 Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (OUP 
2008) 91-93.  
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definition that is too restrictive would obliterate a key investment 
guarantee that protects foreign investors.68 
Soloway’s observations are not without merit; the tribunal in Feldman v Mexico 
highlighted this intricacy and concluded that it is fair to say that no one has 
come up with a fully satisfactory means of drawing this line.69 David Gantz 
observes that where regulatory measures are taken for a public purpose, non-
discriminatory, fair and equitable, the potential cost of requiring compensation 
may discourage desirable policy including necessary environment and social 
regulation.70 Delimiting the contours of expropriation has proved difficult with 
one commentator concluding that in identifying expropriation ‘I know it when I 
see it’71 while Dolzer acknowledges that the reality is indirect expropriation is 
difficult to define with precision in the abstract.72 Some authors such as Higgins 
even question the significance of drawing a distinction between taking for public 
use requiring compensation and non-compensable indirect expropriation for 
regulatory purposes. Analysing the United States taking law, Higgins asks:  
Is this distinction intellectually viable? Is not the State in both cases 
(that is, either by a taking for a public purpose, or by regulation) 
purporting to act in the common good? And in each case has the 
owner of the property not suffered loss? Under international law 
standards, a regulation that amounted (by virtue of its scope and 
effect) to a taking would need to be “for a public purpose” (in the 
sense of in the general, rather than for a private interest). And just 
compensation would be due.73 
                                                 
68 Julie Soloway, ‘Environmental Expropriations under NAFTA Chapter 11: The Phantom 
Menace’ in John J Kirton and Virginia W Maclaren (eds), Linking Trade, Environment and 
Social Cohesion: NAFTA Experiences, Global Challenges (Ashgate 2002) 31. 
69 Feldman v Mexico, para 100. 
70 David A Gantz, ‘The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions: From NAFTA to the United 
States-Chile Free Trade Agreement’ (2004) 19 Am.U. Int’l L. Review 679, 704. 
71 LY Fortier and SD Drymer, ‘Indirect Expropriation in the Law of International Investment: I 
know It When I See It, or Caveat Investor’ (2004) 19 ICSID Review FILJ 293, 327. Fortier and 
Drymer conclude that ‘Given that the law is, truly in a state of flux, the best answer to the 
question ‘when, how or at what point does otherwise valid regulation become, in fact and 
effect, an expropriation?’ may be: I know it when I see it’ Furthermore the authors note that 
‘certain government measures in certain instances will almost always give rise to a finding of 
indirect expropriation, and hence to compensation. Others will not. In between lies a rough 
and sketchy area of large lacunae in the law’. 
72 Rudolf Dolzer, ‘Indirect Expropriation of Alien Property’ (1986) I ICSID Review FILJ 41, 59.   
73 Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in 
International Law’ (1982) 176 Recueil de Cours 259, 331. 
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Despite the misgivings, conceptually cases of indirect expropriation are not a 
new phenomenon.74 By and large, even under customary international law the 
jurisprudence shows ambiguity in determining when government conduct 
interfering with broadly defined property rights constitutes an illegal 
compensable expropriation.75 In sum, indirect expropriation in whatever form 
will be the most common battle between African states and investors and will 
thus attract profound differences.   
3.2.3. Is there a Distinction between Indirect Expropriation and 
Measures Tantamount to Expropriation? 
Although African countries have some BITs that do not explicitly make reference 
to indirect expropriation, the use of phrases such as measures having effect 
equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation76 and measures tantamount to 
expropriation can be construed as implying indirect expropriation.77 There is 
overlap and inconsistence within the approach of arbitral tribunals when 
deciding whether cumulatively these concepts mean indirect expropriation. For 
instance the tribunal in Waste Management v Mexico opined that cumulatively 
these concepts require more than indirect expropriation. In the words of the 
tribunal: 
Where a measure tantamount to an expropriation is alleged, there 
may have been no actual transfer, taking or loss of property or entity, 
but rather an effect of property which makes formal distinctions of 
ownership irrelevant…Evidently the phrase ‘take a measure 
tantamount to nationalisation or expropriation of such investment’ in 
article 1110(1) was intended to add to the meaning of the prohibition, 
over and above the reference to indirect expropriation. Indeed there 
is some indication that it was intended to have a broad meaning 
                                                 
74 The jurisprudence of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal eloquently captures early 
expropriation claims consisting of both direct and indirect expropriation. For a good 
exposition of the jurisprudence, see George H Aldrich, The Jurisprudence of the Iran-US 
Claims Tribunal: An Analysis of the Decisions of the Tribunal (OUP 1996). 
75 David Gantz, ‘The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions: From NAFTA to the United 
States-Chile Free Trade Agreement’ (2004) 19 Am.U.Int’l L. Review 679, 704. 
76 See for example Denmark-Tanzania BIT; Germany-Burundi BIT; Italy-Tanzania BIT; United 
Kingdom- Tanzania BIT; United Kingdom-Kenya BIT; United Kingdom-Burundi BIT. 
77 Ibid. 
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otherwise it is difficult to see why Article 1110(8) was necessary 
(emphasis added).78  
Arbitral tribunals have subsequently rejected the superficial approach 
enunciated in Waste Management v Mexico. By and large, the majority of 
arbitral tribunals favour restricting the phrase tantamount to expropriation 
simply to mean indirect expropriation. Indeed, the tribunal in Feldman v Mexico 
deemed the expression ‘measures tantamount to an expropriation’ to be 
functionally equivalent to indirect expropriation.79 Similarly in Pope & Talbot v 
Canada, the investor argued unsuccessfully that the phrase tantamount to 
expropriation went beyond customary international law. The tribunal rejected 
this view and accordingly held that:  
It does not believe that the phrase measures tantamount to 
nationalisation appearing in Article 1110 of NAFTA broadens the 
ordinary concept of expropriation under international law to require 
compensation for measures affecting property interests without 
regard to the magnitude or severity of that effect….Tantamount 
means nothing more that equivalent. Something that is equivalent to 
something else cannot logically encompass more.80 
Similarly, although the Tanzania-UK BIT does not explicitly refer to indirect 
expropriation the tribunal in Biwater v Tanzania viewed the BIT as broadly 
framed to cover cases of indirect expropriation. According to the tribunal, the 
Tanzania-UK BIT includes not only direct expropriation (i.e. a formal government 
taking) but also de facto or indirect expropriation which does not involve actual 
takings of title but nonetheless result in the effective loss of property.81  
However, as a practical matter the distinction between indirect expropriation 
and measures tantamount to expropriation is one of form rather than substance. 
It would be implausible for a tribunal to find measures tantamount to 
expropriation not simultaneously amounting to indirect expropriation. The 
decision in Waste Management is questionable and unattainable because 
measures tantamount cannot realistically go beyond indirect expropriation. 
                                                 
78 Waste Management Inc v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/3 2004, para 
995 [Hereafter Waste Management v Mexico]. 
79 Feldman v Mexico, para 100. 
80 Pope & Talbot Inc v The Government of Canada (2001) 7 ICSID Reports, 85-87 [Hereafter 
Pope & Talbot  v Canada]. 
81 Biwater v Tanzania, para 452. 
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Indeed, as correctly opined in S.D Myers Inc v Canada ‘‘something that is 
“equivalent” to something else cannot logically encompass more.’’82   
In sum, although some BITs concluded by African countries do not explicitly 
mention the term indirect expropriation substantively indirect expropriation is 
implied based on the spirit and purpose of African treaties. Even more, all 
expropriation clauses contained in African BITs that make reference to indirect 
expropriation do not define the scope and content of indirect expropriation. 
Generally, African BITs usually articulate conditions for lawful expropriation 
without spelling out the meaning of expropriation. Dolzer and Stevens postulate 
that the general reluctance of states to plainly define measures amounting to 
expropriation may be explained by the fact that ‘a host state as is well known 
can take a number of measures which have similar effects to expropriation or 
nationalisation, although they do not de jure constitute an act of 
expropriation.’83   
3.2.4 The Concept of Creeping Expropriation 
There is a remarkable trend in Africa treaty practice not to include the concept 
creeping expropriation. It is not clear whether the omission is deliberate or 
whether it is by default. The reasons behind the omission are unimportant 
because arbitral tribunals view creeping expropriation as a series of government 
action or inaction and hence a form of indirect expropriation. This reasoning is 
endorsed in various tribunals and articulately stated in Tecmed v Mexico where 
the tribunal observed that;  
…the term “creeping” refers only to a type of indirect expropriation — 
and may be carried out through a single action, through a series of 
actions in a short period of time or through simultaneous actions. 
Therefore, a difference should be made between creeping 
expropriation and de facto expropriation, although they are usually 
included within the broader concept of “indirect expropriation” and 
although both expropriation methods may take place by means of a 
broad number of actions that have to be examined on a case-by-case 
                                                 
82 SD Myers Inc v Government of Canada (Partial Award 2000) para 286 
<http://italaw.com/alphabetical_list.htm >accessed 20 May 2012 [Hereafter SD Myers Inc v 
Canada]. 
83 Rudolf Dolzer and Margrete Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties (Kluwer Law 
International 1995) 99. 
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basis to conclude if one of such expropriation methods has taken 
place.84 
Similarly, in Generation Ukraine Inc v Ukraine, the tribunal viewed creeping 
expropriation as:  
…a form of indirect expropriation with a distinctive temporal quality 
in the sense that it encapsulates the situation whereby a series of acts 
attributable to the State over a period of time culminate in the 
expropriatory taking of such property.85  
Finally, the tribunal in Feldman v Mexico observed that ‘‘if the measures are 
implemented over a period of time, they could also be characterised as creeping 
expropriation which the tribunal believed is not distinct in nature, form and is 
subsumed by the terms indirect expropriation or tantamount to 
expropriation…’’.86 There is consistency in the practice of arbitral tribunals to 
describe creeping expropriation as a form of indirect expropriation, nothing 
more and nothing less. In conclusion, although many of the expropriation clauses 
in African BITs do not include the concept creeping expropriation, it would not 
be peculiar for a series of government action to constitute creeping 
expropriation.87 
3.3 The Protection of Property Rights: What Constitutes 
Indirect Expropriation 
As mentioned above distinguishing between government regulatory measures 
that do not require compensation and indirect expropriation that requires 
compensation remains problematic. There are many approaches or tests 
tribunals use to distinguish between non compensable regulatory measures vis-à-
vis direct or indirect expropriations requiring compensation. As a preliminary 
                                                 
84 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/AF/00/2 May 19 2003, para 114 [Hereafter Tecmed v Mexico]. 
85 Generation Ukraine Inc v Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9 May 16 September 2003, para 
20-22 [Hereafter Generation Ukraine v Ukraine]. 
86 Feldman v Mexico, para 101. 
87 This was the line of reasoning in an analogous treaty that did not contain the term creeping 
expropriation. The Ghana Investment Act under section 22 stipulates that no enterprise 
approved under the Act shall be expropriated by the government… Biloune and Marine Drive 
Complex Ltd v Ghana Investment Centre and the Government of Ghana, Award on 
Jurisdiction and Liability of 27 October 1989, (1994) 95 ILR 183, para 209-10 [Hereafter 
Biloune v Ghana]. 
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remark, it should be noted that virtually all African BITs do not contain or 
explain the distinction between indirect expropriation and legitimate 
government measures that do not require compensation. To this end, the 
approaches developed by arbitral tribunals are particularly important in 
examining whether government measures have crossed the line to compensable 
expropriation. Principally, when distinguishing the two, tribunals seek to balance 
between government interests to regulate for public purposes and the interests 
of investors to maximise profits from the investment enterprise. The debate on 
whether tribunals have been successful in striking the right balance between the 
two competing interests continues to stimulate disagreements. Considering that 
the majority of African BITs contain vaguely worded expropriation clauses, the 
following section reviews the various approaches arbitral tribunals use to 
interpret broadly worded expropriation clauses and the underlying rationale of 
these approaches.  
3.3.1 The Effect of Government Measures on the Investor  
Dolzer refers to the effect of the government measure as the ‘‘sole effect 
doctrine’’88 and argues that there is assumed prima facie taking of property 
whenever the effect of the government measure is substantial and lasts a 
significant period of time.89 According to Dolzer, the answer to deciding whether 
measures amount to indirect expropriation requires an evaluation of the effect 
of the government measure on the economic benefit, value and control over the 
investment.90 Tribunals have predominantly followed the sole effect doctrine 
and undermined the importance or intention of the government measure.91 
However, the outcome accruing from applying the sole effect test can be quite 
dramatic and indifferent to government regulatory powers. One remarkable 
                                                 
88 Rudolf Dolzer, ‘Indirect Expropriation: New Developments?’ (2002) 11 N.Y.U. Envtl L. J 64, 
79. Dolzer notes that in claims of indirect expropriation the question is whether the focus on 
the effect of the government measure will be the only and exclusive relevant criterion or 
whether the purpose and the context of the government measure may also be considered as 
part of the takings analysis.    
89 Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (OUP 
2008) 101. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Rudolf Dolzer, ‘Indirect Expropriation: New Developments?’ (2002) 11 N.Y.U. Envtl L.J. 64, 
90. After surveying the jurisprudence Dolzer notes that ‘the language in number of decisions 
clearly points to the effect of the government measure as a major criterion or even the sole 
factor in determining whether or not a taking has occurred.’  
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extreme with such dramatic results was the reasoning adopted in Santa Elena v 
Costa Rica. In this case, the tribunal without giving sufficient credence to 
environment measures held that:    
Expropriatory environmental measures-no matter how laudable and 
how beneficial to society as a whole-are in this respect, similar to any 
other expropriatory measure that a state may take in order to 
implement its policies… where property is expropriated, even for 
environmental purposes, whether domestic or international, the 
state’s obligation to pay compensation remains.92  
This disengagement with the purpose of the government measure and 
considering only the effect of the government measure is not a new controversy 
and remains an on-going debate. Much of the controversy stems from the 
practice of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal which devalued the intention 
of the government measure and only considered the effect of the measure.93 
Over the years, the Iran-United States claims cases have offered inspiration and 
a favourable source of jurisprudence for arbitral tribunals adopting the sole 
effect criterion. While stressing the precedent of the Iran-United States claims 
cases is important, the extent to which this jurisprudence has influenced modern 
arbitral practice is beyond the scope of this thesis.94 The first case, Starrette 
                                                 
92 Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A v Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/96/1 February 17 2000, para 71-72 [Hereafter Santa Elena v Costa Rica]. 
93 For a comprehensive discussion of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal’s approach on 
expropriation, see, George H Aldrich, The Jurisprudence of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal: An 
Analysis of the Decisions of the Tribunal (OUP 1996) 171-276. The Iran- United States Claims 
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instrument created the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. Third, although the Tribunal has 
had a complex docket of jurisprudence over various types of disputes, the Claims Settlement 
Declaration can be viewed for one of these categories of disputes as in essence a 
retrospective BIT. Thus, if the newcomer to the Tribunal can identify the cases decided in 
the retrospective category of disputes, then those Tribunal Awards are relevant as any 
decision of the usual ad hoc or ICSID BIT arbitrations (emphasis added). See also Veijo 
Heiskanen, ‘The Contribution of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal to the Development of the 
Doctrine of Indirect Expropriation’ (1003) 5 Int’I L.F.D 176. 
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Housing Corp v Iran involved a construction project and the rights of 
shareholders to control and manage Shah Goli Apartment a subsidiary of 
Starrette.  
In casu, the Ministry of Housing appointed Mr. Erfan to temporarily manage Shah 
Goli and direct all activities connected with the project on behalf of the Iranian 
government. Starrette Housing argued that the appointment of Mr. Erfan as a 
temporary manager deprived the shareholders their right to manage Shah Goli 
and thus deprived Starrette Housing the possibilities of effective use and 
control. The claims tribunal ruled in favour of Starrette Housing and held that: 
…it is recognised by international law that measures taken by a State 
can interfere with property rights to such an extent that these rights 
are rendered so useless that they must be deemed to have been 
expropriated, even though the State does not purport to have 
expropriated them and the legal title to the property formally remains 
with the original owner.95 
Similarly, the claims tribunal in Phillips Petroleum Company v Iran stressed that 
it does not need to determine the intent of the government measure.96 
According to the tribunal, the purpose of the measures is not a determining 
factor when considering government’s liability to compensate for the effect of 
the expropriation.97 Similarly, in Trippetts v Iran, the United States engineering 
and architectural consulting partnership entered into joint venture with AFFA 
Consulting Engineers. Under the terms of the agreement both companies 
consented to have an equal stake in the management of the company with each 
having equal representation on the coordination committee. On the basis of this 
agreement two people had the authority to sign documents creating obligation 
for TAMS-AFFA. However, as a result of the Iranian revolution the company 
stopped operating and subsequently, the Iranian government appointed a new 
                                                 
95 Starrett Housing Corp v Iran, (14 August 1987) 4 Iran-US C.T.R 122, 154. 
96 Philips Petroleum Company Iran v Iran, (29 June 1989) 21 Iran-US C.T.R 79, 97. 
97 This case is also important for the distinction between lawful/unlawful compensation 
sought by the Respondents. The Respondents argued that the taking of property was lawful 
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manager to run the joint venture. The new manager was authorised to sign 
cheques and made management decisions violating the terms of the joint 
venture. The claims tribunal held that: 
While assumption of control over property by a government does not 
automatically and immediately justify a conclusion that the property 
has been taken by the government, thus requiring compensation under 
international law, such a conclusion is warranted whenever events 
demonstrate that the owner was deprived of fundamental rights of 
ownership and it appears that this deprivation is not merely 
ephemeral. The intent of the government is less important than the 
effects of the measure on the owner, and the form of the measure of 
the control or interference is less important than the reality of their 
impact (emphasis added).98 
From the foregoing, it is important to stress that the United States-Iran Claims 
Tribunal emphasised the effect of government measures and accorded minimal 
consideration to the intention of the Iranian government.99 To this effect, 
Sornarajah cautions arbitral tribunals against relying profoundly on the 
jurisprudence of the Iran-United States Claims tribunal because of the context 
with which the cases were adjudicated.100 According to Sornarajah, ‘‘although 
the awards of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal have been a fruitful source 
for the identification of indirect takings, they dealt with takings that took place 
in the context of a revolutionary upheaval and the propositions the tribunal 
formulated may not have relevance outside the context of the events”.101  Been 
and Beauvais also echo this view and caution against zealous reliance on the 
jurisprudence of Iran-United States Claims tribunal based on the context of 
these cases.102 Specifically, Been and Beauvais contend that the mandate and 
scope of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal was limited to ‘‘post-
revolutionary actions such as government appointment of managers or 
supervisors of foreign companies, de facto nationalisation, and failure to permit 
                                                 
98 Tippetts v TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran (1984) 6 Iran-US CTR 219, 225. 
99 Sea-Land Service Inc v Iran (1984) 6 Iran-US CTR 149, see also The Oscar Chinn Case (Britain 
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the exportation of foreign owned equipment’’.103 Accordingly, although the 
jurisprudence of the Iran-United States Claims tribunal is persuasive and 
reaffirms customary international law principles, modern tribunals should 
internalise the jurisprudence and apply it with restraint.104 However, as will be 
shown below, a spate of modern arbitral tribunals have erroneously relied 
exclusively on the effect of the government measure as the sole criterion.   
For instance, in Metalclad v Mexico, the federal government of Mexico 
authorized Conterin a wholly owned subsidiary of Metalclad to construct and 
operate a landfill transfer station for hazardous waste in La Pedrera, a valley 
located in Guadalcazar. When construction started the municipality alerted 
Metalclad that it was operating without a municipal construction permit. While 
the application for the permit was pending Metalclad continued and completed 
constructing the landfill. However, community and environmental activists 
resented the landfill and exerted considerable pressure on the government to 
revoke the operating licence on environmental grounds. Three days before the 
expiry of his term, the Governor issued an Ecological Decree declaring a Natural 
Area for the protection of rare cactus which included the area of the landfill. 
Metalclad brought a claim alleging that the ecological decree permanently 
precluded it from operating the landfill. The tribunal ruled in favour of 
Metalclad and held that:   
…expropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate and 
acknowledged takings of property, such as outright seizure or formal 
or obligatory transfer of title in favour of the host State, but also 
covert or incidental interference with the use of property which has 
the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of 
the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property 
even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State.105 
Emphasises added 
The tribunal further opined that the motivation or intent of the government in 
passing the ecological decree was irrelevant.106 According to the tribunal the 
implementation of the ecological decree in itself constitutes an act tantamount 
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105 Metalclad Corp v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1 August 30 2000, 
para 103 [Hereafter Metalclad v Mexico]. 
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to expropriation because the decree had the effect of barring forever the 
operation of the landfill.107 Similarly, this approach was adopted in Tecmed v 
Mexico where the Mexican government refused renewal of a licence necessary to 
operate a landfill. Tecmed a Spanish incorporated company argued that this 
refusal amounted to an expropriation contravening the Spain-Mexico BIT. In the 
view of Tecmed, the non-renewal of the licence was arbitrary and resulted into 
the complete loss of the investment and cessation of economic viability. The 
Mexican government argued unsuccessfully that regulatory powers are 
discretionary and the government can grant and revoke licenses as it deems 
appropriate. Mexico also contended that Tecmed violated certain requirements 
of maintaining its license which included restriction on improperly transporting 
toxic waste. The tribunal rejected Mexico’s argument and held that:  
… Government’s intention is less important than the effects of the 
measures on the owner of the assets or on the benefits arising from 
such assets affected by the measures; and the form of the deprivation 
measure is less important than its actual effects.108  
Similarly, in Biloune v Ghana Investment Centre, Antoine Biloune a Syrian 
national owned majority interest in a Ghana incorporated corporation 
established to undertake a hotel construction project.109 However, Biloune lost 
his interest due to claims by the Accra City Council that he did not have the 
required building permit to pursue the construction project. Subsequently, after 
financial scrutiny was conducted by the Accra City Council, Biloune was arrested 
and held in custody for thirteen days without due process, deported to Togo and 
issued with restraining order never to return to Ghana. From the facts of this 
case, Ghana’s motivation for pursuing this course of action was unclear. 
However, the tribunal noted that establishing the motivation of the government 
of Ghana was irrelevant in arriving at a conclusion.110 According to the tribunal 
when viewed in conjunction, ‘‘the issuance of the stop work order, the 
demolition of the construction, the summons, the arrest and detention, the 
requirement of filing assets declaration forms, and the deportation of Biloune 
without possibility of re-entry had the effect of causing irreparable cessation of 
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the project’’.111 In addition, the tribunal noted that given Biloune’s leadership 
position in promoting, financing and managing the project, his expulsion from 
Ghana effectively prevented him from pursuing the project resulting in 
constructive expropriation.112  
Also in Simens v Argentina, the Argentinean government argued unsuccessfully 
that the tribunal should not only consider the effect of the government measure 
but also should take into consideration the intention and purpose of the 
government measure.113 The tribunal making reference to the Argentina-
Germany BIT postulated that the BIT only refers to measures which have the 
effect of an expropriation and does not refer to the intent of the State to 
expropriate.114 Relying on Norwegian Ship owners and the Argentina-Germany 
BIT, the tribunal held that the purpose of the expropriation is a different matter 
and is one of the requirements for determining whether expropriation complies 
with the treaty and not for determining whether an expropriation has 
occurred.115  
In the view of the present author, the Simens v Argentina decision is flawed and 
severely constrains legitimate policy making because a finding of expropriation 
naturally leads to the responsibility to pay compensation. Moreover, strict 
application of the sole effect test rewards investors at the detriment of 
legitimate government policy and as a result hampers the ability of sovereign 
states to function effectively. Indeed, as the preceding arbitral cases 
demonstrate application of the sole effect test simultaneously leads to economic 
interests of investors outweighing the purpose of government measures which 
inevitably means governments will be slow to act even when the policy is in the 
public interest.   
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3.3.2 The Extent of Government Interference with Property Rights  
Aside from the sole effect test, tribunals also consider the extent to which 
government measures interfere with an investor’s property rights. In the 
influential and often quoted 1961 Harvard Draft Convention on the International 
Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, drafted by Sohn and Baxter, an 
expropriation is said to occur when there is “unreasonable interference with the 
use, enjoyment or disposal of property as to justify an interference that the 
owner thereof will not be able to use, enjoy or dispose of the property within a 
reasonable period of time after the inception of such interference”.116 It can 
therefore be said that when government measures severely interfere with an 
investor’s property rights for a long time, tribunals are likely to find the 
measures amount to an expropriation. Conversely, if government measures 
minimally interfere with an investor’s property rights and the interference is for 
short time, tribunals are likely to find that the measure does not amount to an 
expropriation.117  Numerous arbitral tribunals have followed this line of thinking 
without offering a nuanced approach of what constitutes severity or how one 
determines that the duration of the measure is long enough to constitute an 
expropriation. 
The leading case applying the theory of interference is the case of Pope and 
Tabolt Inc v Canada. In casu, a United States wholly owned company with a 
subsidiary in Canada challenged the implementation of the Softwood Lumber 
Agreement which imposed an Export Control Regime. The investor alleged 
unsuccessfully that the Export Control Regime amounted to an expropriation 
under Article 1110 of NAFTA. The tribunal opined that an interference with the 
                                                 
116 Article 10 (3) (a) Harvard Draft Convention of the International Responsibility of States for 
Injuries to Aliens, 15 April 1961 prepared by Louis B Sohn and Richard Baxter. The text of the 
draft is accompanied by a comprehensive and insightful commentary.  The purpose of the 
draft Convention is ‘to codify with some particularity the standards established by 
international law for the protection of aliens and thereby to obviate, as far as possible, the 
necessity of looking to customary international law.’ Louis B Sohn and Richard Baxter (1961) 
55 A.J.I.L 553,547.  Indeed, the draft has become one of the most powerful source of 
reference in international investment law and tribunals have abidingly refereed to it in a 
number of expropriation cases, see for example, Saluka Investments BV v Czech Republic, 
Partial Award of 17 March 2006, para 256-57 < http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/SAL 
CZ%20Partial%20Award%20170306.pdf>accessed 20 May 2012 [Hereafter Saluka Investments v 
Czech Republic]; Pope &Talbot v Canada, para 102. 
117 This position is reinforced in the Harvard Draft Convention of the International 
Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, Louis B Sohn and Richard Baxter (1961) 55 
A.J.I.L 553, 559 
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investor’s property must be substantial enough to be characterised as an 
expropriation.118  In the words of the tribunal to determine interference, ‘‘the 
test is whether the interference is sufficiently restrictive to support a conclusion 
that the property has been taken from the owner’’.119 The tribunal reasoned 
that expropriation requires a substantial interference and not minor 
interference.120 In the tribunal’s view although there had been interference this 
did not raise to the level of expropriation because the investor retained full 
rights of ownership and control over the business.121 The same line of thinking 
has been followed in other tribunals but most remarkably in Sempra Energy 
International v Argentina where the tribunal arrived at the conclusion that:  
Substantial deprivation results…from depriving the investor of control 
over the investment, managing the day to day operations of the 
company, arresting and detaining company officials or employees, 
supervising the work of officials, interfering in administration, 
impeding the distribution of dividends, interfering in the appointment 
of officials or managers, or depriving the company of its property or 
control in the whole or in part.122  
According to the tribunal, although the list of government measures could be 
extended significantly but the interference of the government measures must 
still meet the standard of having as a result substantial deprivation of rights.123 
Even then, the deprivation should be such that the investor no longer has control 
of the business operation, or that the value of the business has been virtually 
annihilated.124 The tribunal found the Argentinean government did not renegade 
the legal and regulatory framework governing privatisation.125 This approach was 
also echoed in Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Ecuador where 
the tribunal held that although the investor was denied a VAT refund this did not 
result in substantial deprivation. According to the tribunal:  
                                                 
118 Pope & Tabolt  v Canada 102. 
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122 Sempra Energy International v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16 May 2005, para 284 
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…there had been no deprivation of the use or reasonably expected 
economic benefit of the investment, let alone measures affecting a 
significant part of the investment. The criterion of substantial 
deprivation under international law in Pope & Talbot and adopted in 
Sempra is not present in the instant case. If narrower definitions of 
expropriation under international law are examined, the finding of 
expropriation would lie still further away (emphasis added).126 
Similarly, the tribunal in Biwater v Tanzania stressed that expropriation requires 
a certain severity and the severity does not have to be economic in nature.127 
The tribunal made a distinction between interference with rights and economic 
loss observing that ‘‘a substantial interference with rights may well occur 
without actually causing any economic damage.’’128 In the tribunal’s view there 
can be a substantial interference with an investor’s rights even if that 
interference does not necessary amount to a quantifiable economic loss.129  The 
tribunal considered an expropriation taking place by reason of a substantial 
interference with rights, even if there is no quantifiable economic loss.130  
In sum, the tribunal found the Tanzanian government severely interfered with 
the investor’s contractual rights although the investor would still have suffered 
economic loss even if the government had not interfered with the property 
rights.131 From the analysis of the tribunal what matters is the intensity or 
extent of the interference and not necessarily whether the interference resulted 
in economic loss. The approach is analogous to PSEG Global Inc v Turkey where 
the tribunal was not persuaded that any extreme forms of interference depriving 
the investor of his duly acquired property rights took place. The tribunal noted 
that although many things were wrongly handled, none could justify a conclusion 
of regulatory taking.132 In essence for a measure to amount to a regulatory 
taking there must be strong interference with clearly defined contract rights. 
                                                 
126 Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Republic of Ecuador, 12 ICSID Rep 
Award of 1 July 2004, para 194 [Hereafter Occidental v Republic of Ecuador]. 
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130 Ibid para 781. 
131 Ibid. 
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The tribunal stressed that the value of property rights is irrelevant and only 
important when addressing issues of damages.133  
The extent of government interference was also stressed in SD Myers v Canada 
where the tribunal ruled in favour of Canada because the measure was for a 
short time. Based on the facts of the case, the tribunal found that Canada did 
not materially benefit from the regulatory measures and the evidence did not 
support a transfer of property from the investor to the government.134 In the 
tribunal’s view for government regulations to amount to an expropriation there 
must be lasting interference in the ability of an investor to make use of his 
economic rights.135 The tribunal added a caveat stressing that ‘‘in some contexts 
and circumstances, it is appropriate to view a regulation as amounting to an 
expropriation, even if it were partial or temporary’’.136 This decision is 
important to the extent that it confirmed that regulatory measures do not 
usually amount to an expropriation,137 but falls short in explaining how much 
interference amounts to an expropriation. Compared to Wena v Egypt where 1 
year was found to be a severe interference, the tribunal in SD Myers did not find 
18 months constituting a severe interference.  
Specifically, in Wena v Egypt, Egypt argued that the 1 year deprivation was 
merely “ephemeral” and therefore did not constitute an expropriation. The 
tribunal rejected this argument and noted that ‘‘putting aside various other 
improper actions, allowing an entity (over which Egypt could exert effective 
control) to seize and illegally possess the hotels for nearly a year is more than an 
ephemeral interference in the use of that property or with the enjoyment of its 
benefits’’.138 Thereafter Wena sought an interpretation of the arbitral award and 
still the tribunal concurred with the arbitral decision. According to the tribunal  
after ‘‘assessing the weight of the actions described above, there was no doubt 
in the tribunal's mind that the deprivation of Wena's fundamental rights of 
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ownership was so profound that the expropriation was indeed a total and 
permanent one’’.139 
On the basis of the foregoing, it can be observed that tribunals give serious 
consideration to the extent of government interference. When using this 
approach, arbitral tribunals normally find government measures amounting to an 
expropriation when there is severe interference with investors’ property rights. 
On the other hand, government measures that do not seriously interfere with 
investor’s property rights will not amount to expropriation. However, tribunals 
have so far failed to clearly point out what precisely constitutes a severe 
interference as well as when do measures become severe enough to amount to a 
deprivation.  
3.3.3 The Intention and Purpose of Government Measures 
Arbitral tribunals have also given considerable importance to the underlying 
purpose of the government measure and the intention thereof. Objectively, 
tribunals pursuing this approach balance the purpose of the regulation vis-à-vis 
the effect of the measure towards an investor’s duly acquired property rights. 
When undertaking the analysis tribunals explore whether the measure falls 
within government’s regulatory competence. Proponents of the sole effect test 
fault this approach because it weighs broad government policy against economic 
considerations.  According to adherents of the sole effect test, the issue should 
not be about legitimacy of government policy but rather whether investors 
should be forced to pay for the protection of government policy.140 
 In essence adherents of the sole effect test postulate that the rights of foreign 
investors are an empty shell when government measures outweigh economic 
considerations.141 On the contrary, Christie questions the premise of the sole 
effect test and accurately observes that in circumstances where regulatory 
measures have a plausible relationship to the action taken there should be due 
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consideration to such measures.142 Despite the importance of weighing 
government measures, tribunals have been more favourable to the sole effect 
criterion and reluctantly considered the intention of government measures. 
From the Iran-United States claims tribunal to modern arbitral tribunals, there 
has been more convergence towards following the sole effect test.143   
Be that as it may, there are a number of important arbitral awards that have 
stressed the importance of considering both the purpose as well as the effect of 
the government measure.  For instance, the jurisprudence of the Iran-United 
States claims tribunal shows that apart from Sea-Land Services Inc v The Islamic 
Republic of Iran all other cases followed the sole effect criterion. The claims 
tribunal in Sea-Land Services endorsed the approach that takes into 
consideration the intention of the government measure vis-à-vis the effect of 
the government measures towards an investors property rights. Substantively, 
the tribunal believed that a finding of expropriation requires at the very least 
deliberate government interference which has the effect of depriving an 
investor use and enjoyment of his property.144 Whereas this decision was 
progressive and unconventional, it was rejected in the dissenting opinion of 
Judge Howard Holtzmann and subsequent claims tribunals. Specifically in 
Phillips v The Islamic Republic of Iran the claims tribunal revived the sole effect 
criterion and asserted that it is not within its mandate to determine the 
intention of the Iranian government.145 Even more, the tribunal noted that ‘‘the 
government’s liability to compensate for expropriation does not depend on proof 
that the expropriation was intentional’’.146 
Dolzer aptly notes that modern arbitral tribunals are also more bent towards 
following the sole effect test as the main criterion for determining whether 
government measures amount to expropriation. Indeed when placed with actual 
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cases, the majority of arbitral tribunals have explicitly rejected the purpose of 
the government measure and found such consideration irrelevant in 
expropriation analysis.147 Despite this shortcoming in the jurisprudence, a 
number of arbitral tribunals have deviated from the norm and stressed the 
importance of considering both the purpose as well as the effect of government 
measures. Although such was the position adopted in SD Myers v Canada the 
approach was not well developed because the tribunal’s analysis relied mainly 
on severe interference. Particularly, in deciding whether the government 
measures amounted to an expropriation, the tribunal in SD Myers tribunal noted 
that:  
…tribunal should not be deterred by technical or facial considerations 
from reaching a conclusion that an expropriation or conduct 
tantamount to an expropriation has occurred. It must look at the real 
interests involved and the purpose and effect of the government 
measure (emphasis added).148  
More astutely the arbitral tribunal in Methanex v United States considered the 
purpose of the government measure vis-à-vis the interests of the investor. This 
case arose out of an order by the state of California to ban the use of methyl 
tertiary butyle ether (MTBE) a product used to increase oxygen content and acts 
as an octane enhancer in unleaded gasoline. California argued that it was acting 
within its regulatory powers because MTBE contaminated drinking water supplies 
causing threat to human health, safety and the environment. On the other hand, 
Methanex a Canadian company specialising in methanol which is used to 
manufacture MTBE claimed that by banning MTBE, the State of California 
effectively expropriated its investment. The tribunal rejected this argument and 
held that:  
as a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory 
regulation for a public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with 
due process and, which affects, inter alias, a foreign investor or 
investment is not deemed expropriatory and compensable unless 
specific commitments had been given by the regulating government to 
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the then putative foreign investor contemplating investment that the 
government would refrain from such regulation.149 
Similarly, the tribunal in LG&E v Argentina also followed this reasoning and 
persuasively offered a balanced approach within which to consider both the 
effect and purpose of the government measure. The facts of this case are 
relatively simple; the government of Argentina pressed with the need to attract 
foreign investors granted LG&E licenses for local gas distribution until 2027. 
Some of the concessions included guarantees that tariffs for gas distribution 
would be calculated using United States dollars and automatic semi-annual 
adjustments of tariffs would be based on the United States Producer Price Index 
(PPI). However, the government faced with severe economic hardships adjusted 
the local gas tariff structure which resulted in economic losses to LG&E. 
According to LG&E, adjusting local gas tariff structure amounted to an indirect 
expropriation because the new gas tariff structure was contrary to previously 
agreed concessions. Differing from other cases, the tribunal correctly noted that 
in evaluating whether there has been an expropriation both the purpose and 
effect of the measure must be considered.  Even more, the tribunal observed 
that in expropriation claims the question was whether one ‘‘should only take 
into account the effects produced by the measure or if one should consider also 
the context within which a measure was adopted and the host State’s 
purpose’’.150 In answering the question the tribunal held that:   
It is this Tribunal’s opinion that there must be a balance in the 
analysis both of the causes and the effects of a measure in order that 
one may qualify a measure as being of an expropriatory nature. It is 
important not to confound the State’s right to adopt policies with its 
power to take an expropriatory measure…With respect to the power 
of the State to adopt its policies, it can generally be said that the 
State has the right to adopt measures having a social or general 
welfare purpose. In such a case, the measure must be accepted 
without any imposition of liability, except in cases where the State’s 
action is obviously disproportionate to the need being addressed.151 
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To sum up, approaches taken in arbitral tribunals assessing both the effect of 
the measure and the purpose of the measure reveals the following: (a) applying 
the sole effect test produces dramatic results in favour of investors, (b) awards 
of cases applying the sole effect test would be different if arbitral tribunals 
considered both the purpose of the measure and effect thereof, (c) ultimately 
fairness demands a proper balance between the effect of the government vis-à-
vis the intended purpose of the measure. 
3.3.4 The Legitimate Expectations of Investors 
Arbitral tribunals also consider legitimate expectations of investors at the time 
of pursuing the investment enterprise. Typically, tribunals focus on 
representations made by government representatives at the time of luring 
foreign investors.152 When examining legitimate expectations, tribunals also 
focus on foreign investor’s reasonably to be expected economic benefit at the 
time of undertaking the investment enterprise. Although few arbitral tribunals 
have considered legitimate expectations as part of the overall expropriation 
analysis, the trend is likely to increase. In large measure this is because many 
foreign investors make investment decisions on the basis of government 
representations and commitments at the time of investment conception. 
For instance, as common practice, the majority of African states use investment 
promotion campaigns as an integral part of attracting foreign investors.153 This 
approach is used as a strategy to attract reluctant foreign investors who would 
otherwise be reluctant to invest in African states. Specifically, African countries 
persuade investors through offering targeted concessions, incentives and other 
government commitments which include inter alia stabilisation clauses, tax 
reductions and regulatory overhaul. Inevitably foreign investors make strategic 
investment decisions on the basis of such representation and expect that 
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governments will honour these undertakings.154 In addition, through offering 
definite investment assurances, African countries and other developing states 
seek to guarantee prospective foreign investors that upon investing special 
protection will be accorded.155 These unilateral undertakings are binding under 
international law156 and will continue to be critical in expropriation claims. 
Indeed where host states make specific representation to investors, arbitral 
tribunals have considered investor’s legitimate expectation as part of the overall 
expropriation analysis. As correctly stated by Thomas Walde and Abba Kolo when 
host states undertake unanticipated regulatory change foreign investors suffer 
excessive detrimental losses because this was not factored into in prior 
calculations.157 The authors aptly point out that:  
Investors are ready, and can be expected to be ready to accept the 
regulatory regime in situations in which they invest. Investment 
protection rather turns around the issue of unexpected change with 
an excessive detrimental impact on the foreign investor’s prior 
calculation, and the-in domestic politics natural-favouring of national 
competitions.158  
It should be stressed that arbitral tribunals have been careful to draw a 
distinction between objective and subjective expectations. This distinction was 
endorsed in earlier awards of Iran-United States claims tribunals and specifically 
in Starrette Housing Corporation v Iran where the tribunal ruled in favour of the 
investor but rejected the claim of legitimate expectations. Regarding the 
investor’s claim of legitimate expectations, the tribunal noted that ‘‘investors in 
all countries have to assume a risk that the country might experience strikes, 
lock-outs, disturbances, changes of economic and political system and even 
revolution’’.159 The tribunal observed that the materialised risk does not 
necessarily mean that property rights affected by such events can be deemed to 
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have been expropriated.160 In essence, the tribunal rejected investors’ 
expectations that are subjective and cannot objectively be evaluated.  
Similarly the Metalclad v Mexico tribunal seriously considered representations 
made by the Mexican government to Metalclad and the reliance thereof.  In 
casu, Metalclad basing itself on the representations of a government affiliated 
entity began construction before applying for a building permit. Although 
Metalclad did not have the building permit there was implicit representation 
that the building permit would be granted. Moreover, while Metalclad was 
constructing and waiting for the building permit, the government did not object. 
Subsequently, after Metalclad accomplished substantial amount of work, the 
government issued a stop order. The tribunal systematically considered 
representation of the Mexican government on which Metalclad relied and found 
that the Municipality’s refusal to issue the construction permit was flawed and 
unlawfully prevented Metalclad from operating the landfill.161 According to the 
tribunal the government by permitting or tolerating the conduct of the 
‘‘municipality in relation to Metalclad and participating or acquiescing in the 
denial to Metalclad of the right to operate the landfill, notwithstanding the fact 
that the project was fully approved and endorsed by the federal government, 
Mexico must be held to have taken a measure tantamount to expropriation.’’162 
Moreover, the absence of a timely, orderly or substantive basis for denying the 
construction permit amounted to an indirect expropriation.163  
Additionally, in Biloune v Ghana Investment Centre, when evaluating the 
expropriation claim the tribunal considered the investor’s justified reliance on 
Ghana’s representations. In this case, Antoine Biloune invested in renovating and 
expanding a Ghana resort restaurant. On the basis of representations from 
government affiliated entities, Antoine commenced construction without 
applying for a building permit. Subsequently, after substantial amount of 
construction had been completed, a stop order was issued prohibiting further 
construction. Consequently, Antoine applied for a construction permit which was 
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neither denied nor was he stopped from continuing. In evaluating whether there 
was an expropriation, the tribunal also considered legitimate expectations as 
part of the overall analysis. The tribunal found the investors objective 
expectations persuasive on the basis that Ghanaian government officials knew of 
the construction for more than one year before issuing the stop work order.164 
Moreover, the fact that permits had not been required for other projects and no 
procedure was in place for dealing with building permit applications meant that 
the investor would reasonably assume that construction permits are not 
mandatory.165 In obiter the tribunal noted that tribunals will not uphold 
legitimate expectations where the host state has not made any specific 
commitments or representation to the investor.166  
Similarly, in Methanex Corp v United States, the tribunal distinguished between 
investors freely entering the market and instances where host states make 
specific commitments to restrain certain future regulatory actions.167 According 
to the tribunal claims of legitimate expectations are viable in circumstances 
where investors are induced to enter markets and host states fail to honour 
those commitments.168 Specifically, the tribunal observed that Methanex entered 
the United States market aware of the constant changes in the business 
environment and actively participated in the process.169 The facts of this case 
can be contrasted to Revere Copper v OPIC where a subsidiary of Revere Copper 
entered into a mining agreement containing a stabilisation clause.  According to 
the stabilisation clause, the Jamaican government assured the investor that for 
the next twenty years the rate on taxes will not be raised and no other financial 
obligations will be imposed. However, after a few years in the mining business 
circumstances changed, the Jamaican government through legislation introduced 
disproportionate tax increases. As a result of the unforeseen increase in taxes, 
Revere Copper discontinued business operations. Revere Copper then sought 
compensation from OPIC (the insurer) claiming expropriation on the basis of the 
expropriation clause contained in its insurance policy.  With respect to the issue 
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of whether the investor had legitimate expectations, the tribunal ruled in the 
affirmative and opined: 
We regard these principles as particularly applicable where the 
question is, as here, whether actions taken by a government contrary 
to and damaging to the economic interests of aliens are in conflict 
with undertakings and assurances given in good faith to such aliens as 
an inducement to their making the investments affected by the action 
(emphasis added).170 
The tribunal in Azurix v Argentina also carried out a legitimate expectation 
analysis although it was not sufficiently persuaded to confirm the investor’s 
claims. According to the tribunal the investor did not lose the attributes of 
ownership, at all times continued to control the company and its ownership of 
90% of the shares was unaffected.171 Although without doubt management of the 
company was affected by the Province’s actions, this was not sufficient to 
constitute a breakdown of the investor’s expectations.172 In LG & E v Argentina, 
the tribunal noted that when evaluating the degree of interference with the 
investor’s property rights, one must analyse the measure’s economic impact as 
well as its interference with the investor’s reasonable expectations.173  
Finally, the tribunal in Tecmed v Mexico considered whether there was 
legitimate justification for the investor to believe that authorisation to operate 
the landfill would be renewed. It found the investor had legitimate reasons to 
believe authorisation to operate the landfill would extend over a long term. The 
tribunal contextualised the social, political and economic circumstances and 
opined that the investor would not have reasonably foreseen the scope, effects 
and consequences conditioned in the issuance of the resolution.174 Account was 
also made of the Environmental Impact Declaration of 1994 which projected a 
useful life of 10 years for the landfill.175 This was even before the investor 
undertook the investment. Therefore it was widely known that any investor 
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expected the investments in the landfill to last for a long term.176 When 
investing in the landfill, investors took into account the estimated time and 
business required to recover such investment so as to obtain the expected 
return.177  Taken as a whole after evaluating the government’s actions, the 
tribunal held that the actions violated the agreement as well as international 
law.178 Against this backdrop, the tribunal found the investor’s expectations 
legitimate and justifiable. 
3.3.5 The Duration of Government Measure 
Arbitral tribunals have considered the duration of government measures to 
establish whether cumulatively government measures amount to expropriation. 
Measures which have a lasting impact on the ability of the investor to enjoy his 
property rights have been found to be tantamount to an expropriation. However, 
this is on a case by case basis, some measures may amount to expropriation even 
though the measures are partial or temporary provided there is serious 
deprivation.179 For instance the tribunal in SD Myers v Canada considered the 
facts at hand and rejected the expropriation claim because the ban on certain 
hazardous waste was temporary and was not a serious deprivation.180 
Particularly, the tribunal asserted that suspending hazardous waste for a 
temporary duration of eighteen months was not severe in the broad scheme of 
things.181  
More clearly, the tribunal in LG & E v Argentina stressed that when examining 
the degree of interference with investor’s property rights, one must also 
consider the duration of the measure.182 This position is analogous to the 
approach taken in SD Myers v Canada requiring the duration of government 
interference to be permanent. Essentially, the tribunal in LG & E v Argentina 
contended that for government measures to reach the threshold of expropriation 
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the duration of such measures cannot be temporary in nature ‘‘unless the 
investment’s successful development depends on the realization of certain 
activities at specific moments that may not endure variations.’’183  Just like in 
SD Myers v Canada, the tribunal in LG&E v Argentina found the actions taken by 
Argentina were not permanent to justify an expropriation because the investor’s 
investment continued to exist. In essence, without a permanent severe 
deprivation the tribunal could not find the duration of the measures sufficient 
enough to constitute an expropriation.184  
With respect to the precise duration of government measures, the tribunal in 
Azurix Corp v Argentina asserted that under international law there is no fixed 
period of time classified as being more than ephemeral.185 In this case both the 
investor and the government offered conflicting views on the duration required 
for a measure to amount to an expropriation. Particularly, the government 
objected to the investor’s claim that international law fixes a strict threshold 
when government measures are tantamount to an expropriation.186 In the 
government’s view only a reasonable period of time is required.187 The tribunal 
adopted the common law approach of treating each case on its own merits and 
on the basis of the facts presented concluded that ‘‘there is no mathematical 
formula to reach a mechanical result’’.188 In other words, for the duration to be 
sufficiently serious, it depends on the cumulative effect of the government 
measure based on the specifics of a given case.189  The tribunal drew parallels 
with the case of Wena Hotels v Egypt which found the seizure of the investor’s 
hotel ephemeral but nevertheless amounted to an expropriation. Distinctively, 
the tribunal noted that the Wena Hotels case involved a single measure but 
when considering multiple measures emphasis must be placed on the duration of 
the cumulative effect.190  
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3.3.6 The Requirement of Proportionality 
Generally the use of proportionality as an approach to examine expropriation 
claims in investment arbitration is still in its early stages of development and has 
only recently been endorsed by arbitral tribunals. When proportionality is used 
as an approach to ascertain the viability of an expropriation claim, arbitral 
tribunals weigh whether government measures are proportional to the public 
interest presumably protected.191 This involves taking into account the 
significance of such measures as well as the overall impact of such measures on 
an investors’ property rights. Practically, this means tribunals achieve two 
objectives; respect for the right of the state to determine the suitability of 
public policy and determine whether such measures are reasonable with respect 
to their goals, the deprivation of economic rights and the legitimate 
expectations suffered from such deprivation.192 Accordingly, arbitral tribunals 
hold that when public interest measures are pursued ‘‘there must be a 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the charge or weight imposed 
on the foreign investor and the aim sought to be realised by any expropriatory 
measure’’.193 
It should be noted that, when evaluating the principle of proportionality arbitral 
tribunals are influenced by the human rights jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and notably the famous case of James and Others 
v United Kingdom. In casu, the ECHR examined the United Kingdom Lease Hold 
Reform Act which was alleged to interfere with the right to property enshrined 
in article 1 of the First Protocol.194 According to the ECHR, for government 
measures to amount to a substantial interference with property rights:  
Not only must the measure depriving a person of his property pursue, 
on the facts as well as in principle, a legitimate aim ‘in the public 
                                                 
191 Tecmed v Mexico, para 122. 
192 Ibid.  
193 Ibid. 
194 Article 1 of the First Protocol to some extent is analogous to expropriation provisions found 
in BITs. It reads ‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and 
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The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce 
such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general 
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interest,” but there must also be a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to 
be realized…The requisite balance will not be found if the person 
concerned has had to bear ‘an individual and excessive burden’… The 
Court considers that a measure must be both appropriate for 
achieving its aim and not disproportionate thereto (emphasis 
added).195 
Essentially, the ECHR sought to balance both the interests of the state as well as 
individual property rights. It cautiously underscores the difference in the way 
government measures affect nationals and non-nationals.196 According to the 
ECHR when safeguarding public interests less should be expected from non-
nationals because they “will generally have played no part in the election or 
designation of its authors nor have been consulted on its adoption’’.197  The 
court was of the view that it is reasonable to require more of the nationals to 
carry a greater burden in the public interest than non-nationals.198 In other 
words, government measures are disproportionate when they impose an 
excessive burden to foreign investors as compared to nationals. On the basis of 
this line of reasoning, the Azurix Corp v Argentina tribunal without much 
elaboration found the guidelines in James and Others persuasive and helpful in 
its expropriation analysis.199 Further, the tribunal endorsed the use of 
proportionality as enunciated in the award of Tecmed which had also 
fundamentally adopted the reasoning in James and Others.200 
However, tribunals need to be cautious when importing the test of 
proportionality especially using the ECHR as the source of inspiration. There are 
fundamental differences between arbitral tribunals constituted to settle foreign 
investment claims and the ECHR but more importantly the ECHR was established 
purposely to interpret core human rights values. Essentially, provisions in BITs 
are unique and contain a dual mandate to protect as well as attract foreign 
investors while the protocol is generic in nature. In addition, substantively while 
                                                 
195 Case of James and Others v United Kingdom (App 8793/79) ECHR 21 February 1986, para 
50-63 [Hereafter Case of James and Others v United Kingdom]. 
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197 Ibid para 63.  
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the protocol permits a margin of appreciation the same cannot be said about 
customary international law and BITs.201 More importantly, the ECHR is 
dedicated to protecting democracy and is mindful that democratic nations 
should be permitted to make policy changes without being held at ransom by 
powerful corporations.202  Although such is a notable undertaking the same 
cannot be said of arbitral tribunals that are constituted purposely to bring about 
a balance in the business relationship between states and foreign investors 
which has little to do with promoting democratic values. 
3.4 The Consequences of the Emerging Expropriation 
Jurisprudence on African Countries 
The approaches used by arbitral tribunals to determine whether measures 
constitute indirect expropriation clearly demonstrate the need for further 
clarification and the need for appropriate consideration of government 
measures. To recap, the majority of the expropriation clauses such as the clause 
in the United States-Congo BIT contain remarkably expansive provisions 
favouring foreign investors at the detriment of African states. Specifically, in the 
United States-Congo BIT expropriation is defined as ‘‘broad and flexible.’’ 
According to the BIT, ‘‘any measure regardless of form, which has the effect of 
depriving an investor of his management, control or economic value in a project 
can constitute expropriation requiring compensation equal to the fair market 
value’’.203 In essence the BIT does not only emphasise the effect of the 
government measure which is detrimental but also protects investors from any 
kind of expropriatory measures.  
Against this backdrop, as a theoretical and practical matter arbitral tribunals 
examining African expropriation clauses must inevitably rely on the existing 
jurisprudence. This would be fundamentally justifiable to the extent that the 
jurisprudence is precise and thoughtful to the interests of sovereign states. 
However, as the above cases have shown, much of what the jurisprudence says 
and achieves is a presumption in favour of investors at the detriment of 
                                                 
201 Siemens v Argentina, para 354. 
202 Helen Mountfield, ‘Regulatory Expropriations in Europe: The Approach of the European 
Court of Human Rights’ (2003) 11 N.Y.U. Envtl L. J 136,146. 
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government regulatory powers even when such policies are in the public 
interest. For instance, the Metalclad tribunal not only rejected the 
environmental measures but also asserted that the motivation or intention of the 
Mexican government was immaterial. The approaches taken in Metalclad and 
Tabolt unequivocally underscore that government measures will be faulted if the 
measures interfere with investor’s property rights with the effect of significantly 
depriving the use of property rights. Writing in 2002,204 and most recently in 
2008, Dolzer accurately notes that the deciding criterion if not the main 
criterion continues to be the effect of government measures.205 Dolzer’s 
observation with exception to LG&E v Argentina correctly captures the evolving 
jurisprudence. Particularly, the approach in LG&E v Argentina is exceptional 
because the tribunal weighed both the effect of the measure as well as the 
purpose of the government measure. Rightly so, the tribunal concisely balanced 
both the effect and purpose of the measure so as to avoid confounding 
Argentina’s right to adopt policies within its power. 
There is reason for concern when the effect of government measures weighs 
over and above the purpose of the measure. The sole effect test undermines and 
deters governments from taking regulatory measures even in the midst of 
legitimate government policy benefiting the entire public. Although nothing 
should preclude arbitral tribunals from making independent judgements such 
discretion should not overtly undermine the purpose of government measures. 
More importantly, economic considerations should not be considered over and 
above legitimate government policy that seeks to benefit the entire population. 
It should be stressed that if all government measures are to be regarded as 
compensable expropriations, African countries will simply forego regulating even 
in the public interest. Specifically, it should be noted that when examining 
regulatory measures involving African countries to achieve equitable outcomes 
regulatory measures for public purpose, non-discriminatory and in accordance 
with due process should not qualify as measures tantamount to expropriation.206 
                                                 
204 Rudolf Dolzer, ‘Indirect Expropriation: New Developments?’ (2002) 11 N.Y.U. Envtl L.J 64, 
90. 
205 Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (OUP 
2008) 101. 
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 It should be stressed that there obviously dangers in using the public interest approach 
because government regulatory measures might sometimes be pursued with a hidden agenda. 
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Undoubtedly the spill offs of finding all government measures interfering with 
property rights constituting compensable expropriation will disproportionately 
affect African countries. 
In stark contrast compared to developed countries, African countries face 
overwhelming challenges which include environmental, public health, safety, 
labour standards and capacity constraints. Particularly, the challenges in African 
countries require constant and on-going improvements in the regulatory 
environment which undoubtedly conflicts with interests of foreign investors. To 
this end, when used as the sole criteria, the sole effect test has the likelihood of 
discouraging African countries from undertaking regulatory policy even when 
such measures are in the public interest. Specifically, the sole effect test and 
the government interference approach have the propensity to overburden 
African countries which are at the peril of environmental degeneration and other 
regulatory standards. For instance as a hypothetical example, if the Tanzanian 
government wanted to increase foreign investment earnings from the mining 
sector and introduced regulations imposing additional levies on the mining 
industry. Creative foreign investors involved in the Tanzanian mining sector 
could potentially argue that the increased levy amounts to an expropriation. 
Indeed, as seen for example in the case of Paushok v Mongolia, usually the 
argument would be that the additional levies have the effect of severely 
depriving the investor’s from the use and enjoyment of his property rights.  
Specifically, in Paushok v Mongolia, the investor argued unsuccessfully that 
introducing a Windfall Profit Tax by the Mongolian government was tantamount 
to indirect expropriation. The tribunal postulated that ‘‘foreign investors are 
acutely aware that significant modifications of taxation levels represents a 
serious risk, especially when investing in a country at an early stage of economic 
and institutional development’’.207 Furthermore, the tribunal was of the view 
that provided foreign investors have not negotiated appropriate guarantees such 
as stability agreements which limit or prohibit the possibility of tax increases 
                                                                                                                                                    
Even more, there is potential for government regulatory measures to be captured by vested 
interests. In essence, therefore although considering the purpose of government measures is 
important this is not without risks.  
207 Paushok v The Government of Mongolia, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Award on Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility, April 28, 2011, para 302.  
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then it is within the discretion of sovereign states to introduce additional 
levies.208 As the discussion in Paushok demonstrates, although the investor’s 
claim was unsuccessful, creative investors can bring claims alleging that increase 
in taxes amount to indirect expropriation. Moreover, as the approach of the 
tribunal suggests, there is scope for investors to successfully pursue such claims 
when the state explicitly through stability agreements guarantees that 
additional taxes will not be levied.  
It should be stressed that compared to other African BITs, the United States-
Rwanda BIT elaborates approaches or factors arbitral tribunals should consider 
when determining indirect expropriation. Annex B Article 4 of the expropriation 
clause provides:  
…where an action or series of actions by a Party has an effect 
equivalent to direct expropriation without formal transfer of title or 
outright seizure. (a) The determination of whether an action or series 
of actions by a Party, in a specific fact situation, constitutes an 
indirect expropriation requires a case-by case, fact-based inquiry that 
considers, among other factors: (i) the economic impact of the 
government action, although the fact that an action or series of 
actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of an 
investment, standing alone, does not establish that an indirect 
expropriation has occurred; (ii) the extent to which the government 
action interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed 
expectations; and (iii) the character of the government action. 
Taken as a whole, the criteria outlined in the United States-Rwanda BIT should 
not be construed as a hierarchy but rather should be applied and balanced on a 
case by case basis. Furthermore, article 4 (b) provides that ‘‘except in rare 
circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are 
designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as 
public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect 
expropriations’’. Although the United States-Rwanda BIT attempts to distinguish 
between non-compensable regulatory measures and regulatory expropriations 
the BIT falls short in drawing the parameters of that distinction. The language in 
the United States-Rwanda BIT is analogous to the reasoning adopted in 
Methanex. In this case the tribunal postulated that ‘‘non-discriminatory 
regulation for a public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process 
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and, which affects, inter alia, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed 
expropriatory and compensable unless specific commitments had been given by 
the regulating government…’’.209 This is the same caveat the United States-
Rwanda BIT invokes in the terminology ‘‘rare circumstances’’. However, this 
caveat is problematic because it does not clarify what constitutes rare 
circumstances thus arbitral tribunals have the discretion to determine 
circumstances that can be regarded as rare. Obviously, it is hoped arbitral 
tribunals will interpret rare circumstances on a case by case basis and it should 
be the exception rather than the norm.210 
From the foregoing, the following conclusions can be drawn from the practice of 
African states; save for a few exceptions like the United States-Rwanda BIT, 
expropriation clauses contained in African BITs do not offer approaches within 
which arbitral tribunals can determine indirect expropriation. Furthermore, 
most African BITs do not demarcate what constitutes non-compensable 
regulatory measure and regulatory expropriation requiring compensation. As a 
result, arbitral tribunals have the discretion to use any of the elaborated 
approaches mentioned above.  Particularly, with respect to arbitral approaches, 
it should be stressed that the sole effect criterion when applied to African 
countries has the propensity to severely constrain the ability of African countries 
to regulate even in the public interest. Generally, compared to other countries, 
African countries face numerous challenges which require continued regulation; 
inadvertently this means that interests of foreign investors will be affected. 
Although African countries have undertaken broad and expansive expropriation 
provisions, there is need to contextualise African BITs and interpret them in such 
a way that African countries are not severely constrained. Specifically, when 
interpreting African expropriation clauses, tribunals should consider both the 
purpose and effect of the government measure so that African countries are able 
to implement measures for public interest which include the environment, 
labour, human rights and public safety. Finally, although the United States-
Rwanda is more nuanced and could potentially serve as a model to other African 
countries there is still need to clarify what constitutes rare circumstances. 
                                                 
209 Methanex v United States of America, chapter D para 7. 
210 See generally Methanex v United States for a brief interpretation of the tribunal’s 
approach on the meaning of specific commitment, Chapter D, para 7-10. 
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3.5 Principles Regulating Lawful Expropriation in African 
BITs 
As mentioned earlier, international law recognises the right of sovereign states 
to expropriate foreign property provided the measures are carried out for a 
public purpose, non–discriminatory and upon the payment of compensation.211 
With respect to African states, the rules of customary international law 
permitting lawful expropriation are pronounced in all African BITs. This clearly 
demonstrates that previous disagreements over the content of customary law 
rules regulating expropriation have at least at the moment through the 
conclusion of BITs been put to rest. Specifically, African expropriation clauses 
condition lawful expropriation for a public purpose, non-discriminatory, in 
accordance with due process,212 and accompanied with the payment of 
compensation. It should however be noted that although nearly all African 
expropriation clauses consent to customary international law standards, there 
are significant variations in the scope and content of customary law articulated 
by the various African BITs. Moreover, it is unclear whether African countries 
deliberately or unintentionally sought to include or omit some of the customary 
law standards. The reasons underlying the omission or inclusion are peripheral. 
Remarkably important is the fact that African countries through BITs have 
consented to the very principles that these states vigorously opposed. 
For purposes of clarity a sample of principles regulating lawful expropriation in 
African states as enunciated in African BITs is necessary. However, this is by no 
means an exhaustive illustration of all expropriation clauses contained in African 
BITs as such a task would be impossible given the number of African BITs. The 
                                                 
211 According to Schwarzenberger the requirement of public interest and compensation are 
generally understood as customary international law standards for a lawful expropriation. On 
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expropriation clause in majority of African BITs typically follow the following 
patterns; in the Germany-Burundi BIT for instance the formula of the 
expropriation clause stipulates that ‘‘investment by nationals or companies of 
either Contracting Party shall not be expropriated, nationalized or subjected to 
any other measure the effects of which would be tantamount to expropriation or 
nationalization in the territory of the other Contracting Party except for the 
public benefit and against compensation’’.213 
Manifestly, from the wording of this clause it is clear that under the Germany-
Burundi BIT non-discrimination and due process are not part of the conditions for 
lawful expropriation. Comparatively, the conditions for lawful expropriation in 
the Germany-Burundi BIT differ from the Belgium-Rwanda BIT which provides 
under article 4(2) that ‘‘…should considerations of public interest necessitate 
derogation…such measures shall be taken exceptionally…for (a) in accordance 
with the legal procedures; (b) shall not be discriminatory; (c) shall be 
accompanied by provisions for the payment of an adequate and effective 
compensation’’.214  On the other hand, the expropriation clause in the Tanzania-
Italy BIT follows the approach in Belgium-Rwanda BIT with minor modification. 
According to article 5 of the Italy-Tanzania BIT ‘‘investment of nationals or 
companies of either contracting party shall not be de jure or de facto 
nationalised, expropriated or subjected to measures having equivalent 
effect…except for a public purpose related to the internal needs of that party on 
a non-discriminatory basis and against prompt, full and effective 
compensation’’.215 The  United Kingdom-Kenya BIT is without exception, it reads 
in article 5 ‘‘investment of nationals or companies of either Contracting Party 
shall not be nationalised, expropriated or subjected to measures having effect 
equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation…except for a public purpose 
related to internal needs of that party on a non-discriminatory basis and against 
prompt, adequate and effective compensation’’.216 
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Similarly, the United Kingdom-Ghana BIT excludes non-discrimination as a 
condition for lawful expropriation. Specifically, article 7 of the expropriation 
clause provides that ‘‘investment of nationals or companies or either contracting 
party shall not be nationalised, expropriated or subjected to measures having 
equivalent effect to nationalisation or expropriation…except for a public purpose 
related to its internal needs…accompanied by provision for the payment of 
compensation amounting to the full and genuine value of the property as well as 
prompt and effective’’.217 The language in the most recent United States-
Rwanda BIT differs from the United Kingdom-Ghana by including non-
discrimination as a condition for lawful expropriation. According to Article 6 of 
the United States-Rwanda BIT,  neither Party may expropriate or nationalize a 
covered investment either directly or indirectly through measures equivalent to 
expropriation or nationalization ("expropriation"), except: (a) for a public 
purpose; (b) in a non-discriminatory manner; (c) on payment of prompt, 
adequate, and effective compensation; and (d) in accordance with due 
process.218 
On the other hand, article III of the United States-Cameroon BIT does not include 
non-discrimination as a condition for lawful expropriation. It stipulates that 
‘‘investments shall not be expropriated or nationalized either directly or 
indirectly except for a public purpose and in accordance with due process of 
law…and upon payment of prompt adequate and effective compensation’’.219 
This provision can be contrasted with the Denmark-Tanzania BIT which provides 
in article 6 that ‘‘investments of investors of each contracting party shall not be 
nationalised or expropriated or subjected to measures tantamount to 
expropriation…except in the public interest, on the basis of non-discrimination, 
carried out under due process of law, and against prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation’’.220 However, the expropriation clause in the United 
States-Congo BIT has more conditions for lawful expropriation than other African 
countries. Under article 3 of the United States-Congo BIT the expropriation 
clause provides that ‘‘no investment or any part of an investment of a national 
                                                 
217 Article 7 of the United Kingdom-Ghana BIT.  
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shall be subjected to any other measure…,unless the expropriation: (a) is done 
for a public purpose; (b) is accomplished under due process of law; (c) is not 
discriminatory; (d) does not violate any specific provision on contractual stability 
or expropriation contained in an investment agreement between the national or 
company concerned and the Party making the expropriation; and (e) is 
accompanied by prompt, adequate and effectively realizable compensation’’.221  
Finally, the last example is article 7 of the Netherlands-Zambia BIT which 
includes four conditions for lawful expropriation. It provides that neither 
‘‘contracting party shall take any measures depriving directly or indirectly, 
nationals of the other contracting party of their investments unless… (a) the 
measures are taken in the public interest and under due process of law; (b) the 
measures are not discriminatory or contrary to any undertaking which the 
contracting party which takes such measures may have given; (c) the measures 
are taken against just compensation’’.222  To sum up, the preceding provisions of 
African expropriation clauses clearly demonstrate that African states have 
consented to customary international law principles regulating lawful 
expropriation. In light of these considerations, the following section analyses the 
four main criteria required for the implementation of lawful expropriation in 
African treaty practice.  
3.5.1 Lawful Expropriation in Africa Requires Public Purpose 
As a starting point BITs signed by African countries permit lawful expropriation 
when it is pursued for a public purpose or in the public interest. Generally, in all 
African BITs the requirement of public purpose is the first criteria for lawful 
expropriation.223 While African BITs use public purpose or public interest 
interchangeably, this is a linguistic difference rather than a substantive 
difference. Substantively, the expropriation clause complies with customary 
international law standard even though the content of public purpose differs 
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among African countries. Particularly, the majority of African countries 
condition lawful expropriation aimed at serving a public purpose to be related to 
the internal needs of the country. Moreover, it should be emphasised that 
except for minor linguistic differences, the public interest requirement fully 
complies with customary international law.224 In light of these considerations, 
the logical question is whether all government measures pursued for public 
interest amount to non-compensable regulatory expropriation and the threshold 
required for such public interest measures to amount to compensable regulatory 
expropriation. 
As discussed above, in answering this question arbitral tribunals have contended 
that the requirement of public purpose is useful only when considering whether 
the expropriation complies with the BIT and plays a limited role in the 
determination of whether an expropriation has occurred. Accordingly, 
respondent governments must adduce sufficient evidence demonstrating that 
the government measures indeed serve a public purpose. In essence, although 
sovereign states have the discretion to take measures in the public interest such 
discretion is challenged if there is an error of judgement or an abuse of power or 
a clear misunderstanding of the issue.225 Particularly, when examining whether 
measures serve a public purpose, tribunals also consider the context within 
which the government arrives at such a conclusion. For instance, the tribunal in 
Siemens v Argentina rejected the Argentinean Decree because the circumstances 
surrounding the Decree were not rationally connected to the 2000 Argentina 
fiscal emergency law.226 According to the tribunal, although there was no doubt 
that the 2000 Emergency Law served a public purpose its application through 
Decree 669/01 was questionable within the specific settings of Siemens 
investment.227 
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Similarly, the tribunal in Tecmed v Mexico examined whether the public interest 
underlying refusal to renewal the landfill permit was proportional to the 
negative economic effect the investor suffered. The tribunal noted that although 
tribunals give states limited deference to determine measures that fit the realm 
of public interest such deference does not prevent them from questioning the 
premise of the measures.228 Put differently, whatever the public interest, the 
measure must be proportional to the economic harm suffered by the investor 
and essentially this means that the public interest should not unfairly supersede 
the foreign investor’s economic interests. Within the context of African BITs, 
arbitral tribunals are likely to find nearly all measures taken by African countries 
comply with the criteria of public interest. However, it is doubtful whether 
equally all the public interest measures will amount to non-compensable 
regulatory measures. 
3.5.2 Lawful Expropriation in Africa must be Non-Discriminatory 
The language in most expropriation clauses signed by African countries requires 
lawful expropriation to be carried out in a manner that is non-discriminatory.229 
Although the United Kingdom-Ghana BIT and Germany-Burundi expropriation 
clause do not require non-discrimination as a condition for lawful expropriation, 
this does not imply that discriminatory expropriations are permitted in Ghana 
and Burundi. Furthermore, arbitral tribunals interpreting the United Kingdom-
Ghana BIT and Germany-Burundi expropriation clause can interpret such 
measures in light of the MFN clause.230 Moreover, it is generally accepted that 
expropriations targeting foreign investors or particular nationals are illegal and 
may automatically amount to payment of compensation notwithstanding the 
public interest.231 For instance government procedures, practices and policies 
that are racially motivated would be evidence of illegal expropriations.232 
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Clearly from a doctrinal point of view, it is evident that the wording of the 
requirement of non-discrimination in African BITs complies with the customary 
international law standard requiring expropriation measures to be carried out 
without discrimination.  
There is broad consensus both in academia and arbitral practice confirming non-
discrimination as a yardstick for lawful expropriation under international law.233 
The presence of discrimination is determined by considering ‘‘individual factual 
circumstances of each particular case’’.234 For instance, in British Petroleum v 
Libyan Arab Republic, the government of Libya passed a Nationalisation Law 
ceasing concessions retaliating against the Iranian occupation of three islands 
which were regarded as Arab.235 Libya and other Arab States blamed the 
occupation on Great Britain as the islands were still technically under British 
control and the government did not react to the occupation.236 The tribunal 
found Libya’s nationalisation law violated international law because it was made 
for purely extraneous political reasons and was discriminatory in character.237   
Similarly, the tribunal in Letco v Liberia found measures taken by the Liberian 
government depriving Letco concessionary rights discriminatory.238 In the 
tribunal’s view this was because ‘‘areas of concession taken away from Letco 
were granted to other foreign owned companies which were run by people who 
were good friends of the Liberian authorities’’.239  Lastly, in ADC v Hungary, the 
government argued that the prohibition applied not only to the claimants but all 
foreign operating the Airport. According to the government, ADC as the only 
foreign investor involved in the operation of the airport cannot raise any claim 
                                                 
233 Ibid 187. See also AFM Maniruzzaman, ‘Expropriation of Alien Property and the Principle of 
Non-Discrimination in International Law of Foreign Investment: An Overview’ (1999) 8 
J.Transnat’l L. & Pol’y 58, 58. 
234 Ibid 67. 
235 British Petroleum v Libya Arab Republic (10 October 1973) cited in James Crawford and 
others, Foreign Investment Disputes: Cases, Materials and Commentary (Kluwer Law 
International 2005) 946. 
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238 Letco v Liberia, (Award of 31 March 1986) cited in James Crawford and others, Foreign 
Investment Disputes: Cases, Materials and Commentary (Kluwer Law International 2005) 904. 
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of being treated discriminatory.240 The tribunal postulated that the government 
‘‘misses the point because the comparison of different treatments is between 
treatment received by the Respondent-appointed operator and that received by 
foreign investors as a whole’’.241 Against this backdrop, the tribunal found that 
government actions amounted to discrimination because nationals received 
favourable treatment compared to foreign investors. From the preceding 
discussion, it is important to note that African states by including non-
discrimination as a ground for lawful expropriation, African states have in 
essence consented to pursue expropriation measures without discriminating 
between nationals and foreign investors. Such restraint in African treaty practice 
is manifestly apparent as the majority of African expropriation clauses plainly 
indicate that government expropriation measures must apply equally to foreign 
investors and nationals. 
3.5.3 Lawful Expropriation in Africa Must Follow Due Process 
Nearly all BITs signed by African countries condition lawful expropriation to 
comply with due process. Specifically, the majority of African treaties make 
reference to due process using the phrase measures must be ‘‘carried out under 
due process of law’’ while other African BITs make use of the phrase measures 
‘‘shall be taken under due process of law’’.242 Comparatively, the Belgium-
Rwanda BIT is unique in this respect, it uses the phrase ‘‘measures shall be 
taken in accordance with the legal procedures’’.243 However, substantively the 
various phrases used are analogous to one another. Put differently, within the 
context of Belgium-Rwanda BIT expropriation would have to follow legal 
procedures and such legal procedures would inevitably require elements of due 
                                                 
240 ADC Affiliate Limited & ADC and ADMC Management Limited v The Republic of Hungary, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16 October 2 2006, para 441 [Hereafter ADC v Hungary]. 
241ADC v Hungary, para 442. 
242 Article 5 of the United Kingdom-Kenya BIT; Article 7 of the United Kingdom-Ghana BIT; 
Article 6 of the United States-Rwanda BIT; Article III of the United States-Cameroon BIT; 
Article 6 of the Denmark-Tanzania BIT; Article 3 of the United States-Congo BIT; Article 7 of 
the Netherlands-Zambia BIT; Article 4(2) of the Germany-Burundi BIT; Article 4(2) of the 
Belgium-Rwanda BIT; Article 5 of the Italy-Tanzania BIT. 
243 Article 4(2) of the Belgium-Rwanda BIT.  
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process. It should also be stressed that occasionally some African BITs do not 
make reference to due process as a condition for lawful expropriation.244  
Arbitral tribunals have shed light to the standard of due process and more 
elaborately in the case of Antoine Goetz v Burundi concerning the revocation of 
a free trade zone permit. In this case, Burundi claimed that revocation of the 
free trade zone permit was legal and complied with domestic legislation as well 
as Burundian regulations.245 The arbitral tribunal held that the requirement of 
due process required Burundi to respect both domestic law and provisions of the 
Belgium-Burundi BIT.246 Manifestly, through signing the BIT with Belgium, 
Burundi committed to place Belgium investors under both international 
protection and Burundian law.247 According to the tribunal, ‘‘however 
commanding the control of the State of Burundi may draw from its sovereignty, 
it is held, by reason of this very sovereignty, to respect its international 
commitments’’.248 
Most recently, the tribunal in ADC v Hungary explained the standard of due 
process as it relates to expropriation demands actual and substantive legal 
procedures foreign investors can use to raise claims against depriving actions 
already taken or about to be taken.249  There is an expectation on the 
government to provide ‘‘ basic legal mechanisms such as reasonable advance 
notice, a fair hearing and unbiased and impartial adjudicators to assess the 
actions in dispute...’’.250  When the government fails to provide legal procedures 
with which such a mechanism exists ‘‘the argument that the action are taken 
under due process of law rings hollow’’.251 The tribunal concluded that the 
                                                 
244 There are a number of African BITs that do not make reference to due process inter alia 
Italy-Tanzania BIT; Germany-Burundi BIT; United Kingdom-Kenya BIT; United Kingdom- Ghana 
BIT. 
245 Antoine Goetz and Others v Republic of Burundi (10 February 1999) ICSID Case No. 
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expropriation did not meet the standard of due process as envisaged in Article 4 
of the Hungary-Cyprus BIT. These two arbitral awards highlight the fact that due 
process is a substantive condition thus African countries implementing 
expropriation measures need to ensure that domestic legislation encapsulates 
fair procedures before expropriations are carried out. Specifically, when 
envisaging expropriations, African countries should engage aggrieved foreign 
investors and provide them avenues within which their concerns are fairly 
adjudicated.  
As noted in Antoine Goetz v Burundi, due process blends both requirements of 
domestic laws as well as international law. The obiter in the case is particularly 
relevant to African countries because expropriation clauses contained in African 
BITs do not elucidate the meaning of due process. Essentially, in the majority of 
African BITs the discretion is placed on African countries to decide within 
domestic legal settings the parameters of due process. The effect of this 
practice is that African countries could potentially assume that due process has 
been followed on the basis of national laws but in reality African domestic laws 
may provide unacceptable legal procedures.  
3.5.4 Lawful Expropriation in Africa Requires the Payment of 
Compensation 
Generally, compensation for government measures interfering with property 
rights is justified on three grounds. First, cost internalisation theorists suggest 
that compensation is necessary because it ensures that the government takes 
only those regulatory actions that are efficient and maximise aggregate social 
welfare.252 On the other hand, insurance theorists justify compensation on the 
basis that it acts as an insurance against the risk of government regulatory 
measures.253 Lastly, proponents of fairness assert that fairness demands 
compensation to prevent investors from bearing excessive burdens that should 
be spread more broadly.254 It should be stressed that as a practical matter, 
states do not argue against compensation per se but against the standard of 
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compensation. As earlier noted the standard of compensation is one of the most 
controversial issues that divided states during the twenty century. Specifically, 
African states inspired with the newly acquired independence rejected the 
standard of prompt, adequate and effective compensation and postulated that 
the standard of compensation should be determined in accordance with 
domestic laws. Be that as it may, this rhetoric at least on the African continent 
can safely be said to have been settled through the inception of BITs on the 
African continent.  
Indeed, all expropriation clauses contained in African BITs require expropriation 
to be accompanied by the payment of compensation. Although, there are 
variations in the wording, it is worth noting that all African BITs condition lawful 
expropriation upon the payment of compensation. The standard of compensation 
pronounced in African BITs fits into three categories; most of African BITs 
condition expropriation upon the payment of prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation, some make reference to adequate and effective compensation,255 
while others simply require payment of just or adequate compensation.256 
Despite the variations, substantively African BITs neatly follow the ‘Hull formula’ 
which had been relentlessly fought by African countries. In addition, African BITs 
offer guidance into the standard of compensation by precisely indicating the 
amount of compensation aggrieved investors will be paid for lawful 
expropriation. Again here African BITs use different formulas, while most African 
countries recognise that compensation should consist of the full and genuine 
value of the expropriated property,257 some African countries stipulate that 
compensation should entail the payment of fair market value at the time 
immediately before the expropriation or impending expropriation.258 
                                                 
255 Belgium-Rwanda BIT makes provision for the payment of adequate and effective 
compensation while the Korea-Congo BIT; Denmark-Tanzania BIT; United Kingdom-Kenya BIT; 
Sweden-Tanzania BIT; United States-Cameroon BIT; United Kingdom-Cameroon BIT; Mauritius-
Ghana BIT and the Tanzania-Italy BIT follow prompt adequate and effective compensation. 
256For instance see Germany-Burundi BIT; Ghana-Egypt BIT; Germany-Tanzania BIT; 
Netherlands-Tanzania BIT and the Belgium-Cameroon BIT. 
257 For e.g. see United Kingdom-Tanzania BIT; Ghana-Benin BIT; India-Ghana BIT; United 
Kingdom- Kenya BIT; China-Ghana BIT; Italy-Tanzania BIT; Netherlands-Tanzania BIT and 
Ghana-Guinea BIT. 
258 See generally United States- Cameroon BIT; Denmark-Tanzania BIT; Ghana-Malaysia BIT; 
United States-Rwanda BIT; Korea-Congo BIT and Sweden-Tanzania BIT which determine 
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Occasionally, other African countries envisage compensation amounting to the 
equivalent value of the investment.259 Whereas African BITs articulate the 
standard of compensation and the amount thereof, most treaties fall short on 
providing the methodology to follow when determining the appropriate value for 
compensation. 
Generally, African BITs give arbitral tribunals discretion to determine an 
appropriate valuation methodology and occasionally some treaties make 
reference to acknowledged international valuation methods.260 The application 
of the valuation methodology can raise controversy when the fair market value is 
not easily determinable or when the actual value of the property has 
significantly diminished. For instance in Biwater v Tanzania, the investor was of 
the view that the question as to what valuation methodology is appropriate for 
calculating “fair market value” depends on the nature of the investment and the 
timing of the expropriation. The investor claimed that the discounted cash flow 
method involving the analysis of future profits and the discounting of these to 
calculate a net present value is only appropriate where the future profits of the 
investment can be determined with a degree of certainty or when the 
expropriated entity has had a history of profitable operations. The tribunal 
rejected this argument on the basis of the facts and the unprofitable status of 
the investor at the time of expropriation. According to the tribunal, ‘‘City Water 
had no economic value on 1 June 2005; that as of that date, BGT was not willing 
to spend another shilling to keep City Water from collapsing and no rational 
buyer with reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts would have spent a 
shilling to buy it’’.261 
3.6 Conclusion 
As shown throughout this chapter, although expropriation clauses contained in 
African BITs have variations and wording differences such differences are 
                                                 
259 Germany-Burundi BIT; Netherlands-Ghana BIT; Germany-Tanzania BIT; Finland-Tanzania 
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inconsequential. For instance some African countries have expropriation 
provisions that do not explicitly capture indirect expropriation but contain 
related phases such as measures tantamount to expropriation which is 
functionally equivalent to indirect expropriation. The common denominator 
amongst all African expropriation clauses is that the expropriation clause is of a 
general nature and does not delimit the contours of indirect expropriation. 
Manifestly, therefore arbitral tribunals have the discretion to decide African 
cases on the basis of the evolving jurisprudence on expropriation. This emerging 
jurisprudence though forms the basis of legal reasoning would justifiably be 
applicable to African states to the extent that the jurisprudence is precise and 
considers the purpose and intention of government measures. However, as the 
preceding analysis has demonstrated arbitral tribunals are reluctant to consider 
the intention of government measures. Specifically, arbitral tribunals 
predominantly apply the sole effect test which has the propensity to constrain 
African countries from pursuing regulatory measures even in the public interest. 
Moreover, the failure to seriously balance the purpose of government measures 
vis-à-vis interests of foreign investors may reinvigorate sovereign centred 
arguments especially in African countries that previously opposed rules 
regulating foreign investment. Lastly, as far as the various expropriation 
approaches are concerned, it is unlikely that these approaches will be clarified 
unless the approaches are clarified in future BITs or through the introduction of 
an appellate body charged with the authority to bring some degree of nuanced 
consistency. 
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Chapter 4 
The Standard of Fair and Equitable Treatment in African 
Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Introduction 
Although the standard of fair and equitable treatment easily finds passage in 
nearly all BITs, it is probably the most controversial and complex undertaking for 
states engaged in modern investment treaty practice.1 Over the last decade, the 
standard has acquired significant prominence both in commentary and investor-
state disputes superseding even traditional expropriation claims.2 For instance in 
2008, arbitral tribunals considered thirteen awards on the merits and in each of 
the cases, investors alleged a violation of fair and equitable treatment.3 Out of 
the thirteen cases, foreign investors successfully demonstrated violation of fair 
and equitable treatment in seven of the awards and in contrast to expropriation, 
of the seven claims based on expropriation, arbitral tribunals ruled in favour of 
foreign investors in two instances.4 The trend therefore suggests that the 
possibility of foreign investors succeeding through claims of fair and equitable 
treatment is higher compared to other substantive treaty rights encapsulated in 
investment treaties. On this basis, it is prudent for investors to fashion treaty 
claims through the broad allegation of fair and equitable treatment. Moreover, 
as will shortly be discussed since the language of the standard is broadly 
construed and captures other treaty violations, this affords arbitral tribunals a 
window within which to adjudicate other ambiguous provisions. Particularly, as 
demonstrated by arbitral practice there is remarkable similarity between the 
                                                 
1 Campbell McLachlan, Laurence Shore and Matthew Weiniger, International Investment 
Arbitration (OUP 2007) 200. 
2 Over the last few years, there has been gradual increase in the number of monographs 
reviewing fair and equitable treatment. For detailed review see Ioana Tudor, The Fair and 
Equitable Treatment Standard in the International Law of Foreign Investment (OUP 2008). In 
part the renewed interest is because majority of cases before ICSID arbitral tribunals include 
an allegation of fair and equitable treatment.  
3 UNCTAD, Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (IIA Monitor No. 1, 
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2009/6/Rev1, 2009) 8. 
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reasoning adopted in expropriation awards and that adopted in fair and 
equitable treatment awards.5 
Aside from the conflicting views expressed in arbitral practice, fair and 
equitable treatment has also aroused significant academic scrutiny.6 The divide 
in opinion as will be subsequently discussed relates to whether fair and 
equitable treatment is equivalent to the minimum standard or whether it is an 
autonomous treaty standard.7 Quite apart from this, is the question about 
whether fair and equitable treatment represents two standards or is simply a 
single standard.8 In light of these differences, arbitral tribunals continue to 
grapple with issues surrounding the two distinctive approaches so as to satisfy 
both the interests of states and investors. Whether tribunals have succeeded in 
balancing the two competing interests is beyond the scope of this chapter but 
evidently the vigorous reaction from states disputing interpretation accorded to 
fair and equitable treatment has been unprecedented. For instance, Bolivia 
withdrew from the ICSID arbitral framework on the basis that fair and equitable 
treatment has been expansively expanded. Specifically, Bolivia asserted that 
ICSID arbitral tribunals have notoriously interpreted the standard in favour of 
multinational corporations at the detriment of sovereign states.9 Aside from 
Bolivia, there are indications that other Latin American countries have also been 
appalled by the interpretation accorded to the standard of fair and equitable 
treatment.10  
These recent developments deserve not to be taken lightly considering the fact 
that the standard has been in existence for over fifty years without any major 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
6 Campbell McLachlan, Laurence Shore and Matthew Weiniger, International Investment 
Arbitration (OUP 2007) 199-264; M Sornarajah , The International Law on Foreign Investment 
(2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2004) 349-363, Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, 
Principles of International Investment Law (OUP 2008) 119-149; Jeswald W Salacuse, The Law 
of Investment Treaties (OUP 2010) 218-244. 
7 Ioana Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in the International Law of 
Foreign Investment (OUP 2008) 56; see also Stephen Vasciannie, ‘Fair and Equitable 
Treatment in International Investment Law and Practice’ (1999) 70 BYIL 99, 104. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Luck Eric Peterson, ‘Investment Treaty News’ (2007) 15 
<www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/itn_may27_2007.pdf>accessed 20 May 2012. 
10 Ibid.  
  
 172 
controversy.11 Commenting on the recent backlash, Professor Schreuer 
reminisced that fair and equitable treatment has been ‘a sleeping beauty’ 
inserted in a number of documents but rarely used in state practice.12 Professor 
Schreuer’s metaphoric expression is not without merit considering the growing 
number of investors relying on fair and equitable treatment as well as the 
increased scrutiny the standard has generated in academic discourse. In light of 
these considerations, this chapter thoroughly examines the scope, the definition 
and meaning of fair and equitable treatment as spelled out in African treaty 
practice. In so doing, the chapter not only contextualises the silent features 
underpinning the development of fair and equitable treatment but also situates 
African treaty practice within general investment law treaty practice. Lastly, 
the chapter explores the extent to which the distinctive arbitral approaches 
shape the understanding of fair and equitable treatment within African treaty 
practice. 
4.1 The Historical Evolution of Fair and Equitable 
Treatment 
The concept of fair and equitable treatment has been in existence for over fifty 
years and first appeared as a non-binding legal obligation in the unsuccessful 
Havana Charter of 1946.13 As noted in Chapter 1, the Havana Charter constituted 
an effort that was supposed to galvanise the establishment of the International 
Trade Organisation.14 Although the Havana Charter was mainly a trade compact 
with few investment articles, the Charter itself highlights the difficulties 
involved in negotiating investment related issues. There are many factors that 
contributed to the failure of the Havana Charter but notably as observed by one 
commentator contracting states feared that ‘‘investment provisions negotiated 
at a multilateral conference might express the lowest common denominator of 
protection to which any of the participants would be willing to agree’’.15 As a 
                                                 
11 Federico Ortino and others, Investment Treaty Law: Current Issues II: Nationality and 
Investment Treaty Claims and Fair and Equitable Treatment in Investment Treaty Law 
(British Inst of Intl & Comparative 2007) 92. 
12 Ibid.  
13 Ibid. 
14 See Chapter 1 for detailed discussion. 
15 Comments by Principal American negotiator extracted from Andreas F Lowenfeld, 
International Economic Law (2nd edn, OUP 2008) 482. 
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result of such considerations, the draft chapter on economic development 
containing international investment related issues was rejected by all member 
states.16 With respect to the standard of fair and equitable treatment, article 11 
(2) empowered the Organization to make recommendations for and promote 
bilateral or multilateral agreements on measures designed to assure ‘‘just and 
equitable treatment for the enterprise, skills, capital, arts and technology 
brought from one Member country to another’’.17 
It should be stressed that although the Charter contained a clause on just and 
equitable treatment, the clause was included as an aspiration without envisaging 
the creation of any binding legal obligations.18 This is mainly because developing 
countries did not participate in the negotiation of the Havana Charter and also 
there was lack of consensus among developed countries about the content of 
international investment rules.19 Particularly, during negotiations of the Havana 
Charter provisions related to investment protection contracting parties did not 
have the disposition or intent to draft binding legal norms.20 Moreover at a 
doctrinal level, states participating in the Havana Charter did not perceive just 
and equitable treatment as part of the corpus of customary international law.21 
After the demise of the Havana Charter, several unsuccessful negotiations both 
at the regional and multilateral level were attempted. Particularly, the 
pioneering regional initiatives included the 1948 Economic Agreement for Bogota 
that contained a clause expressly contemplating fair and equitable treatment for 
foreign capital.22 Subsequently, this was followed by the 1959 private initiative 
known as the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investment Abroad.23  
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment: Havana Charter for 
an International Organization. <http://www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/havana.pdf>accessed 
20 May 2012. 
18 Comments by Principal American negotiator extracted from Andreas F Lowenfeld, 
International Economic Law (2nd edn, OUP 2008) 482. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment: UNCTAD Series on International Investment 
Agreements (Vol. III UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/II, Sales No. E.99.II.D.15, 2009) 7. 
23 Abs Hermann and Hartley Shawcross, ‘Draft Convention on Investments Abroad’ in The 
Proposed Convention to Protect Private Foreign Investment: A Roundtable (1960) 9 J of 
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Particularly, article 1 of the Abs-Shawcross draft provides that, ‘‘each party 
shall at all times ensure fair and equitable treatment to the property of the 
nations of the other party…’’.24 Noteworthy, provisions of the Abs-Shawcross 
Draft put considerable emphasis on the protection of foreign investors and as a 
result the draft is widely perceived as having favoured the perspectives of 
capital exporting countries.25 Although the Abs-Shawcross Draft was 
unsuccessful, the initiative conspicuously inspired the 1967 OECD Draft 
Convention on the International Protection of Foreign Property which also 
included a clause providing for fair and equitable treatment.26 
Indeed, the wordings of the two drafts are remarkably similar and tailored 
towards protecting foreign investors. For instance, Article 1 of the OECD draft 
stipulates that ‘‘each party shall at all times ensure fair and equitable 
treatment to the property of the nations of the other party…’’.27 The inclusion 
of fair and equitable treatment in the draft OECD Convention, ‘reflects the 
dominant trend and perspectives among capital exporting countries in 
investment matters’’.28 Although these initiatives produced unsuccessful results, 
taken as a whole the initiatives clearly illuminate the differences in opinion 
between developed and developing countries.29 In part, the failure of these 
initiatives suggests that the concept of fair and equitable treatment cannot be 
said to form part of customary international law because both the OECD Draft 
Convention and the Havana Charter were drafted without the support of 
developing countries. At the multilateral level, the concept of fair and equitable 
treatment is articulated in a scaled down agreement establishing the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency of 1985.30 Article 12 of this agreement requires 
that ‘‘in guaranteeing an investment, the Agency shall satisfy itself as to…(iv) 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 
25 UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment: UNCTAD Series on International Investment 
Agreements (Vol. III UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/II, Sales No. E.99.II.D.15, 2009) 8. 
26 Ibid. 
27 See 1967 OECD Draft Convention on the International Protection of Foreign Property. 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/4/39286571.pdf>accessed 20 May 2012. 
28 UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment: UNCTAD Series on International Investment 
Agreements (Vol. III UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/II, Sales No. E.99.II.D.15, 2009) 8. 
29 Ioana Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in the International Law of 
Foreign Investment (OUP 2008) 2. 
30 MIGA is a member of the World Bank Group and its core mission is to promote foreign direct 
investment into developing countries to help support economic growth, reduce poverty, and 
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the investment conditions in the host country, including the availability of fair 
and equitable treatment and legal protection for the investment’’.31 A similar 
provision can be found in the 1992 guidelines of the Board of Governors of the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank which reads ‘‘Each State will 
extend to investment established in its territory by nationals of any other State 
fair and equitable treatment according to the standards recommended in these 
Guidelines’’.32 
In close parallel with the Havana Charter, the United States pursued Friendship 
Commerce and Navigation Treaties (FCNs). The nuanced FCNs included property 
protection clauses that had appeared in the colonial era and guaranteed 
‘‘equitable treatment’’ and ‘‘most constant protection and security’’ to 
property of foreign nationals and companies.33  It is important to stress that FCN 
provisions encapsulating fair and equitable treatment were wide in scope and 
covered a wide range of legal issues.34 For instance, the FCN with Ethiopia 
stipulated that ‘‘each Contracting Party shall at all times accord fair and 
equitable treatment to nationals…shall refrain from applying unreasonable or 
discriminatory measures that would impair their legally acquired rights and 
interests; and shall assure that their lawful contractual rights are afforded 
effective means of enforcement, in conformity with the applicable laws’’.35 
Furthermore, FCN treaties concluded after the aftermath of colonialism also 
guaranteed national treatment and MFN treatment with respect to the right to 
establish investment.36 Also, modern FCN interchangeably used the terminology 
‘equitable treatment’ and ‘fair and equitable treatment’.37 
                                                 
31 Article 12 (iv) of MIGA 
<http://www.miga.org/news/index_sv.cfm?stid=1506&aid=1347#3>accessed 20 May 2012. 
32 Word Bank Guidelines on Treatment of Foreign Investments. For the detailed guidelines see 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/WorldBank.pdf >accessed 20 May 2012. 
33 Kenneth J Vandevelde, ‘Romancing the Foreign Investor: BIT by BIT: A Brief History of 
International Investment Agreements’ (2005) 12 U.C Davis J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 157, 163. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations between the United States of America and 
Ethiopia, U.S.T 2134, Sept 7, 1951 [Hereafter FCN between United States and Ethiopia].  
36 Kenneth J Vandevelde, ‘Romancing the Foreign Investor: BIT by BIT: A Brief History of 
International Investment Agreements’ (2005) 12 U.C Davis J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 157, 163. 
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For instance while the FCN treaties the United States signed with France, 
Greece, Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland, Israel, Nicaragua and Pakistan assured 
foreign investors with ‘equitable treatment’,38 other United States FCN treaties 
with Germany, Ethiopia, Oman and the Netherlands assured foreign investors 
with ‘fair and equitable treatment’’.39 However, it should be stressed that the 
interchangeable use between ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘equitable 
treatment’ is of no significant importance.40 In essence, whether the FCN uses 
‘fair and equitable treatment’ or ‘equitable treatment’ the desired objective 
remains the same.41 Not all FCN treaties follow this trend; for example the 
China-United States FCN does not contain either of the two standards of 
treatment.42 The FCN between the United States and Ethiopia is particularly 
relevant to African states because it was the first African treaty to explicitly 
embody the standard of fair and equitable treatment. 
Subsequently, as will shortly be discussed the provision found its way into 
African treaty practice towards the late 1960’s and early 1990’s when most 
African countries become active participants in the bilateral investment treaty 
system. The concept of fair and equitable treatment also found its way into the 
Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations (UN Draft 
Code).43 The UN Draft Code is particularly relevant because it demonstrates 
early views of developing countries with regard to the standard of fair and 
equitable treatment. Most importantly, the UN Draft Code is balanced because 
negotiators included both developed and developing countries espousing 
                                                 
38 See for example the FCN between United States and Greece provides that, ‘Each Party shall 
at all times accord equitable treatment to the persons, property, enterprises and other 
interests of nationals and companies of the other Party’. Friendship Commerce and 
Navigation Treaty between the United States of America and Greece, TIAS 3057, Aug 3 and 
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39 For example see FCN between United States and Ethiopia. See generally Kenneth J 
Vandevelde, ‘Romancing the Foreign Investor: BIT by BIT: A Brief History of International 
Investment Agreements’ (2005) 12 U.C Davis J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 157, 163. 
40 For thorough review see Arghyrious A Fatouros, Government Guarantees to Foreign 
Investors (Columbia University Press 1962) 167. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Republic of 
China, TIAS No. 1871, 63 Stat.1299, Nov 4 1946 [Hereafter FCN between United States and 
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Code see UNCTC, The United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations (UN 
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therefore early understanding of fair and equitable treatment.44 This is in sharp 
contrast to the 1967 OECD Draft which predominantly represented the views of 
developed countries.45 Significantly, during the UN Draft Code negotiations, one 
of the outstanding contentious issues was the standard of fair and equitable 
treatment.46 As a compromise, developed and developing countries agreed to an 
ambiguous and broad concept that simply read ‘‘Transnational corporations 
should receive fair and equitable treatment in countries in which they 
operate’’.47 Although the standard easily found passage into the UN Draft Code, 
this should not to be equated to the international minimum standard as 
advocated by some commentators from developed countries.48 
Moreover, historical trends of the concept suggest that as of 1986, developing 
countries simply viewed fair and equitable treatment as an additional standard 
of treatment and not necessarily equivalent to international minimum 
standard.49 Robinson notes that there is nothing in the UN Draft Code which 
indicates that national treatment, MFN and minimum standard are part of the 
standard of fair and equitable treatment.50 Furthermore, it should be stressed 
that during the negotiations of the UN Draft Code, OECD countries promoted the 
view that fair and equitable treatment encapsulates international law.51 
However, it remains doubtful whether this position was attained based on the 
persistent objection of developing countries.52 To sum up, it can be stated that 
as of 1986, the content of fair and equitable treatment as well as the 
relationship between fair and equitable treatment and the minimum standard 
remained unsettled.53 Aside from the 1967 OECD Draft, the failed Multilateral 
                                                 
44 UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment: UNCTAD Series on International Investment 
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Agreement on Investment (MIA) also included fair and equitable treatment as 
part of the overall provisions regulating foreign investment. The MIA in its 
investment protection clauses under section iv stipulates that ‘‘Each Contracting 
Party shall accord to investments in its territory of investors of another 
Contracting Party fair and equitable treatment and full and constant protection 
and security…’’.54 
The MIA further adds that, ‘‘in no case shall a Contracting Party accord 
treatment less favourable than that required by international law’’.55 It is 
pertinent to note that compared to the OECD Draft, the MIA follows the position 
in the UN Draft Code which incorporated national treatment and MFN in addition 
to fair and equitable treatment.56 Although both the OECD draft and MIA are 
imprints of developed countries, if these agreements had been successful they 
would have become multilateral investment treaties because of the availability 
to non OECD members.57 Vasciannie correctly notes that the character of the 
OECD draft and MIA draft needs to be distinguished from other regional 
agreements that targeted a limited category of countries.58 In comparison to 
regional agreements, OECD drafters intended the drafts to serve as multilateral 
investment treaties covering the broad spectrum of foreign investment 
protection and binding on all countries.59 Having looked at multilateral 
initiatives, it is important to briefly examine the second phase of regional 
agreements containing fair and equitable treatment. Typically, regional 
agreements alluding to fair and equitable treatment include inter alia the Lome 
IV Convention, COMESA and NAFTA. 
Unlike other regional agreements, the Lome IV Convention is of great 
significance because it embodies both the views of developed and developing 
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countries.60 Particularly, the Lome IV Convention encapsulates that at a regional 
level developing countries have accepted to incorporate fair and equitable 
treatment as a treaty standard. This is in contrast to the line of reasoning 
advocated by developing countries during the NIEO and also during the drafting 
of the Code of Transnational Corporations.61 Furthermore, Lome IV represents 
the views of African countries which are the majority of countries making up the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP). Specifically, article 258 
provides that ACP countries and the European Union shall accord investors fair 
and equitable treatment provided such investors comply with the objectives and 
priorities of ACP-EC development co-operation and appropriate laws in their 
respective States.62 Aside from Lome IV, the COMESA Investment Agreement 
further supports the acceptability of fair and equitable treatment among African 
countries. Particularly, article 14 of the COMESA agreement provides that 
‘Member States shall accord fair and equitable treatment to COMESA investors 
and their investments in accordance with customary international law…’’.63 
From the wording of article 14 of COMESA and article 258 of Lome IV 
Convention, it is manifestly clear that African states accept the standard of fair 
and equitable treatment as part of the protection accorded to foreign investors. 
Quite apart from appearing in African regional treaties, the standard of fair and 
equitable treatment also appears in other regional groupings such as NAFTA and 
the Energy Charter Treaty. In particular, as will be shown below, the practice 
under NAFTA is of significant importance because of its contribution to the 
development of the standard through the numerous awards and the 
interpretative note by the Free Trade Commission. Aside from NAFTA, another 
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regional initiative worth mentioning is the Energy Charter and although 
relatively new and limited to the energy sector the agreement represents the 
views of developed countries.64 Specifically, Article 10 (1) of the Energy Charter 
provides that ‘‘Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with the provisions of 
this Treaty, encourage and create stable, equitable, favourable and transparent 
conditions for investors of other Contracting Parties to make Investments in its 
Area. Such conditions shall include a commitment to accord at all times to 
investments of Investors of other Contracting Parties fair and equitable 
treatment’’.65 Commenting on the Energy Charter, Walde Thomas stresses that 
the Charter is the most sophisticated instrument of foreign investment 
protection based on the fact that it was adopted along the lines of NAFTA and 
United Kingdom investment treaty practice.66 Walde further posits that the 
Charter aims at crystallizing customary international law principles derived from 
existing state practice as articulated in NAFTA, BIT practice, World Trade 
Organization and other international investment standards.67 
From the foregoing historical background, a number of key principles can be 
distilled from the evolution of fair and equitable treatment; (i) there is an 
increasing reference to fair and equitable treatment enhanced by post world war  
experience which created the need for foreign capital and unprecedented 
investment protection,68 (ii) the content of the standard remains ambiguous and 
unsettled, (iii) historically, fair and equitable treatment is an independent 
standard and not part of the international minimum standard, (iv) from the 
historical background, fair and equitable treatment though stipulated in treaties 
cannot be said to have crystallized into customary international law because of 
the contradictory views held by developed and developing countries, (v) fair and 
equitable treatment is included in treaties mainly because of its simplicity in the 
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abstract.69 Be that as it may and despite the fact that the meaning of fair and 
equitable treatment is unexplained, there is consensus that when the concept is 
included in treaties, it is a legal standard and foreign investors can rely on it for 
protection.70 
Obviously, the lack of a working definition coupled with the fact that the 
concept is ambiguous makes its application and interpretation difficult in the 
ever changing investment climate. Moreover, the concept consists of not only 
according investors fair or just treatment but also giving weight to equitable 
treatment.71 From a purely interpretative stand point, it is possible to speculate 
that the standard when included as fair and equitable treatment offers superior 
legal protection compared to when it is included as just and equitable 
treatment.72 This would imply that when applied to practical cases the inquiry 
would be one that considers fairness and equity as two distinct tiers of 
analysis.73 However, such speculation would be devoid of the consistency with 
which states have linked the two terms.74 The format of the standard in most 
treaties shows that states believe the standard is one unified standard.75 It is 
suggested that if states believed fair and equitable treatment to embody two 
standards such intention would have been explicitly mentioned.76 Put 
differently, states would for instance have set out the fairness standard in one 
treaty provision and the equity standard in other treaty provision.77 The failure 
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thereof simply means that states intend fair and equitable treatment to connote 
a single treaty standard.78 
As noted earlier, the concept fair and equitable treatment is a legal standard 
although its scope, definition and meaning remain unsettled. With respect to its 
interpretation, there are mainly two schools of thought, some commentators 
contend that fair and equitable treatment is part of customary international law 
while others consider it as an independent standard detached from the minimum 
standard.79 When viewed as an autonomous standard, it follows that investors 
will be granted treatment above and beyond that articulated by the minimum 
standard.80 On the other hand, when viewed as part of the minimum standard, it 
is presumed that investors are to be granted treatment in accordance to and 
limited to the minimum standard.81 Obviously, proponents of this position 
proceed from the assumption that the minimum standard of treatment has 
crystallised into customary law such that treatment falling below this level gives 
rise to liability on part of the state.82 However, this position tends to ignore the 
rejection of the minimum standard by developing countries and also assumes 
that there is settled practice and opinio juris in favour of the minimum 
standard. The following section examines both viewpoints because such an 
assessment informs the discussion of fair and equitable treatment in African 
treaty practice. 
4.2 Fair and Equitable Treatment as Part of the 
International Minimum Standard 
The continued reference to fair and equitable treatment as an embodiment of 
the international minimum standard is supported by NAFTA arbitral practice.83  
However, as pointed out in Mondev International Limited v United States, it is 
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essential to draw a distinction between fair and equitable treatment under 
NAFTA which clearly refers to the minimum standard and other treaty practices 
that potentially have their own system of implementation.84 Some preliminary 
remarks about the international minimum standard are warranted before 
situating fair and equitable treatment as part of the international minimum 
standard. As subsequent chapters have shown, the international minimum 
standard is a concept of deep rooted controversy and such controversy was most 
vividly witnessed when formerly colonised states acquired independence. It 
holds that civilised nations recognise a common standard of treatment 
applicable to aliens and the application of such treatment is invaluable to the 
world community.85 In the words of Root who is probably the most passionate 
defender of the minimum standard, ‘the international standard is nothing else 
than a set of rules, correlated to each other and deriving from one particular 
norm of general international law namely that the treatment of  aliens is 
regulated by the laws of nations.86 Despite the genius of Root’s position, legal 
doctrine has traditionally opposed the articulation of this standard.87 The 
opposition to the minimum standard is partly because it has the tendency to test 
any state conduct by a generalised standard of justice.88 This is self-evident in 
the concept itself and the dubious basis upon which the standard is premised.89 
Even though the international minimum standard is supported by many states, 
caution should be exercised especially when equating the minimum standard as 
part of customary international law. A broad and expansive construction of the 
minimum standard would be ignoring the much heated debates of the early 
century. Particularly, it should be noted that in the last century, the minimum 
standard suffered almost unanimous rejection by majority of developing 
countries whether from Africa, Latin America or Asia. Given the controversy 
surrounding the minimum standard particular restraint should therefore be 
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exercised when construing and applying the precedent of early cases to modern 
investment disputes. The theoretical background as observed in Mondev suggests 
that the international minimum standard was not so much about the treatment 
of foreign investment but rather designed for the physical security of aliens.90   
It is worth mentioning that the precedent of the minimum standard developed 
focusing on physical security of aliens which essentially means that applying the 
Neer case and other related cases to modern arbitration would be devoid of the 
context within which these cases were decided.91 Also, these cases where 
decided at a time when the status of the individual in international law and the 
international protection of foreign investments were far less developed.92 
Obviously, this is different from today were the substance and procedural rights 
of individuals have undergone considerable developments.93 However, despite 
the rejection of the minimum standard, treaty practice of certain countries 
supports the view that fair and equitable treatment merely reflects the 
international minimum standard. The relationship between the two has been the 
subject of controversy within NAFTA arbitral practice. This controversy 
emanates from the wording of article 1105 of NAFTA which provides that;  
Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party 
treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and 
equitable treatment and full protection and security.94 
The approach in NAFTA has also been followed in the 2004 United States Model 
BIT as well as the investment chapters of United States Free Trade 
Agreements.95 Specifically, United States Free Trade Agreements explicitly 
stipulate that fair and equitable treatment is equivalent to the international 
minimum standard. For instance Article 15.5(2) of the Free Trade Agreement 
between the United State and Singapore reads as follows;  
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For greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary 
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the 
minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to covered 
investments. The concepts of fair and equitable treatment and full 
protection and security does not require treatment in addition to or 
beyond that which is required by that standard, and do not create 
additional substantive rights (emphasis added).96 
It should be noted that previously, the lack of clear linkage in the relationship 
between fair and equivalent treatment and the minimum standard provided 
arbitral tribunals with an avenue within which to exercise discretionary 
judgement.97 This resulted in divergent views including arbitral tribunals 
interpreting article 1105(1) using sources beyond customary international law 
thus giving raise to expansive and liberal interpretations.98 For instance in SD 
Myers Inc v Canada the tribunal opined that ‘‘a breach of a rule of international 
law by a host Party may not be decisive in determining that a foreign investor 
has been denied fair and equitable treatment’’.99 However, ‘‘the fact that a 
host Party has breached a rule of international law that is specifically designed 
to protect investors will tend to weigh heavily in favour of finding a breach of 
Article 1105’’.100 More specifically, the tribunal in Pope & Talbot found the 
formulation of the fairness requirement in Article 1105 as being addictive to the 
minimum standard.101 Accordingly, investors are entitled to elements 
constituting fairness notwithstanding other entitlements under international 
law.102 In the view of the tribunal a logical corollary of the language in article 
1105 demands that ‘‘compliance with the fairness elements must be ascertained 
free of any threshold that might be applicable to the evaluation of measures 
under the minimum standard of international law’’.103 
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As a result of the numerous conflicting interpretations, article 1105 became the 
subject of an official interpretation by the NAFTA Free Trade Commission (FTC), 
a body compromised of representatives of the three member states with the 
authority to adopt binding interpretations.104 With the numerous contradictory 
decisions, the Note of Interpretation Concerning Article 1105 sought to clarify 
and reaffirm whether the minimum standard and fair and equitable treatment 
are parallel. The FTC Note specifically states that; 
(i) Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law 
minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of 
treatment to be afforded to investments of investors of another Party. 
(ii) The concepts ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and full protection 
and security’ do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that 
which is required by the customary international law minimum 
standard of treatment of aliens. (iii) A determination that there has 
been a breach of another provision of the NAFTA, or of a separate 
international agreement, does not establish that there has been a 
breach of Article 1105 (1).105 
Even before the FTC Note, Canada had long supported the proposition that fair 
and equitable treatment is functionally equivalent to the minimum standard. 
According to the Canadian Statement on Implementation of the NAFTA, Canada 
was of the view that Article 1105 of NAFTA is a restatement of the minimum 
absolute standard of treatment ‘‘based on long standing principles of customary 
international law’’.106 This position is also followed in Canada’s new Foreign 
Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement (FIPA) model which reads as 
follows; 
The Minimum Standard of Treatment ensures investments of investors, 
fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security in 
accordance with the principles of customary international law. The 
minimum standard provides a floor to ensure that the treatment of an 
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investment cannot fall below treatment considered as appropriate 
under generally accepted standards of customary international law. 
Similarly, the 1979 statement issued by the Swiss Foreign Office endorses the 
proposition that fair and equitable treatment is equivalent to the minimum 
standard of treatment.107 Although the FTC note attracted criticisms from 
investors and commentators, subsequent NAFTA decisions have followed the 
lead.108 Obviously, from the point of view of investors, the FTC note accords 
substantially lesser protection compared to when the standard is interpreted as 
an autonomous standard. Particularly within the NAFTA context, investors 
alleged that the United States deliberately changed the meaning of a NAFTA 
provision in the middle of a case in which fair and equitable treatment plays a 
decisive role.109 To sum up, investors questioned the motives of United States 
pursuing such an interpretation and whether the interpretation was carried out 
in good faith. Despite the misgivings from investors, subsequent arbitral 
tribunals in Mondev, UPS, ADF and Loewen have sided with the conclusive 
opinion undertaken by the FTC. 
However, it should be stressed that the FTC interpretation applies to NAFTA 
party states and is of limited relevance to other treaties.110 This is because 
article 1105 was the subject of an authorised treaty body with jurisdiction over 
NAFTA parties.111 More so, in contrast to other treaties, article 1105 makes 
reference to the ‘Minimum Standard of Treatment’ in its heading and refers to 
international law including fair and equitable treatment.112  Most importantly, 
according to article 31 of the VCLT, treaty interpretation requires each treaty to 
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be interpreted within its context and in light of its object and purpose. 
However, the NAFTA treaty interpretation may offer inspiration especially where 
the treaty makes a connection between customary international law and fair and 
equitable treatment.113 As will be discussed in more details below, the United 
States-Rwanda BIT is an example of such an approach. Specifically, the United 
States-Rwanda BIT explicitly mentions that fair and equitable treatment refers 
to the minimum standard. Evidently, when there is an unequivocal reference to 
fair and equitable treatment joined with the minimum standard, NAFTA treaty 
practice may provide guidance. 
4.3 Fair and Equitable Treatment as an Independent 
Standard 
There is considerable support in commentary, arbitral practice and BITs for the 
proposition that fair and equitable treatment is an independent standard that 
goes beyond mere restatement of the international minimum standard.114 
Commentaries taking this view argue that the concept fair and equitable 
treatment should be given its plain meaning.115 According to this approach, when 
BITs include fair and equitable treatment as part of treaty standards, tribunals 
must inquire whether particular treatment accorded to the investor is both fair 
and equitable.116 Treatment will be considered fair when it is free from bias, 
fraud, or injustices and it will be perceived as equitable when it is characterised 
by equity, fairness or reasonableness.117 Proponents of this school of thought 
contend that interpreting fair and equitable treatment following the plain 
meaning approach is consistent with canons of treaty interpretation espoused in 
international law.118 Probably, the leading argument in favour of the plain 
meaning approach is captured in the words of Mann who argues:    
Nothing is gained by introducing the conception of a minimum 
standard and, more than this, it is positively misleading to introduce 
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it. The terms fair and equitable treatment envisage conduct which 
goes far beyond the minimum standard and afford protection to a 
greater extent and according to a much more objective standard than 
any previously employed form of words. A tribunal would not be 
concerned with a minimum standard, maximum standard or average 
standard. It will have to decide whether in all circumstances the 
conduct in issue is fair and equitable or unfair and inequitable. No 
standard defined by other words is likely to be material. The terms 
are to be understood and applied independently and autonomously.119  
From the foregoing, it is worth mentioning that when fair and equitable 
treatment is interpreted as an autonomous treaty standard, investors receive 
the most favourable protection not only as a matter of textual interpretation but 
also because investors are accorded treatment above or beyond the minimum 
standard. In light of these considerations, it is evident that investors would 
prefer fair and equitable treatment to be interpreted as an autonomous treaty 
standard. Moreover, it should be noted that if states intended to limit fair and 
equitable treatment to the minimum standard this would have been referred to 
explicitly rather than using a different expression.120 The consensus from the 
latest UNCTAD study reveals that most states and investors subscribe to the 
theory of fair and equitable treatment not being functionally equivalent to the 
minimum standard.121 This according to this study is even more compelling when 
such a link has not been established.122 The tribunal in Saluka v Czech Republic 
also supported the opinion that when a treaty does not explicitly refer to the 
minimum standard the concept fair and equitable treatment is an autonomous 
standard and tribunals should restrict themselves to the text of the treaty.123 
According to the tribunal the detachment of fair and equitable treatment to the 
minimum standard implies that the concept should be interpreted in light of the 
object and purpose of the treaty.124 Specifically, in interpreting Article 3.2 of 
The Netherlands and Czech Republic BIT, the tribunal noted the following;   
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Whichever the difference between the customary and the treaty 
standards may be, this Tribunal has to limit itself to the interpretation 
of the “fair and equitable treatment” standard as embodied in Article 
3.1 of the Treaty. That Article omits any express reference to the 
customary minimum standard. The interpretation of Article 3.1 does 
not therefore share the difficulties that may arise under treaties (such 
as the NAFTA) which expressly tie the “fair and equitable treatment” 
standard to the customary minimum standard. Avoidance of these 
difficulties may even be regarded as the very purpose of the lack of a 
reference to an international standard in the Treaty. This clearly 
points to the autonomous character of a “fair and equitable 
treatment” standard such as the one laid down in Article 3.1 of the 
Treaty.125 
In support of the plain meaning approach, Dolzer argues that it’s implausible a 
treaty would refer to a well-known concept like the minimum standard of 
treatment in customary international law by using the expression fair and 
equitable treatment.126 According to Dolzer, although fair and equitable 
treatment may overlap with the minimum standard with respect to issues such 
as arbitrary treatment, discrimination and unreasonableness this does not 
automatically incorporate the minimum standard.127 In sum, when fair and 
equitable treatment is invoked the central issue for assessment is whether the 
actions in question are in all circumstances fair and equitable or unfair and 
inequitable.128 The plain meaning approach is without doubt problematic 
because both fairness and equitable treatment are subjective concepts. In 
addition, fairness and equitable are evolving terms essentially what may have 
been unfair in the past might be fair in the present circumstances. Most 
importantly, members of the international community have different 
backgrounds, legal heritages and ideological differences which all make the 
plain meaning approach inherently difficult. For instance, what may be fair and 
equitable in the developed countries may be perceived as unfair in African 
countries. 
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Indeed, the tribunal in LG&E v Argentina recognised this difficult and postulated 
that the concept is of a generic nature and its interpretation varies overtime 
based on the circumstances of each case.129 This according to the tribunal makes 
it difficult to establish fair and equitable treatment as an unequivocal and static 
concept.130 Vasciannie correctly notes that the plain meaning approach does not 
refer to an established body of law or to existing legal precedents.131 Instead the 
plain meaning approach assumes that in each case the key question will be 
whether the state accorded to foreign investors’ fair and equitable treatment 
without reference to any technical understanding of the meaning of fair and 
equitable treatment.132 Although there is adequate support for the plain 
meaning approach, arbitral tribunals have also noted that the minimum standard 
has evolved and the content is substantially similar whether the terms are 
interpreted in their ordinary meaning or in accordance with customary 
international law.133 However, the convergence approach has its own difficulties 
especially where the treaty does not make reference to the minimum 
standard.134 
4.4 Elements of Fair and Equitable in Arbitral Practice 
The jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals has not only concentrated on the 
relationship between the minimum standard and fair and equitable treatment 
but also developed further to distil elements of this broadly construed standard. 
In particular, elements developed through arbitral practice are necessary 
ingredients to interpret fair and equitable treatment especially when the treaty 
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does not contain any reference to the minimum standard or when the treaty 
merely indicates international law or when the treaty is silent on both.  
Given the importance of elements developed in arbitral practice to the 
application and understanding of fair and equitable treatment, it is necessary to 
discuss them first before examining the standard of fair and equitable treatment 
within African treaty practice. Obviously, one must be mindful that the content 
of the standard remains largely unsettled and controversial. Moreover, arbitral 
tribunals apply the elements developed to specific set of facts and 
circumstances which makes it difficult to replicate the principles to new 
cases.135 Nevertheless, different themes have emerged from arbitral practice 
which include inter alia,  (a) the protection of investor’s confidence and 
legitimate expectation, (b) protection against discrimination and arbitrariness, 
(c) transparency, (d) denial of procedural due process and denial of justice, (f) 
the failure to act in good faith.136 The following section reviews the five main 
themes developed in arbitral practice as such a discussion informs and is 
imperative to the understanding of fair and equitable treatment within African 
treaty practice.  
4.4.1 The Protection of Investor Confidence and Legitimate 
Expectation 
The respect of investor’s legitimate expectations is the foundation to ensuring 
that foreign investors receive fair and equitable treatment. The failure to 
honour such expectations will inevitably come at the forefront for any alleged 
violation of fair and equitable treatment. Particularly, it should be stressed that 
when states provide assurances of fair and equitable treatment, presumably 
such states wish to indicate to the international community that foreign 
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investors will receive treatment comparable with some of the main expectations 
of foreign investors.137 Generally, as shown above, the respect of legitimate 
expectations is important because as a matter of practice especially in 
developing countries during the process of attracting foreign investors, 
governments make promises to foreign investors that include inter alia change 
of laws, provision of concessions, and uncompromising good will. As expected, 
investors rely on such government conduct and expressions to make strategic 
investment decisions. To this end therefore, the failure by the host state to 
comply with the expectations once the investment is made makes legitimate 
expectations crucial in the determination of fair and equitable treatment.  
However, it should be stressed that only objective expectations are relevant138 
and even then arbitral tribunals have no mandate to evaluate laws and 
regulations that predate the decision when the investment was made.139 
Significantly, the question for arbitral tribunals is not what the investor 
subjectively expected to happen but what the investor was objectively entitled 
to expect.140 Most importantly, the host state is not responsible for the 
investor’s poor investment decision.141 To this end, it should be stressed that 
when the investor takes on unreasonable risks, or when the risks taken actually 
come to pass, the investor cannot look to the State as guarantor against such 
risks.142 As pointed out in the case of Thunderbird v Mexico; 
The concept of legitimate expectations relates within the context of 
the NAFTA framework, to a situation where a Contracting Party’s 
conduct creates reasonable and justifiable expectations on part of an 
investor (or investment) to act in reliance on said conduct, such that a 
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failure by the NAFTA Party to honour those expectations could cause 
the investor (or investment) to suffer damages. The threshold for 
legitimate expectations may vary depending on the nature of the 
violation alleged under the NAFTA and the circumstances of the 
case….143 
Indeed even outside the context of NAFTA, arbitral tribunals view legitimate 
expectation as a dominant feature to achieving fair and equitable treatment. 
Specifically out of the NAFTA arena, arbitral tribunals have stressed that host 
states must ensure that the business environment is predictable, dependable 
and stable. This was emphasised in CMS v Argentina where the tribunal noted 
that fair and equitable treatment is inseparable from stability and 
predictability.144 According to the tribunal fair and equitable treatment is 
desirable to maintain a stable framework for investment and maximum effective 
use of economic resources.145 This principle has been echoed in subsequent 
tribunals that include inter alia Enron v Argentina Republic,146 PSEG v Turkey,147 
and Parkerings-Compagniet v Lithuania.148  
The stability of the business environment constitutes the core of investor’s 
expectations because investors envisage the legal framework to remain stable 
after the investment has been undertaken.149 This was precisely the issue in 
Occidental Expropriation v Ecuador where the tribunal found that Ecuador had 
mischievously changed the legal framework under which the investment was 
made.150 According to the tribunal, Ecuador deliberately changed the tax law 
without providing clarity about its meaning and also the regulations were 
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inconsistent with Ecuador’s own practice.151 Similarly in LG & E v Argentina, the 
tribunal recognized Argentina’s economic hardships as well as the political and 
social realities which influenced the government’s response to the growing 
economic difficulties.152 On the balance, the tribunal opined that Argentina 
exceeded the threshold through completely dismantling the very legal 
framework constructed to attract foreign investors.153 
Similarly in the case of MTD v Republic of Chile, MTD a Malaysian corporation 
signed a foreign investment contract with the government of Chile to develop a 
real estate project consisting of a self-sufficient satellite city with houses, 
apartments, schools, hospitals, commerce and services (the Project). However, 
the project was halted after the Chilean government informed the investor that 
the project is inconsistent with existing zoning regulations. The tribunal ruled in 
favour of the investor based on the inconsistency of action between two arms of 
the same Government vis-à-vis the same investor.154 According to the tribunal 
although it was the responsibility of MTD to make proper judgment especially 
when investing in unfamiliar environment, Chile was not a passive party to the 
investment process.155 The government had the responsibility to ensure that 
various officials through which Chile functions act coherently.156 In sum, the 
tribunal found that the approval of the investment against the urban policy of 
the government was a breach of the obligation to treat the investor fairly and 
equitably.157 
Also, in ADF Group v United States, the investor argued unsuccessfully that the 
refusal of the United States Department of Transport to apply pre-existing case 
law was a denial of legitimate expectations generated by the case law. 
According to the tribunal any expectations that the investor may have had with 
respect to the relevancy or applicability of the case law was not out of any 
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misleading representations created by government officials.158  From the 
wording of this decision, arbitral tribunals will find host states in breach of 
legitimate expectations when investors are lured to invest on the basis of 
government misleading representations. 
Furthermore, tribunals have noted that investors are entitled to rely on official 
government representations even when such representations are misleading. For 
instance in SPP v Egypt, the respondent argued that representations made by 
government officials were against Egyptian law and should therefore be treated 
as legally non-existent or null and void or susceptible to invalidation. In the 
tribunal’s judgement, whether the representations where legal under Egyptian 
municipal law was irrelevant because they created expectations protected by 
established principles of international law.159 According to the tribunal, the 
actions were cloaked with the mantle of government authority and 
communicated to investors who relied on them to make investment judgements 
therefore the Egyptian government could not claim that the representations 
violated Egyptian law while the representations were deliberately pursued to 
induce investors.160 
4.4.2 The Protection against Discrimination and Arbitrary Conduct 
According to proponents of the plain meaning approach fair and equitable 
treatment is violated if there is unfair discrimination or if investments are 
subjected to arbitrary or capricious treatment.161 Accordingly therefore, fair and 
equitable treatment aims at inherently precluding arbitrary and capricious 
actions against foreign investors.162 In the famous case of ELSI v Italy, although 
not entirely related to fair and equitable treatment, the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) gave content to the meaning of arbitrariness in international law. In 
casu, the issue was whether the requisition measures where arbitrary and 
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discriminatory actions prohibited by Article 1 of the Supplementary Agreement. 
The United States argued that the requisition order prevented Raytheon and 
Machlett from exercising their control and management of ELSI which resulted in 
the impairment of their legally acquired rights and interests. 
On the basis of the foregoing facts, the ICJ examined whether the requisition 
order constituted arbitrary and discriminatory treatment prohibited under 
international law. The ICJ stressed that unlawful acts under municipal law do 
not necessarily amount to breach of international law.163 According to the ICJ 
the findings of domestic courts may be relevant to the argument of unlawfulness 
but this by and in itself without further evidence of unlawfulness cannot be said 
to amount to arbitrariness.164 In essence according to the ICJ, it does not follow 
from a finding by the municipal courts that an act was unjustified, or 
unreasonable, or arbitrary, that the act simultaneously becomes characterised 
as arbitrary in international law.165 However, the qualification given to the 
impugned act by a municipal authority may be an invaluable indication and 
persuasive.166 Finally, the ICJ was of the view that arbitrariness ‘‘is not so much 
something opposed to a rule of law…It is wilful disregard of due process of law, 
an act that shocks, or at least surprises a sense of judicial propriety’’.167 
More recently, the tribunal in LG &E v Argentina examined whether forced 
renegotiation of licensees violated the standard of fair and equitable treatment. 
The claimant argued that Argentina deliberately adopted measures which 
discriminated against foreign investors. According to the claimant, the 
government subjected most of the privatised public-utility sector to the least 
favourable of the several regimes devised for the conversion of dollar obligation 
into pesos.168 In addition, the claimant opined that the standard of what 
constitutes an arbitrary act is a disregard for the rule of law.169 On this premise, 
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the claimant argued that the government  ‘‘acted under the trappings of laws, 
decrees, resolution, regulations and court decisions, but by wilfully repudiating 
the commitments it made to the gas distribution licensees and their 
shareholders, the Government followed ‘the rule of power, not the rule of 
law’’.170 However, the tribunal disputed this reasoning because the charges 
imposed by Argentina though unfair and inequitable were the result of reasoned 
judgement rather than simple disregard of the rule of law.171 
It follows from this case and as correctly observed by Tudor, host states actions 
will only amount to arbitrariness when government decisions are taken in 
violation of the law or are at least not grounded on a legal basis.172 In essence, 
throughout the investment duration, investors expect the behaviour of host 
states to remain consistent and grounded in the rule of law.173 For instance in 
Lauder v Czech Republic, the tribunal found the conduct of Czech Republic 
Media Council arbitrary and breached the contractual relationship between the 
investor and broadcaster.174 According to the tribunal, the actions of the Media 
Council were motivated out of fear for political implications emanating from a 
foreign investor influencing Czech television broadcasts.175 The tribunal 
emphasised that conduct which is arbitrary or discriminatory violates the 
standard of fair and equitable treatment.176 Similarly, the tribunal in CMS v 
Argentina indicated that measures which involve arbitrariness and discrimination 
are contrary to fair and equitable treatment.177 Accordingly, conduct that is 
arbitrary and discriminates against foreign investors is considered prima facie 
breach of the standard of fair and equitable treatment. It therefore follows that 
when a host state imposes measures considered as arbitrary and discriminatory 
such measures will inevitably violate the standard of fair and equitable 
treatment. However, as pointed out by the ICJ for such discriminatory conduct 
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to reaches the threshold of international law there must be; (i) an intentional 
treatment, (ii) in favour of a national, (iii) against a foreign investor, (iv) that is 
not taken under similar circumstances against another national.178 
4.4.3 Transparency 
Transparency is considered an important component of fair and equitable 
treatment because it guarantees legal certainty. In essence, transparency in 
government decisions ensures that investors are left without doubt about the 
law applicable at a given time, in a given area thus making it possible for 
investors to know whether certain acts or conduct are lawful or unlawful.179 
Particularly, the principle of transparency requires that the legal framework 
affecting foreign investor’s operations should be readily apparent and decisions 
affecting the investor’s enterprise should be traceable to that legal 
framework.180  As noted by the recent UNCTAD, ‘‘if laws, administrative 
decisions and other binding decisions are to be imposed upon a foreign investor 
by a host state, then fairness requires that the investor is informed about such 
decisions before they are imposed’’.181  
It should be stressed that although transparency forms part of fair and 
equitable, the two concepts overlap. In other words, if an investment treaty 
does not explicitly provide for transparency but does include fair and equitable 
treatment then implicitly transparency forms part of the treaty.182 Most 
importantly, as a practical matter when an investor pursues action based on fair 
and equitable treatment, arbitral tribunals are inclined to examine the degree 
of transparency in the regulatory environment.183 This gives tribunals the scope 
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and framework within which to assess whether an investor has received fair and 
equitable treatment in any given case.184 
Within the context of investment arbitration, arbitral tribunals have confirmed 
transparency as an integral part of fair and equitable treatment. In Metalclad v 
Mexico, transparency was understood ‘‘to include the idea that all relevant legal 
requirements for the purpose of initiating, completing and successfully operating 
investments made, or intended to be made, under the Agreement should be 
capable of being readily known to all affected investors of another Party’’.185 In 
casu, the federal officials reassured Metalclad that if it applied for a municipal 
construction permit, the Municipality would have no cause to deny the permit. 
However, shortly after construction commenced, the Governor out of political 
pressure embarked on a public campaign to denounce and prevent the operation 
of the landfill. In finding a violation of fair and equitable treatment, the tribunal 
opined;  
The absence of a clear rule as to the requirement or not of a 
municipal construction permit, as well as the absence of any 
established practice or procedure as to the manner of handling 
applications for a municipal construction permit, amounts to a failure 
on the part of Mexico to ensure the transparency required by 
NAFTA.186 
Obviously, investors cannot expect that circumstances prevailing at the time of 
the investment will remain totally unchanged during the course of the 
investment. However, as pointed out by the tribunal in PSG v Turkey, 
particularly in complex negotiations, host states are expected to proceed with 
greater transparency and discuss any intended changes openly.187 The facts of 
this case involved a continuous change in the conditions governing the corporate 
status of the Project as well as constant alternation between private law status 
and administrative concessions. In casu, the tribunal recognised that in complex 
negotiations many changes will occur beyond the control of the government but 
the longer term outlook must not be altered in such a way that there will end up 
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being no outlook at all.188 The tribunal upheld the claimant’s contention that the 
abuse of regulatory power ultimately resulted in the termination of the Project 
through a process characterized by a total lack of transparency and candour.189  
In arriving at this conclusion the tribunal noted that there was ‘‘a cumulative 
lack of transparency close to negligence, compounded by the fact that various 
witnesses admitted not having read key documents or taken appropriate action 
on them for long periods’’.190 
Similarly, in Tecmed v Mexico, the tribunal noted that the manner in which non-
renewal of the licence occurred was totally lacking in transparency.  According 
to the tribunal, the lack of transparency in the behaviour leading up to the non-
renewal did not reflect the reasons that led to the non-renewal of the permit.191 
More so, the ambiguity of government actions was even greater when it resorted 
to non-renewal of the permit to overcome obstacles not related to the 
preservation of health and environment.192 The tribunal further noted that the 
lack of transparency within government operations did not permit the investor to 
adopt behaviour to prevent the non-renewal of the permit.193 According to the 
tribunal the conduct of Mexico amounted to a breach of fair and equitable 
treatment because the standard requires host states to act in a consistent 
manner, free from ambiguity and;  
…totally transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so 
that it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations that 
will govern its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant 
policies and administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan 
its investment and comply with such regulations.194 
From the foregoing, it should be noted that the principle of transparency is an 
objective test based on the given context and the surrounding circumstances. 
Specifically, in determining whether government measures are transparent, 
arbitral tribunals have the discretion to determine whether the disputable 
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conduct, omission or commission amounts to a failure by the host state to act in 
a transparent and consistent manner. As the cases above have demonstrated the 
essence of transparency is to enhance predictability in the relationship between 
host state and investors. Evidently, without a stable and predictable business 
environment investors would be held at ransom by host states. But most 
importantly, the objective of investment treaties would be unattainable without 
the reassurance that the host state is acting in a transparent and consistent 
manner. Thomas Waide accurately notes that an equitable investment climate 
requires the host state not to hide behind inconsistencies or different 
interpretations of the laws by government officials to the detriment of 
investors.195 Evidently, from the preceding discussion, the failure by the host 
state to act in a transparent and predicable manner will inevitably be the most 
fraught element of fair and equitable treatment. 
4.4.4 Denial of Procedural Due Process and Denial of Justice 
The right to both substantive and procedural fairness are elementary principles 
of the rule of law and vital elements of fair and equitable treatment.196 
Procedural due process and denial of justice are grounded in arbitral practice as 
cardinal requirements for an inquiry whether investors have been treated fairly 
and equitably.197 Specifically, the inquiry examines whether the investor was 
given a fair hearing before an independent tribunal, whether the investor was 
given specific information in advance of the hearing of the claim and whether 
there was a reasonable disposition of the investor’s case.198 The lack of due 
process embodies a process that leads to an outcome which offends judicial 
propriety ‘‘such as a manifest failure of natural justice in judicial proceedings or 
a complete lack of transparency and candour in administrative process’’.199 A 
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number of arbitral cases are illustrative, for instance in Metalclad, the tribunal 
found a lack of procedural fairness in the process leading up to denial of the 
construction permit. Particularly, the tribunal upheld a violation of fair and 
equitable treatment because ‘‘Metalclad was not notified of the Town Council 
meeting where the permit application was discussed and rejected, nor was 
Metalclad given any opportunity to participate in that process’’.200 Furthermore, 
the tribunal found that Metalclad’s request for reconsideration of the denial of 
the permit was rejected without cause and the denial was without any reference 
to Metalclad’s flaws in conduct or failure to comply with rules and regulations.201  
Similarly, in Middle East Cement v Arab Republic of Egypt, the tribunal reasoned 
that the manner in which the claimant’s ship was auctioned cannot be said to 
have taken place in a process that respected due process.202 Specifically, the 
tribunal found the auction procedure and notification process did not comply 
with due process of law as envisaged in Article 4 of the BIT.203 According to the 
tribunal, the respondent was in violation of fair and equitable treatment by 
failing to directly communicate with the claimant about the seizure and 
auctioning of his ship.204 Also, the auctioning was in bad faith and failed to 
provide certain information relevant for the evaluation of the ship such as the 
name of the debtor and the existence of cranes and other equipment on the 
ship.205 On the basis of these facts, the tribunal found there was lack of due 
process because the auction price cannot be said to have been an indication of 
the market value of the ship. 
Evidently, when there are flaws in procedural fairness, the investor is inevitably 
denied justice. However, it should be stressed that there is a thin line between 
denial of justice and procedural fairness because substantively state conduct 
leading to violation is similar. Denial of justice broadly refers to ‘‘injury 
consisting of, or resulting from, denial of access to courts, or denial of 
procedural fairness and due process in relation to judicial proceedings, whether 
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criminal or civil’’.206 Specifically, within investor-state arbitration, denial of 
justice and procedural fairness are synonymous and both encapsulate a violation 
of fair and equitable treatment. In sum, as demonstrated by the cases above, 
fair and equitable treatment is breached when the host state through actions or 
omissions denies an investor due process, justice, and procedural fairness. 
4.4.5 The Failure to Act in Good Faith 
Under normal circumstances, the relationship between host states and foreign 
investors is supposed to be based on good faith. Foreign investors expect the 
host state to abide by well-established fundamental standards such as good 
faith, due process and non-discrimination.207  On this premise, host states bound 
by the obligation of fair and equitable treatment are expected to act in good 
faith throughout the investment process.208 Although the principle of good faith 
has been alluded to in arbitral practice, there has not been a single case decided 
solely on the basis that the host state acted in bad faith. Practically, arbitral 
tribunals have found the customary standard of good faith is of negligible 
assistance in the task of giving content to the standard of fair and equitable 
treatment.209 Obviously, this is not only because it is difficult for investors to 
show that the host state acted in bad fair but also tribunals can rely on different 
components of fair and equitable treatment to achieve the same result.210 
Moreover, deference is accorded to host states to determine in good faith 
national policy regulating foreign investors.211 
Furthermore, deciding whether government authorities acted in bad faith is 
subjective and tantamount to interfering with sovereignty.212 Indeed, this is why 
arbitral tribunals and commentators support the view that bad faith or malicious 
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intention is not an essential element of unfair and inequitable treatment.213 As 
underscored by the tribunal in Tecmed v Mexico, bad faith is not required for 
the violation of fair and equitable treatment what is unfair or inequitable need 
not equate with the outrageous or the egregious.214 In particular, a state may 
treat a foreign investor unfairly and inequitably without necessarily acting in bad 
faith.215 The principle of good faith only requires governments to provide foreign 
investors treatment that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken 
into account by the foreign investor while making the investment decision.216 
Indeed, when the government sufficiently shows that it acted in good faith to 
achieve the objectives of its laws and regulations, this acts as a counterbalance 
to instances of disregard of legal or regulatory requirements.217 
4.5 The Standard of Fair and Equitable Treatment in 
African Investment Treaty Practice 
Virtually, all BITs concluded by African countries contain the provision of fair 
and equitable treatment.218 However, there are a number of significant 
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variations in the way the standard is articulated in the various African treaties. 
For instance, in some African BITs, the standard is not defined while in other 
African BITs the standard is qualified by reference to other treaty standards, 
general international law, international law or domestic law.219 Given the 
formulation of African BITs, the question about whether fair and equitable 
treatment forms part of the minimum standard or whether it is an autonomous 
standard is equally relevant to African countries. Particularly, within the African 
context, this debate is compelling considering the vast number of African BITs 
which have not linked fair and equitable treatment to the minimum standard.220 
Furthermore, throughout the history of the minimum standard, the standard has 
faced firm resistance from African countries suggesting therefore the minimum 
standard cannot be said to have fully crystallised into the status of customary 
international law. Specifically, assuming the minimum standard of treatment as 
part of customary international would be detrimental for African countries that 
have not included provisions of fair and equitable treatment in their BITs.221 On 
the basis of foregoing discussion, the following section extensively assesses the 
obligation of fair and equitable treatment as articulated in African BITs. 
4.5.1 The Location of Fair and Equitable Treatment in African BITs 
Before situating the practice of African states with respect to fair and equitable 
treatment, some preliminary remarks about the location of fair and equitable 
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treatment are important. At the onset, it should be stressed that the standard of 
fair and equitable treatment serves as a gap filler to ensure that investors obtain 
the level of investment protection that might have been forgotten in the more 
specific standards.222 In addition, the location and place of fair and equitable 
treatment within the treaty demonstrates the nature of its binding effect.223 For 
instance, when it is located only in the preamble this suggests that the standard 
has a hortatory effect and does not create legal obligations for the parties.224 On 
the other hand, when it is expressed both in the preamble and other substantive 
parts of the treaty this suggests the standard is a binding legal obligation.225 This 
is reinforced when fair and equitable treatment is combined with other treaty 
standards such as full protection and security this suggests greater protection for 
investors than when the standard is a stand-alone.226  
The vast majority of African BITs include fair and equitable treatment as a 
substantive treaty standard encapsulated either under the heading of 
‘protection and promotion of investment’ or under the heading of ‘treatment of 
investors’.227  Furthermore, African BITs normally provide for fair and equitable 
treatment in conjunction with full protection and security and  typically 
majority of African BITs stipulate that investors ‘shall at all times be accorded 
fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy full protection and security’.228  
However, it should also be stressed that there are a number of African BITs 
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where fair and equitable treatment is a stand-alone.229  In African treaties when 
fair and equitable treatment is expressed as a stand-alone, the standard is 
usually not accompanied with any other treaty obligation.230 Furthermore, there 
are also instance where the standard appears both in the provisions of 
‘protection and promotion’ as well as in the provision of ‘treatment of investors’ 
It should also be noted that in virtually all African BITs, the standard of fair and 
equitable treatment rarely appears in the preamble. In essence, the trend in the 
vast majority of African BITs is either to include fair and equitable treatment in 
juxtaposition with full protection and security or as a stand-alone and 
exceptionally not to include the standard at all. Essentially, for African treaties 
that have included fair and equitable treatment as part of the substantive rights 
there is no doubt that the standard is part of the substantive treaty obligations 
and legally binding.231 
Quite apart from the location, in African BITs the terminology of the standard 
slightly varies between the concepts of fair and equitable treatment and 
equitable treatment.232 However, the prevalent trend among African BITs 
favours the use of fair and equitable treatment rather than equitable 
treatment.233 Obviously theoretically, there might be differences between the 
two adjectives as well as the extent of protection but undoubtedly this remains 
at a theoretical level and is not supported by the majority of commentators.234 
There is considerable consensus among commentators that ‘‘the variation in 
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form of words seems to be of no great importance’’.235 Given the broadness 
between the two adjectives, the majority view holds weight for African treaty 
practice as well.  
Aside from this, there has been discussion whether fair and equitable treatment 
represents more than one standard.236 In the view of the present author given 
the wording of fair and equitable treatment in African BITs such a distinction is 
moot and logically unpersuasive. Dolzer uses an interesting analogy noting that 
there are some terms that are usually lumped together such that no distinction 
is needed.237 For instance according to Dolzer, we do not distinguish when we 
talk about law and order because this is reflective of a certain position.238 From 
this analogy, he suggests that equally, the term fair and equitable treatment has 
been lumped together to constitute one concept and this is reflected in arbitral 
practice whereby no arbitral tribunal ever asks whether ‘is it fair and is it 
equitable’.239 Within African treaty practice, it is submitted that undoubtedly 
African states clearly intended fair and equitable treatment to represent one 
single and unified standard. Presumably, if African states perceived the standard 
as representing two standards this would have been explicitly indicated. 
Evidently without such indication, it would be implausible to argue that fair and 
equitable treatment under African treaty practice represents more than one 
standard. 
4.5.2 African BITs Making No Reference to Fair and Equitable 
Treatment 
As stressed above, although most African BITs contain the standard of fair and 
equitable treatment, there are some exceptions. Particularly, exceptional 
African BITs that do not make reference to fair and equitable treatment include 
the Ghana-Romania BIT and the China-Ghana BIT as well as the Malaysia-Ghana 
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that simply make reference to equitable treatment.  Specifically in the Ghana-
Romania BIT there is no provision requiring the parties to accord fair and 
equitable treatment to foreign investors. From the wording of the Ghana-
Romania BIT, it seems the omission of fair and equitable treatment is deliberate 
considering that Ghana has generally included the standard in the majority of its 
existing treaties. However, whatever the reasons for the omission or reference 
to equitable treatment rather than fair and equitable treatment this reinforces 
the view that fair and equitable treatment is an independent treaty standard.   
Particularly, this reinforces the view that the standard is included in treaties at 
the discretion of contracting states which choose from the plenty of variations or 
deliberately omit the entire standard.240 With this in mind, it is therefore 
important to interpret the standard of fair and equitable treatment as contained 
in the treaty so as to accord with the intention of contracting states explicitly 
stipulated in the treaty. Specifically, for African BITs that have not included fair 
and equitable treatment as part of the substantive treaty rights, investors should 
not expect treatment in accordance with this standard. Equally, arbitral 
tribunals should not dubiously include fair and equitable treatment through the 
backdoor of the minimum standard.241 The minimum standard on its own account 
is controversial while state practice suggests that fair and equitable treatment 
has never been fully accepted as part of customary international law.242 
Evidently, as seen above, including the minimum standard as part of fair and 
equitable treatment would be inconsistent with the intention of African states 
that have chosen not to include the standard in respective BITs. 
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4.5.3 Fair and Equitable Treatment in African BITs without 
Reference to International Law 
The majority of African BITs include the obligation of fair and equitable 
treatment without reference to international law or any other body of law.243 It 
should be stressed that this is the trend both in treaties signed between African 
countries themselves and with traditional capital exporting states.244 Moreover, 
the same trend is followed in treaties signed between African countries and 
other developing countries.245 Typically, in nearly all African BITs, the standard 
of fair and equitable treatment simply reads as follows, ‘‘investment of 
nationals and companies of each Contracting Party shall at all times be accorded 
fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy full and adequate protection and 
security in the territory of the other Contracting Party’’.246 
Whether fair and equitable treatment represents an autonomous standard or is 
simply equivalent to the minimum standard will likely generate many 
disagreements in the interpretation of African BITs. This is mainly because fair 
and equitable treatment as expressed in majority of African BITs does not make 
reference to international law. Although there have not been many arbitral 
cases interpreting the scope of fair and equivalent treatment within African 
treaty practice, the most recent case of Biwater v Tanzania is illustrative. This 
case is particularly important because the arbitral tribunal gave content to the 
typical formulation of fair and equitable treatment found in majority of African 
treaties. Specifically, the tribunal interpreted article 2 (2) of the United 
Kingdom-Tanzania BIT which contains the obligation of fair and equitable 
treatment without reference to either international law or customary 
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international law. In casu, the claimant and respondent disagreed on the 
meaning of fair and equitable treatment as stipulated in the United Kingdom-
Tanzania BIT. The claimant was of the view that the obligation was an 
autonomous treaty standard while the respondent contended that the obligation 
meant no more than the minimum standard.  
In response, the tribunal pointed out that caution must be exercised in any 
generalized statement about the nature of fair and equitable treatment since 
the standard finds different expression in different treaties.247 Specifically, with 
reference to Article 2(2) of the Tanzania-UK BIT the tribunal acknowledged that 
the contracting states intended fair and equitable treatment to be an 
autonomous standard even though the content of the standard is not materially 
different from the content of the minimum standard.248 The tribunal concurred 
with the view expressed by Professor Schreuer that ‘‘if the parties to a treaty 
want to refer to customary international law, it must be presumed that they will 
refer to it as such rather than using a different expression’’.249 The tribunal 
observed that the standard is not defined in the BIT which gives it much latitude 
to determine whether in all the circumstances the conduct at issue is fair and 
equitable or unfair and inequitable.250  On this basis, the tribunal noted that it 
has discretionary powers to explore the range of principles necessary to achieve 
the objectives and purpose of the BIT in accordance with the treaty standard.251 
Accordingly, this requires the tribunal to examine the entire conduct of the 
respondent in accordance with relevant components of fair and equitable 
treatment such as protection of legitimate expectations, good faith, 
transparency, constituency and non-discrimination.252  
From the foregoing, the tribunal noted that although the claimant had a poor 
record and despite the public criticism, the claimant still had the right to proper 
and unhindered performance of the contractual termination process.253 In the 
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tribunal’s view unwarranted interference could not be said to follow the normal 
contractual course and cannot be said to have complied with the standard of fair 
and equitable treatment.254 The approach in Biwater will inevitably be of 
persuasive value to future tribunals applying fair and equitable treatment within 
the Africa treaty setting because the majority of African BITs do not make 
reference to either the minimum standard of treatment or international law. 
The conclusion reached by the tribunal is laudable because the tribunal aptly 
acknowledged that the parties intended fair and equitable treatment to 
constitute an autonomous standard. This approach is in line with findings of 
similar cases discussed above and also conforms to the rules of interpretation 
stipulated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.255 
Further, with all the resistance mounted by developing countries towards the 
minimum standard, it is doubtful African states would refer to the minimum 
standard by using the expression fair and equitable treatment.256 In addition, the 
fact that the majority of African states do not make reference to the minimum 
standard clearly shows the intention in African BITs is to make fair and equitable 
treatment an autonomous treaty standard. Manifestly, if African countries 
intended the minimum standard to be equivalent to fair and equitable treatment 
this would either have been plainly mentioned or implicitly stated in the wording 
of the BITs. Since this is not the case, one can reasonably state that majority of 
African countries do not consider the international minimum standard as 
equivalent to fair and equitable treatment. In other words, the standard of fair 
and equitable treatment as stipulated in African BITs squarely represents an 
autonomous treaty standard. Obviously, as arbitral tribunal have pointed out 
differences between the treaty standard of fair and equitable treatment and the 
minimum standard of treatment may be more apparent than real.257 
Notwithstanding this, it is important to stress that in contrast to the minimum 
standard, fair and equitable treatment is an elastic and flexible standard which 
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can be adjusted to cover several situations not envisioned by the minimum 
standard.258 
4.5.4 Fair and Equitable Treatment in African BITs with Reference 
to International Law 
As mentioned above, although majority of fair and equitable treatment 
provisions in African BITs do not make reference to international law, there are 
a few exceptions. The language of these provisions deserves scrutiny especially 
because the provisions suggest that the treatment is not restricted to the 
minimum standard.  For instance article 2(4) of the United States-Congo BIT 
reads;  
Investments of nationals and companies of either Party shall at all 
times be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy 
protection and security in the territory of the other Party. The 
treatment, protection and security of investment shall be in 
accordance with applicable national laws, and may not be less than 
that recognized by international law (emphasis added).259 
Although article 2(4) of the United States-Congo BIT pairs fair and equitable 
treatment parallel to national law the clause incorporates international law as 
the threshold. Particularly, a proper reading of this clause suggests that foreign 
investors are to be accorded treatment conforming with national law but not 
below that recognised under international law. To my mind, this is a broad 
provision and equivalent to construing fair and equitable treatment as an 
autonomous standard. Specifically, this is chiefly because the scope of 
international law is broad and not restricted to the minimum standard. Coupled 
with this a breach of international law may not necessarily be decisive in 
determining whether investors have been denied fair and equitable 
treatment.260  In essence, to achieve the objectives of article 2(4) of the United 
States-Congo BIT, a tribunal would have to examine whether there has been 
protection of legitimate expectation, protection against discrimination and 
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arbitrariness, transparency, denial of procedural due process and the failure to 
act in good faith.261 The standard of fair and equitable treatment in article 4(2) 
of the United States-Congo BIT is closely similar to article 2(2) of the Finland-
Tanzania BIT which stipulates that:  
Each Contracting state shall in its territory accord to investment and 
returns of investment of investors of the other contracting party fair 
and equitable treatment and full protection and security. In no case 
shall a party accord treatment less favourable than that required by 
international law (emphasis added).262 
From the foregoing, it is evident that reference to international law under the 
mentioned African BITs clearly suggests that foreign investors should receive 
treatment beyond domestic law and the minimum standard. In essence, any 
treatment below national treatment breaches fair and equitable treatment and 
any treatment above national treatment but below international law also 
breaches fair and equitable treatment. Manifestly, reference to international 
law without qualification implies that fair and equitable treatment under the 
above African BITs cannot be equated to the minimum standard. Put differently, 
reference to international law as stipulated in the above African BITs simply 
means foreign investors are accorded treatment above that required by the 
minimum standard. More succinctly the tribunal in Azurix v Argentina 
interpreting a similar phrase noted that the purpose of a sentence providing for 
treatment no less than that required by international law ‘‘sets a floor, not a 
ceiling, in order to avoid a possible interpretation of these standards below what 
is required by international law’’.263 
4.4.5 Fair and Equitable Treatment in African BITs with Reference 
to the Minimum Standard 
The United States-Rwanda BIT supports the view that fair and equitable 
treatment and the minimum standard are functionally equivalent. This BIT is 
indeed rare among African BITs because of the explicit reference to the 
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minimum standard. Article 5 of the United States-Rwanda BIT including its 
heading reads as follows;   
Article 5: Minimum Standard of Treatment  
Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in 
accordance with customary international law, including fair and 
equitable treatment and full protection and security.264 
Article 5 further provides that fair and equitable treatment does not go 
beyond the minimum standard.  In the words of article 5 (2); 
For greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary 
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the 
minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to covered 
investments. The concepts of "fair and equitable treatment" and "full 
protection and security" do not require treatment in addition to or 
beyond that which is required by that standard, and do not create 
additional substantive rights (emphasis added).265 
To be sure, article 5 even goes further to articulate the substantive content of 
fair and equitable treatment. Specifically article 5 points out that fair and 
equitable treatment includes ‘‘the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, 
civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the 
principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the 
world’’.266 Through the use of an annex, the United States-Rwanda BIT also 
defines the scope of the minimum standard to include all customary 
international law principles that protect the economic rights and interests of 
aliens. Particularly, article 5 of the United States-Rwanda BIT clearly indicates 
that the parties intended fair and equitable treatment not to exceed the 
minimum standard. In essence, as compared to other African BITs which contain 
an autonomous standard, the United States-Rwanda BIT explicitly limits the 
interpretation of fair and equitable treatment to the minimum standard. 
Moreover, such limitation to the minimum standard is reflective in the heading 
titled the ‘minimum standard of treatment’ as well as deducible from the 
wording of the text itself. Essentially, the treaty explicitly makes it clear that 
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fair and equitable treatment basically means the minimum standard removing 
any doubt about the scope of the standard. Unlike other African BITs, the United 
States-Rwanda BIT articulates the relationship between fair and equitable 
treatment and the minimum standard. 
From the preceding discussion, considering that the United States-Rwanda BIT is 
unambiguously worded, it would be implausible especially since the intention of 
contracting states is clear to argue that the standard of fair and equitable 
treatment has an autonomous character. Comparatively, the wording is similar 
to that of NAFTA and the United States Model BIT. Interestingly, unlike other 
African BITs, the provision of fair and equitable treatment in the United States-
Rwanda BIT mirrors the authoritative interpretation issued by the FTC. The 
obligation of fair and equitable treatment in the United States-Rwanda BIT may 
have followed this format for the following reasons; the United States on the 
basis of its experience in NAFTA may have wanted to limit the discretion of 
arbitral tribunals by imposing a strict interpretation of fair and equitable 
treatment so as to limit ambiguity.267 At a policy level Rwanda may have 
envisioned that concluding a treaty with the United States may attract foreign 
capital into Rwanda and therefore easily subscribed to the United States Model 
BIT. Indeed, through restricting discretionary interpretation, the United States-
Rwanda BIT ensures that arbitral tribunals limit the obligation of fair and 
equitable treatment to the minimum standard and constrains the expansive 
interpretation of customary norms. The unambiguous reference to the minimum 
standard is particularly important considering that it is ‘‘often difficult in 
international practice to establish at what point obligations accepted in treaties, 
multilateral or bilateral, come to condition the content of a rule of customary 
international law binding on States not party to those treaties’’.268 
As a result of the striking similarities between the United States-Rwanda BIT, the 
jurisprudence developed within NAFTA arbitral practice has persuasive value in 
the interpretation of the United States-Rwanda BIT. Particularly, two issues are 
of fundamental importance, the content of the minimum standard and the 
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threshold of fair and equitable treatment. Arbitral practice states that the 
threshold of violating fair and equitable treatment under NAFTA arbitral practice 
is high.269 Also, it is generally accepted that for conduct to constitute treatment 
below the international minimum standard such treatment should ‘‘include acts 
showing a wilful neglect of duty, an insufficiency of action falling below 
international standards, or even subjective bad faith’’.270 However, it should be 
stressed that both customary international law and the minimum standard of 
treatment it incorporates are constantly in the process of development.271 
Furthermore, it should be stated that when fair and equitable treatment is 
restricted to the minimum standard, investors cannot claim treatment above the 
minimum standard.272 
For instance, in Mondev International v United States, Canada suggested the 
meaning of the minimum standard in customary international law is that laid 
down by the Neer case and other related cases.273 This position was however 
rejected because according to the tribunal there is insufficient reason for 
assuming the provisions of BITs and NAFTA while incorporating Neer principles 
are confined to the Neer standard of outrageous treatment.274 In the tribunal’s 
view the minimum standard has an evolutionally character and the parties would 
not have frozen fair and equitable treatment to the Neer principles.275 The 
tribunal then examined treatment accorded to the investor to assess whether 
there was denial of justice. In the tribunal’s view for state conduct to constitute 
a violation of the standard, the question to ask ‘‘is whether, at an international 
level and having regard to generally accepted standards of the administration of 
justice, a tribunal can conclude in the light of all the available facts that the 
impugned decision was clearly improper and discreditable’’.276 The tribunal 
further noted that tribunals do not have an unfettered discretion to decide for 
themselves, on a subjective basis, what was fair or equitable in the 
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circumstances but they are bound by the minimum standard as established in 
State practice and in the jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals.277 
Similarly, in Waste Management v Mexico following the lead in SD Myers, 
Mondev, ADF and Loewen, the tribunal acknowledged a general standard of fair 
and equitable treatment emerging under NAFTA. In the view of the tribunal, the 
general standard suggests that at a minimum fair and equitable treatment is 
infringed if the state conduct is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic 
and exposes the claimant to sectional or racial prejudice, or involves a lack of 
due process leading to an outcome which offends judicial propriety.278 According 
to the tribunal a manifest failure of natural justice in judicial proceedings or a 
complete lack of transparency and candour in an administrative process would 
breach the standard of fair and equitable treatment.279 Taken as a whole, the 
jurisprudence supports the view that fair and equitable treatment is equivalent 
to the minimum standard but with an evolutionary character and not frozen to 
the Neer principles.  
Unlike other African BITs, the provisions of fair and equitable treatment in the 
United States-Rwanda BIT are the most detailed and extensive. Although the 
meaning of fair and equitable treatment is not defined the standard to a large 
extent is clearer than most other African BITs. As mentioned above, restricting 
fair and equitable treatment to the minimum standard limits arbitral tribunals 
from second guessing the intention of state parties. The standard as articulated 
in the United States-Rwanda BIT could serve as a model for African countries 
interested in limiting the scope of fair and equitable treatment. Having said 
that, acceptance of the minimum standard in the United States-Rwanda BIT 
demonstrates changing attitudes towards the minimum standard and general 
international law by African countries. In addition, the fact that African states 
support the minimum standard both in arbitral practice and in treaties may be 
an indication that the minimum standard of treatment has attained the status of 
a customary norm.280 At least the position in the United States-Rwanda BIT 
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seems to support the conclusion that as far as Rwanda and the United States are 
concerned reservations about the existence of the minimum standard of 
treatment as part of customary international law are closed.281 This view is also 
echoed in the Biwater case where Tanzania contended that fair and equitable 
treatment is no more than the customary international minimum standard.282  
Obviously, caution should be exercised when defining the content of the 
minimum standard in large measure because the standard is inherently 
controversial but also the substance of the standard remains difficult to 
articulate. 
4.5.6 Fair and Equitable Treatment in African BITs Combined with 
Full Protection and Security 
The majority of African BITs combine the standard of fair and equitable 
treatment with the obligation of full protection and security.283 Generally, the 
assurance of full protection and security originates in the United States 
customary international law treaty practice developed in the early FCN 
treaties.284 Originally, the obligation was understood as the exercise of 
regulatory power but has subsequently developed to encompass protecting 
stability of the investment.285  For instance in Biwater the tribunal started that 
the content of full protection may extend to matters other than physical 
security.286 According to the tribunal, the obligation includes a state’s guarantee 
of conducting business in stable and secure environment covering both physical 
and commercial aspects.287 Similarly, the arbitral tribunal in Azurix v Argentina 
supported the view that full protection and security goes beyond protection and 
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security safeguarded by the police and includes a secure investment 
environment which is critical for the investor’s overall protection.288 The 
combined use of full protection and security and fair and equitable treatment in 
African BITs, typically follows the approach in the Ghana-Benin BIT which read 
as follows;  
Investments of nationals and companies of each Contracting Party 
shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall 
enjoy full and adequate protection and security in the territory of the 
other Contracting Party.289 
It should be stressed that for African treaties combining fair and equitable 
treatment with the obligation of full protection and security, the pattern is the 
same whether treaties are between African states themselves or between 
African states and other developing countries and also between African states 
and developed countries.290 Usually, the provision is qualified with adjectives 
such as ‘full protection’,291 ‘full and adequate protection’,292 ‘and adequate 
protection’.293 However, it should be stressed that not all African BITs follow the 
obligation of protection and security with qualifying adjectives. For instance, 
the United States-Congo BIT reads as follows, ‘‘investments of nationals and 
companies of either Party shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable 
treatment and shall enjoy protection and security in the territory of the other 
Party’’.294 A quick glance at the jurisprudence suggests that opinion remains 
divided whether substantively there is a difference in protection between 
treaties incorporating the adjective ‘full protection’ and those that do not 
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contain the adjective. For instance, the tribunal in Parkerings reasoned that the 
variation in language between the formulation ‘protection’ and ‘full protection’ 
does not make a difference in the level of protection a state is required to 
provide.295 However, other cases reaffirm the view that when qualifies are 
added, the scope of obligation extends beyond physical security. For example 
the tribunal in Azurix v Argentina was of the view that “when the terms 
‘protection and security’ are qualified by ‘full’ and no other adjective or 
explanation is provided, they extend, in their ordinary meaning the content of 
this standard beyond physical security”.296 Conversely, if the adjective ‘full’ is 
not added, the protection is restricted to physical security and protection.297 
This position is also supported in Biwater where the tribunal viewed full 
protection and security as extending to actions by organs and representatives of 
the State and not limited to a State’s failure to prevent actions by third 
parties.298 Another question that frequently arises is the relationship between 
‘full protection’ and the obligation of fair and equitable treatment.299 The 
practice in arbitral tribunals has often resulted in merging the two standards 
especially when the obligation is qualified with ‘full protection and security’.300 
Most importantly, it would be difficult to find a violation of fair and equitable 
treatment that does not inevitably lead to a breach of ‘full protection and 
security’. However, even though some tribunals have separated the two 
standards,301 there is a growing trend towards equating full protection and 
security to the obligation of fair and equitable treatment.302 
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4.5.7 Fair and Equitable Treatment in African BITs Combined with 
Unreasonable and Discriminatory Measures 
There are a few African BITs that link the standard of fair and equitable 
treatment to the prohibition of unreasonable and discriminatory measures.303 In 
these African BITs, the threshold of unreasonable and discriminatory measures 
seems higher than the standard of fair and equitable treatment.304 Furthermore, 
the language suggests there is a relationship between the two standards but one 
where unreasonable and discriminatory measures have an overarching character. 
Typically, provisions of African BITs following this formulation read as follows:  
Neither contracting party shall in any way impair by unreasonable or 
discriminatory measures the management, maintenance, use, 
enjoyment or disposal of investments in its territory of nationals or 
companies of the other Contracting Party.305 
The relationship between discriminatory measures and fair and equitable 
treatment has been the subject of considerable disagreements. For instance in 
Biwater, the claimant argued that apart from government measures breaching 
fair and equitable treatment, the measures also amounted to unreasonable and 
discriminatory treatment. The tribunal concurred with the claimant and held 
that the conduct of the respondent was unreasonable and also violated the 
standard of fair and equitable treatment.306 Particularly, drawing parallels 
between the two standards, the tribunal adopted the reasoning enunciated in 
CMS v Argentina where the tribunal held that the standard of protection against 
discrimination is related to fair and equitable treatment.307 Accordingly, the 
tribunal noted that any discriminatory measure simultaneously amounts to a 
breach of fair and equitable treatment.308 Applying this reasoning to the facts at 
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hand, the tribunal found the statements the Minister made at press conference 
impaired management of the claimant investment.309 In addition, the address to 
the staff was unreasonable, politically motivated and undermined management 
of city water.310 Lastly, withdrawing VAT exemption impaired city waters 
business; the deportation of senior management was abusive and 
unreasonable.311 
Interestingly, although the tribunal viewed the government measures as 
unreasonable, the measures in and of themselves did not cumulatively amount 
to discrimination.312  According to the tribunal, there was insufficient evidence 
to justify that the respondent accorded the competitor preferential 
treatment.313 From the tribunal’s analysis, it is important to stress that the 
threshold of discriminatory measures is relatively high as compared to fair and 
equitable treatment. Given this, it can be presumed that if a claimant 
successfully proves that the measures amounted to discrimination then breach of 
fair and equitable treatment is an automatic conclusion.314 In essence, arbitral 
tribunals will be inclined to find measures amount to breach of fair and 
equitable treatment more often because such findings are based on objective 
criteria while assessment of discriminatory measures are purely based on 
subjective criterion. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The preceding analysis shows that the majority of African countries have 
concluded BITs offering foreign investors the right to fair and equitable 
treatment as well as full protection and security. In addition, the analysis has 
shown that African BITs do not define the meaning of fair and equitable 
treatment. As previously discussed, with the exception of the United States-
Rwanda BIT, the obligation of fair and equitable treatment in the majority of 
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African BITs is overly broad and accords arbitral tribunals the discretion to 
determine the scope and substantive content of fair and equitable treatment. 
Specifically, within African treaty practice, majority of African BITs usually 
encapsulate fair and equitable treatment as an all or nothing right. Essentially, 
the practice of African states as demonstrated through the body text of African 
BITs is twofold; fair and equitable treatment is either entrenched as part of the 
substantive treaty protections offered to foreign investors or as seen in a few 
African BITs the standard is completely excluded. However, it should be stressed 
that the wording of African BITs incorporating fair and equitable treatment make 
it clear that the standard forms part of substantive treaty protection and creates 
binding legal obligation.  
From the foregoing discussion, it should be noted that African treaty practice 
supports the view that fair and equitable treatment is an autonomous treaty 
standard and is not tied to customary international law. The analysis of arbitral 
jurisprudence also showed that when interpreting the ordinary meaning of fair 
and equitable treatment, arbitral tribunals have developed components such as 
protection of legitimate expectations, good faith, transparency, consistency and 
discrimination. These components are particularly relevant to the interpretation 
of BITs concluded by African countries because fair and equitable treatment as 
articulated in most African BITs is either a stand-alone or linked to international 
law. This essentially means that the interpretation of fair and equitable 
treatment as developed through arbitral practice will influence and inform 
decisions of investor-state disputes involving African BITs. 
As stressed earlier, given that the content of customary international law 
remains controversial and the traditional resistance of African states towards the 
minimum standard, it is doubtful African states intended equating fair and 
equitable treatment to the minimum standard. Taken as a whole therefore, it 
can be stated that fair and equitable treatment as expressed in African treaty 
practice goes beyond the minimum standard. The rationale of this reasoning is 
additionally reinforced with the fact that in most African BITs international law 
is rarely mentioned suggesting a further detachment to the minimum 
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standard.315 In light of these considerations, by leaving fair and equitable 
treatment as a stand-alone standard and in some instances making reference to 
international law without mentioning the minimum standard this underscores the 
autonomous character of fair and equitable treatment within African treaty 
practice. Further, as noted above construing fair and equitable treatment as 
part of the minimum standard would be conflicting with the intention of African 
states that have not linked fair and equitable treatment to the minimum 
standard. Having said that, although linking fair and equitable treatment as 
equivalent to the minimum standard is not supported by African treaty practice, 
African countries are considerably better positioned clarifying that fair and 
equitable treatment simply means no more than the minimum standard. As 
noted above, although the content of the minimum standard is controversial 
when fair and equitable treatment is linked to the minimum standard the 
discretion of arbitral tribunals is fundamentally restricted to generally accepted 
principles of customary international law. More importantly, explicitly linking 
fair and equitable treatment to the international minimum standard would 
minimize the possibility of arbitral tribunals second guessing the intention of 
African states. 
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Chapter 5 
Analysis of Dispute Settlement Clauses of African Bilateral 
Investment Treaties 
Introduction 
The procedural protection offered to foreign investors to directly bring 
investment disputes under the scrutiny of international investment tribunals is 
probably the most important protection included within the broad spectrum of 
modern investment treaties.1 Indeed, commentators have approvingly described 
dispute resolution provisions appearing in virtually all modern investment 
treaties as the ‘‘ultimate investor protection’’.2 Moreover, as previously noted in 
Chapter 1, the introduction of modern dispute settlement provisions through 
restricting diplomatic protection have to some extent depoliticized the 
settlement of investment disputes.3 In essence, through offering ‘‘arbitration 
without privity’’ foreign investors are protected from undergoing complicated 
political nuances involved with espousing claims to home countries.4 
Furthermore, modern dispute settlement provisions have radically diminished 
the international law standard requiring the exhaustion of local remedies.5 As a 
practical matter therefore, the significance of modern dispute settlement 
provisions cannot be taken lightly considering the traditional ideological 
differences between developed and developing countries.6 For example, within 
the African context, early investment treaty practice of African states embodied 
reluctance towards international arbitration and the insistence that foreign 
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investment disputes should primarily be resolved through national courts.7 
Notably, during this period, African states incorporating aspects of international 
arbitration required the exhaustion of local remedies and emphasised the 
centrality of national courts in settling foreign investment disputes.8Moreover, 
many African countries argued that with respect to certain aspects of 
investment claims only their domestic courts could resolve such investment 
disputes.9  
From a historical perspective, the change in tone and content of modern African 
investment treaty practice demonstrates remarkable evolution in the attitude of 
African states towards international investment arbitration-from periods of 
resistance to acquiescence. In the view of the present author, the fundamental 
shift in attitude especially for African states can possibly be attributed to the 
underlying premise on which BITs are negotiated. The uneven power disparity 
notwithstanding, investment treaties and indeed as will shortly be seen through 
deliberations of the ICSID Convention, African states negotiate investment 
treaties with the perception that upon concluding such treaties the flow of 
foreign investment will increase. On this basis, African states in search of foreign 
investment flows inevitably conclude treaties containing liberal international 
investment arbitration clauses irrespective of whether African states have any 
outstanding concerns. It is against this background that virtually all BITs 
concluded by African countries contain clauses providing not only for state to 
state arbitration but also direct investor-state arbitration. Clauses providing for 
direct investor state arbitration are particularly tempting to many multinational 
corporations that view African legal and political systems as traditionally hostile 
towards foreign investors.10  
In some quarters, opinion holds that foreign investors will not be accorded 
sufficient protection on the basis that African courts are generally perceived as 
unsuitable to settle investment disputes because of rampant levels of 
corruption, biased judiciary and the lack of separation of power between the 
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executive and judiciary.11 Moreover, even with an independent judiciary, a 
number of African states through nationalistic driven legislatures overrule court 
decisions especially when the executive believes that the amount of 
compensation awarded for the expropriation claims is unreasonable.12   
On this basis, the apparent conclusion is that African states through consenting 
to alternative dispute resolution forums this minimizes the limitations of African 
domestic courts. Although such a conclusion is plausible on both legal and equity 
grounds, presently however, the interpretation accorded to arbitration clauses 
as features encapsulated in virtually all modern BITs has produced divergent 
reactions especially with respect to issues such as the scope of dispute 
settlement clause and its interrelationship with other substantive provisions. 
Against this backdrop, this chapter thoroughly examines the dispute resolution 
provisions commonly articulated in African BITs. Given that the majority of 
African states consent to ICSID as the choice of arbitration, the chapter starts by 
briefly exploring the participation of African states in the design and formulation 
of the ICSID framework. The chapter then moves on to examine the nature and 
scope of jurisdiction conferring clauses as well as the consent to arbitration 
clauses contained in the national legislation of African states. By so doing, the 
chapter situates not only the scope of dispute settlement clauses contained in 
African treaty practice but also situates whether African treaty practice 
conforms or differs from general treaty practice. Lastly, the chapter explores 
the policy implications resulting from dispute settlement clauses of African BITs. 
5.1 The ICSID Dispute Settlement System: Design, 
Structure and Participation of African States 
The Convention establishing the international centre for the settlement of 
investment disputes is an initiative of the World Bank aimed at facilitating the 
peaceful resolution of investment disputes between contracting states and 
nationals of other contracting state.13 The ICSID framework as is commonly 
known facilities the settlement of investment disputes either through 
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conciliation or arbitration.14 The centre itself does not engage in arbitration or 
conciliation, instead the task is carried out by conciliation commissions and 
arbitral tribunals established by the parties in accordance with the rules of the 
Convention.15  
The ICSID institutional arrangement gives parties to the dispute considerable 
autonomy in deciding the panels of conciliators or arbitrators as well as the 
venue of the dispute.16 Theoretically therefore the institutional arrangement 
presumes that through parties to the dispute selecting members of the tribunal 
the outcome of such arbitral tribunals should convincingly be fair to both foreign 
investors and state parties. Since the inception of the ICSID Convention on 
October 14, 1967 with initial membership of 20 countries, the Convention 
presently includes nearly all nations and has a growing membership of 147 
countries.17 Over the years, the Centre has become the preferred destination for 
settling foreign investment disputes and as of December 31, 2010 nearly 331 
cases have been arbitrated under the rules of the ICSID Convention and 
Additional Facility Rules.18 More broadly, considering the historical resistance 
towards international arbitration, the rapidly expanding number of cases and the 
emerging body of jurisprudence demonstrates considerable advance in the 
progressive development of international law.19  
Before discussing arbitration options articulated in African BITs, preliminary 
remarks about the participation of African states in the drafting of the ICSID 
Convention are worth making. In particular because this supports the opinion of 
the present author that African states participate in investment treaties and 
include consent to dispute settlement provisions based on assumptions made by 
architects of such treaties. For instance with respect to the innovative ICSID 
Convention, it is stated that one of the primary objectives of the Convention is 
to ‘‘encourage and accelerate economic development in the poorer 
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countries’’.20  The drafting of the ICSID Convention occurred at a time when 
foreign investors inhibited general reservations about investing in developing 
countries because of mounted hostilities towards foreign investors inspired by 
forces of nationalism.21 At the time of the Convention’s inception, it was 
believed that the assurance of a dispute settlement system with proximity to the 
World Bank would ‘‘assuage the anxieties of foreign investors and encourage 
them to invest, while at the same time cooling the enthusiasm of host 
governments against expropriatory actions’’.22 Indeed, the Report of the 
Executive Directors on the ICSID Convention puts the intention of the Convention 
in the following words: 
In submitting the attached convention to governments, the Executive 
Directors are prompted by the desire to strengthen the partnership 
between countries in the cause of economic development. The 
creation of an institution designed to facilitate the settlement of 
disputes between states and foreign investors can be a major step 
towards promoting at atmosphere of mutual confidence and thus 
stimulating a larger flow of private international investment capital 
into those countries which wish to attract it.23  
Indeed, the avowed emphasis of the World Bank on the positive contribution of 
the Convention towards directing the flow of foreign investment to poorer 
nations probably explains the enthusiasm expressed by African states during the 
drafting of the Convention.24  Preparatory documents of the ICSID Convention 
highlight the fact that during regional consultations discussing the draft ICSID 
Convention, African states perceived the Convention as a vehicle for social 
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economic development.25 As such the attitude of African states throughout the 
drafting of the ICSID Convention was positive thus enabling the Convention to 
enter into force soon after it was opened for signature.26  Asouzu notes that 
during regional meetings made up of high level delegations of African states 
discussing the details of the draft Convention ‘‘remarks of participants on the 
preliminary draft of the Convention were generally positive’’.27 At numerous 
regional meetings, African states supported the principles embodied in the 
Convention and the purpose it was meant to achieve’’.28 For instance, some 
representatives at the African consultative meeting optimistically believed that 
through concluding the convention ‘‘it would be easier for developing countries 
to obtain the investments they needed if all agreements contained a clause to 
the effect that disputes could be referred to the centre’’.29  Evidently, the 
optimism of the majority of African states in the ICSID Convention, explains why 
Tunisia, an African state was the first state to sign the Convention and Nigeria, 
an African state was the first state to ratify the Convention.30 Indeed, positive 
expectation in the ICSID convention justifies the attachment many poorer 
countries attach to the Convention through ratification and also this explains 
why presently nearly all African states are signatory to the ICSID Convention.31 
As noted above, participation in the ICSID Convention alone without any further 
action does not create any obligation to foreign investors that contracting states 
will consent to arbitration under ICSID arbitral rules.32 To be sure, during the 
                                                 
25 Amazu A Asouzu, International Commercial Arbitration and African States: Practice and 
Institutional Development (Cambridge University Press 2001) 230.  
26 Ibid 221. 
27 Ibid 222. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid 228.  
30 Ibid 221. 
31 Almost all African states are signatory to the ICSID Convention and majority of African 
states have ratified the Convention. Particularly, 47 out of the 51 African states have signed 
the ICSID Convention. For a detailed list see ICSID, List of Contracting States and Other 
Signatories of the Convention (as of April 18, 2012) 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDoc
ument&language=English> accessed 20 May 2012.  
32 UNCTAD, Course on Dispute Settlement (UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232 2003) 16. See also Report 
of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States, Article 25 provides as follows ‘while consent of 
the parties is essential prerequisites for the jurisdiction of the centre, consent alone will not 
suffice to bring a dispute within its jurisdiction. In keeping with the purpose of the 
Convention, the jurisdiction of the Centre is further limited by reference to the nature of the 
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drafting of the ICSID Convention and for purposes of respecting state autonomy, 
Mr. Broches the then General Council of the World Bank and inventor of the 
Convention stressed that ‘‘the use of the Centre’s facilities would be voluntary 
and that participation in the Convention would not compel any state to submit 
disputes to the Centre’’.33 Indeed, the Report of the Executive Directors to the 
Convention ardently describes consent of both parties and especially consent of 
contracting states as the cornerstone of the centre’s jurisdiction.34 In the same 
breath and along the lines of searching for foreign investment earnings, African 
states have subsequently perfected the ratification of the ICSID Convention 
through including consent clauses in treaties consenting to arbitration under the 
Convention.35  
Indeed, presently the majority of African countries have not only ratified the 
ICSID Convention but also expressed consent to ICSID arbitration through BITs, 
national legislation and contractual undertakings. Particularly with regard to 
BITs, as part of the treatment accorded to foreign investors, virtually all African 
BITs contain arbitration clauses offering consent to conciliation and arbitration 
                                                                                                                                                    
dispute and the parties thereto’ 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/partB.htm>accessed 20 May 2012. 
33 Christoph Schreuer and others, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary on the Convention on 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (2nd 
edn, Cambridge University Press 2009) 190. 
34 Ibid.  
35 Virtually all BITs concluded by majority of African BITs consent to arbitration under the 
ICSID Convention. For e.g. see Article 10 of the Belgium-Rwanda BIT; Article 8 of the  
Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the United Republic of Tanzania for the Promotion and Protection of Investments 
(Treaty Series No. 90, 1996) [Hereafter United Kingdom-Tanzania BIT] ; Article 9 Netherlands-
Tanzania BIT; Article 8 of the Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Kenya for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments (Treaty Series No. 8, 2000) [Hereafter United 
Kingdom-Kenya BIT;  Article 9 of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of 
Finland and the Government of the Republic of Tanzania for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments (19 June 2001) [Hereafter Finland-Tanzania BIT]; Article 8(3) of the Agreement 
between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (March 17, 2005);  Article 
25 of the Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Republic of Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investment [Hereafter United States-Rwanda BIT]; Article 8(3) of the Ghana-
Mauritius BIT; Article 9(2)  of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of 
Ghana and the Government of the Republic of Benin for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments [Hereafter Ghana-Benin BIT]; Article 8(2) of the Agreement between United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Ghana 
for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (Treaty Series No. 8, 1992) [Hereafter United 
Kingdom-Ghana BIT]. For detailed list of all African BITs see UNCTAD database < 
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch.aspx?id=779>accessed 20 May 2012.  
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under ICSID arbitral rules.36 Predominately, African BITs express consent to the 
resolution of foreign investment disputes either through the ICSID framework or 
under UNCITRAL rules.37 In essence, when pressed with disputes depending on 
the treaty language foreign investors have the discretion to choose between any 
of the dispute resolution option that best suits them. The scope of discretion 
varies among different African BITs, some African BITs consent fully to the 
discretion of foreign investor in selecting the arbitration option while other 
African BITs explicitly require agreement between the host state and the 
investor in selecting the arbitration option.38 With respect to the range of 
arbitration options, typically African BITs follow the approach articulated in 
article 7(2) of the Malaysia-Ghana BIT that reads as follows:  
Where the dispute is referred to international arbitration, the investor 
and the Contracting Party concerned in the dispute may agree to refer 
the dispute either to: (a)  the International Centre for the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (having regard to the provisions, where 
applicable, of the Convention of the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between states and nationals of other states, opened for 
signature at Washington DC on 18th march, 1965 and the Additional 
Facility for the Administration of Conciliation, Arbitration and Fact-
Finding Proceedings); or (b) an international arbitrator of ad hoc 
arbitration tribunal to be appointed by a special agreement between 
the parties to the dispute or established under the Arbitration Rules of 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.  
The majority of African BITs explicitly consent to several arbitration options as 
in the above BIT. However, there are a number of African BITs that consent to 
arbitration only under the ICSID framework. Particularly, such BITs include the 
Belgium-Rwanda BIT, United Kingdom-Tanzania BIT and the Belgium-Cameroon 
BIT. However, it should be stressed that African BITs expressing consent only 
through the ICSID arbitration option without providing for alternative arbitration 
options are few. Generally, the majority of African states broadly consent to 
                                                 
36 Ibid. 
37 For e.g. Article 10 of the Belgium-Rwanda BIT; Article 8 of the Korea-Congo BIT; Article 
8(3) of the Ghana-Mauritius BIT; Article 8(2) of the United Kingdom-Ghana BIT; Article 9(2) of 
the Ghana-Benin BIT; Article of the Finland-Tanzania BIT; Article 25(3) of the United States-
Rwanda BIT and Article 9 of the Netherlands-Tanzania BIT. 
38 Article 8 of the Agreement for the Protection and Promotion of Investments between the 
Republic of Ghana and the Arab Republic of Egypt (11 March 1998) [Hereafter Ghana-Egypt]; 
Article 9 (2) of the Ghana-Benin BIT, 10(2) of the Cameroon-Belgium BIT, 9(1) Ghana-Guinea 
BIT, Article 7 (3) of the United States-Cameroon BIT and Article 7 (1) of the Malaysia-Ghana 
BIT.  See for instance the article 9(2) of the Netherlands-Ghana BIT and article 9(2) of the 
India-Ghana BIT that require mutual consent and agreement between both parties to the 
dispute.  
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several dispute resolution options. Specifically, of the various arbitration 
alternatives, the most common arbitration option consented to by nearly all 
African BITs is arbitration through the ICSID framework. It should also be noted 
that some African BITs envisage the use of additional facility rules where one of 
the contracting state part to the same BIT has not ratified the ICSID 
Convention.39  In addition, African dispute resolution clauses emphasize the fact 
that once consent to submit disputes to the centre has been given such consent 
is irrevocable.40   
The choice of arbitration aside, it is important to note that the wording of 
consent clauses of nearly all African BITs unequivocally consent to the resolution 
of investment disputes through international arbitration.41 Generally, African 
BITs contain dispute resolution clauses affirming binding consent to arbitration 
using five different mechanisms but substantively similar in scope. Typically, 
offers to binding arbitration included in African BITs follow the approach 
provided for under Article 8 of the United Kingdom-Cameroon BIT which reads as 
follows ‘‘each contracting state hereby consents to submit to the international 
Centre for the settlement of investment disputes’’.42 On the other hand, article 
10 (2) of the Germany-Burundi BIT stipulates that ‘‘if a divergence cannot thus 
be settled it shall upon request by either contracting party be submitted to 
arbitration tribunals’’.43 While article 8 of the Ghana-Mauritius BIT states that 
disputes ‘‘may be submitted to an international arbitral tribunal established by 
both parties’’.44 The subsequent article of the Ghana-Guinea BIT provides that 
‘‘disputes shall be submitted at the first instance to the competent court of the 
                                                 
39 For e.g. see Article 24(3) of the United States-Rwanda BIT and Article 10(2) of the United 
Kingdom-Ghana BIT. 
40 Specifically see Article 10 (3) of the Belgium-Rwanda BIT; Article 8 (3) of the United 
Kingdom-Tanzania BIT; Article 10 (2) of the Belgium-Cameroon BIT; Article 8 (3) of the United 
Kingdom-Kenya BIT; Article 9 (2) of the Finland-Tanzania BIT; Article 8 (3) of the Mauritius-
Ghana BIT; Article 9 (4) of the Ghana-Benin BIT and Article 10 (2) of the United Kingdom-
Ghana BIT. 
41 Ibid. 
42 See also Article 9 (1) of the Netherlands-Tanzania BIT, Article 8 (1) of the United Kingdom-
Tanzania BIT, Article 7 (3) of the United States-Cameroon BIT and Article 9 (3) of the 
Belgium-Rwanda BIT. 
43 See also Article 10 (2) of the Germany-Kenya BIT.  See a slight variation contained in Article 
8 (2) of the Malaysia-Ghana BIT that provides as follows ‘If a dispute between the Contracting 
Parties cannot thus be settled, it shall upon the request of either Contracting Party be 
submitted to an arbitral tribunal’. 
44 See also Article 10 (2) of the Belgium-Cameroon BIT, Article 10 (2) of the India-Ghana BIT 
and Article 10 (2) of the Belgium Rwanda BIT. 
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Contracting Party for decision, or to international arbitration if either party to 
the dispute so wishes’’.45 Lastly, article 9 of the Netherlands-Ghana BIT provides 
that ‘‘…disputes…shall by mutual consent be submitted to international 
arbitration or conciliation’’.46 
Although the Netherlands-Ghana BIT requires ‘‘mutual consent’’, it is doubtful 
that Ghana would withhold consent to international arbitration if faced with 
foreign investment claims because withholding consent would be in breach of 
the spirit and purpose of article 9 of the same BIT which provides that ‘‘Each 
Contracting Party hereby consents to the submission of an investment dispute to 
international arbitration or conciliation’’.47 It should be stressed that 
exceptionally some African BITs such as the Netherlands-Kenya BIT do not 
unequivocally consent to arbitration. Specifically, article 11 of the Netherlands-
Kenya BIT reads as follows, ‘‘The Contracting Party in the territory of which a 
national of the other Contracting Party makes or intends to make an investment, 
shall give sympathetic consideration to a request on the part of such national to 
submit for conciliation or arbitration, to the Centre established by the 
Convention of Washington of 18 March 1965, any dispute that may arise in 
connection with the investment’’ (emphasis added).48 Although, Kenya may 
decline consenting to the investor’s request for arbitration, the Netherlands may 
exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of the affected investors.49  
                                                 
45 Similarly see Article 9 (1) of the Ghana-Benin BIT providing for disputes to ‘...be submitted 
at the first instance to the competent court of the Contracting party for decision or to 
international arbitration if either party to the dispute so wishes’. 
46 It should be stressed that throughout African practice the submission of dispute after 
mutual consent is rarely included as a requirement for the commencing of arbitral 
proceedings.  
47 Article 9 (4) of the Netherlands-Ghana BIT. 
48 Article 11 of the Netherlands-Kenya BIT. 
49 For instance in Italian Republic v Republic of Cuba, the tribunal was of the view that Italy 
could invoke diplomatic protection within the BIT’s interstate arbitration framework provided 
that other jurisdictional requirements setforth in the treaty were met. Although Cuba did not 
object that Italy could bring claims in its own name, it rejected the resort to interstate 
dispute settlement clause for the purposes of diplomatic claims. The tribunal postulated that 
‘‘as long as the investor had not consented to international arbitration with the host state or 
submitted the dispute to arbitration, it could request diplomatic protection from its home 
state’’. For detailed discussion see,  Republic of Italy v Republic of Cuba, Michele Potesta 
(ed) (2012) 2, Vol 106, AM. J. Int’l. L, 341-347. Based on this case, it is plausible to argue 
that if the host state declines consenting to arbitration then the home state can pursue 
diplomatic protection on behalf of the affected investors.   
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It should also be stressed that despite the passionate endorsement of the ICSID 
Convention this has not resulted in massive flows of foreign investment within 
African states otherwise how one would explain the fact that African states with 
the largest regional membership of the ICSID Convention still receive the lowest 
flows of new investments.50 Broadly, however, the enthusiastic support of the 
ICSID Convention by African states as evidenced throughout the drafting process 
demonstrates remarkable evolution in the attitude of African states towards 
international law. Particularly, it should be stressed that, unlike other rules of 
international law that developed and consolidated during the colonial era, a 
period when African states were not regarded as members of the international 
community, the drafting and adoption of the ICSID Convention happened at a 
time when most African states had acquired independence.51 This means that at 
least theoretically, consent to arbitration by African states suggests that African 
states are no longer opposed to the settlement of investment disputes outside 
domestic settings.  
In practice though, it is prudent to stress that positions taken by African states 
in cases such as Holiday Inns v Government of Morocco, Societe Ltd Benvevuti et 
Bonfant Sri v the Government of Congo suggest that African states remain 
reluctant to submit to ICSID arbitration especially when disputes arise requiring 
them to fulfil their undertaking.52 Agyemang postulates that Congo and Morocco 
participated in these two cases only because the two countries could not afford 
to renegade from ICSID commitments because this would send wrong signals to 
investors that they do not honour agreements to arbitrate and are not prepared 
to guarantee investor security in their jurisdiction.53 From the positions of these 
two states, it would be unsurprising to discover that many other African states 
still harbour similar reservations questioning the settling of investment policy 
decisions through international tribunals outside the scrutiny of domestic 
actors.54 
                                                 
50 Amazu A Asouzu, International Commercial Arbitration and African States: Practice and 
Institutional Development (Cambridge University Press 2001) 230-231. 
51 Ibid 221. 
52 Agyemang AA ‘African States and ICSID Arbitration’ (1988) 21 Comp. & Int’l L.J. Southern 
Afr 177, 181. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
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5.2 Jurisdictional Conferring Clauses in African BITs 
5.2.1 The Scope of Consent Clauses  
As noted above, ratification of the ICSID Convention alone without any further 
action does not automatically imply consent to jurisdiction under the ICSID 
framework.55 According to ICSID arbitral rules, ICSID jurisdiction is only 
enforceable through written consent by both parties.56 Specifically, for 
contracting states consent to arbitration under the Convention can either be 
expressed through treaties such as BITs or any other instrument while foreign 
investors can duly express consent through instituting proceedings.57  
As expressed in article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention, the Convention does not 
impose conditions on the form that consent should take except that when 
consent to arbitration is given, it must be expressed in writing.58  In essence 
therefore, contracting states have the discretion to limit the scope of consent 
through for instance imposing conditions on the types of disputes that can be 
arbitrated under the Convention as well as the duration such disputes should 
take before proceeding to arbitration. Practically, this means that as long as the 
dispute satisfies other objective requirements set forth in Article 25 of the 
Convention, arbitral tribunals have the jurisdiction to hear all disputes that fall 
within the scope of the contracting parties consent.59  Substantively therefore, 
consent to arbitration clauses articulated in African BITs form an integral part 
when determining jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals over disputes between foreign 
investors and African states. 
                                                 
55 Christoph Schreuer and others, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary on the Convention on 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (2nd 
edn, Cambridge University Press 2009) 190. 
56 Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention provides as follows ‘The Jurisdiction of the Centre 
shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment between a Contracting 
State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State) and a national of 
another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to 
the Centre. When the parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent 
unilaterally. 
57 Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, Article 24 of the Report reads as 
follows ‘Consent may be given, for example, in a clause included in an investment 
agreement, providing for the submission to the Centre for future disputes arising out of that 
agreement, or in a compromis regarding a dispute which has already arisen. 
58 Article 25 (1) of the ICSID Convention.  
59 Tokio Tokeles v Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18 Decision on Jurisdiction 29 April 2004, 
para 19 [Hereafter Tokio Tokeles v Ukraine]. 
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The vast majority of African BITs expansively consent to arbitration covering 
virtually all disputes. There are however, some significant variations with 
respect to the different formulas used when expressing consent to arbitration.60 
For instance the consent to arbitration clause in the United Kingdom-Tanzania 
BIT covers ‘any disputes’ while the Germany-Burundi BIT covers ‘‘divergences 
between the Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation or application of 
the Treaty’’. The precise meaning of divergence is unclear but as persuasively 
stressed by Paul Peters, the scope of ‘divergence’ is much broader than 
‘dispute’ because it covers not only legal disputes but could also encompasses 
any questions where a gap in an agreement has to be filled by a third party 
(binding advice) or where facts have to be ascertained by an outsider (fact-
finding commission).61 Accordingly, Paul Peters opines that ‘‘when arbitration is 
called for by such a BIT, it must of course have a correspondingly wide scope 
beyond that expressed by the phrase dispute’’.62 Apart from this wording, as 
demonstrated in the Korea-Congo BIT, some African BITs include consent to 
expropriation claims in the dispute resolution clause. Specifically, article of the 
Korea-Congo BIT provides that;  
Any dispute between a Contracting Party and an investor of the other 
Contracting Party derived from an alleged breach of an obligation 
under this Agreement, including disputes related to the expropriation 
or nationalization of investments, shall, as far as possible, be settled 
by the parties to the dispute in an amicable way. 
Evidently, from the wording of the Korea-Congo BIT the unambiguous consent to 
expropriation disputes removes any doubts about the jurisdiction of arbitral 
tribunals in cases involving expropriation claims. In the same breath, article 8 of 
the Italy-Tanzania BIT uses wording similar to the United Kingdom-Congo BIT. 
Particularly, article 8 of the Italy-Tanzania BIT provides as follows; ‘‘any dispute 
which may arise between one of the Contracting parties and the investor of the 
other contracting party on investments, including disputes related to the amount 
of compensation shall be settled through consultations and negotiations as far as 
                                                 
60 For different variation see Article 9 of the Ghana-Guinea BIT,  Article 9 of the Netherlands-
Ghana BIT, Article 11 of the Netherlands-Kenya BIT,  Article 10 of the India-Ghana BIT ,  
Article 7(3) of the United States-Cameroon BIT, Article 10 of the Belgium-Rwanda BIT, Article 
10 of the Belgium-Cameroon BIT and Article 8 of the Egypt-Ghana BIT. 
61 Paul Peters, ‘Dispute Settlement Arrangements in Investment Treaties’ (1991) 22 NYIL 91, 
111. 
62 Ibid. 
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possible’’.63 Aside from the Korea-Congo BIT and the Italy-Tanzania BIT, 
predominately consent to arbitration clauses of most African BITs follow three 
distinct but interrelated formulas. For example, many African BITs contain the 
phrasing expressed in article 9 of the Denmark-Tanzania BIT which provides as 
follows ‘‘any dispute between an investor of one Contracting Party and the other 
Contracting Party in connection with an investment in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party shall, as far as possible, be settled amicably through 
negotiations between the parties to the dispute’’.64 
The Denmark-Tanzania formulae aside, other African BITs follow the wording 
similar to article 10 of the Belgium-Rwanda BIT which provides as follows; ‘‘Any 
investment dispute between one Contracting Party and an investor from the 
other Contracting Party shall, to the extent possible be resolved amicably 
between the parties to the dispute’’.65 Finally, a number of African BITs 
extensively consent to dispute resolution but with limited scope to the 
substantive standards of the BIT. Typically, African BITs encapsulating this line 
of reasoning contain a clause similar to article 9(1) of the Ghana-Guinea BIT 
which provides as follows; ‘‘disputes between a national or company of one 
Contracting Party and the other Contracting Party concerning an obligation of 
the latter under this agreement in relation to an investment of the former which 
have not been amicably settled shall, after a period of six months from written 
notification of a claim, be submitted at the first instance to the competent court 
of the Contracting Party for decision, or to international arbitration if either 
party to the dispute so wishes’’.66  
The wording of consent clauses articulated in African BITs explicitly demonstrate 
that African states have broadly consented to the arbitration of foreign 
investment disputes under the ICSID convention. As noted above, apart from the 
ICSID Convention African states have also included in their respective BITs 
consent to other alternative arbitration options. However, although consent 
clauses encapsulated in African BITs are broadly worded, it remains unclear 
                                                 
63 Article 8 of the Italy-Tanzania BIT. 
64 Article 9 of the Denmark-Tanzania BIT; see also Article 8 of the Mauritius-Ghana BIT. 
65 Article 10 of the Belgium-Rwanda BIT. 
66 Article 9(1) of the Mauritius-Ghana BIT; see also article 10 of the United Kingdom-Ghana 
BIT. 
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whether the consent to arbitration clause includes not only disputes from BIT 
obligation but also other disputes arising out of contractual undertakings. In 
practice, the approaches of different tribunals dealing with consent clauses 
similar to those stipulated in African BITs remains divided. For instance, in Salini 
v Morocco, the tribunal in interpreting article 8 of the Morocco-Italy BIT 
consenting to ‘‘all disputes or differences’’ reasoned that the scope of the 
consent clause was generally construed to include both BIT claims as well as 
contractual claims.67 According to the tribunal the wording of article 8 ‘‘compels 
the state to respect the jurisdiction offer in relation to violations of the bilateral 
investment treaty and any breach of contract that binds the state directly’’.68 In 
sum, the tribunal accepted jurisdiction over contractual claims provided such 
claims directly correspond to violations of the BIT.69  
On the other hand, faced with similar consent clauses but contained in two 
different BITs, arbitral tribunals in the SGS cases arrived at conflicting 
conclusions. Specifically, in the first case, SGS v Pakistan the tribunal was of the 
view that article 9 of the Pakistan-Swiss BIT providing for consent to ‘disputes 
with respect to investments’ was merely descriptive of the ‘factual subject 
matter of the disputes and does not relate to the legal basis of the claims, or 
the cause of action asserted in the claims’’.70 The tribunal further held that 
from the description of article 9 alone without any further explanation ‘‘no 
implication necessarily arises that both BIT and purely contractual claims are 
intended to be covered by the Contracting Parties in Article 9’’.71 Furthermore, 
the tribunal postulated that the wording of Article 9 or any other provision of 
the BIT did not justify a reading vesting the tribunal ‘with jurisdiction over 
claims resting ex hypothesis exclusively on contracts’’.72  
                                                 
67 Salini Construttori SpA v Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4 Decision on Jurisdiction July 23 
2001, para 59 [Hereafter Salini v Morocco]. 
68 Ibid para 61.  
69 Ibid para 63. 
70 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/13 Decision on Jurisdiction, para 161[Hereafter SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance 
v Pakistan]. 
71 Ibid.  
72 Ibid.  
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On this basis the tribunal declined jurisdiction with respect to contractual claims 
submitted by the claimant that did not constitute or amount to breaches of the 
substantive standards of the treaty.73 However, subsequently, the approach 
adopted by the tribunal in SGS v Pakistan was rejected in the SGS v Philippines 
tribunal. In SGS v Philippines while interpreting the clause ‘‘dispute with respect 
to investments’ the tribunal stated that the consent clause was ‘‘entirely 
general allowing for submission of all disputes by the investor against the host 
state’’.74 According to the tribunal, it was implausible to suggest that the 
‘‘general language in BITs dealing with all investment disputes should be limited 
because in some investment contracts the parties stipulate exclusively for 
different dispute settlement arrangements’’.75  
From the approach of the tribunal in SGS v Philippines, it is plausible to state 
that since most African BITs have expansive consent clauses this implies that the 
jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals involving African states would extend not only to 
breach of BIT substantive standards but also to contractual claims. On the other 
hand, the few African BITs with expansive consent clauses but with limited 
consent to substantive treaty claims contain umbrella clauses extending treaty 
protection to contractual claims. For instance, although the Ghana-Benin BIT has 
wide consent clauses but limited to substantive treaty claims, it does contain an 
umbrella clause that suggests consent to disputes arising out of contractual 
claims. Specifically, Article 3(3) provides as follows; ‘‘each Contracting Party 
shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments 
of nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party’’.76 
A similar provision is stipulated in article 13 of the Netherlands-Ghana BIT which 
reads as follows ‘‘each Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it may 
have entered into with regard to investments of nationals of the other 
contracting Party’’.77 It is generally accepted that the inclusion of umbrella 
clauses in BITs elevates contractual obligations between host states and 
                                                 
73 Ibid para 162. 
74 Ibid para 131. 
75 Ibid para 134. 
76 Article 3(3) of the Ghana-Benin BIT. 
77 Article 13 of the Netherlands-Ghana BIT. 
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investors to the level of treaty violations.78 Conclusively, the wording of the vast 
majority of consent to arbitration clauses stipulated in African BITs offer arbitral 
tribunals jurisdiction over both substantive treaty obligations as well as 
contractual violations related to investments. Moreover, even African BITs with 
broad but narrow consent to jurisdiction clauses contain umbrella clauses that 
extend the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals to contractual claims. This suggests 
therefore that consent clauses in African investment treaty practice cover both 
substantive treaty obligations as well as contractual claims. 
5.2.2 Procedural Restrictions 
Although all dispute settlement provisions contained in African BITs consent to 
international arbitration, this is not without conditions that must be followed 
before commencing arbitration. The practice among most African states requires 
that foreign investors before resorting to arbitration must initially attempt to 
resolve the dispute amicably through negotiations.79 This is illustrated for 
example in article 7 of the Sweden-Tanzania BIT which provides as follows ‘any 
dispute concerning an investment between an investor of one contracting party 
and the other contracting party shall, if, possible be settled amicably.’80 African 
BITs generally incorporate a minimum time frame providing for duration of time 
negotiations must take before aggrieved foreign investors can resort to 
international arbitration.81 The required time frame varies but typically the time 
ranges between three to six months.82 However, predominately the vast majority 
of African BITs require the lapse of 6 months before resorting to international 
                                                 
78 Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer, The Oxford Handbook of 
International Investment Law (OUP 2008) 839. A detailed discussion of umbrella clauses is 
beyond the scope of this work. 
79 See for example Article 8 of the United Kingdom-Tanzania BIT, Article 9 of the Mauritius-
Ghana BIT, Article 10 of the India-Ghana BIT, Article 7 of the United States-Congo BIT, Article 
10 of the Belgium Rwanda BIT, Article 10 of the Denmark-Ghana BIT, Article 24 of the United 
States-Rwanda BIT, Article 9 of the Finland-Tanzania BIT and Article 8 of the United Kingdom-
Tanzania BIT.  
80 Article 7 of the Sweden-Tanzania BIT; see also Article 9 Ghana-Mauritius BIT, Article 8 of 
the United Kingdom-Tanzania BIT, Article 9 of the India-Ghana BIT, Article 10 of the Denmark 
BIT, Article 9 of the Finland-Tanzania BIT and Article 8 of the United Kingdom-Kenya BIT.  
81 Ibid  
82 Specifically for African BIT providing three months period see Article 7 of the Malaysia-
Ghana BIT,  Article 8(3) of the United Kingdom-Kenya BIT, Article 9(2) of the Denmark-
Tanzania,  Article 10(1) of the United Kingdom-Ghana BIT, Article 8(3) of the United Kingdom-
Congo BIT, Article 9(2) of the Finland-Tanzania BIT and Article 10(1) of the Denmark-Ghana 
BIT. 
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arbitration.83 A good example of such provisions and this basically appears in 
most African BITs is article 8 of the Ghana-Mauritius BIT that reads as follows:   
If the dispute cannot be settled through negotiations within six 
months, either party to the dispute shall be entitled to initiate 
judicial action before the competent court of the Contracting Party in 
whose territory of investment was made or it may be submitted to an 
international arbitral tribunal established by both parties (emphasis 
added).  
It should also be stressed that a number of African BITs do not contain any time 
limitations as illustrated in article 9 of the Netherlands-Tanzania BIT which 
provides that, ‘‘Each Contracting Party hereby consents to submit any legal 
dispute arising between that Contracting Party and an investor of the other 
contacting Party concerning an investment of that investor in the territory of the 
former Contracting Party to the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes by conciliation or arbitration under the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other 
States....’’.84 It is prudent to stress that for African BITs containing no cooling 
off periods, aggrieved foreign investors have the discretion to directly institute 
international arbitration without necessarily having to wait for any waiting 
period. Furthermore, some African BITs as illustrated under article 10 of the 
Belgium-Cameroon BIT do not only require the lapse of 6 months but also require 
written notification accompanied by sufficiently detailed memorandum before 
commencing disputes.85 Lastly, the majority of African BITs offer aggrieved 
foreign investors the option of either pursuing claims through local courts or 
international tribunals upon the lapse of the cooling off period.86  
                                                 
83 African BITs providing for 6 month waiting period include the following Article 7 (4) of the 
United States-Congo BIT, Article 7(3) of the United States-Cameroon BIT,  Article 9(1)  of the 
Ghana-Benin BIT, Article 10 (2) of the Belgium-Cameroon BIT, Article 8 (2) of the Egypt-Ghana 
BIT, Article 8 (4) of the Mauritius-Ghana BIT,  Article 24(3) of the United States-Rwanda BIT,  
Article 8(3) of the Korea-Congo BIT, Article 9(1) of the Ghana-Guinea BIT, Article 9 (2) of the 
Netherlands-Ghana BIT, Article 10 (2) of the Belgium-Cameroon BIT, Article 9 (2) of the India-
Ghana BIT and Article 7(2) of the Sweden-Tanzania BIT. 
84 Article 9 (1) of the Netherlands-Tanzania BIT. 
85 See also Article 10(4) of the Belgium-Rwanda BIT. 
86 For instance see inter alia Article 9(2) of the India-Ghana BIT, Article 9 (2) of the Finland-
Tanzania BIT, Article 9(1) of the Ghana-Benin BIT, Article 8 (2) of the Ghana-Egypt BIT, 
Article 24(3) of the United States-Rwanda BIT and Article 8 (3) of the Mauritius-Ghana BIT. 
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However, the formulation of African BITs varies with respect to the choice of 
arbitration for instance; some African BITs stipulate that at first instance the 
investor should seek to resolve the dispute through domestic courts while other 
African BITs only mention the option of international arbitration.87 This is 
illustrated for example in the Ghana-Mauritius BIT which provides under article 8 
that ‘if the dispute cannot be settled through negotiations within six months, 
either party to the dispute shall be entitled to initiate judicial action before the 
competent court of the Contracting Party in whose territory of investment was 
made or it may be submitted to an international arbitral tribunal established by 
both parties.’88 While article 9(2) of the Netherlands-Ghana BIT simply provides 
that ‘‘if such disputes cannot be settled…within a period of six months from the 
date either party to the dispute requested amicable settlement, the dispute 
shall, by mutual consent, be submitted to international arbitration or 
conciliation’’.89  
Substantively, the wording of article 8 of the Ghana-Mauritius BIT and that of 
article 9(2) of the Netherlands-Ghana BIT are not any different because even 
though the option of domestic courts is not mentioned in the Ghana-Netherlands 
BIT, nothing compels aggrieved foreign investors from pursuing claims only 
through international arbitration. However, the most pressing issue in both BITs 
is not whether aggrieved foreign investors can directly institute international 
arbitration but whether foreign investors can pursue arbitration without 
complying with the six month cooling off-period. The answer to this question is 
not peculiar to African states and indeed the jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals 
with respect to waiting periods remains conflicting. 
For instance the tribunal in Ronald Lauder v Czech Republic concluded that the 
‘‘requirement of a six-month waiting period in Article VI (3) (a) of the United 
States-Czech Republic Treaty is not a jurisdictional provision, i.e. a limit set to 
the authority of the Arbitral Tribunal to decide on the merits of the dispute, but 
                                                 
87 See for example Article 9(1) of the Ghana-Guinea BIT, Article 7 of the United States-Congo 
BIT and Article 8 (2) of the Mauritius-Ghana BIT. 
88 Article 8(2) of the Mauritius-Ghana BIT, see also 9 (2) of the Finland-Tanzania BIT, Article 9 
(1) of the  Ghana-Benin BIT, Article 8 (2) of Egypt-Ghana BIT, Article 24 (3) of the United 
States-Rwanda BIT  and Article 9(2) of India-Ghana BIT. 
89 Article 9(2) of the Ghana-Netherlands BIT. 
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a procedural rule that must be satisfied by the Claimant’’.90 According to the 
tribunal even though only 17 days had passed between the time when the letter 
had been delivered to the Media Committee of the Czech Parliament and the 
filing of the Notice to Arbitration, evidence presented suggested that the 
respondent would not have accepted entering into negotiations.91 In the 
tribunal’s view insisting that the claimant cannot commence proceedings until 
after 6 months would amount to an unnecessary and overly formalistic approach 
that does not protect any legitimate interests of the parties.92 Similarly, the 
tribunal in SGS v Pakistan supported the opinion expressed in Ethyl Corporation 
v Government of Canada where the tribunal concluded that the consultation 
period should be treated as directory and procedural rather than mandatory and 
jurisdictional.93 Particularly, the tribunal rejected the notion that a twelve 
month consultation period before commencing arbitration is a condition 
precedent for the vesting of jurisdiction.94  
However, the tribunal in Murphy v Ecuador rejected this line of reasoning and 
found that ‘‘the requirement that the parties should seek to resolve their 
dispute through consultation and negotiation for a six-month period does not 
constitute, as claimant and some arbitral tribunals have stated, “a procedural 
rule” or a “directory and procedural rule’’ which can or cannot be satisfied by 
the concerned party’’.95 The tribunal reasoned that the six month period is a 
compulsory requirement and forms a fundamental basis before submitting 
requests for arbitration under the ICSID arbitral rules.96 According to the 
tribunal; 
The purpose of such requirement is that during this ‘‘cooling-off 
period,’’ the parties should attempt to resolve their disputes 
amicably, without resorting to arbitration or litigation, which 
generally makes future business relationships difficult. It is not an 
                                                 
90 Ronald Lauder v Czech Republic, UNICTRAL Tribunal Final Award 3 September 2001, para 
187[Hereafter Ronald Lauder v Czech Republic]. 
91 Ibid 188. 
92 Ibid para 190. 
93 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance v Pakistan, para 184. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Murphy Exploration and Production Company International v Republic of Ecuador, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/08/4 Award December 15 2010, para 149 [Hereafter Murphy Exploration v 
Ecuador]. 
96 Ibid. 
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inconsequential procedural requirement but rather a key component 
of the legal framework established in the BIT and in many other 
similar treaties, which aims for the parties to attempt to amicably 
settle the disputes that might arise resulting of the investment made 
by a person or company of the Contracting Party in the territory of 
the another State.97 
The tribunal in Burlington v Ecuador arrived at a similar conclusion. It noted that 
the six month waiting period starts to run only once an allegation of Treaty 
breach has been made to the host state.98 The tribunal found that the claimant 
had made no allegations of Treaty breach in connection with the indigenous 
opposition blocks prior to filling its request for arbitration.99 On this basis the 
tribunal held that the claims submitted by the claimant were inadmissible 
because the claimant failed to comply with the six month waiting period, as it 
should have, before filing the request.100 The tribunal stressed that the six 
month waiting period does not impose a formal requirement but rather requires 
that evidence of some form or another alleging treaty breach must be made.101 
In essence, according to the tribunal, the six month waiting period requires 
investors to ‘‘inform the host State that it faces allegations of Treaty breach 
which could eventually engage the host State's international responsibility 
before an international tribunal’’.102 The six month waiting period therefore 
offers the host state the opportunity to be informed of the likely negative 
consequences that will follow if negotiations fail to produce an amicable 
settlement.103   
5.3 Overcoming Consent Restrictions Enunciated in 
African BITs through Invoking the MFN Clause  
The majority of African BITs contain the most-favoured-nation (MFN) provisions 
similar to article 4 of the Ghana-Benin BIT which provides that ‘‘neither 
Contracting Party shall in its territory subject investments or returns of nationals 
                                                 
97 Ibid para 151. 
98 Burlington Resources Inc v Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5 Jurisdiction June 
02 2010, para 336. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid para 337. 
102 Ibid para 338. 
103 Ibid. 
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or companies of the other Contracting Party to treatment less favourable than 
that which it accords to investments or returns of nationals or companies of any 
third state’’.104 The MFN clause when incorporated into BITs ensures that 
investors receive treatment similar to or better than like investors from third 
party states.105 In essence therefore, the MFN clause removes discriminatory 
treatment based on nationality and creates ‘‘a level playing field for investors or 
investments protected by the treaty’’.106 The applicability of the MFN clause to 
substantive treaty obligations is unquestionable however whether the MFN 
clause extends to jurisdictional issues remains debatable.  
At the core of this discussion as aptly summarized by Professor Christoph 
Schreuer concerns the question about whether the MFN clause can be used to 
bypass consent limitations through relying on another BIT the respondent state 
has entered into with a third party state that contains favourable dispute 
settlement procedures.107 The scope of the MFN clause is not merely of 
theoretical significance but one with practical consequences which is indeed 
demonstrated through the growing number of cases and the unsettled 
jurisprudence. Evidently over the last decade, the scope of the MFN clause has 
been undeniably one of the most divisive issues in investor-state dispute 
settlement and indeed this has placed the applicability of the MFN clause at the 
forefront of controversial issues in investment arbitration.  
Historically, prior to the Maffezini case, the scope of the MFN clause was not 
contentious and numerous cases as well as commentators argued against the 
extension of the MFN clause to jurisdictional matters.108 Moreover, as noted by 
Zachary Douglas ‘‘across the hundreds of years of activity of international courts 
and tribunals leading up to Maffezini, there had only been judicial 
pronouncements against such a device, including the International Court of 
                                                 
104 Similarly see inter alia Article 11 of the Belgium-Rwanda BIT, Article 3 of the United 
Kingdom-Congo BIT, Article 3(1) of the Ghana-Egypt BIT, Article 4 (2) of the Ghana-Mauritius 
BIT, Article 4(4) of the Germany-Burundi BIT, Article 3 (1) of the Finland-Tanzania BIT, Article 
4(1) of the India-Ghana BIT and Article 2(7) of the United States-Cameroon BIT. 
105 Norah Gallagher and Wenhua Shan, Chinese Investment Treaties: Policies and Practices 
(OUP 2009) 340. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer, The Oxford Handbook of 
International Investment Law (OUP 2008) 852. 
108 Zachary Douglas, ‘The MFN Clause in Investment Arbitration: Treaty Interpretation Off the 
Rails’ (2010) 2 Jnl of Int. Dispute Settlement 97, 101. 
  
 249 
Justice’s judgment in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case and the British-
Venezuelan Mixed Claims Commission’s decision in Aroa Mines’’.109 The 
Maffezini tribunal dramatically changed settled practice and at the time of 
writing this thesis opinion remains difficult to reconcile and in some cases 
misleading. Specifically, the structural differences underpinning the MFN 
jurisprudence are mainly twofold; on one hand some cases and commentators 
alike favour a presumption incorporating dispute settlement within the scope of 
the MFN clause while another line of cases proceed from the presumption that 
dispute settlement cannot be extended through the backdoor of the MFN clause 
unless the intention of contracting parties is manifestly clear.110  
The question about whether the MFN clause extends to dispute settlement 
mechanism is equally relevant to African states considering the generality of 
MFN clauses contained in African BITs. Specifically, with respect to African 
treaties virtually all MFN clauses contained in African BITs are generic in nature 
and commonly make reference to ‘treatment’ without providing further 
clarification about whether ‘treatment’ extends to dispute settlement.111 
Typically, the MFN clause in African BITs except for wording variations usually 
follow the formulation of article 4 of the Mauritius-Ghana BIT which reads as 
follows; ‘‘Each Contracting Party shall in its territory accord to investors and to 
investments and returns of investors of the other Contracting Party treatment 
not less favourable than that which it accords to investments and returns of 
investors of any third State’’.112  
                                                 
109 Ibid. 
110 For the growing body of jurisprudence and varying opinions see Emilio Augustin Maffezini v 
The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 January 25 2000, [Hereafter Maffezini v The 
Kingdom of Spain]; Gas Natural v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10 June 17 2005 
[Hereafter Gas Natural v Argentina]; National Grid v Argentina, UNCITRAL June 20 2006, 
[Hereafter National Grid v Argentina], Siemens v Argentine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8) August 
2004 [Hereafter Siemens v Argentina], Salini v Jordan, Plama v Bulgaria. 
111 See for instance Article 2 United States-Cameroon BIT;  Article 3(2)  of the Netherlands-
Ghana BIT; Article 3 of the Egypt-Ghana BIT; Article 4(2) of the Mauritius-Ghana BIT; Article 
11 of the United States-Congo BIT; Article 4 of the Denmark-Ghana BIT; Article 3 of the 
Ghana-Malaysia BIT; Article 3(4) of the Germany-Tanzania BIT; Article 4 of the Ghana-Benin 
BIT; Article 3(2) of the Bulgaria-Ghana BIT and Article 11 of the Cameroon-Belgium BIT. 
112 See also Article 4 of the Ghana-Benin BIT; Article 2 of the United States-Cameroon BIT; 
Article 3 of the Egypt-Ghana BIT; Article 3(2) of the Bulgaria-Ghana BIT; Article 2 of the 
United States-Congo BIT; Article 3(2) of the Netherlands-Ghana BIT; Article 3(2) of the 
Netherlands-Tanzania BIT and Article 4 of the India-Ghana BIT. 
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Aside from this wording, other African BITs follow the MFN formulation 
stipulated in article 3(2) of the United Kingdom-Tanzania BIT which provides as 
follows; ‘‘Neither Contracting Party shall in its territory subject nationals or 
companies of the other Contracting Party, as regards their management, 
maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of their investments, to treatment less 
favourable than that which it accords its own nationals or companies or to 
nationals or companies of any third State’’.113  
Although the wording of the two common MFN formulations articulated in 
African treaty practice are theoretically different, substantively both provisions 
make little headway in clarifying whether dispute settlement falls within the 
scope of the MFN clause. Quite apart from these two common MFN clauses, the 
third and seldom used MFN formulation is article 3 of the United Kingdom-Kenya 
BIT which provides as follows:  
Nether contracting Party shall in its territory subject nationals of 
companies of the other Contracting Party, as regards their 
management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of their 
investments, to treatment less favourable than that which it accords 
to its own nationals or companies or to nationals or companies of any 
third state. For the avoidance of doubt it is confirmed that the 
treatment provided for in paragraphs (1) and (2) above shall apply to 
the provisions of Articles 1 to 11 of this Agreement (emphasis added).  
Unlike the two common MFN clauses found in African BITs, the wording of article 
3 of the United Kingdom-Kenya BIT is exceptional because it removes any doubts 
about the intention of contracting states to include dispute settlement within 
the scope of the MFN clause. Furthermore, because the intention of contracting 
states is manifestly clear i.e. dispute settlement falls within the scope of the 
MFN clause, arbitral tribunals do not have the discretion to second-guess the 
intention of contracting states. Having said that, since majority of MFN clauses 
included in African BITs fall within the two formulas mentioned above, the MFN 
clause stipulated in most African BITs can potentially although questionably be 
interpreted as extending to dispute settlement mechanisms. 
                                                 
113 For instance see also Article 3 of the United Kingdom-Cong BIT, Article 3 of the Germany-
Burundi BIT, Article 4 of the United Kingdom-Ghana BIT, Article 4 of the Ghana-Benin BIT, 
Article 3 of the Germany-Kenya BIT and Article 4 of the Denmark-Ghana BIT. 
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In addition, as noted above, consent to arbitration provisions in African BITs 
usually contain different consent restrictions depending on the asymmetrical 
relationship of contracting parties during the negotiation process of the BIT. To 
this end therefore, an expansively interpreted MFN clause can further upset the 
delicate balance in the relationship between foreign investors and African states 
through negatively interfering with previously agreed consent restrictions.114 For 
instance, the Netherlands-Tanzania BIT does not contain any waiting period 
while the Sweden-Tanzania BIT contains a waiting period of six before instituting 
arbitral proceedings. Equally important, the MFN clause contained in both BITs is 
generally worded to cover any treatment accorded to investments. It is unclear 
from the wording of this MFN clause and indeed many other African BITs whether 
treatment extends both to the jurisdictional provisions as well as to substantive 
provisions. On the basis of this example, it would not be unsurprising for a 
Swedish foreign investor to invoke the Sweden-Tanzania MFN clause so as to 
benefit from more favourable dispute settlement conditions contained in the 
Netherlands-Tanzania BIT which essentially permits direct arbitration without 
requiring any waiting period. In essence, through invoking the Netherlands-
Tanzania MFN clause, the Swedish foreign investor would be seeking to bypass 
the six months waiting period contained in the Sweden-Tanzania BIT. 
The scope and complexities thereof of the MFN clause was extensively dealt with 
in Maffezini v Spain where the claimant sought to bypass restrictions contained 
in the Argentine-Spain BIT which provided domestic courts with the opportunity 
to deal with disputes for a period of eighteen months before disputes can be 
submitted to arbitration.115 To succeed with the jurisdictional question, the 
claimant invoked article 10(2) of the Chile-Spain BIT which accorded foreign 
investors the right to pursue arbitration upon the lapse of six month waiting 
period. During the proceedings, the claimant argued that investment claims of 
Chilean investors in Spain are treated more favourable than those of Argentinean 
investors which according to the claimant breached the spirit and purpose of the 
MFN clause 
                                                 
114 Apart from Article 3(3) of the United Kingdom-Kenya BIT, none of the reviewed MFN 
clauses contained in African BITs explicitly mention the applicability of the MFN clause to 
dispute resolution. 
115 Maffezini v Spain, para 39. 
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In the claimant’s view, the MFN clause contained in the Argentine-Spain BIT 
offered investors the option of submitting disputes without prior reference to 
domestic courts provided such provision is contained in third party investment 
treaties.116 The respondent rejected these claims arguing that the MFN clause 
serves the purpose of avoiding discrimination and such discrimination is only 
related to material economic treatment and not procedural matters.117 In 
essence, the respondent was of the view that the scope of the MFN clause is 
limited to substantive aspects of treatment accorded to investors and does not 
extend to procedural or jurisdictional matters.118 The tribunal concurred with 
the claimant and opined that ‘dispute settlement arrangements are inextricably 
related to the protection of foreign investors, as they are also related to the 
protection of rights of traders under treaties of commerce.’119 In the tribunals 
view, ‘‘if a third party treaty contains provisions for the settlement of disputes 
that are more favourable to the protection of the investor’s rights and interests 
than those in the basic treaty, such provisions may be extended to the 
beneficiary of the most favoured nation clause as they are fully compatible with 
the ejusdem generis principle’’.120 In conclusion the tribunal held that;  
…the requirement for the prior resort to domestic courts spelled out 
in the Argentine-Spain BIT does not reflect a fundamental question of 
public policy considered in the context of the treaty, the negotiations 
relating to it, the other legal arrangements or the subsequent practice 
of the parties. Accordingly, the Tribunal affirms the jurisdiction of the 
Centre and its own competence in this case in respect of this aspect 
of the challenge made by the Kingdom of Spain.121 
Although the Maffezini tribunal ruled in favour of the claimant, in obiter the 
tribunal stresses the limited application of MFN clauses to dispute settlement 
procedures. The tribunal particularly detailed a number of scenarios where 
public policy concerns demand that the application of the MFN clause to dispute 
settlement procedures should be restrained. For instance the tribunal noted that 
‘‘if one contracting party has conditioned its consent to arbitration on the 
exhaustion of local remedies, which the ICSID Convention allows, this 
                                                 
116 Ibid para 40. 
117 Ibid para 42. 
118 Ibid para 41. 
119 Ibid para 54. 
120 Ibid para 56. 
121 Ibid para 64. 
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requirement could not be bypassed by invoking the most favoured nation clause 
in relation to a third-party agreement that does not contain this element since 
the stipulated condition reflects a fundamental rule of international law’’.122  
Furthermore, the tribunal noted that if a BIT provides for a particular arbitration 
forum such as ICSID, this option could not be changed merely through invoking 
the MFN clause so as to refer the dispute to another arbitration system.123 In 
addition, the tribunal emphasized that ‘‘if the contracting parties have agreed 
to a highly institutionalized system of arbitration that incorporates precise rules 
of procedure…it is clear that neither of these mechanisms could be altered by 
the operation of the clause because these very specific provisions reflect the 
precise will of the contracting parties’’.124 Against this backdrop, the reasonable 
inference that can be drawn from the Maffezini decision is that the tribunal did 
not entirely support the applicability of the MFN clause to dispute settlement 
procedures. In essence, although the tribunal left room for the MFN clause to 
apply to dispute settlement procedures, the tribunal was conscious of the 
inherent limitations placed upon the MFN clause. Additionally, the tribunal’s 
approach suggests that the MFN clause applies in narrowly circumscribed 
circumstances and should not be construed to be of general applicability to 
dispute settlement procedures.  
Subsequently, the Siemens v Argentina tribunal did not only concur with the 
Maffezini decision but went even further and expansively interpreted the 
applicability of MFN clause to dispute settlement procedures. In rejecting the 
respondent’s argument that the MFN clause does not apply to jurisdictional 
matters such as dispute settlement, the tribunal stressed that access to dispute 
settlement is part of the protection offered under treaties.125 This according to 
the tribunal means that treatment of foreign investors and investment is part of 
the advantage accessible through the MFN clause.126 The respondent argued 
unsuccessfully of the difference between the MFN clause in the Spain-Argentina 
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123 Ibid.  
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BIT which refers to ‘‘all matters subject to this agreement’ and the Argentina-
Germany BIT which refers only to ‘treatment’’.127  
On this basis the respondent postulated that the Maffezini decision should be 
interpreted within its specific context because the Argentina-Germany MFN 
clause was different from the Spain-Argentina MFN clause.128 However, the 
tribunal was not persuaded and reached the conclusion that the phrase ‘all 
matters subject to this agreement’ and ‘treatment’ are sufficiently wide enough 
to include settlement of disputes.129 In essence, the tribunal was of the view 
that provided the MFN clause does not explicitly exclude dispute settlement 
procedures then undoubtedly dispute settlement falls within the scope of the 
MFN clause. 
Departing from this line of reasoning, the tribunal in Plama v Bulgaria reached a 
different conclusion and rejected the Maffezini approach. According to the 
tribunal, dispute settlement provisions are negotiated and included into specific 
treaties to achieve specific objectives.130 This therefore means that 
incorporating dispute resolution provisions from other treaties negotiated in an 
entirely different context would defeat the intention of contracting states.131 In 
the tribunal’s view the self-adaptation of an MFN clause to dispute settlement 
provisions creates the impression that investors have the option of picking and 
choosing provisions from various BITs.132 The tribunal was of the opinion that ‘‘if 
that were true, a host state which has not specifically agreed thereto can be 
confronted with a large number of permutations of dispute settlement provisions 
from the various BITs which it has concluded’’.133 
In the tribunal’s opinion this could create a chaotic situation that is ‘‘actually 
counterproductive to harmonization and cannot be the presumed intent of 
Contracting Parties’’.134 Unlike the Siemens tribunal, the Plama tribunal 
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favoured a presumption against the incorporation of dispute settlement 
procedures into the MFN clause unless the treaty explicitly includes dispute 
settlement. According to the tribunal, ‘‘an MFN provision in a basic treaty does 
not incorporate by reference dispute settlement provisions in whole or in part 
set forth in another treaty, unless the MFN provision in the basic treaty leaves no 
doubt that the Contracting Parties intended to incorporate them’’.135 Against 
this background, the tribunal concluded that there was no basis on which the 
MFN clause contained in the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT could be interpreted as 
providing consent to submit disputes under other BITs Bulgaria has concluded 
other than the Bulgaria-Cyprus treaty. 
Similarly, the tribunal in Salini v Jordan dealt with the question of whether the 
scope of the MFN clause extends to dispute settlement. The tribunal observed 
that the MFN restriction expressed in Maffezini may in practice be difficult to 
apply thereby contributing more uncertainties to the risk of treaty shopping.136 
According to the tribunal, treaties address this issue differently, for example 
some treaties expressly provide that the MFN obligation extends to provisions of 
dispute settlement while others limit the scope of the MFN clause to substantive 
matters.137 The tribunal noted there was no evidence from either the practice of 
Jordan or the intention of state parties to the effect that the parties intended to 
have the MFN clause apply to dispute settlement.138 On the contrary according 
to the tribunal the intention of the state parties was to ‘‘exclude from ICSID 
jurisdiction contractual disputes between an investor and an entity of a State 
Party in order that such disputes might be settled in accordance with the 
procedures set forth in the investment agreements’’.139 On the basis of the 
evidence submitted, the tribunal concluded that the dispute should be settled 
through the Jordan-Italy BIT and further held that the MFN clause does not apply 
to dispute settlement procedures. 
Lastly, in a more recent case supporting this line of reasoning, Wintershall v 
Argentina, the claimant sought to invoke the MFN clause contained in Article 3 
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of the Argentina-Germany BIT in order to bypass the requirements of article 
10(2) of the BIT. Article 10(2) provided inter alia that international arbitration 
may be resorted to if ‘‘(i) the court has not rendered a final decision within 
eighteen months as from the initiation of the court proceeding or (ii) even upon 
a final decision rendered by a court, if the parties are still under dispute…’’.140 
The tribunal noted that dispute resolution clauses are specific provisions 
reflecting the will of contracting parties and cannot be altered by the MFN 
clause unless such an intention is explicitly stated by the contracting parties.141 
The tribunals further stressed that the requirements of article 10(2) are 
fundamentally jurisdictional and not simply procedural and as such can only be 
dispensed with by ‘‘some legitimate extension of rights by means of the 
operation of the MFN clause’’.142  
Even then, according to the tribunal, the MFN clause must permit the 
interpreter of the treaty to conclude that ‘‘this was the clear and unambiguous 
intention of the Contracting Parties’’.143 The tribunal further rejected the 
assertion that contracting states included the term ‘treatment of investment’ 
with the intention of covering both dispute resolution as well as any other 
treatment accorded to investors.144 In the tribunal’s view such an interpretation 
would be erroneous because the intention of contracting states is unclear and 
cannot easily be adduced from the wording of the MFN clause.145 In sum the 
tribunal concluded that ‘‘it is difficult to say that when the Contracting Parties 
used the word “treatment” in Article 3 they “had in mind” the dispute 
resolution clause in Article 10’’.146 
Comparatively, between the two approaches discussed above, the present 
author concurs with the line of cases that reject the presumption against 
incorporating dispute settlement into the scope of the MFN clause. Moreover, 
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effective treaty interpretation that reasonably takes into account the object and 
purpose of BITs and fundamentally the differences between the two competing 
interests would bear credence to the conclusion that consent to investment 
arbitration should be squarely within the state’s discretionary powers as 
expressed in the treaty language. Practically, this means that unless the MFN 
clause clearly includes dispute settlement, arbitral tribunals should refrain from 
drawing any inference that would interfere with prior consent restrictions 
imposed by contracting parties. Besides, usurping a state‘s consent powers 
through incorporating dispute settlement into the scope of the MFN clause would 
not only be contrary to the intention of contracting states especially where 
consent to dispute settlement is not unequivocally stated but also this type of 
interpretation would be inadmissible under international law.147 Equally 
important, the general framework of BITs suggests that when contracting states 
consent to arbitration such consent is intrinsically limited to the agreement of 
state parties arrived at during the negotiation process of the treaty.  
Evidently, it is during the negotiation process that contracting states agree 
conditions ratione personae, ratione materiae, ratione temporis and ratione 
voluntatis of the treaty.148 In turn these conditions detail the prerequisites for 
‘‘enjoyment of the rights under the treaty, the conditions for the application of 
the treaty depending on the rules of general international law concerning the 
consent of the states’’.149 To this end, Professor Bridget Stern in her vigorously 
dissenting opinion in Impregilo S.p.A v Argentine Republic correctly argues that 
if factors shaping contracting parties previously agreed consent restrictions can 
be waived through invoking the MFN clause then consent restrictions included in 
treaties are essentially meaningless.150 In other words, changing previously 
agreed consent restrictions between contracting states basically makes 
contracting parties dependent on the vagaries of other possible treaties entered 
                                                 
147 Article 31(1) read with article 31(2) of the VCLT provides that ‘A treaty shall be 
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Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Professor Brigitte Stern, para 60. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid para 98. 
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into by the state.151 This according to Professor Stern would be unclear consent 
and tantamount to not including any consent restrictions at all.152 
In light of the foregoing discussion, it is imperative to note that unless the MFN 
clause unambiguously includes dispute settlement, incorporating dispute 
settlement through the operation of the MFN clause would be contrary to the 
intention of contracting parties. Put differently, foreign investors should only be 
permitted to import the MFN clause to acquire more favourable dispute 
settlement provisions of BITs with third states when the circumstances indicate 
that the state parties to the basic treaty envisaged the MFN clause to apply to 
dispute settlement.153 From an equity standpoint and more especially from the 
perspective of African states, including dispute settlement within the scope of 
the MFN clause would unfairly imbalance the relationship between African states 
and foreign investors in particular because during BITs negotiations African 
states are at the receiving end. As seen from the sections of African BITs above, 
African treaties contain broadly worded MFN clauses suggesting that African 
states are perilously predisposed to the danger of disruptive treaty shopping.  
In addition, the wording of African MFN clauses interpreted without purposively 
balancing the interests of African states vis-à-vis the interests of foreign 
investors could potentially result in foreign investors disregarding consent 
restrictions imposed by African states which would inevitably lead to disruptive 
treaty shopping. Given the fact that African states are capital recipients, it is 
reasonable to assume that during the negotiation process of the treaty, the 
dispute settlement and MFN clause were negotiated to favour foreign investors. 
Clearly, adding further technicalities through a catch all MFN clause would 
dispense the minimum consent restrictions African states successfully negotiated 
and included into the dispute settlement clause. Finally, for all practical 
purposes, the MFN clause like other treaty provisions such as expropriation and 
fair and equitable treatment evidence an apparent pattern that African states 
have undertaken expansively worded BITs which have a direct impact on the 
ability of African states to make legitimate policy. 
                                                 
151 Ibid. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Stephen Fietta, ‘Most Favoured Nation Treatment and Dispute Resolution under Bilateral 
Investment Treaties: A Turning Point?’(2005) 8 Int’l Arb.L.Rev 131, 138. 
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5.4 Alternative Forms of Consent in African Treaty 
Practice 
Aside from consent to dispute settlement clauses contained in African BITs, the 
majority of African states have also consented and incorporated dispute 
settlement clauses into their domestic laws and procedures regulating foreign 
investors.154 Typically, the vast majority of African states include in their foreign 
investment protection laws or codes explicit consent to the resolution of foreign 
investment disputes either through the ICSID framework or under UNCITRAL 
arbitration rules. In addition, African states also normally include national courts 
as an alternative forum to settle investment claims. Given this, foreign investors 
have the discretion to choose from any of the three available dispute resolution 
forums; however the majority of African investment laws further make provision 
for national courts to play a vital role when foreign investors and the respondent 
state do not mutually agree the arbitration forum within which the dispute 
should be arbitrated.155  
Generally, African foreign investment protection laws usually include a clause 
similar to article 34 of the Rwanda Investment Code which reads as follows ‘‘in 
case parties to a dispute do not agree on the mode or forum for arbitration, the 
party aggrieved by the possession or acquisition of his or her property, or the 
amount and compensation payable, or in respect of any other matter relating to 
the investment enterprise, may sue to a competent Rwandan court for the 
decision to be rendered’’.156 In addition, some foreign investment legislation of 
African states include a provision offering foreign investors at the time of 
registering the business enterprise the possibility of acquiring special arbitration 
                                                 
154 See for instance Article 32 of the Rwanda Law Relating to Investment and Export 
Promotion and Facilitation (Law No. 26/2005 of 17/12/2005)  [Hereafter Rwanda Investment 
Act]; Article 23(2) of the Tanzania Investment Act (2 No.26, 1997) [Hereafter Tanzania 
Investment Ac]; Article 38 of the Democratic Republic of Congo Investment Code (Law No. 
00/4/2000 of 21 February 2002) [Hereafter Democratic of Congo Investment Act]; Article 29 
of the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act (1994, Act 478) [Hereafter Ghana Investment 
Act]; Article 17 of the Burundi Investment Code (Law No. 1/24, 10 September 2008) 
[Hereafter Burundi Investment Act]; Article 11 of the Republic of Cameroon Investment 
Charter (Law No. 2002/004 of April 19, 2002) [Hereafter Cameroon Investment Act]. 
155 See particularly Article 32 of the Rwanda Investment Act and Article 23 of the Tanzania 
Investment Act. 
156 Article 34 of the Rwanda Investment Act. See also article 29 (3) of the Ghana Investment 
Act which makes special provision for the investor’s choice of arbitration to prevail in case 
parties to the dispute do not reach an amicable resolution on the choice of arbitration. 
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procedures.157 The undertakings included in special arbitration procedures 
acquired by foreign investors as part of incentives for acquisition and 
establishment of business enterprises are contentious especially when the 
certificate of incentives contains unrestricted rights to international arbitration 
beyond the consent restrictions contained in national legislation and other 
international treaties.158  
Similarly, just like in African BITs, foreign investment laws of African states 
place a high premium on other alternative dispute resolution methods that can 
resolve investment disputes amicably through negotiations.159 However, dispute 
resolution clauses contained in African national investment laws are vaguely 
drafted and do not provide any specificities with respect to the waiting period 
required before commencing international arbitration.160 In essence, the 
envisaged negotiations are of little substantive value because foreign investors 
can directly institute arbitration without waiting for the lapse of any cooling off 
period. Also, in some African countries there are substantive difference between 
the procedures for initiating investment claims contained in BITs and procedures 
envisaged in national investment laws. Indeed, sometimes reconciling the 
consent restrictions stipulated in national investment laws and related but 
different consent conditions contained in BITs has resulted in arbitral 
disagreements.161  
The lack of harmonization between national investment laws and BITs has 
sometimes resulted in creative foreign investors taking advantage of such 
weakness so as to benefit from the most favourable treatment which is usually 
at the detriment of African states.162 For example in Biwater, the claimant with 
the intention of benefiting from the most favourable treatment provided for 
under the Tanzania National Investment Act, the United Kingdom-Tanzania BIT 
                                                 
157 Article 33 of Rwanda Investment Act; see also Article 23(2) of the Tanzania Investment Act 
and Article 38 of the Democratic Republic of Congo Investment Act. 
158 See for instance Biwater v Tanzania, para 329-337. 
159 See article 23 (2) of the Tanzania Investment Act; Article 38 of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo Investment Act; Article 29(1) of the Ghana Investment Act;  Article 17 of the Burundi 
Investment Act and Article 32 of the Rwanda Investment Act. 
160 Ibid. 
161 See particularly, Biwater v Tanzania, para 329-337. 
162 See for instance Biwater v Tanzania, para 241-277 and also see Gustav F W Hamester v 
Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24 Award 18 June 2010, para 62-79. 
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as well as the Certificate of Incentive invoked all the three consent to 
arbitration clauses contained therein. Although the respondent successfully 
demonstrated that the consent to arbitration clause under the Tanzania National 
Investment Act and the certificate of incentives did not offer foreign investors 
the right to refer investment disputes directly to ICSID, this illustrates the 
dubious ways through which foreign investors can take advantage of weakness in 
African national investment laws.  
Undoubtedly such differences in the arbitration requirements between BITs and 
national investment laws epitomizes the thinking of an African contracting party 
at the time of concluding the BIT and supports the argument that African states 
indeed undertake BITs expecting increased foreign investment flows. A case in 
point for instance is section 23.2 of the Tanzania Investment Act and article 8(1) 
of the United Kingdom-Tanzania BIT which contains different procedures for 
initiating investment claims. Section 23.2 of the Tanzania Investment Act (TIA) 
provides as follows;  
A dispute between a foreign investor and the Centre or the 
Government  in respect of a business enterprise which is not settled 
through negotiations may be submitted to arbitration in accordance 
with any of the following methods as may be mutually agreed by the 
parties, that is to say-(a) in accordance with arbitration laws of 
Tanzania for investors; (b) in accordance with the rules of procedure 
for arbitration of the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes; (c) within the framework of any bilateral or 
multilateral agreement on investment protection agreed to by the 
Government of the United Republic and the Government of the 
Country the Investor originates (emphasis added). 
In stark contrast to section 23.2 described above, article 8 (1) of the United 
Kingdom-Tanzania BIT reads as follows; 
Each Contracting Party hereby consents to submit to the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (the “Centre”) for 
settlement by conciliation or arbitration under the [ICSID Convention] 
any legal dispute arising between that Contracting Party and a 
national or company of the other Contracting Party concerning an 
investment of the latter in the territory of the former (emphasis 
added). 
The interpretation of these two provisions came under scrutiny in Biwater where 
the respondent argued that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction because section 23.2 
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was not a unilateral standing offer to submit disputes before ICSID tribunals. In 
the respondent’s view an accurate interpretation of section 23.2 required a 
mutually agreed arbitral forum between investors and the government before 
the submission of investment disputes.163 The tribunal concurred with this line of 
reasoning postulating that the natural reading of this section indeed suggested 
that although disputes may be referred to ICSID tribunals this required 
subsequent agreement between the parties.164  
Practically, according to the tribunal section 23.2 was different from the 
provision of article 8(1) of the BIT which contained a unilateral standing offer 
that simply required the investor to provide written consent to conciliation or 
arbitration.165 In essence, according to the tribunal the consent clause in section 
23.2 required the investor not only to consent to the arbitration forum but also 
to mutually agree with the government the chosen arbitration forum.166 Equally, 
important the tribunal noted that unlike article 8, section 23.2 affords the state 
the possibility of concluding specific types of dispute resolution agreements with 
foreign investors without the raise of internal issues such as ultra vires.167 On 
the basis of the facts, the tribunal found that it lacked jurisdiction on claims 
based on the TIA because the claimant and respondent did not mutually agree 
about the arbitration forum before submitting investment claims to the ICSID 
tribunal. Regarding the BIT, the tribunal contended that it had jurisdiction over 
investment claims submitted with respect to alleged violations of the BIT.168  
The differences in consent restrictions between the Tanzania Investment Act and 
the United Kingdom-Tanzania BIT are not peculiar to Tanzania.  Similar 
provisions are included in the Rwanda Investment Code and BITs undertaken by 
Rwanda as well as in the Ghana Investment Code Act and BITs concluded by 
Ghana. For instance, the Rwanda Investment Code despite approvingly 
consenting to arbitration, foreign investors and the government must agree on 
the arbitration forum before instituting arbitral proceedings. This provision 
                                                 
163 Biwater v Tanzania, para 300-301. 
164 Ibid para 329. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Ibid para 330. 
167 Ibid para 331. 
168 Ibid para 351. 
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differs with Rwanda BITs that express consent to arbitration without requiring 
subsequent consent from the government about the arbitration forum. Moreover, 
just like the Tanzania Investment Act, the Rwanda Investment Code also 
mandates the use of domestic courts in the event that there is no consensus 
between the government and foreign investor about the arbitration forum. 
However, it remains doubtful that foreign investors faced with disagreement 
about the arbitration forum would refer the investment disputes to domestic 
courts. More so, recourse to domestic courts seems superfluous considering that 
more favourable treatment consent conditions are provided for in BITs. Finally, 
the requirement of ‘mutually agreed arbitral forum’ is not a uniform standard 
across Africa. Indeed, other African countries such as Congo and Burundi in their 
national investment codes explicitly consent to foreign investors determining the 
arbitration forum without seeking consent from the state parties.169 
5.5 Conclusion 
As previously noted, the treaty practice of modern African treaties to acquiesce 
to investment arbitration demonstrates remarkable evolution in the attitude of 
African states towards rules of international investment law. Obviously in 
principle consent to investment arbitration as embedded within African 
investment treaty practice is a positive step towards creating dependable 
dispute resolution systems through which foreign investment disputes are 
neutrally settled. However, like all legal provisions, the devil is in the details 
and as the foregoing discussion has shown the majority of African consent 
clauses are manifestly problematic. In part this is because the scope of African 
consent clauses is expansive and as a result the wording has the propensity of 
extending not only to breach of substantive treaty standards but also to purely 
contractual undertakings. Evidently, it is doubtful that African states during 
treaty negotiations intended this to be the desired consequence. Although this 
was not the desired consequence, the reality is African consent clauses textually 
interpreted undoubtedly cover not only breach of substantive treaty standards 
but also contractual claims. 
                                                 
169 Article 38 of the Democratic Republic of Congo Investment Act and Article 17 of the 
Burundi Investment Act. 
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Moreover, even in instances where some African BITs contain circumscribed 
consent clauses the breadth of other treaty provisions contained therein such as 
the umbrella clause unambiguously extend the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals 
to both substantive treaty claims and contractual claims. The wording of consent 
clauses aside, MFN clauses contained in majority of African BITs are equally 
expansive and this has the danger of undermining legitimate policy making. 
Moreover, it should further be stressed that the MFN clause of virtually all 
African states do not clearly delimit the scope of the MFN clause which 
inherently makes it possible for foreign investors to bypass previously agreed 
consent restrictions. In light of these considerations, arbitral tribunals should 
take caution not to overtly extend the scope of the MFN clause to cover dispute 
settlement mechanisms especially when the intention of African states is not 
manifestly clear. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
This thesis set out to situate the investment treaty practice of African states and 
examine whether African treaty practice conforms or differs from general 
investment treaty practice. The analysis was inspired by the fact that African 
states have traditionally resisted the internationalisation of foreign investment 
rules but have subsequently concluded BITs containing far-reaching treaty 
provisions. With this in mind, the thesis attempted reviewing the investment 
treaty practice of African states which by and large is missing from general 
discourse on investment law. Through reviewing the treaty practice of African 
states, the thesis also sought to explore the extent to which the emerging 
investment treaty practice interferes or restrains legitimate policy making of 
African states. In so doing, the thesis raises awareness to African specific 
concerns with respect to the international law of foreign investment; the 
controversy entrenched in substantive treaty standards and the suitability of 
treaties concluded by African states. 
The thesis observes that there has been a paradigm shift in the investment 
treaty practice of African states. Specifically, the present treaty practice of 
African states suggests that African states have retreated from previously held 
positions augmenting for state sovereignty to a more peculiar position of 
acquiescence. The current state of African investment treaty practice is all 
surprising when contrasted with the fierce resistance of African states towards 
the internationalisation of foreign investment rules in the last century. 
Moreover, the attitude of African states is astonishing considering that African 
states have historically been active and relevant players in shaping foreign 
investment rules. As demonstrated in the thesis, Africa’s contribution to the 
evolution of international investment law dates back even before colonialism but 
was more evident in the period immediately after colonialism. In essence, the 
thesis shows that historically apart from the colonial era which substituted 
African sovereignty with that of European colonial masters, African states have 
been relevant contributors to the formulation of foreign investment rules. 
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Africa’s contribution is evidently illustrated in the deliberations of the Non-
Aligned Movement, Africa’s role in the creation of specialised institutions such as 
UNCTAD and Africa’s strategic use of her numerical strength to sponsor 
numerous United Nations Resolutions and Declarations. From the historical 
evolution, the thesis concludes that without the active participation of African 
leadership within the NAM, the numerous United Nations Declarations and 
Resolutions of the 60’s and 70’s would not have successfully been adopted in the 
United Nations General Assembly. The overarching importance of Africa’s 
numerical strength and influence in the passage of the numerous declarations 
and resolutions is more evident considering the resistance developed countries 
mounted against these resolutions. The thesis also demonstrated that Africa’s 
support for the rhetoric of favourable foreign investment rules and principles of 
sovereignty did not end at the United Nations General Assembly. As the United 
Nations General Assembly discussed the numerous resolutions, many African 
states imported this rhetoric at the national level leading to the implementation 
of nationalisation and forced confiscation of foreign property. Also, at the 
national level, African states introduced sweeping changes to national 
investment laws that emphasised principles of national ownership. In fact, as 
noted in the thesis throughout decolonised African states, of all existing post-
colonial law, investment laws were the first set of laws to undergo changes. 
Based on the foregoing, one would have expected African states to remain active 
and relevant players. However, this has not been the case and indeed this is 
surprising. Given the present state of African treaty practice, it is unclear 
whether the previously active participation of African states in demanding for a 
new international economic order was out of naivety. However, what is 
remarkably apparent about the present state of African investment law is that 
African states have regressed from two contradictory extremes. Presently, 
African states have not only conformed to general investment treaty practice 
but also retreated to the position of passive observers. The discussion in 
chapters 2-5 clearly shows that African treaty standards are similar to general 
treaty provisions elsewhere. In essence, African BITs do not offer any nuance 
and generally follow existing BITs. Moreover, as the investment regime witnesses 
increased resistance from Latin American countries, the African continent with 
the exception of South Africa has remained relatively silent. Under normal 
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circumstances, given the previous practice of African states, one would have 
expected the African continent to be at the forefront of debates questioning the 
present status quo. 
The analysis in chapters 2-5 demonstrates that there really are not many 
differences between BITs concluded by African states and other existing BITs. 
Similarly, within the African continent majority of BITs concluded by African 
states have more similarities than differences. In essence, although some African 
BITs contain slight variations such differences are substantively insignificant. 
Particularly, the following can be stressed about the treaty standards of African 
BITs reviewed in this thesis; chapter 2 demonstrated that the majority of African 
BITs define the concept ‘investment’ broadly to include every kind of asset. This 
is usually followed with a broad based asset definition containing a non-
exhaustive list of examples of assets African states consider as investments. 
However, it should be stressed that through concluding BITs with a broad based 
asset definition, African states have basically extended treaty protection to 
virtually all assets which could include insignificant assets that have little impact 
on the economic development of the respective African state. 
Similarly, although there variations and wording differences in expropriation 
clauses contained in African BITs such differences are inconsequential. As the 
review in chapter 3 illustrated, some African countries have expropriation 
provisions that do not explicitly capture indirect expropriation but contain 
phrases such as measures tantamount to expropriation which are functionally 
equivalent to indirect expropriation. Perhaps more striking is the fact that 
majority of African expropriation clauses are generic and do not delimit the 
contours of indirect expropriation. The resulting consequences for African states 
is that predominantly arbitral tribunals apply the sole effect test which has the 
propensity to constrain African countries from pursuing regulatory measures 
even in the public interest.1 Also, since African BITs do not precisely articulate 
the meaning of expropriation, the discretion to decide whether measures 
amount to indirect expropriation rests entirely within the discretion of arbitral 
tribunals. As chapter 3 demonstrated, this ambiguity has significant 
consequences for African states because some tribunals disregard the intention 
                                                 
1 See chapter 3 for discussion on the different arbitral approaches. 
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and purpose of government measures and instead place a premium on the effect 
of the measure towards the investors’ property rights. 
Aside from the expropriation clause, majority of African countries have 
concluded BITs offering foreign investors the right to fair and equitable 
treatment. However, as discussed in chapter 4, the majority of African BITs do 
not define the meaning of fair and equitable treatment. With the exception of 
the United States-Rwanda BIT, the obligation of fair and equitable treatment in 
the majority of African BITs is overly broad and accords arbitral tribunals the 
discretion to determine the scope and substantive content of the standard. 
Lastly, African states have concluded BITs with problematic dispute settlement 
clauses. As the discussion in chapter 5 showed, the wording of the consent to 
arbitration clause contained in majority of African BITs has the propensity of 
extending not only to breach of substantive treaty standards but also to purely 
contractual undertakings. Similarly, the scope of the MFN clause encapsulated in 
majority of African BITs is expansive and vaguely worded. As chapter 5 
illustrated, the failure of African states to unambiguously limit the scope of the 
MFN clause has the danger of empowering foreign investors to bypass previously 
agreed consent restrictions. 
The discussion in chapters 2-5 showed that when interpreting treaty standards 
arbitral tribunals have in some instances taken contradictory and expansive 
approaches. Given the array of inconsistent decisions and the vagueness of 
African treaty standards, it is imperative that African states should reconsider 
changing from the present attitude of passive observers to more relevant and 
active players. African states need to reassert themselves and join the group of 
countries pushing for a more balanced investment regime. However, it should be 
stressed that reasserting does not mean a return to the ideological differences of 
the last century. Put succinctly, the active participation of African states 
through a return to the ideological differences of the 60’s and 70’s would be 
naïve and counterproductive. On the basis of the existing investment regime, 
African states can pursue a number of policy options which include, withdrawing 
from BITs, renegotiate existing BITs, not simply consent to foreign model drafts, 
prepare more favourable model drafts and finally reinvigorate support for a 
multilateral investment treaty framework. However, for African states to 
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successfully pursue any of these practical policy options this would require 
African states to actively participate in the evolving investment treaty practice. 
Having said that, although withdrawing from BITs and renegotiating existing BITs 
are attractive policy options this is not without high risks. Essentially, this can 
create the perception that African states are renouncing BIT treaty 
commitments which in turn may discourage reluctant foreign investors from 
investing in African states. Given the high risks, the most plausible option would 
be for African states to prepare their own model text which in turn would enable 
African states avoid the practice of simply consenting to foreign model drafts. In 
essence, through this approach African states would be using legal tools to 
advance more balanced treaty provisions that do not expansively constrain the 
ability of African states to implement regulatory measures. There are many 
model texts African states can borrow from when drafting or negotiating future 
treaty provisions that balance the interests of foreign investors and government 
regulatory competence. With respect to existing models, the United States-
Rwanda BIT is an ideal starting point because it addresses many of the 
ambiguities existing in majority of African BITs. 
Specifically, an African model text addressing the four most contentious 
provisions reviewed in this thesis should articulate unambiguous treaty provisions 
to minimize the discretion of arbitral tribunals. This would in essence ensure 
that arbitral tribunals do not second guess the intention of African states when 
interpreting treaty provisions. For instance, as the discussion in chapter 2 
demonstrated, majority of African BITs broadly define the concept ‘investment’ 
and do not precisely indicate what constitutes an investment. To this end, 
arbitral tribunals have unfettered discretion to determine whether assets qualify 
for treaty protection. For purposes of clarity and to avoid protecting worthless 
investments, a model African BIT should explicitly indicate unambiguous 
characteristics that assets must meet before such assets qualify for treaty 
protection.  
In particular, a model African BIT should specify that before assets qualify for 
treaty protection such assets must contribute to economic development, the 
investor must make commitment of capital or other resources, the investor must 
have an expectation of gaining or profiting from invested assets, the investor 
  
 270 
must demonstrate evidence of assumption of risk.2 For purposes of clarity, the 
African model BIT should explicitly stipulate that assets falling below this 
threshold will not qualify for treaty protection. Similarly, the African model BIT 
should draw a distinction between direct and indirect expropriation. Also, since 
African states rarely pursue direct expropriation, the model text should attempt 
to demystify the meaning of indirect expropriation. 
For purposes of regulatory autonomy, the African model BIT should stress that 
legally implemented regulatory measures aimed at serving legitimate public 
objectives such the environment, public health, safety do not constitute indirect 
expropriation.3 Even more, for purposes of guiding the discretion of arbitral 
tribunals, the model text should provide approaches arbitral tribunals can use 
when examining allegations of indirect expropriation. To this end, the African 
model text should follow the wording of Annex B of Article 4 (a) of the United 
States-Rwanda BIT. It reads as follows; 
The determination of whether an action or series of actions by a 
Party, in a specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation 
requires a case-by case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among 
other factors: (i) the economic impact of the government action, 
although the fact that an action or series of actions by a Party has an 
adverse effect on the economic value of an investment, standing 
alone, does not establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred; 
(ii) the extent to which the government action interferes with 
distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations; and (iii) the 
character of the government action. 
By including the above provisions the African model text would ensure that not 
all government regulatory measures amount to indirect expropriation. Also, the 
suggested provisions require arbitral tribunals to consider the character of 
government measures and more importantly economic considerations do not 
outweigh the purpose of government measures. Obviously, arbitral tribunals 
must make a value judgment but such an analysis cannot entirely be influenced 
by economic considerations but rather a thorough consideration of the 
government regulatory measures vis-à-vis the extent to which such measures 
                                                 
2 The following characteristics are listed in the United States-Rwanda BIT and would be ideal 
for an African model text. The developmental characteristic is included in the Denmark-
Ghana BIT.  
3 The expropriation clause in the United States-Rwanda BIT is a balanced clause and ideal for 
an African model BIT. 
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interfere with duly acquired property rights. Similarly, as noted in chapter 4, the 
standard of fair and equitable treatment in majority of African BITs is 
autonomous and not linked to the minimum standard. Given the expansive 
wording of the standard, arbitral tribunals have the discretion to interpret the 
meaning of fair and equitable treatment broadly. Obviously, although the 
content of the minimum standard remains controversial but for the purposes of 
avoiding an overly expansive interpretation of fair and equitable treatment, the 
model African text should stipulate that fair and equitable treatment is no more 
than the minimum standard.  
This would minimise the possibility of arbitral tribunals second guessing the 
intention of African states. For further clarity and to guide arbitral tribunals, the 
model African text should stipulate that fair and equitable treatment is 
functionally equivalent to the minimum standard and not an independent treaty 
standard. The benefit of this approach ensures that arbitral tribunals do not 
impose an idiosyncratic standard of what is fair or equitable without reference 
to established sources of law.4 Even more, as the NAFTA Free Trade Commission 
explained the minimum standard simply refers to a standard under customary 
international law and not to standards established by other treaties.5 According 
to the tribunal in Mondev International v United States of America, the phase 
‘‘minimum standard of treatment has historically been understood as reference 
to a minimum standard under customary international law, whatever 
controversies there may have been over the content of that standard’’.6 
However, it should be stressed that, there risks in equating fair and equitable 
treatment to the minimum standard because the minimum standard has an 
evolving character and is not tied to the Neer principles.7 In essence, this means 
that arbitral tribunals may broadly construe the minimum standard to cover 
circumstance equivalent to fair and equitable treatment.   
In addition, the model text should stress that African states understand 
customary international law to result from general and consistent state 
                                                 
4 Mondev International Limited v United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/99/2, 
October, 11 2000, pata 119. 
5 Ibid para 121. 
6 Ibid para 121. 
7 Ibid para 114.  
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practice.8 The benefit of including such explicit reference to the minimum 
standards simply means that arbitral tribunals would have to justify any 
principle that has not yet reached the threshold of customary international law. 
Also, the model African text should stipulate that based on the minimum 
standard, fair and equitable treatment simply means ‘‘the obligation not to deny 
justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in 
accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the principal legal 
systems of the world’’.9  
Lastly, the African model text should explicitly stipulate that the MFN clause 
does not extend to dispute settlement. As the discussion in chapter 5 illustrated, 
the MFN clause contained in virtually all African BITs does not clearly delimit the 
scope of the MFN clause. In majority of African BITs, the MFN clause is generic in 
nature and commonly makes reference to ‘treatment’ without providing further 
clarification about whether ‘treatment’ extends to dispute settlement. As a 
result of this ambiguity, arbitral tribunals have the discretion to incorporate 
dispute settlement within the scope of the MFN clause. Given the array of 
inconsistent decisions, the African model text should unambiguously stipulate 
that dispute settlement does not fall within the scope of the MFN clause.10 The 
wording of such a clause could read as follows; ‘‘the interpretation and 
applicability of favourable treatment does not extend to dispute settlement 
provisions included in third part treaties’’.11 The inclusion of such unambiguous 
limitation in the African model will ensure that arbitral tribunals do not second 
guess the intention of contracting states following the African model BIT.  
Alternatively, African states should galvanise support for a multilateral 
investment treaty framework. The pursuit of changes to the present investment 
regime through galvanising support for a multilateral investment treaty 
framework would undoubtedly be ambitious but possible especially if such a 
model multilateral treaty framework is initiated and supported by the broad 
spectrum of developing countries. In the view of the present author, support for 
an African initiated multilateral treaty framework would not be surprising given 
                                                 
8 See Annex A of the United States-Rwanda BIT for the full wording of this provision. 
9 See Article 5 of the United States-Rwanda BIT for full wording. 
10 For detailed discussion, see Chapter 5. 
11 Clause suggested by present author.  
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that the once initiators of overly expansive treaty standards have started 
experiencing constraints to legitimate policy making even when such government 
regulatory measures serve a public purpose. Particularly, if one goes by the 
experience of NAFTA arbitral jurisprudence, it is interesting that the usual 
public policy arguments normally advanced by developing countries against 
expansive treaty standards are now surprisingly asserted by developed countries. 
The opposition to treaty standards is understandable considering that NAFTA 
treaty provisions just like the patchwork of existing BITs have been expansively 
interpreted and in some NAFTA tribunals the interpretation has been overly in 
the direction of foreign investors.12 Furthermore, foreign investors have 
demonstrated that they will challenge virtually any government action that 
interferes with duly acquired property rights.13  
The concerns of regulatory chill have never been more obvious and as numerous 
studies have shown, there is a real danger that NAFTA and the patchwork of BITs 
frustrate the ability of governments to exercise regulatory powers even when 
such measures serve a legitimate public purpose such as protecting health and 
the environment, preserving natural resources and delivery of government 
services.14 It seems history is repeating itself though from different perspectives 
and different avenues. In the past, the investment regime was shaped by divisive 
ideological differences between developed and developing countries. Lately, the 
area is witnessing gradual but steady resistance of treaty standards not only 
from developing countries but also some developed states. The scaling down of 
overly expansive treaty provisions is properly captured in latest model texts 
initiated by some developed countries such as the United States, Norway and 
Canada.15  
                                                 
12 Gus Van Harten, ‘Reforming the NAFTA Investment Regime’ in Kevin P Gallagher, Enrique 
Dussel Peters, and Timothy A Wise (eds), The Future of North American Trade Policy: Lessons 
from NAFTA (Pardee Center Task Force Report, Boston University, November 2009) 43. 
13 Ibid 44. 
14 Ibid 45. 
15 The 2004 Canada Model BIT does not only include a general exception clause but also 
specifically stresses that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic 
health, safety or environmental measures. For detailed wording see Article 10 and Article 11 
of the 2004 Canada Model BIT <http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/2004-fipa-model-en.pdf>accessed 3 June 2012. 
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The scaling down of overly expansive treaty standards was clearly unimaginable 
in the last century. For example, the 2012 United States Model BIT, 2004 Canada 
Model BIT and the 2007 Norway draft Model BIT offer foreign investors sufficient 
treaty protection but also include safeguards and articulate clearer treaty 
standards that preserve regulatory autonomy.16 The gradual change in the 
attitude of developed countries is obviously influenced by the array of 
inconsistent arbitral decisions but more importantly developed countries through 
arbitral practice may have realised the danger of expansive treaty standards 
over legitimate policy making. Given the evolving changes in investment treaty 
practice, it is imperative for African states to change from the present practice 
of passive observers and resist the attitude of simply consenting to foreign 
model texts. More broadly, whether African states pursue changes to the present 
system either through model texts or galvanise support for a multilateral 
investment treaty framework, the most immediate and pressing action is for 
African states to shift from the position of mere observers to active and relevant 
participants. To conclude the thesis on a more positive note, given the historical 
contribution of African states in the formulation of foreign investment rules, it is 
still within the capacity of African states to influence the adoption of more 
favourable treaty standards.  
                                                 
16 See <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf>accessed 3 June 2012. 
See also the 2007 Norway Draft Model BIT <http://www.asil.org/ilib080421.cfm>accessed 3 
June 2012. 
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